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Welfare State Adaptation 
 
Privatisation of Health Care in Denmark, England and Sweden 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This dissertation deals with the following question: In the past decades some 
of the countries most dedicated to the universal public welfare state have privatised many 
of their welfare service provisions. Why is this so? The dissertation takes a close look at 
privatisation policies in health care in Denmark, Sweden and England in order to figure out 
how and why the private health care sector has expanded rapidly in recent years. Health 
care services in Denmark, Sweden and England provide good examples of welfare state 
service privatisation because these three countries have spent decades building up universal 
public health care systems that offer free and equal access to all citizens – and these 
programmes are very popular.  
 In this dissertation I find that the most common explanations for welfare 
state reform fail to explain these changes: Privatisation policies are not the result of partisan 
politics, instead they are supported by Social Democratic / Labour parties and in some 
cases the unions as well. Privatisation is not the result of pressures for fiscal retrenchment; 
in fact, public health care funding has increased in all three countries over the past decade. 
Neither is privatisation the straight forward result of new right wing ideas. Certainly, new 
ideas play a role in this change, but it is difficult to sustain the argument that ideas alone 
have been the cause of privatisation in these three health care systems. Finally, it has been 
debated whether privatisation is the result of pressure from EU legislation. This 
explanation does not hold either for the basic reason of timing. The policies leading to 
privatisation in Denmark, England and Sweden were all implemented before the European 
debate over health care services started.  
 Instead, I suggest that privatisation in health care in Denmark, Sweden and 
England can best be understood as the product of policy makers puzzling over important 
policy problems (Heclo, 1972). I call this an adaptive process. In this analysis I show that 
privatisation is the result of several interconnected attempts to adapt health care systems to 
a changing context. By taking a long historical view of the changes in health care systems, it 
becomes evident that the changes towards privatisation do not occur overnight or as a 
result of a ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Rather, the increasing privatisation in health care is the 
accumulated effect of several small step policy changes, which, over time, result in rising 
levels of privatisation. 
 Some scholars have suggested that neo-liberal policies, such as privatisation 
of service provision, will ultimately lead to the end of the welfare state. In this study, I 
come to a different conclusion. Rather than undermine the welfare state, privatisation in 
health care may help the welfare state survive. Privatisation can be seen as a way of 
adapting welfare state services to a changing political context.   
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Preface 
 
Change in the welfare state 
I started the research for this thesis in 2006 because I was interested in the 
rising privatisation in welfare states across Europe. I was puzzled by the fact that more and 
more welfare services were being privatised when, at least in my perception (being a Dane), 
the universal public welfare states had shown superior results in terms of equity in 
outcomes, at the same time as they had demonstrated competitive strength - a combination 
which many observers had claimed was impossible. My first hunch was that privatisation 
was the result of right-wing party politics; however, I soon realised that this was not the 
case. Across the political spectrum, parties were adopting and testing ideas of competition 
among welfare service providers, private provision, and choice-policies, which offer choice 
to citizens instead of politicians making centralised choices on behalf of citizens. These 
changes were not confined to specific ‘liberal’ welfare systems, such as New Zealand or 
Britain, even in the welfare state heartland of Scandinavia, the same types of policies were 
being tried out in areas such as education, long-term care and health care. And 
furthermore, privatisation of these services only rarely involved retrenchment or cut-backs 
in public expenditure. In fact, contrary to a common expectation, privatisation often means 
higher cost for the public sector. These changes therefore seemed to be processes of 
liberalisation without retrenchment.  
As a consequence of these insights, I had to look deeper at the policy 
processes, which drive privatisation, for an explanation. The closer I studied these trends 
the more I came to realise that the context in which these welfare states operate change 
remarkably over time. This changing context consists not only of elites’ new ideas about 
how to structure welfare state services, but also of citizens who over time change their 
ideas and preferences towards the welfare state and towards political parties. At the same 
the public universal welfare state model has an inherent set of problems, which policy 
makers become aware of and are looking for solutions for. This insight led me to think that 
changes in the welfare state are the result of several processes, which take place 
simultaneously and are intertwined. Essentially, I realised that the policy solutions, which 
drive privatisation in health care can be viewed as adaptations to a changing context of the 
welfare state. 
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The initial puzzle of ‘why privatisation’ could have been answered with a 
narrow look at the crucial policy-decisions in each country. Such an approach, however, 
would have been blind to a central point in the study: while policy decisions are important, 
the outcomes are the result of several processes accumulating over time. Therefore the 
study takes a long historical view on the question of privatisation. In each of the case-
studies I build a historical narrative of how and why policies evolved in health care and 
how these led to increasing privatisation.  
 This thesis has been written in Italy and many people have asked me why 
Italy was not one of the case-studies. It could have been, but there are very particular 
reasons (one of them being organised crime1), why some parts of the Italian health care 
system is private. But there are also similar elements, which could have justified including 
Italy in the study. The Italian public health care system is free for all and offers free access, 
and in some rankings rates quite high (WHO, 2000); it is also more expensive than the 
health care systems found in Denmark, Sweden and England. I am not an expert on the 
Italian health care system, but the insight I have gained into the Italian health care system 
over the years as a user of it has contributed to my thinking about privatisation. As the case 
studies show, Denmark, Sweden and England have each fought hard to bring down waiting 
lists lengths and to make the system responsive to users/citizens, rather than organised to 
the benefit of the system and its employees (which also used to be the case in Denmark 
and Sweden). As a user of the Italian system, it is unavoidable to notice the low 
responsiveness and long wait times the system offers. I have spent a considerable number 
of hours in the waiting room simply to get an appointment with a doctor for a children’s 
vaccination, and when you do show up one month later the doctor is not there, is two 
hours late or has run out of the vaccine and the appointment needs to be rescheduled. 
When discussing these issues with Italians, the most common suggestion is: “why don’t 
you go private and pay yourself – it is much more convenient”. Quite a large number of 
Italians as a consequence do use the private health care system because they find the public 
system too problematic and too slow. Paradoxically, a part of the explanation of why 
                                                 
1
 In the exploratory stage of the research I realised that Sicily is the Italian region with the highest level of 
private provision in health care. I have asked several Italian scholars why this is so and they have all 
offered a version of the following explanation: Italian regions are in charge of health care and each region 
is free to decide how large a part of services is put on tender. The Sicilian Mafia is deeply involved in 
regional politics and has put pressure on the region to tender a large part of health care services. In turn, it 
seems well-known that Mafia-related companies run many of the public services put out to tender. The 
connection between privatisation and corruption is well-known in the literature (Bjorvatn & Søreide, 
2005; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum, 1997).   
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privatisation takes place in Denmark, Sweden and England is to avoid that mechanism. In 
these countries, a range of services are privatised in order to avoid ‘real’ privatisation and in 
order to make the public sector providers more responsive and deliver services which 
citizens find adequate. The empirical chapters demonstrate how this, somewhat counter-
intuitive, process takes place.  
 
 A large number of people have helped me on the way through this doctoral 
dissertation. At the EUI my supervisor Sven Steinmo has been an immense help in 
introducing me into the academic world and to academic thinking. He has offered 
invaluable support in reformulating and narrowing the research and has constantly pushed 
me to sharpen arguments and to think about how readers perceive arguments and 
narratives. Further, he has a crucial quality as a supervisor: Sven has the ability to criticise 
strongly, but do it in such a way that I leave the talk very motivated to go on. I also owe a 
great deal to my fellow students at the EUI: Lasse Lindekilde, Johan Davidsson, Morten 
Poulsen, Jane Gingrich, Michael Kuur Sørensen and Nicola Pensiero who have discussed 
several issues of academic thinking and welfare state policy over the years. 
 Outside the EUI, I owe special thanks to the 75+ interview participants that 
spent time answering my sometimes naïve questions about the welfare state and changes in 
health care systems. The dissertation could not have been completed without so many 
people having showed interest and willingness to talk to me. 
 Finally, my friends and family need special thanks. They have made the 
experience of writing a PhD in Florence a wonderful and busy experience. To mention a 
few: Lasse, Lotte, Morten, Adda, Lone, Ole, Antoine, Stephanie, Bjørn, Christiano, Matteo, 
Michael, Francesco, Francesca, Simone, Sarah, Nicola, Mi Ah, Takeshi and all the others. 
We came to Florence with a young child – and leave with three. It has been a joy to see 
them grow and play with the other children both at the EUI and outside of it. Without the 
love, support and incredible stamina of my fantastic wife, Helene, the stay in Italy would 
not have been the same. I owe Helene much for making me aware that while PhD research 
may be interesting it must come to an end, because there is only one thing in life worth 
working on forever, and it is not a PhD-thesis. This dissertation is dedicated to Helene, 
Lasse, Mads & Andreas.      
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Privatisation in Public Health Care Systems 
 
In the past decades there has been increasingly heated debate about 
privatisation and the role of the private and public sector in many countries. This debate 
has also taken place in countries with a universal public health care system, such as the 
Nordic countries and England. The image of health care in these countries is often that 
there is little private health care and a very low amount of private finance. However, the 
past decades have seen a rise in privatisation in health care in these countries. As a result 
the private health care sector has experienced large growth and is expanding rapidly: In 
Denmark, for example, the number of private hospitals rose from virtually none in 2000 to 
178 in 2008. Alongside of that rise, the number of citizens covered by private health care 
insurance rose from app. 40.000 to 850.000 in the same time-span. In England the number 
of private hospitals rose from 225 in 2000 to 335 in 2008. In Sweden, where privatisation 
has mainly taken place in primary care, virtually all health-centres were public in the early 
1990s, while some counties now have around 50% of primary care delivered from private 
providers. By 2008, 380.000 Swedes hold private health insurance, which is almost a 
quadrupling of the number from 2000. 
Health care offers an interesting case for studying privatisation. First, health 
care forms a core element of welfare states. Second, public health care services are very 
popular and privatisation often makes citizens wary about such reforms. When we take a 
closer look at different countries, it becomes clear that different countries follow different 
roads to privatisation. The puzzle of this study is: why and how are universal health care systems 
turning towards privatisation? 
 
In this study I will look closely at privatisation policies in three countries 
which historically have shown strong support to universal public health care systems: 
Denmark, England2 and Sweden. When the large national health care systems were created 
                                                 
2
 In the discussion of privatisation in the UK, I focus on changes in the English health care system, 
because since 1999 Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have had separate devolved assemblies with 
responsibility for health care. Although many of the reforms studied were introduced in the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom, I will confine the analysis to reforms occurring in England. 
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in these countries in the post-war period, the aim was to secure free and equal access to all 
citizens in order to improve the general health of the population. One of the central 
policies to meet these goals was large public health care systems funded through general 
taxation. The logic behind this model was to crowd out the private health sector.3  
Given this history, the move to privatisation is paradoxical. The construction 
of large public health care systems occurred historically because of the perceived or real 
failures of private markets to deliver on the social aims and goals of policy makers. 
Economists argued that the presence of externalities and market imperfections in several 
social sectors (such as health care and education) made competition far from perfect and 
suggested that state intervention in funding and production of these services was necessary 
(Barr, 1998). The sustained turn to privatisation further seems paradoxical considering the 
mixed results of the early experiences with markets in social sectors, including health care 
(Bartlett, et al., 1998; J. Le Grand, 1998; Webster, 2002a). Looking at one of the world’s 
most privatised health care systems, the American, it also seems ironical that the current 
American health care debate is about how to make the system more public. When analysts 
and policy makers in Europe look to the American health care system they find that it is 
both expensive and unfair (since it leaves around 45 million American citizens without 
health insurance).  
Politically, the appeal of privatisation is not obvious either. Privatisation is 
not a citizens’ demand with respect to social services or to health care. Indeed, the 
privatisation processes are mostly driven by elites, as the empirical chapters will 
demonstrate. Moreover, since the universal health care services in Denmark, England and 
Sweden are very popular, privatisation is often met with scepticism among a large part of 
the electorate.  
 
In this thesis I will argue that the evolution of a more demanding and volatile 
electorate, combined with altered fiscal conditions and technological advancement, and the 
intrinsic problems in the traditional welfare state model have changed the context around 
                                                 
3
 One of the driving ideas behind the British NHS was to get rid of a complicated web of private, public 
and community health care provision and funding, which some people had access to and others did not. 
The state would take over all funding and provision to secure the individual and benefit the whole society, 
as stated, for example by Nye Bevan in 1948: “Society becomes more wholesome, more serene, 
spiritually healthier, if it knows its citizens have at the back  of their consciousness the knowledge that not 
only themselves, but all of their fellows, have access, when ill, to the best  that medical skills can 
provide.” (cf. Øvretveit, 2003)   
 15 
welfare state issues such as health care. These changes make privatisation policies appealing 
across the political spectrum, because privatisation responds to some of those new 
pressures, while still offering free and equal access to all citizens in need. In other words, 
privatisation policies are attempts to adapt the welfare state model to a changing context. 
Taking that argument one step further, privatisation policies can be viewed as an attempt to 
help the welfare state model survive (this argument is elaborated in section 1.6 of this 
chapter). 
 
The study aims to contribute to the scholarly debate in two important ways. 
On the one hand, the thesis presents an empirical assessment of the politics of privatisation 
in health care in the past two decades. Through careful studies of these policy-processes in 
Denmark, Sweden and England I will demonstrate 1) what drives privatisation policies and 
2) which new problems arise out of those policies.  
Although the analysis is confined to health care policy, the argument 
developed has implications for the welfare state in a broader sense and why it changes. A 
long-standing question in the welfare state debate is whether and how the welfare state can 
survive. It has been deemed to be in crisis several times and most recently scholars have 
argued that neo-liberalism and neo-liberal policies are threatening its survival. Through this 
study I will also engage in this debate and suggest that adaptations of the model may be 
important in helping it survive.   
 
I approach the politics of privatisation in health care from two angles, 
pursuing both a cross-national and a longitudinal dimension. First, the cross-national 
component compares privatisation policies in Denmark, Sweden and England. This part of 
the study asks: Why did different countries, all devoted to public health care provision, 
pursue the road towards privatisation? The comparative analysis of public health care 
policy shows these countries did so for similar reasons: to solve problems inherent in the 
public sector model, which over time had become increasingly political salient.  
Second, the longitudinal dimension of the study tracks the development of 
privatisation in health care systems in Denmark, England and Sweden from the birth of the 
national health care systems up to the present. The analysis shows that the three countries 
pursued privatisation in different ways and have had different trajectories of privatisation in 
health care. This aspect of the study addresses the question of how institutional change can 
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be understood and speaks directly to one of the theoretical challenges found in 
contemporary institutional theory of the political world: how do institutions change? The 
answer suggested is that change has been slow and incremental but nevertheless 
transformative (Thelen, 2004). Policy elites repeatedly attempt to solve important policy 
problems and over time the accumulated effects of these efforts result in institutional 
change. The study of privatisation trends in health care can offer a window onto questions 
of institutional and societal change and illustrate how policies, including their intended and 
unintended effects, lead to new policies, how the interactions between actors and their 
context create outcomes that in effect constitute institutional change.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section 
discusses different explanations of why privatisation is taking place in health care. This 
section will review the most common political science approaches to the study of welfare 
state reform. I will suggest that the most fruitful approach for studying policy-processes of 
privatisation is found in the literature on public policy, in particular the framework 
developed by John Kingdon (1995). Following that, section 1.4 will look closer at the 
debate over privatisation of public services, will qualify the notion of privatisation, the 
dependent variable of this study, and suggest how it may be conceptualised. Section 1.5 
briefly presents the case studies, section 1.6 spells out the argument of the thesis, while 
section 1.7 lays out and discusses the methodology of the study.  
 
1.1 Why privatisation in health care? Alternative explanations. 
This section will review and discuss alternative explanations of why 
privatisation in health care may occur. It is not a comprehensive review; rather I will 
discuss the most obvious suggestions found in the literature. These include the power-
resource explanation, the retrenchment explanation, the ideas-explanation and the Europe-
explanation. While all of these propositions hold valuable points, at the end, however, I 
find that they do not offer convincing explanations of the outcome of privatisation. 
Instead, I turn to the literature on public policy and agenda-setting, which offer a dynamic 
set of tools adequate for an analysis of policy change and at the same time incorporate 
several of the elements suggested in these broader political science theories.  
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The Power-Resource theory has been one of the most influential theories in 
the welfare state literature in the past decades. The core idea of the theory is that it matters 
a great deal for welfare state development who holds the power and the resources. The theory 
explains variations between western welfare states as a result of the varying power of the 
social democratic parties and labour movements (Gösta Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 
1981; Korpi & Palme, 2003). It claims that the relatively small role played by private 
enterprise and markets in welfare services, for example in the Nordic countries, can be 
explained by the political dominance of the social democratic parties and the strong unions, 
who support the public welfare state. Consequently, we would expect that privatisation 
would be the result of either the existence of right wing governments in power and/or the 
weakening of unions. If we take a broad look at governing parties in the three countries 
(table 1.1) we see that Sweden has been dominated by  
 
Table 1.1: Which party held government power? Left and Right wing parties in 
Government in Denmark, Sweden and Britain.  
Number of years in government (% of the period). 
 
1975-2009 
Left wing parties (social democratic 
party/Labour) 
Right wing parties 
 
Denmark  16 (46%) 19 (54%) 
Sweden 23 (66%) 12 (34%) 
Britain 17 (49%) 18 (51%) 
   
   
1990-2009   
Denmark 9 (45%) 11 (55%) 
Sweden 14 (70%) 6 (30%) 
Britain 12 (60%) 8 (40%) 
 
Source: Calculated by author on the basis of data from www.ft.dk (Danish parliament), www.riksdagen.se 
(Swedish parliament) and www.number10.gov.uk (prime ministers office in Britain) 
 
 
 
Social Democratic governments, while in Britain and Denmark, left wing and right wing 
parties have, more or less, split the period of government between the two sides.  When we 
look closer at the cases, however, a more complex picture reveals itself. In the Danish case, 
most privatisation took place between 2001-2009 under a right wing government, and thus 
the power resource explanation would have some leverage. But it is noticeable that these 
reforms have been to a large extent supported by the Social Democratic party. On the 
contrary, in Sweden, the Social Democrats have been in power in the past decades, despite 
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a short period from 1991-1994 and from 2006 until today. While the right wing 
government did introduce market-oriented reforms, which involved private actors in health 
care between 1991-1994, the Social Democrats did not roll back these reforms, when they 
returned to power. Further, as shown by Svensson, several policies of 
marketisation/privatisation were introduced by the Social Democrats between 1980-2000 
in education, health care and long-term care (Svensson, 2001). The English case may be the 
one, which, at closer look, defies the power-resource explanation the most. After 18 years 
of right wing government (1979-1997), the Labour Party took power in 1997 and in the 
subsequent decade would, to the surprise of many, introduce policies of privatisation to the 
National health care service more far-reaching than Margaret Thatcher had ever thought 
possible. 
Considering the strength of Unions it is true that across these three countries 
unions have been losing political influence as they lose members and as unions’ bonds with 
the social democratic parties is loosened (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2002; Sano & Williamson, 
2008). However, the English case is the one which fits best with the power resource theory 
in the sense that English unions firmly oppose privatisation policies4. Both the British 
Medical Union and the other large union, Unison, which organises most of the NHS 
employees, are very critical towards the privatisation policies enacted by New Labour in the 
health care arena. While English unions may be important, they have never played the 
essential role in policy making, which unions do in both Sweden and Denmark. What may 
surprise some is that in these two countries unions have not been fierce opponents of 
privatisation. In Denmark, the largest union, LO, does oppose private health insurance, but 
broadly speaking Danish unions are in a dilemma with regard to private health care. Several 
unions have been met with demands from members for private health insurance and some 
of the largest unions have considered including it in the collective agreements. On the 
overall this means that Danish unions do not collectively mobilise against privatisation, nor 
                                                 
4
 In the power resource theory approach the most common assumption is that Unions have preferences 
towards reducing inequality between classes in society and further the power ressource approach suggests 
that union power in Scandinavia explain why we find a particular type of generous welfare state, with 
great or universal coverage (Kangas, 1991; O'Connor & Olsen, 1998) and several policy programmes 
which mitigate numerous forms of inequality (Erikson & Åberg, 1987). Since privatisation is most often 
criticised for being a policy which inherently will increase inequality and may eventually break the 
principle of universality, a reasonable assumption here is that Unions would oppose privatisation. 
Looking more specifically at the Medical Unions, these professional organisations have for decades 
advocated for the medical advantages of an integrated health care system, whereas privatisation (and even 
only contracting out of services) is likely to imply a more disintegrated health care system. For this reason 
we could also expect unions to oppose privatisation. 
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do they promote it collectively. Also somewhat surprising, the Danish Medical Association 
is sceptical towards private health insurance, but supports policies in favour of patient 
choice and the rise of private hospitals to compete with the public sector providers, despite 
fears of a more disintegrated health care system. On the other hand, the Danish Nurses’ 
Organisation opposes private providers in secondary care, fearing that it will drain the 
public hospitals. In Sweden (the country sometimes called the most social democratic 
country in the world), unions are strong supporters of privatisation. Both the Swedish 
Doctors Association, the Nurses Association and the unions organising public (and private) 
health care workers (e.g. Kommunal) support the introduction of private providers, market 
mechanisms and choice policies quite wholeheartedly. On this background, one might 
argue that the Power Ressource Theory fits well since Unions are undecided or pro-reform 
and strong in Sweden and Denmark, where reform succeeds and anti-reform, but weak in 
England, where reform also succeeds. This however, does not qualify for a succesfull 
explanation, because what the Power Resources Theory suggests is that this Union power 
is translated into political power through a political party (O'Connor & Olsen, 1998). 
Therefore the Power resource approach suggests that party politics matters. As shown in 
table 1.1 and as will be clear in the empirical chapters, party politics has mattered relatively 
little with regards to the question of privatisation in health care.   
To sum up, the expectation that social democratic governments and unions 
will support public service provision and oppose privatisation does not seem to hold in the 
cases of Denmark, Sweden and England. And furthermore, the expectation that a 
dominance of social democratic governments will prevent privatisation in health care does 
not seem to be the case either. As such, the power resource theory does not offer a 
convincing explanation of the policy changes which have taken place in Denmark, Sweden 
and England in the past decades. Stated even more generally, privatisation in health care in 
Denmark, Sweden and England in the past decades is not explained by partisan politics. 
   
Retrenchment and privatisation 
Another widespread approach in the reform literature is the retrenchment 
literature, most known from the works of Paul Pierson, but originally developed by 
Kischelt (1999). The logic of the retrenchment argument is that fiscal pressure on the 
welfare state will force governments to withdraw from heavy welfare commitments, in 
particular in areas of large public expenditure. As the welfare state “rolls back” this might 
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result in increasing privatisation, either because the state stops providing services or 
reduces quality or coverage to an extent, which makes citizens find private solutions. Such 
reforms are politically risky, since they take away rights or entitlement from citizens.  
Kitchelt’s thesis is that retrenchment reforms in modern welfare state are carried through 
by Social Democratic parties because these parties have “issue ownership” over welfare 
state matters5. Therefore voters have great confidence in social democratic parties when it 
comes to welfare state reforms. Using a “Nixon-goes-to-china” logic,6 “social democratic 
or labour parties engaging in social policy retrenchment that is unpopular with the median 
voter may be more acceptable to citizens because they represent the ‘lesser evil’ and enjoy 
more credibility in protecting the core of the system than right-wing market reformers” 
(Kitschelt, 2001, p. 275). On the contrary, right wing parties pursuing welfare state reforms 
will be associated with neo-liberal attacks on the welfare state. Underlying the logic of the 
retrenchment argument is the assumption that reforms take place because of economic 
pressure (Pierson, 1996, 2001).  
 There is no reason to doubt that economic pressure can be an important 
driver for welfare state reform, but in the case of health care in Denmark, Sweden and 
England, privatisation has not been accompanied by retrenchment or cutbacks. On the 
contrary all three countries have increased public spending on health care in the past 
                                                 
5
 To be fair, Kitschelt’s argument is more complex than presented here. For an elaborate version see 
Kitschelt (2001). 
6
 “Nixon goes to China” refers to the American President Richard Nixon, who, with a political image of 
being anti-communist republican with a hawk-like foreign policy, could go to china and solve problems 
with China, without being accused of being a comrade and sell out on American values and principles. 
When the logic is used in relation to welfare state reform it is expected that social democratic parties are 
more likely to reform the welfare state without being punished by voters (Kitschelt, 2001, p. 275).  
 
Table 1.2: Increases in public health care expenditure, 1991-2007 
  Sweden Denmark 
United 
Kingdom 
     
Total public health care expenditure as % of GDP 2007 7,4 8,2 6,9 
 
% increase in total public expenditure between 1991-2007 +4,2% +18,8% +30,2% 
     
     
Total public health care expenditure pr. capita,( US$ at 2000 PPP rates) in 
2007 2418 2597 2067 
 
% increase in total public health care expenditure / capita (US$ in 2000 
PPP rates) between 1991-2007 +47,3% +61,8% +91,6% 
Source: Calculated on the basis of OECD health care data 2009. 
 
 21 
decades. Economically, the public health care sectors in Denmark, Sweden and England 
have grown, both in absolute and relative terms, over the past decades (table 1.2). 
 As mentioned above, I do not dispute that social democratic parties have 
played an important role in privatising health care (or other policy areas) in the past 
decades, but they have not done so in order to reduce public spending, or retrench the 
public health care system.    
 
Pressure from the European Union 
Another explanation for privatisation is suggested by what we might call the 
Europe hypothesis. The hypothesis has two aspects. First, it has been argued that free-
market legislation at the EU level will affect national health care systems and may drive 
privatisation as European integration accelerates. Grave risks of ‘social and health tourism’ 
or ‘regime shopping’ will arise as the European countries remove economic and physical 
borders. Again, for the sake of competitiveness, European countries will necessarily adjust 
their welfare systems downwards in a struggle to survive in the common market which, 
paradoxically, was created to regulate and ensure competitiveness and preserve welfare for 
citizens (Adnett, 1995; Aspinwall, 1996; Liebfried & Pierson, 1995). First, the evidence is 
that patient mobility in Europe is very low and there does not seem to any ‘health tourism’ 
(Rosenmöller, et al., 2006) and second, as noted above, none of the cases studied here has 
displayed a downward trend in health care spending, on the contrary, health care 
expenditure has been rising in the past decades. 
The other aspect of the Europe hypothesis is more interesting and focuses 
on how the EU legislates with regards to health care services. This view postulates that the 
regulatory framework of the European Union will have a growing impact on health care in 
nation states (McKee, et al., 2002; E. Mossialos & McKee, 2002). The ‘four freedoms’ of 
movement – free movement of good, services, labour and capital – will push forward 
privatisation in health care insurance and health care delivery, the argument states. As of 
2009, health care falls within areas of national competence within the European 
framework, however, EU legislation7 and rulings at the European Court of Justice may 
have an indirect influence on the development of national health care systems. A set of 
rulings from the European Court of Justice offers indications about EU pressure on 
                                                 
7
 A study of the Danish case showed that in national health care legislation (1997-2005), approximately 8 
% of the adopted proposals were proposed in order to implement EU directives (Martinsen & Vrangbæk, 
2008). 
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member states’ health care systems8. Hatzopoulus argues that these rulings will “Kill 
national health and insurance systems, but heal patients” (Hatzopoulus, 2002). 
I do not find that the ECJ rulings have been a driver for privatisation in 
health care in Denmark, Sweden and England, nor have their killed their national health 
systems. That does not imply that EU plays no role. In both Britain and Denmark these 
ruling were taken into consideration when involving the private sector in health care. In the 
British case, the purchasers of services (the Department of Health) chose to contract for 
services, not because they wanted to favour national providers, on the contrary they wanted 
to favour non-national providers, because one of the aims was to expand capacity and 
therefore new doctors and nurses were needed. In the Danish case the law on patient 
choice from 2002 was also in accordance with ECJ rulings. Private hospitals were not on 
contract with the state, instead they made agreements with the regional authorities, licensing 
them to provide services, but without specifying any contractual terms (either of volume or 
prices), and as such circumventing the ECJ rulings. Furthermore, National authorities in 
Denmark, England and Sweden do not promote a “free European health care market,” 
because they fear that costs could get out of control. As stated by the English department 
of health in 2007 on the EU health care debate: “We think it is critical […] that the NHS 
                                                 
8
 The first important case was Kohll (Judgment of 28 April 1998 in case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-
1931). Mr. Kohll, a Luxembourg national, was seeking reimbursement for a dental treatment received (by 
his daughter) in Germany, without having received prior authorisation by his home institution. In this 
case, the Court made it clear that the principles of freedom of movement do apply to health services, even 
when they are provided in the context of a social security scheme. Or, as the Court put it: ‘the special 
nature of certain services does not remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of freedom 
of movement’ (Rec. 20 of the judgment. This passage of the judgment has been repeatedly cited by the 
Court in its more recent judgments.) . Therefore, health care systems cannot require prior authorisation of 
health care treatments (it would imply a violation of Article 49 (then 59) of the European Treaty). In 
Decker (Judgment of 28 April 1998 in case C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-1831) the Court affirmed that 
national security and healthcare schemes should also respect the principles of free movement of goods 
(article 28). The finding that healthcare is a priori subject to the Treaty rules was further explained in the 
judgments in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms (Judgments of 12 July 2001 in cases C-368/98, Vanbraekel, 
[2001] ECR I-5363 and C-157/99, Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473), as well as in cases Müller-
Fauré and Watts (Judgment of 13 May 2003 incase C-385/99, Müller-Fauré, [2003] ECR I-4509; 
judgment of 6 May 2006 in case C-372/04, Watts). The Watt judgement from 2006 was the first 
judgement on the principles of free trade of health care services in a country with a public and free NHS. 
Central to the case was English Mrs. Watt, who went to France for a hip operation because she found the 
NHS waiting-lists to long. Back in England she claimed reimbursement from the British state. Mrs Watt 
lost the case in England, but the European Court of Justice ruled that the British state had to pay Mrs Watt 
an amount equivalent of what the operation would have cost in England. Thereby the EU interferes 
directly with national political rules on patient choice, giving patients the right not only to choose national 
providers but any provider within the EU. Essentially the rulings of the ECJ state that health care is a 
service (in the meaning of a good), which can be traded freely within the EU, also in NHS systems, 
thereby breaking the monopoly of the national NHS. Moreover, the Court ruled that it was illegal to 
favour national providers over providers from other EU countries, unless the provision is contract-based. 
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retains the ability to decide what care it will fund to meet the needs of individual patients.”9 
In both Denmark, England and Sweden there is a reluctance to open up a European 
market, while at the same time they have adopted several policies to introduce private 
providers to serve national citizens.  
 However, the main reason why European pressure does not explain 
privatisation is found in the timing of the process. In all of these countries policies which 
led to privatisation started in the 1990s, and assumed greater pace in the early 2000s, as we 
shall see in the case-studies. The European debate only took off in 2001 (after the 
Vanbraekel and Peerbooms judgement), and in fact it was only after the Watts judgement 
in 2006 that NHS systems were forced to pay for patients who choose treatment in other 
countries (or potentially private hospitals). The privatisation policies enacted in Denmark, 
England and Sweden had been put in place years before these judgements, and, I will 
suggest, for very different reasons. This finding is supported by another study on 
privatisation in health care in which Maarse concludes that there is “not much evidence for 
European influence upon privatisation […] health care delivery and financing are seen as 
the exclusive competence of the Member States […] Yet, the picture may change in the 
future” (Maarse, 2004, p. 188). 
In the last years there has been much debate over the European service-directive, 
which included patients’ rights to mobility within health care systems in the EU. 
Opponents of the directive in the Nordic Countries have argued that it would lead to more 
privatisation. Yet also in this case there is a timing problem in terms of making it an 
explanation for privatisation in health care. The Service-directive process was initiated in 
2004; the policies which have driven privatisation in the last decade in Denmark, Sweden 
and England were initiated in 2003 or earlier. Furthermore, the Service-Directive was 
‘watered down’ between 2006 and 2009 and in the final version offered much more limited 
rights to patients than when originally conceived. Finally, the directive was dropped in 
December 2009, indicating that the EU will not be a driver of national health care changes 
nor privatisation in the near future. 
 
Right wing ideas suggest privatisation 
Another important theoretical approach contains the suggestion that right 
wing ideas have influenced policy thinking across Western Europe in the past decades 
                                                 
9
 Cited from BBC NEWS ” EU 'health tourism' plan delayed”, dec, 19th, 2007 
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(Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2002; P. A. Hall, 1989; Steinmo, 2008b). The general proposition in 
this literature is that the policy ideas proposed initially by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s 
have gained influence on the broad spectrum of policy makers. The literature stresses that 
there appears to be a growing political consensus around the point of view that the state 
should not do many of the things that it used to do. Within economics there has been a 
general shift away from Keynesianism to towards Neo-liberal policy ideas (at least until the 
financial crisis in 2008), (P. A. Hall, 1989). While Keynesianism focused on market failures, 
the neo-liberal ideas addressed government failures as one of the main problems in both 
economic and welfare state policy. As a consequence, one of the general propositions of 
these new ideas was to roll back the state. This set of economic ideas has also spilled over to 
several other policy arenas, where ideas of competition, privatisation and deregulation have 
become prominent (Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002; Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). The ideas 
affected thinking of how to organise and structure public service delivery, a set of policy 
solutions which became known as New Public Management (Hood, 1991; Klausen & 
Ståhlberg, 1998; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  
It is beyond doubt that these new ideas concerning how to structure public 
services have been influential in policy debates in Denmark, Sweden and England. While it 
was Thatcher in Britain who privatised public industries, airports, ports, telecoms, water 
delivery and electricity, it was the social democratic parties who did the same in Denmark 
and Sweden in the 80s and 90s (Bergh & Erlingsson, 2009; Christoffersen & Paldam, 
2006). Similarly, in all three countries ideas of how to create markets or otherwise 
manipulate incentives for health care providers were aired and debated in the mid 1980s 
and tried out in different versions in the 1990s. These ideas were often carried by new 
actors, with a background in economics, who suggested that public services need not 
necessarily be provided by publicly owned organisations. They could be privatised. As the 
empirical chapters demonstrate these ideas were not rejected by the social democratic 
parties, rather the ideas were, over time, adopted by these parties. The suggestion by the 
ideational approach towards explaining privatisation in health care is then, that new ideas 
(privatisation) became prominent among policy makers and that explains why health care is 
increasingly being privatised in Denmark, Sweden and England.  
However, though ideas are important, the proposition raises a range of 
questions, which are nevertheless still difficult to answer. What is particular difficult about 
the claim of the role of ideas is that ‘idea’ is a difficult term to use analytically. First, the 
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term has come to cover very different variables (norms, values, preferences, culture, 
attitudes) and is poorly conceptualised (Campbell, 1998). Second, it is difficult to 
demonstrate that it is the ideas that matter (and not the actors carrying them). Third, policy 
ideas do not come out of nothing. They are created in a policy context. At the same time, 
that policy context is shaped by the previous set of ideas. The ideas and the institutional 
context in which they develop co-evolve with each other. Therefore it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to separate them, or hold one of them constant. Ideas cannot be detached 
from the context they are in; ideas cannot offer an independent explanation of the outcome 
we are trying to explain.  
On the other hand ideas are central in this analysis. If we consider an idea to 
be equivalent to a policy solution, then, what the empirical chapters will demonstrate is 
how ideas (or solutions to important policy problems) evolve over time. Ideas evolve 
because the context around policy elites changes over time. This context consists of 
technological advances, citizens and their changing preferences, growing affluence etc. This 
changing context does affect which ideas are accepted and become prominent solutions at 
different points in time. Therefore it is very difficult to separate ideas from the context they 
are found in. Whether one policy solution is selected over another, is highly dependent on 
the context and a central part of that context is voters and their attitudes. As such, ‘ideas’ 
are central in understanding why privatisation became an acceptable solution in health care 
during the 2000s, while it was firmly rejected in the 1980s.   
 
These different propositions (power-resources, retrenchment, European 
pressure and ideas) found in the political science literature have one aspect in common: 
They all seek one over-riding explanation for a particular outcome (in this case for the 
privatisation of health care). In the empirical cases studied here, I find that the outcome 
privatisation in health care is the result of a slow adaptive process of policy change and 
adjustments, which take place over several decades. In this process political parties, both 
left- and right-wing, economic pressures and ideas, each play a role in shaping policies that 
lead to privatisation. At the same time, I find it hard to suggest that elements can be 
separated from each other and from their particular context; it is difficult to suggest that 
the outcome would have been the same if one of these elements had not been there. In 
other words, I suggest that the dynamics which led to privatisation was the result of a 
gradual process of policy adjustments. In this process policy elites continuously puzzle over 
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policy solutions to policy problems (Heclo, 1972). Over time, the solutions tried out where 
different, because the context changed. Adequate analytical tools to describe such a 
development are found in the literature on public policy. 
 
 1.2 A Public policy approach 
Public Policy Studies are concerned with the questions of 1) why 
governments choose certain policies and 2) what the consequences of these choices are. In 
this field the question of how new ideas enter the political agenda and become policy has 
always been central. Therefore studies of public policy have always been concerned with 
issue-definition, agenda-setting and policy change. Political scientists have been involved in 
such studies since the classic works of Cobb and Elder (1983), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
and Schattsschneider (1960). The importance of  controlling the agenda was one of the 
central points made by the early studies of community power in the 1960s (e.g. Dahl, 1961; 
Polsby, 1963). After Schattschneider’s claims about the importance of the “size of conflict” 
itself in explaining a particular outcome, and Bachrach and Baratz’ suggestion that there 
were “two faces of power” based on the ability to control which alternatives were 
considered by policy makers, political science has been concerned with the issues of 
problem recognition and with conflicts over appropriate policy solutions. 
The more recent works of Kingdon (1995) and Jones and Baumgartner 
(2002) follow up on these classic works and widen the field to include broader policy-
making processes rather than only agenda-setting. The common core of policy studies is 
attention to the dynamics of how new ideas, alternative policy solutions, and novel 
understandings of problems may or may not be accepted in the political system. The 
literature is equally concerned with the forces reinforcing the status quo, resisting the 
emergence of new issues or the incorporation of new actors, as well as those circumstances 
that allow for slow and gradual or more dramatic changes. New ideas may well meet 
resistance from the prevailing political arrangements, but they sometimes break through to 
create policy changes. From the earliest studies, scholars have focused on the status-quo 
biases of political institutions and the associated distribution of power favouring 
established interests. The studies simultaneously explored the possibilities for new ideas 
and issues to reach the political agenda. Thus, the literature today continues to address 
fundamental questions such as those raised by Schattschneider in the earliest studies of 
public policy making.  
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In contrast to the single-level approaches in political science (mentioned in 
the previous section), Public policy approaches tend to include a range of factors (interests, 
ideas, institutions, external pressure etc.) when analysing decision-making processes. On 
the one hand, this setup risks being overdetermined - because everything can be explained - 
rather than parsimonious. To avoid this, the analytical framework must suggest how these 
different processes are causally linked to each other. E.g. while new ideas enter the agenda 
we must be able to explain how these new ideas become accepted by actors and interplay 
with their interests. In the case of privatisation in health care we must be able to explain 
why social democratic / Labour parties came to find privatisation strategies to be in their 
electoral interest. In other words, the Public Policy approach cannot simply suggest that 
everything matters, but should aim to uncover the causal links between processes.  
Health care policy in Denmark, Sweden and England has been changing 
quite substantially in the past decades, although most scholars agree that these changes 
have evolutionary rather than revolutionary (Pedersen, et al., 2005; Webster, 2002b). 
Theories of public policy making offer a framework for analysing this change, because it 
focuses on how new ideas rise, which alternative solutions are suggested and why one 
solution is chosen over others. It is most likely that solutions chosen are not radically 
different from the existing one because “even the most the innovative creations are 
decisively shaped by the contents of previous policy” (Heclo, 1972, p. 5). One of the 
insights of Heclo’s study of social policy change is that while policies shift over time, most 
often it does not happen through revolutions, rather through processes of incremental, but 
transformative change.  
The framework of Baumgartner and Jones focuses on “punctuated 
equilibriums”, indicating that policy changes can be seen as large scale changes to otherwise 
stable systems. Since the process of privatisation in health care has to a large extent been a 
process of slow and gradual change without any radical punctuations, I will instead build 
the framework on the works of Kingdon (1995), who suggests that political systems are 
mainly in flux, rather than being predominantly stabile.  
Kingdon’s basic question is “when has an idea’s time come?”. In other 
words, Kingdon’s framework aims to help understand why a particular idea can reach the 
political agenda and why this particular idea, or policy solution, was selected over other 
alternatives at a given time. Kingdon’s framework is often presented simply as a framework 
for studying agenda-setting, but it goes further than that. In order to understand when an 
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idea’s time has come, Kingdon suggests that there are three “streams” of processes in 
policy making: Problems, policies and politics. People recognise problems, they generate 
proposals for public policy changes, and they engage in politic activity, such as 
negotiations, campaigning and interest group pressure. Policy makers, be it civil servants, 
politicians, journalists etc. can in principle be involved in one or all processes. Kingdon’s 
proposal is that an idea’s time has come when these three streams meet to create a policy 
window, which is an opportunity for a new policy idea to succeed.  
Kingdon suggests that problems come on the political agenda depending on 
how a problem is defined. First, there may be simple indicators, for example of the costs of 
a programme, which brings problems onto the political agenda. Second, policy makers may 
learn about problems through feedback from existing programmes, either routines 
(evaluations) or less formal (complaints). However, more often problems become 
important in a more accidental or random way - because of a disaster, crisis, personal 
experience or through powerful symbols. If such events can be linked to a substantial, 
confirmed problem, then it is likely to become part of the government agenda. How a 
problem is understood and defined will also affect the choice of policy solution. 
The political stream also determines whether a problem is set on the political 
agenda. This stream has a different dynamic from the problem stream and can run 
somewhat independently of the more technical process of problem recognition, but does 
not necessarily do so. Political participants perceive swings in the national mood, new 
bureaucrats gain influence, interest groups press new demands on governments and 
elections change the ideological distribution in parliaments. Such changes are important 
agenda setters. A change in government can introduce a new conception of problems and 
solutions to the political agenda. If the “national mood”10 is found to be very conservative 
it may dampen politicians urge for costly initiatives, a more critical national mood may urge 
politicians to solve particular problems etc. The national mood is in part an attitudinal 
concept, as shown in for example surveys over different issues (e.g whether citizens prefer 
private providers to compete with public health care providers) and policy makers do pay 
                                                 
10
 Kingdon discusses the “national mood” as a broad notion of the stand of the citizens. It may be 
respresented as changes in public opinion, broad social movements or the climate of the country. 
Common to these labels is the notion that a rather large number of people are thinking along similar lines. 
Such changes in the “national mood” can found in public opinion data or news paper coverage, but a 
perceived change in the mood can also be the result of interest group pressure, rather than wide-spread in 
the mass public. These changes in moods affects policy makers’ attention to problems but also to which 
solutions may be viable (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 146-149).   
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attention to such surveys. But, as will be demonstrated in the empirical analysis changing 
attitudes have affect on political strategies, as parties loose elections and change their 
policies to regain the electorate. The policy stream is the question of how some policy 
solution are selected over others. Policy solutions (or ideas) float around in the policy 
“primeval soup” (Kingdon, 1995), where ideas float, bump into each other and encounter 
new ones. While the origin of these ideas are somewhat unclear, the selection mechanism is 
more structured, since all policy solutions can be judge on a set of criteria, such as technical 
feasibility, congruence with a broader set of values, future constraints (e.g. budget), public 
acceptability and political receptivity. Proposals which meet most or all of these standards 
are likely to be possible policy solutions. In the policy stream, actors show indicators, 
demonstrate technical feasibility of a particular solution and argue for certain issues to be 
viewed as problems – here participants recognise problems by persuasion.  
Kingdon’s framework of streams is a methaphor for a fluctuating policy 
system, where different processes run simultaneously – and sometimes these processes 
result in a “window of opportunity” where collective attention focuses on a problem and 
particular solution, resulting in policy change. Often policy windows are unpredictable: 
airline crashes, a tragedy at a hospital or the like. Predictable or not, these windows are 
small and infrequent and will make actors flock to them and float their solutions – 
somewhat close to what is known as the Garbage-Can model (Cohen, et al., 1972). In other 
words, the policy system is one, where policy makers consider policy problems and struggle 
or puzzle over solutions to these in the light of the context there are in.  
A public policy approach is suitable for this analysis of health care policy, 
because it offers a dynamic view of how problems reach the political agenda and how 
solutions are arrived at depending on the political and economic context (See also Tuohy, 
1999). This is however, a rather complex framework, which I believe has several far-
reaching implications for the study of politics (which I will explore further in the 
conclusion). 
 Kingdon’s framework suggest that policy change often comes as a result of a 
somewhat random process. This framework, however, ignores that an ‘ideas’ time’ may 
have come through a longer process of societal change and that policy changes do not take 
place at point X in time, but are often the result of slow gradual processes, which at closer 
examination are not random. In the analysis conducted here I find that three countries 
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gradually, but slowly, move towards privatisation in health care and that process is not 
random. 
 
1.3 Slow, Gradual Change 
The notion of a ‘policy window’ may leave the impression that once that 
‘window’ is open large policy change is inevitably going to come about. Therefore an 
important comment needs to be added to this policy framework: Large changes need not 
have large sources. In the current debate over institutional change the role of slow and 
gradual accumulative change is increasingly being seen as a process of change which has 
been given too little attention (Streeck, 2009), because most researchers were looking for 
the dramatic change or “the punctuated equilibrium”. Hugh Heclo noticed the tendency to 
focus on dramatic events more than 35 years ago:  
We revel in every new excuse to label our times revolutionary; ours is the 
atomic/permissive/ electronic/affluent/space age. Attention centres on the 
glittering pageant and dramatic incident, although it is the annual change of 
only one percent that can produce some of the greatest transformations. 
Paradoxically, a glib preoccupation with the “revolutionary” has tended to 
reduce our sensitivity to change itself (Heclo, 1972, p. 1) 
 
Slow, gradual change plays an important role when explaining institutional 
and policy changes in welfare states. A similar point is made by Rose and Karran, who 
suggest that much change has come about through ‘political inertia’ (Rose & Karran, 1987). 
This phenomenon exists because some decisions are difficult for politicians to make, 
because they fear punishments from voters. Therefore policy-makers tend to make small, 
almost insignificant adjustments, with minimal political costs, rather than major and visible 
reforms. However, the accumulated effects of small changes, can amount to significant 
change. Rose and Karran put it the following way:  
While the government of the day may view their marginal decisions as small 
in terms of an immediate impact, history places more weight on the 
cumulating of long-term consequences […] ‘big events are not necessarily 
produced by big causes (Rose & Karran, 1987, p. 13)   
 
This insight implies that studying public policy and institutional changes must be historical 
and include a large time-span in order to see the impact of slow gradual change. That 
privatisation is rising need not be the result of one single dramatic policy solution. 
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So what does all this mean for an analysis of public policy and privatisation 
reforms? Certainly, part of the story entails the usual political struggle that involve a variety 
of actors, including political parties, business associations, labour unions and the involved 
industries or private companies and the ‘mood of population’. And certainly it also involves 
broader institutional factors, the policy fields’ historical legacy, which problems exists and 
how they are understood/concieved and which solutions/ideas have been developed 
and/or tested in the health care system. The analysis will also include which policy 
solutions are available in different points in time, and how they are debated and selected. 
This analysis will in particular pay attention to how the context around health care systems 
change over time and how new ideas become influential as this context changes.  
We will also focus on how the existing institutional arrangements do 
constrain radical transformation, while on the other hand it does not rule out path-breaking 
policy change. By taking a look at the long-term consequences of certain policies we will 
observe how small policy changes at the margins over time constitute real institutional 
change. The case-studies conducted in this thesis will analyse political struggles over 
problems and solutions chronologically to stress the following points: policy-problems 
change over time and so do the solutions suggested. Both problems and solutions are 
shaped by the context they are in. By looking at these changes over time, the analysis will 
show both the continuity of and change in problems and solutions over time.       
 
While this framework focuses on policy changes, it may be useful to 
distinguish between policy driven privatisation and privatisation driven by other factors 
(Maarse, 2006). Privatization is policy driven when it is the (intended or unintended) result 
of government action. The government pursues a policy of privatization, for instance, to 
make health care more efficient and/or responsive to citizens. Examples of policy-driven 
privatization could be transforming public provider organizations into private 
organizations, contracting out health care operations to the private sector, or giving private 
investors more room for commercial activity in health care. Policy-driven privatization is 
often based on the claim that private structures perform better than public structures.  
Not all privatization is policy driven. It may also be brought about by 
spontaneous or unorganized processes in society (Maarse, 2004; Tuohy, 1999). For 
instance, technological innovation may facilitate a change from inpatient to outpatient care, 
which often creates more opportunity for private practice. Demand-led privatization may 
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develop as an individual response to perceived failures in the public system; for instance, 
when long waiting times in public hospitals induce a demand for private services. A belief 
that the clinical quality of private health services is better than the quality provided in a 
public setting may also give rise to the private sector. In a similar way, privatization may be 
the result of the elite’s demand for a more or less exclusive (parallel) structure in health 
care. Having mentioned these different drivers, it is important to notice that in practice (as 
the empirical chapters show) they are difficult to separate. The approach taken in this study 
focuses mainly on policies, but the other drivers are also identified in explaining the rise in 
private health care. 
These comments stress a broader point: the context surrounding decision-
makers play an important role in explaining public policies. As already mentioned, the 
“national mood” forms part of this environment, but so too does the broad economic 
factors such as developments in the national macroeconomic situation which can affect 
privatisation: Under economic constraints, governments may seek efficiency gains by using 
private sector provision. Alternatively, under economic constraints the public funding for 
health care may decrease and so may the quality of public health care, pushing more people 
into the private sector (Johnson, 1995). Changes in the electorate may result in a different 
policy context. As the wealth of the middle class rises, they may also want to choose 
between different alternative services. Finally, but importantly, technological changes in 
health care may also have contributed to privatisation: 30 years ago a cataract operation 
required several days in hospital and involved significant risk – today it takes 30 minutes 
and the patient can walk straight home (or go to work). One the one hand, increased 
treatment possiblities results in a higher demand for health care for the simple reason that 
health care systems can do more today than they could 30 years ago. Modern health care cure 
more diseases, solve more problems and ease the pains of health care problems, which 
citizens in earlier decades simply had to live with (or die of). This puts enoumous demand-
pressure on health care systems. Combine this technological development with ageing and 
the demand for modern health care services increases even more. Technological change 
also makes many types of operations less complicated and less risky. Over the past decades 
there has been a shift from inpatient care (hospital-treatment to ambulant treatment. This 
change makes more operations and diagnostics relevant for the private market, both 
because costs are lower (and therefore available to more individuals) and risks are lower 
(and therefore more secure for private companies). This in turn also makes these 
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operations easier to out-source to private providers. As we shall see this technological 
development forms an important part of the changing context of modern health care 
systems.  
1.4 Privatisation: What is it? How do you know it when you see it? 
We may tend to think of privatisation as a brand-new neo-liberal offspring. 
However, the discussion of the role of the state vis-à-vis the market is certainly not. 
Observe, for example, New York City in the 1840’s: “If government was such an obvious 
and obnoxious failure, critics reasoned, then the best way to reform it was to reduce its 
responsibilities and powers as much as possible […] Retrench, reduce cost, simplify 
government, let businessmen do what politicians so obviously could not do – these were 
the rallying cries for reform which suited not only the interests of taxpayers but the rising 
faith in the virtues of private enterprise as well” (Spann, 1981, p. 50). 
In the postwar period, governments in Western Europe debated to what 
extent the national government should be involved in regulating the national economy and 
which industrial sectors should be reserved for state ownership. Until the 1980s, the answer 
to this debate in most European countries was that the government should at least own the 
telecommunications and postal services, electric and gas utilities, and most forms of non-
road transportation (e.g. airlines and railroads). Many politicians also believed that the state 
should control certain "strategic" manufacturing industries, such as steel and defence 
production. In many countries, state-owned banks were also given either monopoly or 
protected positions (La Porta, et al., 2000). In that same period, the state was the central 
actor in building up health care systems and expanding educational systems. In short, the 
set of dominating ideas were suggesting that the state necessarily had to play a major role in 
the national economy and in the provision of services (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998).  
Most people associate modern privatization programs with Thatcher's 
government in Britain in the 1980s. However, the Adenauer government in the Federal 
Republic of Germany launched the first large-scale, ideologically motivated "de-
nationalisation" program of the postwar era. In 1961, the German government sold a 
majority stake in Volkswagen in a public share offering and four years later, the 
government launched an even larger offering for shares in VEBA (W. L. Megginson & 
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Netter, 2001)11. Despite the fact that the Thatcher government was not the first to launch a 
large privatization program, it is arguably the most important historically. Privatisation was 
not a major campaign theme for the Tories in 1979, but the new Conservative government 
embraced the policy. Thatcher adopted the label "privatisation", coined by Peter Drucker, 
which replaced the term "de-nationalization" (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). 
Already back in 1969 Peter Drucker had argued that “the best we get from 
government in the welfare state is competent mediocrity. More often we do not even get 
that; we get incompetence” (1969, p. 204) – “Government is a poor manager” (1969, p. 
214). The government should govern (make decisions), and production should be left to 
the market, Drucker concluded. In Drucker’s view Government was good at making 
decisions but not good at executing them. Therefore states should seek to split decision-
making in areas of public policy from the execution of service provision. Thus, Drucker 
proposed adopting a “systematic policy of using the other, the nongovernmental 
institutions of the society of organizations, for the actual ‘doing,’ i.e. for performance, 
operations, execution. Such a policy might be called ‘reprivatization’” (Drucker, 1969, p. 
218).  
Since the 1980s, privatisation programmes spread far beyond the UK, with 
countries across the world introducing privatisation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
and introducing market reforms in the public sector and the introduction of private 
provision of services, in part because of the perceived failure of prior arrangements (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2004). By the mid-1990s a new set of ideas stressing the virtues and dynamics 
of private entrepreneurs increasingly became accepted on the political scene and among 
citizens. Surveys demonstrate that ‘nationalisation’ where favoured by large parts of the 
public in the 1960’s this was no longer the case in the 1990s.12 
The arguments for privatisation was mainly developed in economic theory 
(Feigenbaum, et al., 1998; Köthenbürger, et al., 2006; W. L. Megginson & Netter, 2001; 
OECD, 1997) or the application of economic theory on politics and bureaucracy, known as 
“public choice” (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1968, 1971). Although the political arguments 
for privatisation may also be of economic character (such as efficiency gains) this study 
will, on the contrary, consider privatisation as a core political issue (See Immergut, 1992), 
                                                 
11
 A more detailed overview of the history of modern privatisation can be found in (W. Megginson, et al., 
1994) or (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). 
12
 A range of these survey results are presented in chapters 2-4. 
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and look more closely at the policy processes which bring about privatisation. The 
following section will spell out in detail what privatisation means for public services. 
 
Privatising public sector services 
Privatisation of public sector services has taken place in three “waves”. The 
first wave of privatization in the 1980’s focused largely on selling State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), such as industrial and financial firms, especially in sectors of network industries, 
which include electricity- and gas production and delivery, telecommunications, airports, 
banks etc. (Köthenbürger, et al., 2006; W. L. Megginson & Netter, 2001; Prokopenko, 
1995). In the traditional definition of privatization, which was often used in Anglo-Saxon 
countries like the U.S., Australia, UK or New Zealand privatization is defined narrowly, 
simply the sale of public enterprises (Hodge, 2000). The second wave included the 
privatisation or contracting out of services such as cleaning, catering, waste-disposal or 
transport (Savas, 1987), which are often considered non-essential to the public services.  
A third, and ongoing, privatisation wave includes core public services 
(education, health care, employment services etc), started in the mid 1990s in Western 
Europe and is still underway. Levels and modes of privatisation in these policy arenas differ 
significantly across welfare states (Abrahamson, et al., 2005; Ascoli & Ranci, 2002; 
Kamerman & Kahn, 1989; OECD, 1998; Smith, 2002) and there is much disagreement 
about the outcomes of the policies (Boyne, 1998; Hodge, 2000; Savas, 2000; K. Walsh, 
1995).  
In contrast to the first privatisation wave, the third wave has only 
occasionally included sale of public assets, rather it often represents a mixed model of 
service provision and funding.13 According to this development most academic authors 
now consider privatisation in a wider manner, embracing all kinds of policy initiatives 
which transfer responsibility or organizational capacity from the public sector to actors 
outside of it (Paula Blomqvist, 2004; Hodge, 2000; Hodge & Greve, 2005; Savas, 2000), 
which is also the approach that will be followed and elaborated in this study. 
Since the early 1980’s, up to today, much has happened in the privatisation 
debate, making it more nuanced. The term privatisation is often substituted by the less 
contentious term ‘public-private partnership,’ but many of the central arguments and 
                                                 
13
 This has also been called the Mixed Economies of Welfare (Abrahamson, et al., 2005; Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2008). 
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expectations remain. Today, these propositions are not carried forward by right wing 
parties alone, but by the political spectrum as a whole (Blyth, 2002; Klitgaard, 2007), and 
even the welfare strongholds of Scandinavia has experienced privatisation and 
marketisation policies in public services, such as health care, long-term care and education 
(Belfrage & Ryner, 2009; Björklund, et al., 2004; Paula Blomqvist, 2004; Christensen, 2003; 
Green-Pedersen, 2002a).  
 
Where to look for privatisation? 
Studies of welfare state development have typically focussed on public 
spending on a range of social policy areas and on the private/public mix in welfare state 
provision (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi & Palme, 2003; Pierson, 1994). The public 
and private arenas are viewed in dichotomous terms; a larger role played by the private 
inevitably means less public responsibility and represents welfare state retreat. With the 
focus on public welfare spending many scholars have concluded that - in general - welfare 
states have not undergone radical change or as Esping-Andersen phrased it, we see a 
“frozen” welfare state landscape (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 1996; se also Ferrera & Rhodes, 
2000). This conclusion, I argue, misses an important point, because public expenditure 
levels only tell part of the story. It fails to recognize that important changes have taken 
place in the fashion in which welfare services are provided. Privatisation defined broadly as 
the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part from the public sector to the private 
sector (e.g. Paula Blomqvist, 2004; Feigenbaum, et al., 1998) involves an increased reliance 
on private actors and market forces to take over functions and /or responsibilities that had 
earlier belonged to the governmental sphere. The previous system of public provision of 
uniform services, allocated through bureaucratic planning, has been profoundly 
transformed, being replaced with a system where the choices of service by users play a large 
role, where private providers have become important contributors (and consequently, 
political actors) and where relations between actors within the system are structured in an 
increasingly market-like environment. This development represents a significant change in 
relation to previous welfare state policies, which is not revealed by naked expenditure 
figures. The ongoing changes in welfare states, with policies of privatization, contracting 
out and markets for public services, further involves a transformation of the role of the 
state and changes in the relationships between public and private agencies, not captured by 
expenditure analysis. These transformations blur the distinction between the public and the 
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private. Therefore these institutional changes also matter for the larger political context 
surrounding the welfare state (Smith, 2002, p. 98; Steinmo, 2010). To capture these 
changes, this study will consider not only expenditure, but more so the actual policy 
changes, which involve privatisation of the health care sector. We will simultaneously 
consider how these policy changes reflect the political context in which they are conceived 
and debated. If we are to grasp why and how policies change and how this affects and 
reflects the welfare state context we must therefore study policy changes, rather than 
expenditure figures alone. 
The health care sector is broad. Health care consists of primary and 
secondary care, medicine, dental care, different types of therapies etc. In this study the 
analysis of health care is confined to primary and secondary care. Put simply, primary care 
means General Practioners and secondary care is what takes place at hospitals. These two 
elements form the bulk of most health care systems. It is within these parts of the health 
care system that privatisation has taken place within the past two decades in Denmark, 
Sweden and England. Furthermore, the question of introducing or raising co-payments is a 
sub-field by itself and a question in health care, which has already received a lot of 
academic attention (an overview is given in Chalkey & Robinson, 1997).  
 
Types of privatisation 
The concept of privatisation is more complex than political stereotype would 
suggest. Privatisation has different dimensions, which are important to distinguish when 
analysing privatisation in health care policies. A one-dimensional move ‘from state to 
market’ does not differentiate between the dimensions of production, finance and 
regulation. Load-shedding, contracting out, vouchers, public-private partnerships are 
different types of privatisation policies. What links these various forms together is less their 
substantial similarities than the fact that they stand in opposition to the alternative: the 
direct governmental model, where public sector institutions fund, regulate and provide key 
public services and do so in response to political rather than market incentives. Implicit 
here is the dualist perspective; government can be clearly distinguished from the private 
and the growth of the modern welfare state has been characterised solely by a growing 
reliance on the state as opposed to the private sector. Reality is often much more blurred, 
but the distinction is relevant from an analytical/heuristic point of view. In the analysis we 
shall distinguish between these various dimensions since they each raise different sets of 
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issues. Analytically, it is useful to distinguish between three different types of privatisation 
in health care: 
 
1: Contracting out. Governments may invite bids from private providers of health services 
(often planned surgery or diagnostics). To elucidate this type of privatisation, the study will 
focus on how the state finances private primary and secondary care, and how choice 
polices have affected contracting out. Such policies affect the size of the private sector. 
2: Privatisation. These are private solutions to health problems and concern private health 
insurance and private funding of hospital services. The study will consider how and why 
private health care insurance is on the rise and how this contributes to the private health 
care sector. Moreover, in England, a specific scheme, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), is 
unique because is uses private providers and finance for the building (and rebuilding) of 
hospitals. 
3: Government regulated services: This type of privatisation usually concerns user-charges in the 
publicly provided health care system. User-charges in Sweden, Denmark and England are 
mostly related to medicine, dentistry and rehabilitation treatments (e.g. physiotherapy). 
Since the study focuses on primary and secondary health care, this type of private payment 
is largely excluded from the analysis.  
 
However, it is useful to add a third dimension to privatisation: regulation. While services 
may be outsourced or privatised, they may yet be subject to different degrees of public 
regulation. This is particularly important in health care, because all providers, whether 
public or private, are to a large extent subject to regulations (doctors’ qualifications, 
insurance, provide statistics, use well-defined and proven methods etc.). The three types of 
privatisation are shown in the four-fold typology14 in figure 1.1. The typology distinguishes 
between who provides and who funds the health services in question, while the arrows 
illustrate that it is the processes away from the government model that are of interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 This typology is inspired by Klein (1984), Whitty (2000), and Powell (2008). 
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Figure 1.1: Dimensions of privatisation 
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 Public Private 
Public 1: Government Services 
1A (high regulation) 
1B (low regulation) 
 
2: Contracting out  
2A (high regulation) 
2B (low regulation) 
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Private 3: Government regulated 
services 
3A (high regulation) 
3B (low regulation) 
 4: Privatization 
4A (high regulation) 
4B (low regulation) 
 
 
 
The largest leap towards privatisation would be from 1A to 4B. In reality, matters combine 
in a variety of ways and categories overlap each other. The relationships between the 
private and public sphere are complex. Public and private agencies interact in a range of 
ways, just as different funding arrangements mix public and private money. However, these 
categories provide an initial general frame for assessing the processes of privatization of 
public services. The focus of the analysis in chapters 2-4 will focus on the types 2 and 4 in 
the figure above. 
Contracting out and Privatisation are different in nature. Contracting out health 
care services may, in the simplest version, simply be that the public sector buys services in 
the private sector made available for all citizens in the universal health care system. 
However, this does involve important aspects, since politicians no longer are directly 
responsible for the provision of services (the private companies are) and this creates a 
range of democratic issues with regard to responsibility for public services.  Privatisation, on 
the other hand, involves private markets growing (often insurance-schemes), which are 
only available to a selected part of citizens (non-universal). This type of privatisation 
therefore directly involves questions of unequal access to health care. In reality, these two 
types of privatisation are intertwined. When governments start purchasing care in private 
hospitals, a market for private health care is established and sustained. Once the private 
health care market is established, actors can nurture the ‘real’ private market (through e.g. 
health insurance). And so the developments of contracting out and the private health care 
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market grow together. The result is the emergence of a private health care market, which 
has reached a scale and scoped beyond the original ideas and expectations of policy-
makers. 
This way of conceptualising privatisation has one very important 
consequence. Competition within the public sector services (also called quasi-markets) is 
not within the definition of privatisation. In Denmark and Sweden choice policies were 
introduced in health care in the 1990’s, and the “internal market” was rolled out in the 
British NHS in the early 1990s. With the concept or privatisation outlined above, these 
policies are not privatisation, since these policies does not involve either private provision 
or private funding. That, however, does not imply that choice-policies are not important to 
this study.  As we shall see, these policies laid the foundation for actual privatisation later 
on in time.  
Finally, one aspect of privatisation in health care is excluded from this 
analysis: cost-sharing. Cost-sharing fits into cell 3 in figure 1 and is often related to 
medicine, where costs are shared between the state and the consumer. In the Swedish case 
there is also a level of cost-sharing in GP- and hospital-visits (Swedes pay a fixed amount 
for each visit). And in both Denmark, Sweden and England there is cost-sharing for dental 
services. Cost-sharing has an element of private finance and therefore could be included in 
an analysis of privatisation. Often, however, cost-sharing is aimed at decreasing demand. In 
this analysis this question is left out, both due to space-limitations but also because the 
question has been analysed elsewhere (Chalkey & Robinson, 1997; Ellis & McGuire, 1993).    
Having surveyed these more conceptual issues regarding privatisation, I will 
now present a short outline of the empirical cases. 
 
1.5 Denmark, England and Sweden: Different roads of privatisation 
Health care systems have long histories, which go hundreds of years back. 
Through the 20th century an increasing number of the poor, the sick, the disabled, the 
young and the very old were offered access to health care through public health care 
systems, which dramatically increased the general level of health among the European 
population (Christopher Ham, 2004, chp 1; Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007). Without these 
public health care systems poverty, inequality and human misery would have been greater, 
and society would have witnessed greater social exclusion than can already be observed. 
Cross-national differences between health care systems are evident, but the common goal 
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of the introduction of these public health care systems was to reduce the individual and 
social risks which were an integrated part of industrialised capitalism. The large public 
universal health care systems in Europe brought massive improvements to the quality of 
life of its citizens. The general level of health has been improved to an extent which no-one 
imagined at the inception of public health care more than 60 years ago. Cures are available 
for most known deceases. Today Europeans have the prospect of being around 78 years 
old, while in 1950 the life expectancy rate in Europe was 63.15 Survival rates among 
children have also increased dramatically over the past 60 years due to the advancement of 
accessible health care. In the fight against poverty and misery the collective provision of 
free and equal health care to all citizens is for many regarded as a profound expression of a 
modern society, based on humanitarian values. These successful figures cannot be credited 
to health care systems alone. But it is beyond doubt that the modern public health care 
systems and the research and technological development entailing it have played an 
enormous role in the betterment of society.  
Despite the major success of public health care systems in improving the 
level of health care and more generally advancing the living conditions of all citizens, the 
rapid expansion of the welfare state arrangements in the 60s and 70s also led to criticisms. 
Somewhat similar to an ancient Greek tragedy, the good intensions and provisions of the 
large welfare state arrangements became the object of intense criticism at the same time as 
the truly positive accomplishments of these systems were unquestionable.  Neo-liberals 
argued that the welfare state contradicted the logic of capitalism, obstructed the market 
from functioning and made individuals dependent rather than free. With regard to the large 
health care system, citizens increasingly felt alienated in the growing and impersonal 
bureaucracies and the web of apparently incomprehensible rules set by professionals. 
Furthermore, the large health care systems tended to draw heavily on state funds and due 
to their uncontrollable costs they would ultimately contribute (along with other welfare 
state programmes) to the financial bankruptcy of the nation-state.  
Through the 1980s the welfare state systems were increasingly being depicted 
as a part of a societal problem, rather than a part of the solution, at least in the more radical 
                                                 
15
 These figures can be found at: World Population Prospects, the 2008 Revision. United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, New York. See: 
www.unpopulation.org 
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ideological rhetoric.16 Welfare state systems presented a number of serious social and 
economic problems and in the long run these services and their intended benevolent 
consequences could not be taken for granted. The widespread support for welfare state 
provision in the 60s and 70s went hand in hand with a concern about how to maintain the 
basic principles behind the welfare state in times of economic hardship. In the late 1970s 
and 1980s many scholars predicted a welfare state crisis and its inevitable collapse and 
elimination (Kuhnle, 2000). Scholarship in the 1990s showed that the welfare state proved 
to be much more resilient than expected by these crisis-theories (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 
1996; Pierson, 2001). Today, the welfare state still exists and so do the public health care 
systems, which form a core element of them. At the same time, these systems are changing.  
In the following chapters I will examine the evolution of three different 
health care systems, which all form part of a welfare capitalist democracy. These health care 
systems share a number of features: They are all universal (free and equal access for all 
citizens), they are the most public health care systems in the world (as measured by public 
share of total health care costs),17 they are very popular among citizens and the spending 
levels on health care are close to the OECD average (OECD, 2007b).18 All three countries 
follow trends towards more private health care. In all three countries, centre-left parties 
promote, support, or do not roll back the policies towards privatisation.  
 However there are also important differences between these countries and 
the way health care policy is made: the English NHS is a highly centralised health care 
system, with most decisions made at the national government level. The government 
intervenes and regulates in detail concerning how the NHS is run and most NHS issues are 
political issues at the national level. In contrast, Sweden and Denmark has very 
decentralised health care systems, with the responsibility for services residing with the 
regional political bodies in Regions (Denmark) and Läns (Sweden). Behind these particular 
health care arrangements, there are also different electoral systems in the three countries. 
While England has a Single Member plurality system (first past the post), Sweden and 
                                                 
16
 This notion was caught by Ronald Reagan’s famous phrase: “[In this present crisis,] government is not 
the solution to our problem; government is the problem”. Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, January 20, 
1981. 
17
 In 2007 the share of public health spending out of total health care spending was: Denmark (83,7%), 
Sweden (81,3%), England/UK (82,1%). The OECD average is app. 70%, with the USA as the ‘most 
private’ system, where 45,6% of health care expenditure was public in 2007 (OECD, 2007b). 
18
 In 2007, Denmark spent 9,8% of GDP on health care, Sweden spent 9,1% of GDP and England 8,4% of 
GDP, while the OECD average was app. 9% of GDP. The American health care system cost 16% of GDP 
in 2007, the French 11%. The least expensive health care systems in OECD cost around 6% of GDP 
(Mexico, Korea, Poland) (OECD, 2007b). These figures include both public and private expenditure.  
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Denmark have proportional representation systems. Another notable difference is that 
while Sweden and Denmark has a long tradition of corporatism and involving social 
partners (unions and employers) in policy making, England has no such tradition in policy 
making. While such basic political institutional differences could be expected to shape the 
outcome of policies, this has not been the case regarding privatisation – this outcome is 
found in all three cases.  At the same time however, these institutional differences do affect 
how these different cases go about privatisation in health care: each country has introduced 
privatisation in health care in different ways. Here I give a brief overview of these different 
roads to privatisation. 
 
Denmark: The rise of private health care 
The Danish health care system is universal and public. Primary care has 
historically been provided by private businesses, with full public financing. Hospitals, on 
the other hand, are public. In Danish health care the first private hospitals opened in the 
1980s. There was no support to them, neither among citizens or policy-makers. Politicians 
even proposed a ban on private hospitals altogether. In the early 1990s the first proposals 
on choice in health care were enacted, although with much reluctance and choice was 
effectively controlled by the regions, which held authority over health care provision. In the 
1990s there was intense debate over the health care system including intense critique of 
waiting list length, low responsiveness towards citizens, and a sense that public provision 
was ineffective.  
In this period policy makers initiated several attempts to bring down waiting 
lists, which had become a symbol of all the problems in public health care. These attempts 
were largely failures. After 2001 a waiting list guarantee was installed, promising patients 
who could not get quick treatment in public hospitals access to a private hospital paid by 
the Regions. This law effectively put out a safety-net for private hospitals, which started to 
grow in numbers.  
Simultaneously, changes in tax-law made private health insurance tax-
exempted. No-one noticed these changes much until the economy accelerated and the 
labour market heated up, and Private health insurance became a popular fringe benefit in 
the intense competition for labour between 2003-2008. This further put private hospitals in 
business. Within a short time then the rise of the private sector in Denmark had been the 
result of minor changes in rules in national legislation, which did not raise the level of 
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debate considerably - partly because policy makers did not expect these changes to matter 
much and partly because the social democrats agreed with the centre-right parties. 
However, the accumulated effects of these minor changes over time were quite noticeable. 
At the same time, the debate over failures in public health care seems to have affected the 
attitudes towards privatisation both among citizens and policy makers. While there was a 
strong scepticism towards privatisation only 20 years ago, citizens are now accepting choice 
and private alternatives. And so do the social democrats, who were the fiercest protectors 
of the public sector provision. In the Danish case the private sector rose as the result of 
smaller changes in rules, which over time accumulated to larger numbers. This was on the 
initiative of the national government, but the private sector, which is made up of 
independent private hospitals set up to meet this new demand.  
The rise of private sector has resulted in inequality in access to health care in 
Denmark, which is an important breach of the basic pillar of universal health care: that all 
citizens are to be treated equally. Furthermore, the private sector contributes to the driving 
up of health care costs, as the private alternative is more expensive than the public sector 
provision. At the same time, due to change towards a more demand-driven financing 
model production is rising in Danish health care and the health care sector is regaining 
legitimacy among citizens. With this increase in production, however, have also come 
increasing costs and a weakening of the cost-containment measures.  
 
England: The planned private market 
The English universal NHS is the crown-jewel of the English welfare state, 
enjoying massive public support. At the same time, however, England has always had 
private hospitals and the NHS has also historically offered to treat patients privately. Under 
Thatcher in the 1980s there were debates about whether she aimed to privatise the NHS, 
but these were swept away already in the early 1980s by Thatcher herself, stating that “the 
NHS is safe with us”. The conservatives installed the internal market in NHS services in 
the early 1990s, but most analysts agree that these arrangements did not have the intended 
effects and it did not involve privatisation in the NHS. In the 1980s and 1990s the NHS 
was also heavily criticised for its shortcomings on responsiveness, waiting times and its 
over-bureaucratic image. There was also heavy criticism of NHS funding. Many claimed it 
was too low – on the other hand policy makers were content to have cost-control. When 
New Labour took over government in 1997, it promised to save the NHS and abolish the 
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reform made by the Tories in preceding decades. To the surprise of many, however, the 
NHS underwent a series of reforms in the 2000s, which did indeed include privatisation. 
There was not, as in Denmark, efforts to let the private market grow by its own dynamic – 
it was instead a planned exercise, where central government in London invited and planted 
private hospitals and clinics in specific spots around England. New Labour took schemes 
of Private Finance forward, which have involved private investors and companies in the 
construction of new hospitals (and other public services). A range of other reforms, 
including ‘independent sector treatment centres’,  ‘patient choice’ and ‘payment by results’, 
have led to more intense competition between the private and public hospitals. Around 
12% of English citizens are covered by private health insurance, which also helps sustain 
the private health care market.  
These reforms, but maybe more importantly, a substantial increase in NHS 
funding, has led to much shorter waiting lists in the NHS, to the satisfaction of citizens. 
But it has also included low value for money, as the private sector hospitals are more 
expensive than the NHS. 
The privatisation policies enacted in England were a planned exercise much 
in line with centralised nature of the NHS itself. Somewhat surprisingly it was carried 
through by a centre-left government and rather large opposition among unions, 
professionals and citizens, who insist that the NHS should be public. Opponents to 
privatisation in England also suggest that the reforms may affect equity, but mainly critics 
fear that the privatisation policy will bring an end to one of the national symbols of the 
British welfare state, the NHS. Policy makers on the other hand pursue these reforms in 
order to satisfy the changing demands of middle-class voters. The political system in 
England, with a strong government and weaker corporatist tradition and a centralised 
health care system, make it possible for policy makers to plan the introduction of private 
providers. Yet, improving the NHS has been very costly. 
 
Sweden: Privatisation from below 
 Sweden’s Universal health care system stands out for being the most public 
health care system in the world, with almost all financing and provision being public. The 
Swedish welfare state was constructed in the postwar years under almost exclusive social 
democratic dominance. In this welfare state equality plays a central role in understanding 
policy making, in particular in health care policy where most policies are evaluated on 
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whether they breach the principles of equality. On the other hand, cost control is also 
important, as Sweden fought against strong pressures on health care costs both in the 
1970s and 1990s. The Swedish health care system was also criticised heavily by the Swedes. 
During the 1980s and 1990s Swedes increasingly lost confidence in the health care system 
claiming that it did not offer choice or acceptable levels of responsiveness towards citizens. 
In those same years new ideas of private provision, markets and choice entered the health 
care debate. These ideas were picked up by the political Swedish elite, both among 
moderates and social democrats who were looking for solutions to the shortcomings of the 
existing welfare model.  In national level politics, privatisation still raises much ideological 
debate, it is, however, at the county level actual health care policy is made. At this 
decentralised level of government partisan politics matter less, and privatisation has been 
carried through by both centre-right and centre-left counties. Since privatisation policies 
are decided by counties there are large differences in privatisation levels between counties. 
However, it is the accumulated decisions in counties which drive up the overall level of 
privatisation in Swedish health care. This has primarily happened in primary care, but there 
is also a rise in private hospitals, which get finance both through the public sector and 
through the contribution from private health care insurance, which have risen steeply to 
cover more than 380.000 Swedes (around 4% of the population) in 2008. 
 These adaptations of the Swedish health care systems are successful in the 
sense that Swedes are very happy with private provision and choice – they experience a 
better service. At the same time, however, costs of Swedish health care are rising and so are 
concerns about rising inequity in health care since more and more Swedes are getting 
private insurance coverage and private hospitals are opening up to cater to private 
customers. Swedes are thus still very much in favour of a public health care system. 
The central commonalities and differences between the three countries are 
summed up in table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3: Summery of country similarities and differences 
 
 Denmark England Sweden 
Political system 
 
Social-corporatist Liberal Social-corporatist 
Health care system 
 
Universal Universal Universal 
Health care system 
responsibility 
 
Decentralised Centralised Decentralised 
Public/private 
divide in health care 
in 1980 
 
Primary care private 
Secondary public 
Primary care private 
Secondary public 
All health care public 
Public / private 
divide in 2010 
Primary care private 
Small (but increasing) 
parts of secondary 
care private 
Primary care private 
Small (but increasing) 
parts of secondary care 
private 
Parts of primary care 
private 
Small part of 
secondary care private 
Road to privatisation Centralised policy 
proposals have forced 
regions to adapt 
Centralised policy 
proposals 
Privatisation has been 
promoted by 
regions/local 
government bodies. 
 
Health care 
expenditure 
No retrenchment in 
the past decades. 
Instead public 
expenditure is rising. 
No retrenchment in the 
past decades. Instead 
public expenditure is 
rising. 
No retrenchment in 
the past decades. 
Instead public 
expenditure is rising. 
 
Partisan politics, 
Unions and 
privatisation 
Proposals initially 
implemented by social 
democrats, furthered 
by centre-right 
parties, largely with 
the support of social 
democrats. Unions in 
a dilemma and not 
acting collectively. 
Privatisation policies 
forwarded by New 
Labour. Unions 
strongly oppose 
policies. 
Privatisation 
forwarded by both 
right wing parties and 
social democratic 
parties. Unions are 
positive towards 
privatisation. 
Disagreement at the 
level of detail. 
Equity There are rising 
debates over equity in 
access as private 
health insurance 
becomes more 
widespread. 
Equity is a concern but 
less so than in 
Denmark/Sweden. 
There are rising 
debates over equity in 
access as private 
health insurance 
becomes more 
widespread 
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1.6 The argument: Adapting the welfare state 
Traditionally politics is said to be merely about conflict and power. 
Governments execute their power and through public policy set off the course of action 
which reflects their world-view, ideology and chosen solutions to collective problems. Neo-
liberal policies are often connected to right-wing politics. As such we would expect that 
privatisation was merely being pursued by right-wing governments and rolled back when 
left-wing governments returned to power. That is not the case in health care. Both left-
wing and right-wing governments have pursued privatisation agendas in this field over the 
past decades. This suggests that the traditional view of left and right wing politics is 
sometimes blinding – in particular when applied to social policy areas, such as education or 
health care. To quote Heclo:  
 
Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men 
collectively wondering what to do. Finding feasible courses of action 
includes, but is more than, locating which way the vectors of political 
pressure are pushing. Governments not only “power” […]; they also puzzle. 
Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf. (Heclo, 
1972, p. 305) 
 
In other words, privatisation policies in social policy areas (e.g. health care or 
education) can be viewed as the result of policy makers puzzling over solutions to some of 
the problems which exist in these areas of welfare state services. Policy-makers choose 
these solutions both because voters give support to governments that solve problems, but 
also because policy-makers are creative actors and look to solve problems in the existing 
institutional arrangement. Further, these problems are on the problem-agenda because 
policy-makers and voters in Denmark, England and Sweden prefer to see the universal 
health care system survive. But how, then, can neo-liberal policies, such as privatisation and 
out-sourcing, contribute to the survival of the universal health care model? 
 
The argument is the following: In countries with universal health care 
systems voters are supportive of the universality principle in public health care. Citizens 
want free access and are in favour of the equality principles embodied in the universal 
health systems, in particular in the English NHS and the Scandinavian systems. At the same 
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time, however, citizens have become increasingly dissatisfied with the services, which are 
conceived as unresponsive and consumer-insensitive (Kumlin, 2004). Like consumers, 
citizens want choices and more responsive services, just as they know it from the private 
market and they are not happy with the “one size fits all” model that was the historical 
foundation of the universal health care systems. As such, citizens (in particular middle 
class) support some of the criticisms of the large monopolistic state-provided health care 
services, which were raised in England, Sweden and Denmark in the 1980s and 1990s – 
often by right-wing parties. Governments (regardless of their ideological stance) were faced 
with rising expectations with regards to quality and responsiveness – and in health care, 
waiting times became a proxy for this problem. This pressure was re-inforced by two 
factors which also changed over time. Technological improvements in health care made 
more services available and demographic changes made more people need more health 
care. These two factors increase pressure on the health care system and on policy makers to 
deliver more services. On the other hand, there was also a reluctance to pay more taxes. 
The problem for policy-makers was to deliver more responsive services for the amount of 
tax-money citizens were prepared to pay. Several ideas were floated and tried out. One of 
those was to introduce competition in the public sector. What was called Quasi-markets were 
infused in public health care provision in the 1990’s in all three countries with the aim of 
making providers more responsive through the working of the market (Bartlett, et al., 1998; 
Saltman & Bergman, 2005; Saltman & Otter, 1992). The first experiences with such 
markets in health care did not result in the responsiveness hoped for. Very few patients 
made active choices, and there were several barriers to the functioning of the market, as 
perverse consequences were discovered (Bartlett, et al., 1998; J. Le Grand, 1998; Vrangbæk, 
et al., 2007).  
The choice-policies and the quasi-markets laid the groundwork for taking the 
new ideas further. As a part of the policies of public markets, financial payment systems 
(DRG-systems19) were established, which made transactions between different providers 
possible. These financial structures paved the way for introducing private providers to 
compete with public providers. This idea was attractive for policy makers for three reasons. 
First, Private hospitals, clinics and private health care centres are expected to deliver exactly 
those individualised services, which the demanding consumer wanted - in particular they 
                                                 
19
 DRG - Diagnosed Related Groups is a system where every type of operation, treatment or diagnostic is 
given a price. The system makes it possible to pay health care providers for the type of 
operation/treatment they perform.  
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can often deliver short waits and a more customer-oriented environment, which have 
become highly visible factors in health care. Second, the hope was that private providers 
would contribute to increasing the overall service production, a need which for a large part 
was driven by technological advances and ageing. When policy-makers contract health care 
to private providers, they are trying to solve a problem with waiting lists, which, despite 
many attempts, has not been solved within the public health care systems. The hope was 
that private providers would contribute to bringing down waiting lists. Third, the hope was 
also that competition and economic incentives would encourage the public sector to be 
more responsive and increase production, so as to offer shorter waits for patients. 
The public health care system has not been abolished or eliminated in any of 
the three cases. At the same time the evidence presented here suggests that the public 
sector health care systems have been affected by the introduction of private actors and 
market-like forces. Waiting lists are falling (but they have not disappeared), production 
increasing and satisfaction with services seems to be rising. Privatisation policies alone do 
not account for these outcomes; most importantly, in all three countries governments have 
invested substantial amounts of tax-money in public health care in the same time-span. 
The argument relies on one central premise: if the universal health care 
systems are to survive, they need support from a large group of citizens – in Denmark, 
Sweden and England the middle class plays the central role in such a supportive base. Since 
the universal health care systems are paid for through general taxation, the middle class 
must be willing to pay taxes for health care and they do so if they find that the level of 
access, quality and responsiveness is satisfying. One may claim that this has always been a 
premise for the large public welfare state arrangements. But the point is that the middle-
class is also changing; it is getting wealthier, it is getting bigger, it is getting older (and more 
in need of health care) and middle class citizens are increasingly finding themselves to be 
consumers in the private market, with a wide range of choices and expectations of 
responsive producers. From the market, these citizens are used to exercise ‘exit’, rather 
than ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1969). Simultanously, techonology and ageing also increases 
pressure on the health care systems. One of the fears of policy makers is that citizens 
increasingly will try to ‘exit’ the public health care system and turn to the ‘real’ private 
market. To use a phrase from the ongoing health care debate in these countries, policy 
makers and policy elites fear “the American model”. 
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If this premise is accepted the argument can be taken one step further: 
policies of choice, out-sourcing and privatisation may be important in keeping the support 
of the middle class, which expects shorter waits and more responsive service and may 
otherwise stop supporting the public system and take their tax-money elsewhere, i.e. to the 
private market. While the study reveals that there is still very high-levels of support for 
public health care, there is at the same time an increasing group of citizens purchasing 
private health care insurance. In line with the argument of welfare state legitimacy by 
Rothstein (1998), such tendencies may induce policy makers to reform welfare state 
services to make them comply with the expectations of the services – to maintain the 
legitimacy of the universal welfare state model. Again, the careful reader may think: so, 
privatisation is all about the changing characteristics of the median voter? I argue that these 
change matter a great deal because the middle class voters demand more responsive health 
care services. Yet, it is important to note that this change alone does not answer the 
research question of why the policy-turn to privatisation. While the voters did change 
significantly between the 1970s and the 2000s, they never developed a preference for 
privatisation, instead voters in Denmark, England and Sweden continuously show massive 
support for a universal public health care system. Privatisation is an elite-driven policy.  
Voters increasingly demanded more responsive and individualised health care service as a 
response to the some of the problems with existing services. The policy solutions to these 
demands chosen by policy makers were several different ones, where privatisation is just 
the latest iteration of this process of ‘puzzling’ with these problems. To be sure, the shift in 
the median voter’s preferences explains why political parties develop new strategies - to 
follow the median voter. But here many policies could be imagined, not including any 
private actors (e.g. increasing the public sector capacity, improving planning and pushing 
hospitals to focus on patient needs, granting patients ‘rights’ in the public system etc.) and 
many such policies were tried out in the 1980s and 1990s – but most of these attempts 
failed. But to understand why privatisation (or contracting out) became a policy solution, 
we need ‘to go back and look’  and trace what happened in the development of policies 
over time. 
Electoral volatility has increased across the advanced industrial world since 
the 1970s as class and self-proclaimed party identification have become less stable 
predictors of votes (Dalton & Wattenburg, 2002). The rise in electoral volatility weakens 
political parties’ links to a traditional support group and makes parties more sensitive to 
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voters and their demands. This sensitivity often pulls towards cost pressures, as citizens in 
developed countries expect higher quality and more individualised and responsive services 
(Julian Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993; Rothstein, 1998). The debate on electoral volatility often 
presents political parties with difficult choices, and the conflict between rising expectations 
and cost pressures often result in small step, incremental reforms (Pierson, 1996). This 
pressure may limit direct cuts in welfare state services, but has left open the possibility to 
reform the structures of service delivery, including privatisation and out-sourcing.  
Public health care service is supported by the middle class voters for both 
economic and value-based reasons. Economically, public health care is less expensive than 
private insurance or self-finance would be (in particular early and late in life). For most 
middle class voters the public health care insurance is a good buy. Second, the services are 
valued because the citizens in general support the idea that health care should be available 
for everyone regardless of income. The idea that health care should be a public 
responsibility is widely supported in most industrialised countries (Taylor-Gooby, 1999).  
  Citizens in England, Denmark and Sweden have experienced rising 
government spending on health. Despite the massive improvements in overall care, the 
health systems do not deliver what citizens expect from them. The problems indicated are 
mostly: long waiting lists, other difficulties with access, lack of privacy, bad food and 
stressed out personel. Choice policies, competition and private providers may address the 
demands from the, politically pivotal, middle-class, who are more articulate and often 
better educated, and better able to make their own choices.  
The middle class in Denmark, England and Sweden is thus the crucial group 
of voters for sustaining the welfare state. If this group of voters is not willing to support 
the large public solutions and the tax levels they incur, then the comprehensive welfare 
state is not viable. Therefore, if there is an aim of upholding the universal welfare state 
model, then the middle class must believe that it is getting value for tax money. But the 
middleclass is not static, it is evolving and so are its demands and expectations. Medical 
needs and expectations rise with technological development increasing the pressure on 
health care systems to deliver more. As shown in the empirical chapters, affluence among 
citizens have been rising over the past decades (enabling them to buy private health 
insurance), citizens are increasingly demanding individualised services (Inglehart, 1990) and 
the same voters are increasingly unsatisfied with public services which are conceived to 
unresponsive to citizens’ needs (Kumlin, 2004). In sum, several contextual factors around 
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health care systems change. Therefore policies must be adapted accordingly. As policy-
makers puzzled over solutions to the perceived problems, privatisation was one of the 
answers, regardless of the fact that there were (unforeseen?) tradeoffs (both in terms of 
cost and equality). 
In short, in these three countries, where the principle of free and equal access 
in health care is paramount, the universal health care services are in a (classic) dilemma: 
address the needs of the articulate, strong voters or lose political support. The universal 
welfare state has been made politically sustainable through a construction where cash 
benefits and service provision are tailored to satisfy not only the basic needs but even the 
more discriminating needs of the middle classes. Their loyalty with the taxes is politically 
crucial and therefore their evaluation of the services in the welfarist sense equally 
important. That loyalty, however, is threatened when citizens are unsatisfied with the 
services that are delivered for their tax-money. In short, the privatisation policies in health 
care in the 1990’s and 2000’s are attempts to adapt the universal welfare state, rather than 
undermine it. 
To sum up the argument in analytical terms, I argue that privatisation is the 
result of both endogenous and exogenous forces. Endogenously, the universal health care system 
(free access for all, but with limited resources) produces problems of low responsiveness 
(eg. waiting time). Exogenous to the same health care systems are changes occurred in the 
middle class making them wealthier, more demanding, less loyal to political parties, but still 
strong supporters of the public health care systems. These changes within the electorate 
make parties more sensitive to the demands of voters. Further, technological changes 
increases demand. Health care policy makers puzzle to solve these problems and are at the 
same time influenced by a new set of ideas, which promote private enterprise and the 
benefits of the economic incentives embroiled in the market (another exogenous factor). 
As John Kingdon suggests, policy solutions sometimes float around waiting for a problem. 
Privatisation became the exogenously provided policy solution to a problem endogenous to 
the universal public health care system.20     
A public school or a hospital, which provided benefits and service adequate 
in the 1970s would be a political problem, not an asset, in the current political context. The 
choice facing politicians is not to defend the old, the existing, or decrease service-levels. 
                                                 
20
 Here the notion of exogenous and endogenous factors is used analytically. In the conclusion, I will 
return to the point of the extent to which it makes sense to consider some elements exogenous to the 
political system.   
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Instead politicians must repeatedly puzzle out new solutions, which will make health care 
systems (or other welfare state provisions) adapt to changing environments.  Just as policy-
makers has done in other troubled times, such as the 1950s or the 1970s. 
 The careful reader may think: so privatisation is simply policy-makers’ answer 
to demands of the electorate, which politicians are eager to deliver on. End of story. In part 
that is the answer: in a democracy policies are often responses to what people want. Yet, in 
this analysis I will also pay careful attention to other contextual factors of great importance 
to health care. One is technology which over time develops to offer more and more 
sophisticated treatments, second ageing also plays a role, because with ageing more patients 
need more health care. Third, the economic context also changes over time. While the 
1980s where times where public budgets were constrained, the 2000s was a decade where 
many European welfare states had surpluses, which, among other things, were invested in 
health care. Even if argue that privatisation was the solution to voters demands, the story 
does not here; this particular solution produces new problems (Heclo, 1972) and the 
process of puzzling out new solutions continue.  
The privatisation policies introduced in the past decades has also created a 
set of new problems. Some of those include rising inequality in access to health care, rising 
health care costs (somewhat contrary to the commonly expected outcome of privatisation 
and competition), a rising need to regulate the health care sector, a partial loss of cost 
control on the part of policy-makers, a blurring of the democratic responsibility of private 
providers, scepticism towards the fact that the new private welfare state providers make 
profits (sometimes lavishly) on public service provision (and from tax-money) and choice 
policies may result in eschewed medical priorities. I do not pretend to be able to predict the 
future of health care policy. But it is my expectation that policy makers in the future will 
turn to puzzle out new solutions to these new problems. Again, such new solutions will 
most likely to be shaped by the context they are developed in.  
Privatisation may be viewed as a part of these health care systems’ 
development. Just as the universal public health care systems carried problems within them, 
so does the privatisation policies. But political institutions do not survive by standing still; 
they survive by adapting to changing environments. 
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1.7 Methodology: Case-studies 
In the past years there has been a debate in political science over how to 
study the political world. Simply put, the ‘causal-effect model’ has aimed to show a link 
between an effect and its cause. Critics, however, argue that such an aim is insufficient, 
because it does not reveal how an effect is linked to its cause. Therefore, more effort need 
to go into uncovering causal mechanisms (Bennet, 1999), that is show how a chain of events 
lead to a specific outcome.  
Hall (2003) argues that a gap has opened between ontology and methodology 
in social science. Most ontologies assume that policy outcomes are the result of complex 
interaction effects and various forms of multiple causality, as argued above. However, there 
is a prevailing tendency to apply statistical methods, which are most often based on much 
more restrictive assumptions about causal relationships (independence of variables, steady 
impact over time and space, absence of multiple causality, etc.). The real world of politics is 
not so sterile and controlled and there are large numbers of exogenous and endogenous 
variables that may influence the preferences of political actors, the decisions made by 
governments, the outcomes of policies or whatever the object of study is. If the aim is to 
understand the complexity of the political world, holding factors equal in order to isolate a 
single causal relationship may very well be misleading or worse, uninteresting (Peters, 
1998).21  
This critique does not undermine statistical methods. But it draws attention 
to the importance of not only evaluating correspondence between data of “causes” and 
those representing outcomes, but also the process whereby those causal factors operate and 
lead to certain outcomes. Hall (2003) therefore argues that the essence of explanation is 
explaining the mechanism whereby one factor leads to another and not only the mere 
relationship. If political science does not focus on why processes are started, we may know 
a lot about how certain parties have reformed the welfare state, which is important, but we 
also want to know the motives of these actors and why certain strategies have been chosen. 
In other words, the causal effect approach aims to address the question of “how much and 
how many,” while the causal mechanism approach addresses questions of “why and how”. 
                                                 
21
 Increasingly, there is a move towards qualitative comparative approaches (QCA), which combine the 
detailed study of the qualitative approach with the mathematical rigour of quantitative studies (Ragin, 
1989). However, as Hall (2003) argues, such an approach essentially retains the notion of correlation and 
often confuses causality with co-occurrence. 
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Although I have argued that privatisation policies is carried through by both 
right and left wing governments, we cannot make the claim, as the behaviouralists did, that 
the actual behaviour of the actors must be the same as the actors real preferences. We need 
to investigate further what the political motives are behind political action and public 
polices. The causal-effect model is further problematic as it becomes apparent that political 
outcomes are created in complex political systems, with institutional constraints, and feed-
back mechanisms and the final outcome may not even be the desire of any actor, but the 
emergent result of complex interactions. The last decades of welfare state research have 
stressed the importance of path-dependent political processes and claimed that the 
dependent variable becomes the independent variable in an ongoing process (P. A. Hall, 
2003; Mahoney, 2000). In other words, the effects/outcome becomes the reason of other 
effects and research should take notice of that. That is part of the theoretical claim I am 
testing in this study: namely that the effects of the expansions of the large universal health 
care systems in three countries has created a set of problems and a new political context, 
and thus a new set of challenges for policy makers.  
The focus on causal mechanisms does not imply that effects are unimportant 
– indeed effects and mechanisms are closely related. What good is knowledge of the 
mechanism if we cannot show what it produces? If a certain set of problems found in the 
health care systems in Denmark, Sweden and England was the cause of rising privatisation, 
then the question is: how these two elements are linked.  
In order to investigate causal mechanisms I employ in-depth analysis of the 
mechanism connecting the cause and the effect. This is in reality only possible through 
qualitative analysis and “thick description” of a limited number of cases. In this dissertation 
I employ the method called “process tracing,” which is particularly well designed to capture 
or uncover causal mechanisms (Bennet & George, 1997; P. A. Hall, 2003; Vennesson, 
2007). It is not sufficient to show that governments carry through privatisation reforms, we 
must be more specific and explain the motives behind the reforms and the strategies used 
to carry them out (P. A. Hall, 2003).  
The empirical parts of the study are analytical narratives, which trace the 
process of policy changes in the health care sector in Denmark, Sweden and England. Not 
all changes in the health care arena are considered. Since our focus is on privatisation, only 
policies concerning private provision of health care are part of the analysis. To narrow the 
focus even more, only the primary and secondary health care sectors are included. This 
 57 
does not mean, however, that only policies or debates around private hospitals and GPs are 
analysed, because hospitals, private or public are not isolated. Privatisation in primary and 
secondary services thus makes a good case for a comparative study because several similar 
problems and challenges are found across the cases.  
A comparative study of policy processes and policy outcomes in ‘real’ 
countries presents both problems and advantages. On the one hand, the complex 
sequences of events are of interest to the study and play an important role in explaining 
outcomes. On the other hand, variables come in large clusters, often intertwined in less 
than transparent manners. The challenge for the researcher is then “to disentangle the 
sources of variance, to contextualise the findings, and to provide as usefull a “story” about 
politics as he or she can” (Peters, 1998, p. 2).  That is the aim of the case-studies in chapter 
2-4. The analysis conducted does to some extent have an explorative aim, as it is the aim to 
trace the process to privatisation. Nevertheless, there are particular factors that are included 
in all the case studies. First, I aim to describe how the electorate has changed over time, 
both in terms of voting behaviour and attitudes towards the welfare state broadly and 
specifically towards health care. Second, but related I describe the development of other 
contextual factors relevant to the health care sector. These include technological change, 
demographic change and economic change. I link these developments to changing 
strategies among the political parties. These new strategies translate into new policy 
proposals. I analyse the origins of these policy proposals, the debate over them and how 
there are implemented and evaluated. This is a process which repeats itself several times 
over the decades and the analysis traces this policy process over time. 
The choice of cases and generalisation 
In a qualitative case-study the choice of cases is important if we want to 
extract more general knowledge about privatisation processes, policies and their effects. 
There are theoretical advantages in choosing the “least likely case” (Eckstein, 1975). The 
least likely case of privatisation is one where its characteristics imply that privatisation is 
unlikely to happen. If privatisation is nonetheless taking place there is a high probability 
that these processes might also occur in other countries. In other words, the least likely 
case provides a stronger grounding for general statements. As Eckstein puts it: “A single 
Crucial case may certainly score a clean knockout over a theory” (1975, p. 127).  
Privatisation in health care can be considered a least likely case in countries with a large 
universal, tax-financed health care system as in Denmark, Sweden and England. All three 
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countries have for a long period had large, integrated National Health Systems covering all 
citizens with free and equal access to health care. The health care systems have all enjoyed 
popular and political support for decades. In Britian the NHS is the crown-jewel of the 
welfare state; in 2008 90% of the Britons supported the NHS as a public and tax-funded 
service and 59 percent of them believed that the British Health Care System is “the envy of 
the world” (Timmins, 2008). Danes and Swedes have similarly high levels of support for 
their universal public health care systems (see chapter 2 and 4). If privatisation takes place 
in health care in Denmark, Sweden or England, it is likely that it might also occur in other 
areas and countries.  
 
Critics may argue that the cases are chosen on the dependent variable, a 
critique often raised against studies in historical institutionalism (Steinmo, 2008a). That is, 
students study why a particular unexpected outcome came about or why an expected 
outcome never came. The critique is, that if one wants to answer the question of “why 
privatisation in health care,” the study should be designed to compare cases where 
privatisation did take place with some cases where it did not – and then to figure out how the 
different independent variables differed between the cases. The answer to that critique is 
threefold. First, there are good reasons for choosing Denmark, Sweden and England. All 
three health care systems are large National health care systems and we should expect them 
to be very resistant to change, in particular to privatisation. Therefore they are solid cases 
to prove a theoretical point, namely that transformative institutional change happens all the 
time, even in the face of what appears to be strong institutional constraints. In other words, 
I am interested in why privatisation took place in these particular countries, because they are 
the ‘hardest cases’ with some of the most universal and public health care systems in the 
world. Second, as the case-studies reveal, there are substantial differences in the way 
privatisation is shaped in Denmark, Sweden and England and the possible explanations 
have different weight in each country. Third, the three cases have sufficient internal 
variation for the choice to be justified. The three countries represent different electoral 
systems, belong to different welfare regimes, have different principles for organising the 
health care system (decentral vs. central), privatisation is introduced by different (left/right) 
government in the different countries and different levels of corporatism (these differences 
are also summerised in table 1.3). Fourth, more pragmatically, it is, in fact, difficult to find 
health care systems in the western world which do not display privatisation trends (Maarse, 
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2006, 2004; Schmid, et al., 2008). The trends of privatisation in health care takes place in 
almost all western European countries that I am familiar with. Finally, and even more 
pragmatically, the choice of cases reflects the possible choices in terms of access and the 
language skills of the author.  
The traditional critique of case studies is, in short, that case studies cannot 
provide reliable knowledge of broader phenomena. However, as Rueschemeyer (2003) 
argues, case-studies can both generate theoretical ideas, test theoretical propositions and 
offer persuasive causal explanations. As a response to the critique of case-studies several 
authors have developed arguments, trying to modify the notion and aim of case studies. 
First, the aim is not to provide knowledge independent of the context (I. Andersen, et al., 
1992; Ragin, 1989; Yin, 1994). In the social sciences the most appropriate knowledge will in 
most cases be dependent on the context it was collected in. Further, the aim is not 
generalisation as in statistical analysis. Yin (1994) makes a distinction between statistical and 
analytical generalisation. Statistical generalisation is made on the basis of a sample, in order to 
give statements concerning the whole population. Analytical generalisation is when 
empirical findings are held and discussed against existing theory. And it is this latter notion 
of generalisation that is interesting when conducting case studies. When attempting 
analytical generalisation cases can be used as metaphors or examples of a new hypothesis. 
This approach is not without problems. There is a risk that the argument will be of the “we 
cannot generalise, but I will do it anyway”-type of solution. There is no easy way to keep 
this balance. I try to minimise this risk by focusing on what is specific for the cases studied, 
and what can be said to be general characteristics for process of privatization and the 
outcomes in each country.  
 
Methodologically, the study employs the strategy of “thick historical 
description and process tracing”, where process tracing is a “detailed analyses of policy 
documents, debates, and histories” (Campbell, 2002). The empirical material for each case 
is historical data, academic work, newspaper articles,22 statistics, and interviews with policy-
                                                 
22
 In each country a comprehensive newspaper search has been conducted using electronic database using 
searchwords as ‘privatisation health care’, ‘choice health care’, ‘private providers health care’, 
‘outsourcing health care’,’private insurance health care’. For England the database used was Lexus 
Nexus, for Denmark Infomedia, for Sweden Presstext. The period searched was 1990-2008. Each search 
resulted in large amounts of articles, which were screened for relevance. The media-search has mainly 
been used to form an image of the public debate on health care and the issue of privatisation. Moreover, 
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makers, civil servants, Union-representatives and independent researchers23. More than 75 
indepth interviews have been conducted over a three year period (2006-2009) in Denmark, 
Sweden and England. Most interviews have been done face to face on research trips to 
Denmark, Sweden and England, while the others have been conducted as telephone 
interviews. The interviews have had several functions: first to learn about the developments 
in each country and to map the playing field of health care; second to gather information 
on different actors’ positions in the policy development and how they played their cards; 
and, thirdly, the interviews have been used to “test” the statements and claims I make in 
the dissertation. By introducing my arguments regarding privatisation to central policy 
actors in each country, I have tested whether these statements “resonate” with the actors 
who were involved in policy-making over the last decade (Kvale, 1997). Finally, 
respondents in all cases have been very helpful in directing me – and giving access – to 
data-sources. 
 
1.8 Outline of chapters 
Chapters 2-4 present the empirical cases: Denmark, England and Sweden. In 
each case, a short description of the country’s political systems and a brief history of the 
health system is provided in order to lay out the political playing field and the historical 
battles of public vs. private health care. These introductory parts of the chapters also 
explain how Sweden came to nationalise all of its health care system, while England and 
Denmark nationalised secondary care and primary care doctors have always been private 
businesses.  
After the introduction, each chapter contains three sections: the first section 
analyses the changes in the electorate with regards to electoral volatility and rising wealth 
and how these changes result in rising demands towards public services. In short it is the 
story about how the working class turns into the middle class in the decades from 1950-
1980 and how that affected citizens’ views of the public sector and ‘the national mood’ on 
the health care system. Here, the analysis will also show how changing attitudes affect voter 
behaviour and kept the social democratic party out of office for almost a decade. This in 
turn made the social democratic party change their policies to regain the electorate. The 
                                                                                                                                               
by comparing these sources with informants’ claims, it has been possible to check the informants 
statements (triangulation).   
23
 The interview guide used for these semi-structured interviews was adapted to the different respondents. 
An example of this interview guide is provided in appendix 1. 
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second section focuses on identifying problems in the health care system. This section will 
deliberately focus on the set of problems, which are on the political agenda. The third 
section analyses the policies introduced to deal with the endogenous problems in the health 
care system and the exogenous demands towards that system. The analysis focuses on 
which policy solutions were selected and why. Further, this section takes a look at the 
consequences of these policy solutions and why they led to privatisation. 
Each narrative will focus on the ongoing interplay between societal context 
and political actors and new ideas of privatisation against an existing universal public health 
care system. A long historical horizon in each analytical narrative will allow the analysis to 
grasp the small marginal changes which over time cumulated into rather large shifts.  
 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and sums up the central arguments: 
privatisation in health care systems is an adaptive strategy responding to both endogenous 
and exogenous problems. Privatisation can be seen as an attempt to help the universal 
model survive, rather than to dismantle it. This policy strategy is not without problems, 
however. The strategy of privatisation itself affects actors and their preferences in the 
health care system, altering the institutional arrangement in health care in Denmark, 
Sweden and England. Political systems are complex and intertwined – change one element 
and several other elements will be affected in ways that are very hard to predict from the 
outset. 
Secondly, the conclusion looks at the theoretical consequences of this view 
of policy making. I will suggest that this insight into the complexity of policy making will 
bring about a better understanding of real world policy making. By focussing on why ideas 
evolve over time we may find a better understanding of why the welfare state is able to 
adapt to changing circumstances and survive, rather than die out, as predicted many times 
in the past. Unfortunately, for some, this view also implies that predicting the future of the 
welfare state is close to impossible. 
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Chapter 2  
 
 
 
 
Denmark: The Rise of a Private Health Care Sector 
 
 
In 2002, a law concerning a one-time investment of 1,5 billion Danish 
Kroner with the aim of bringing down waiting list in hospitals was debated in the Danish 
parliament. The possible investment led to heated debate. No political party was opposed 
to investing more in health care and most parties also agreed that waiting lists was a 
problem in the Danish health care system. The debate circled around the technical 
implementation of the funds and over which results it would bring. The proposal reflected 
that waiting lists in hospitals had been one of the major themes on the political agenda up 
to the general elections in 2001. The policy proposal was another in a line of several 
attempts to bring down waiting lists, which had largely been considered policy failures, at 
least to the extent that there were still long waiting list in the Danish health care system. 
The same law, however, had also another aspect, which was given limited attention from 
the parties in parliament: the law offered a waiting-time guarantee of 2 months, called the 
‘extended choice’-policy; if a public hospital could not offer treatment within 2 months, 
patients had the right to choose treatment elsewhere, in a public or private hospital, either 
in Denmark or abroad. This guarantee did not provoke much debate, although the Socialist 
People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance were critical – however, these parties were not 
expected to agree with the new centre-right government on many issues, if any at all. There 
was not much debate about the waiting guarantee for three reasons: 1) Policy actors did not 
believe that this new choice policy would be used to any significant extent. Patients in 
Denmark had already had choice options since 1992, which very few patients had used; 2) 
The Social Democratic party agreed that choice was an important feature of a modern 
health care system, although they were reluctant to involve the private sector; but 3) the 
private sector virtually did not exist in 2002.  
Nevertheless, the waiting list guarantee and the extended choice options were 
to evolve over time. Patients would begin to exercise choice and choose private hospitals to 
an unexpectedly large extent. In 2001 there were almost no private hospitals in Denmark, 
while in 2007 there were around 178 private hospitals offering treatments and surgery for 
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patients on waiting lists in the public hospitals. In some specialities private hospitals 
conducted 10% of all treatments in 2008. Most of the private sector activity was paid for by 
the public hospitals that could not offer treatment within the guaranteed period (another 
small part was paid by private health insurances, which also rose in popularity in the same 
time span). As such, the regional authorities, responsible for hospital care, were largely 
financing the rise of a private health care sector in Denmark. 
This historical narrative will demonstrate how a significant private hospital 
sector has been built up alongside a public health care system in the past decade. In the 
Danish case there has been political contestation over privatisation. However, the debate in 
the past decade has mainly revolved around how to do it (and not whether to do it). The 
discussion has focused on prices and the length of the guaranteed waiting time. On the 
national level there has been political agreement on the choice policies and the existence of 
private hospitals. Another side of privatisation is the dramatic rise of private health 
insurance in Denmark. This development has resulted in intense political debate and 
contestation. However, I will argue in this chapter that what is sustaining the growth of the 
private hospital sector in Denmark is the choice-policies, rather than the rise in the uptake 
of Private Health Insurances.  
The Danish case is one of gradual change, where policy makers continuously 
puzzle over solutions to policy problems in the health care sector – problems, moreover, 
which change over time. While the health care system expanded and was modernised in the 
postwar decades it created cost-problems. When the cost-problems where solved by 
capping budgets, a new problem arose: waiting lists for treatment. As several attempts to 
solve the problems of waiting lists failed, and citizens increasingly demanded more 
responsive services, the solution puzzled out was to make public hospitals compete with 
private ones. Yet, the aim of this solution was not privatisation per se. Privatisation in 
Danish health care has been an emergent process. An emergent process is one where a new 
patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions (Miller & Page, 2007).24 
Over the past decades the context around health care has changed; citizens have demanded 
more responsive services and choice between providers, as voters their have become more 
volatile and technology has made more health care treatments available. As a response 
policy makers have tried to adapt the health care system. In Denmark, privatisation in 
health care is the result of several small institutional adaptations (reforms) over a long 
                                                 
24
 The term Emergence is often used in connection with Complex Adaptive Systems 
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period of time. Over time patients, private entrepreneurs and national and regional policy 
makers have adapted to changing contexts and created new rules, resulting in a large 
increase in the usage of private hospitals.  
To understand how privatisation entered the political agenda and why it was 
accepted as a policy solution - in an otherwise typical Scandinavian universal public welfare 
state - the analysis will look at the changes in the Danish electorate, their preferences and 
the changes in policies of the major Danish political parties. The analysis reveals how 
private hospitals were completely unacceptable in the mid-1980s, while the Danes slowly 
started to accept the idea in the 1990s and 2000s, at the same time as did the major political 
parties. In this new changing context, private hospitals became accepted as an integrated 
part of the existing institutional frame.  
The chapter is a public policy analysis, where particular attention is given to 
changes in the problems on the health care agenda and the available solutions or policy 
ideas available in the “soup of policy ideas”. The analysis focuses on explaining why 
privatisation became an accepted idea or solution. To do so the chapter considers changes 
in the context, in particular the technological changes in health care and changes in the 
electorate and their preferences over time are important here. Despite the fact that the 
introduction of private hospitals has taken place in the past decade under a right wing 
coalition government, the analysis will also pay attention to the changes in the social 
democratic party’s policies in order to understand why also this party supported the 
policies leading to privatisation of the health care system. Indeed, the analysis shows that 
the policy solution chosen in 2002, which led to increased use of private hospitals, is closely 
connected to debates and policies solutions tested during the social democratic government 
of the 1990s.  
The analysis of privatisation focuses on different sets of policies: 1) choice-
policies enacted in 1992 and 2002; 2) waiting list initiatives in the 1990s; and 3) changes in 
tax policy, which affected the up-take of private health insurance. The aim of the chapter is 
to explain outcomes, not only the decision of a particular law. Therefore the analysis will 
also consider the broader context when explaining the outcome of privatisation.  
The analysis is based on the proceedings of parliamentary debates, a 
comprehensive review of academic literature, a comprehensive review of newspaper 
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articles25 and in-depth interviews with key health care policy actors.26 The narrative traces 
the process of privatisation, the choice of policy instruments, changes in the political 
stream and the national mood (to use the words on Kingdon) and the effects of policy 
choices are also considered to the extent data has been available. In such a public policy 
analysis the political system and the historical legacy of health policy is important, because 
it defines the initial playing field. To properly understand the range of institutional change 
which has taken place in the past decade we need to go back to the birth of the modern 
health care system and the health care crisis of the 1970s. However, initially we will take a 
brief look at the political playing field for health care politics. 
 
2.1 The Danish political system 
Denmark has a multi-party system and no single party has held an absolute 
majority in parliament (The Folketing) since the beginning of the 20th century. Because 
only four post-war governments have enjoyed a majority in parliament, government bills 
rarely become law without negotiations and compromise with both supporting and 
opposition parties. The social democratic party dominated Danish politics from the 1950s 
to the end of the 1970s, the 1980s were dominated by a centre-right coalition, the ‘90s by 
the Social Democrats and the 2000s by another the centre-right coalition. On broad welfare 
state issues the political parties tend to opt for co-operation and compromises to insure 
long-lasting solutions, and the Danish state welfare model receives broad parliamentary 
support.27 The Danish welfare state model is extensive and an example of the Scandinavian 
welfare state model, where the state offers child-care, education at all levels, elderly care, 
health care, unemployment insurance and social benefits, all mainly financed by general 
taxation. In practice the production of welfare service is decentralised to municipalities and 
Regions,28 which each have political bodies. Responsibility for the health care system is at 
                                                 
25
 The media-search includes all major Danish newspapers in the period from 1990-2008 a well as 
professional journals such as The Scientific Journal for the Danish Medical Association and Daily 
Medicin (Dagens Medicin, an independent newspaper on the health sector). Articles were selected based 
on key words in the text (choice, free choice in hospitals, privatisation of hospitals, privatisation in health 
care) 
26
 The respondents have been promised anonymity. A list of informants is provided in appendix 2.  
27
 Historical research shows that in most of the postwar period, welfare policies was supported by the 
broad political spectrum in Denmark (Lidegaard, 2002).  
28
 From 1970-2007 the regional authorities were called ‘Counties’ and there were 14 of them. From 2007 
onwards these authorities were called Regions. In this chapter I will only use the term regions to avoid 
any confusion.  
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the regional level.29 For this reason, the formal influence of national politicians has been 
largely restricted to budget negotiations between the central and regional governments. 
This has meant that the central government had more influence over total health care 
spending than over how those funds were actually spent. This decentralisation is central to 
understanding how Denmark managed to control health care costs, especially during the 
1980s (Vrangbæk & Christiansen, 2005). 
Denmark has a strong corporatist tradition, where employers’ organisation 
and unions have played a central role in policy making. Professional organisations and 
decentral authorities30 are invited to comment on legislative proposals during the legislative 
process in a similar, but not as formally organised, way as in Sweden (see chapter 4).  In 
effect, this setup has meant that the Regions and the professional organisations have had 
large influence over the health care system in particular until the mid 1980s (Pallesen, 
1999). In practice only the very broad lines in health care policy was put down in national 
legislation.31 Instead most of the actual production and regulation took place regionally in 
dialogue with the professional organisations and the National Board of Health. This does 
not imply, as we shall see, that health care policy plays no role in national politics. This 
institutional framework for the health care systems, however, means that the main political 
battleground for health care politics is between the central government, the regions and – 
to some extent – the professionals, the doctors.   
 
2.2 The birth of the modern health care system in Denmark 
The development of the modern health care system in Denmark started in 
the early post-war years. It was driven by economic boom, the rising power of the medical 
profession and several important innovations in medical technology. The health care law of 
1946 had initiated a new health care era, stating that the “hospital sector building and 
expansion [is] to give all citizens access to the – at any given time – best medical treatment” 
(cf. Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007, p. 396). This nailed down the principle of free and equal 
                                                 
29
 From 1970-2007, the health care system was the responsibility of 14 counties (amter), while from 2007 
the health care system resides with 5 regions, due to a structural reform. 
30
 Regions are organised in a central organisation called Danish Regions (formerly called 
Amtsrådsforeningen), just as all municipalities have a central organisation called Local Government 
Denmark, serving the interests of local governments. 
31
 The basic legal frame around the health care system is called the Health Care Law (Sundhedsloven), 
which was first drafted in 1946 and had gone through several changes becoming more and more detailed 
over time.  
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access to health care in Denmark. Two further principles were laid down in the 1946 law; 
the responsibility of hospitals was decentralised to regions and municipalities while the 
state paid the bill.  In the 1950’s several modern hospital projects were initiated, because 
the development in medical technology demanded larger and more centralised and 
specialised hospitals. This development had been pushed by the National Board of Health, 
who for long had been arguing for larger and more specialised hospitals in order to offer 
citizens the best treatment available.32 As the Chair of the Board of health, J. Frandsen, 
argued, it was an “all or nothing” – question. Either the hospitals could offer the best 
treatments (and have the newest technology) or they could not. They had to specialise 
(Frandsen, 1966). In the 1950’s there was little political disagreement over the broad 
questions in health care policy; the broad political spectrum agreed that more spending was 
needed in health care. With the medical technological development at centre stage, a 
growing group of ever more specialised doctors and a health care law from 1946 which 
promised everybody the best treatment and no limits on expenditure, the health care 
system had its own endogenous driver for growth. The 1950’s and 1960’s were the golden 
age of hospital building in Denmark, taking place in the middle of an economic boom 
(Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007).  
Simultaneously, new ideas of broad societal economic principles were also 
changing. Before the war the Social Democrats had mainly focused on redistributive issues, 
but in the economic rise of the 1960’s the party started focusing on economic growth as a 
means to raise employment. Tax-laws were changed to stimulate private investments and 
the credit-market reformed to support the industrial and constructions sectors’ need for 
finance. At the same time the public sector expanded and the social democrats started 
viewing the public sector growth in health care and education as a prerequisite for private 
sector growth and expansion – essentially the Keynesian doctrine. This line of thinking set 
off the economic spending cycle – “we have entered the good circle”, as the social 
democratic Prime Minister, Viggo Kampmann, told the Danes. The Social Democrats won 
the elections held during the 1960’s by large margins. In the decade of the 1960s the 
investments in hospital building and running cost tripled in fixed prices and the number of 
hospital employees almost doubled between 1960 and 1972 (Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007, pp. 
                                                 
32
 These aims were subsequently laid down in rules and recommendations, see for example: 
Bekendtgørelse af lov om udøvelse af lægegerning 9. august 1955, Vejledende retningslinjer for 
planlægningen af sygehusvæsenets fremtidige udbygning 8. juni 1971, nr. 103, Vejledning, Lands- og 
Landsdelsfunktioner i Sygehusvæsenet, Sundhedsstyrelsen 1973. 
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416-417). The good economic times went on and the 1960’s changed not only the health 
care sector but the whole economy. When the social democrats lost the election in 1967, 
the winning right wing coalition government set out to reduce public expenditure as their 
primary goal. But it was not an easy task. In the financial year 1968/69 public expenditure 
increased by 18%. The government managed to reduce the increase to 11% in 1969/70. 
But when the right wing government resigned in October 1971, they looked back at a 
government period with the highest rise in public expenditure in recorded Danish history. 
However, the social democrats also realised that something had to be done about the 
dramatic expenditure rise. In 1972 the Social Democratic Budget-minister, Per Hækkerup, 
headed a group (kulegravningsbanden) tasked with recommending major public savings 
and a retrenchment of social programs. The attempt largely failed because the plan 
involved reducing pensions, which the social democratic government believed would result 
in a major critique from their own central constituency.33 Growth in public spending 
seemed unstoppable, particularly so in the health care sector (Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007, p. 
425), and cutting back on cost was difficult politically. As parliamentarians noticed in the 
Danish parliament in 1950: “our hospitals are increasingly costly and largely we can say that 
these spending increases are unavoidable and hospital boards [managements] are without 
any influence over the size of these costs” and further: ”no-one would refuse the use of 
new medication or new instruments, just as the re-building and modernising of hospitals 
has to be done, even though it is expensive” (cf. Sigrid Vallgårda, 1992, pp. 174-175, 
authors translation). As a result, the health care system was largely in the hands of the 
doctors, who had interests in developing the sector and their own profession. These factors 
were the main drivers of development in an (almost) politician-free environment, without 
(almost) any economic constraints.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 In addition, the government had planned a popular vote on EU-membership in 1972. If the government 
proclaimed retrenchments of the welfare state, they feared that voters would punish the government at the 
EU-vote, because critics of the EU had already been claiming that if Denmark joined the EU it would 
affect the Danish welfare state negatively. A detailed political description of why this attempt and others 
failed are given in Lidegaard  (2002, pp. 596-600). 
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Figure 2.1: Public health care expenditure, Denmark, 1971-2007 (constant 2000-prices, mill. 
DKr) 
 
 
While the expanding secondary health care sector was public provided, 
primary care (GP’s) remained private in Denmark as it had been since the early 1900s. In a 
large structural reform in 1970 (kommunalreformen), which formally decentralised all 
health care areas to the regions, the position of GPs as private businesses was left 
untouched. GPs had the status of liberal businesses with a free right to establish their 
business. This position was highly valued by doctors. It was therefore somewhat surprising 
that the Organisation of Young Doctors in the early 1970s proposed that GPs should be 
nationalised. The organisation did so because they feared unemployment among doctors 
since there had been a significant “overproduction” of doctors in the previous decade. The 
proposal from the younger doctors would eliminate the free choice of doctor and the right 
to free establishment of GP-businesses and make it impossible for doctors to make a profit 
when they sold their business. Instead the public sector was to take over GP functions and 
centralise them in local health care centres, similar to the Swedish primary care model. The 
proposal met hard resistance from the established GPs. The debate continued for some 
years and the media overflowed with stories of GPs and their sky-high profits. The matter 
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was settled in the collective agreements in 1977. The GPs had to make severe concessions 
and accept a “nationalisation light” model to prevent the worst scenario. The right to free 
business establishment was abolished – counties were to regulate how many GP-businesses 
could be set up and where they could be located. Free choice of doctor and the right to 
earn a profit when selling the business remained (Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007, pp. 434-436). 
While GPs remain private businesses up to 2009 they are under strict public regulation, and 
most GPs rely exclusively on the income from the national health insurance. 
In the early postwar years not all Danes were covered by health insurance. 
Instead the population relied on private arrangements called “sygekasser”. This insurance 
was collective, but privately organised, either being related to profession or geographical 
area. In 1940 66% of the Danes were members of an insurance-scheme, which rose to 77% 
in 1950 and by 1970 more than 90% were members. While the insurance system was 
private it was increasingly subsidised with public funding up through the 20th century. In 
1973 the public sector took over the health insurance systems and it became universal 
(Signild Vallgårda & Krasnik, 2007). From 1973, the Danish public health care system was 
the principal source of medical care for the vast majority of Danes. The system is paid for 
out of general taxation, although there is cost-sharing (user-charges) in areas such as 
dentistry, medicine and physiotherapy. 
 To sum up, in the postwar decades (1950s-1980) there was wide consensus 
for building up a large and modern health care system. There was no push for privatisation, 
on the contrary the leading ideas of how to build the welfare society focused on expanding 
the public sector in service delivery, not only to meet equality aims, but also to be able to 
control and enhance the overall economy. Doctors maintained their right to private 
business in the primary sector, although it became increasingly regulated. The building of a 
modern and specialised health care system was not the result of a grand plan. Nevertheless, 
it is fair to say that was a response to a policy problem, namely that there was no adequate, 
integrated medical system, which offered coverage to all citizens. Yet, the massive fiscal 
expansion of the health care system was to create a new policy problem: namely how to 
control costs in this system. 
 
2.3 Technology and health care change 
 It is commonly agreed that technology is an important factor in 
understanding the development of modern health care systems (Twaddle, 1999). In the 
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1980s, an elderly person would be offered a cataract operation if he or she could not see 
anymore. Cataract-operations were at that time rather complicated and required several 
days in a hospital bed. Today, an elderly person is offered a cataract operation when he or 
she has slightly reduced sight and needs to renew a driver’s licence. New technological 
developments have made a cataract operation one which takes one hour and does not 
require a hospital bed. Likewise, 30 years ago most types of cancer were equivalent to a 
death sentence, while today most types of cancer can be treated and cancer patients often 
live a large number of years with cancer under control. This development has been 
extraordinary from the 1950s until today, and it is a feature common to all modern health 
care systems. Through the creation of medical schools and research into the causes and 
treatment of diseases this resulted in a “knowledge explosion” (Twaddle, 1999). This 
development has taken place in a time of increasing need for medical care as the population 
was entering a period of rapid aging. Diagnosis and treatment became more complex, 
requiring more effort in each medical case. This was reflected in the increasing 
specialisation and centralisation of hospitals as described above. New possibilities in 
medical care created increased demand for treatments, resulting in escalating costs. What 
started as an attempt to solve medical problems of technical competence thus generated 
new problems with a both more complex medical care systems and with rising costs. The 
new issues became how to finance these costs and ensure the systems ability to respond to 
the needs of individual patients. As doctors were the authorities in the professional-patient 
relationship, patients had little control and patients increasingly felt alienated.  
 While technological development in health care is largely un-political, it is, 
however, important to understand its relevance for the health care systems. Technological 
development can be considered an underlying driver for increased demand for health care 
services and thus a contributor to the pressure placed on policy makers to deliver the best 
available treatment and to increase the supply of health care services. The process of 
marketisation and privatisation in health care includes (in Denmark, England and Sweden) 
a shift from a ‘supply-based’ system towards a ‘demand-based’ system. In such a system, 
where new technologies offer new treatments and patients increasing can choose and are 
guaranteed treatment, the effects of new technology on service demand are reinforced. It is 
difficult to estimate these effects. In a recent study on the Danish case, it was suggested 
that annual demographic real growth in publicly financed health expenditures is estimated 
to be 0,4 %, while non-demographic (new treatments/increased service supply) real growth 
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was 2,0 % for the period 1993-2008. The most recent decade, where policies have 
increasingly been introducing demand-based mechanisms, showed an annual demographic 
real growth of 0,2 % and non-demographic growth of 2,8 %. The average annual real non-
demographic expenditure growth rate exceeds the growth rate in real productivity per 
working hour by 1,5-2,3 pct. in the period 1999-2008 (Hansen & Pedersen, 2010). In other 
words, technological development and new treatment possibilities are important drivers of 
health care costs.   
 
2.4 The health care crisis bites 
Similar to most other western health care systems, the Danish one came 
under pressure in the 1970s and 1980’s due to the financial crisis. People in western 
countries increasingly demanded quality health care, delivered efficiently, equitably and with 
a focus on the specific needs of the patient. At the same time technological development 
made more and more sophisticated operations and treatments possible. As western 
countries all have health care systems that are largely publicly funded, governments were 
met with enormous pressure to raise funding to meet demands (Elias Mossialos & Grand, 
1999). Moreover, governments and academic analysts started to believe that the best way to 
understand health care financing was Wildavsky’s Law of Medical Money: “medical cost 
will rise to equal the sum of all private insurance and government subsidy.” In other words, 
the demand for health care spending is endless and health systems are not self-stabilizing 
(Wildavsky, 1977). In the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s there were rarely any 
waiting lists in the Danish public hospitals and budgets kept rising. The policy response to 
the health care crisis of the 1970s (of ever rising expenditure) was cost-containment 
measures, primarily by introducing fixed annual budgets with a ceiling on overall 
expenditure for municipalities and regions and global fixed budgets for single hospitals (T. 
Christiansen, et al., 1999). This solution is relatively simple in an all-public health care 
system. Thereby, the central government gained some power to control the overall budget 
and expenditure growth rate,34 although the responsibility for administration and financing 
of health care still resided with the regions. The hospital sector did experience real growth 
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 After the structural reform in 2007, the 14 counties were reduced to five regions and financial 
responsibility was centralised to the national level. The regions can no longer collect taxes, but rely on the 
yearly negotiations with the national government for funding of the health care system.  
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of 4,6 % from 1980-1990, but this was conceived as a major retrenchment (Jacobsen & 
Larsen, 2007, pp. 456-457). 
In the mid 1980s a nation-wide debate took place on priorities in health care. 
The debate was initiated by the Minister of Health Care, Agnete Lausten, who argued in 
1986 that money was better spent on 50 new hips than on one new heart. This statement 
stoked up the health care debate fire even more and made the Minister lose public 
popularity (Petersen, 2005). Making concrete economically motivated priorities between 
different illnesses was clearly difficult.  
While capped or fixed budgets for hospitals have several advantages in terms 
of cost control, they do not generally give incentives to increase efficiency or activity 
(Pallesen, 1997). While a hospital director may find it difficult to force doctors and nurses 
to work harder, patients on a waiting list are more anonymous and may even be used to 
press for increased budgets in future budget-negotiations. The financial limits imposed on 
health care in the 1980’s, and the incentive-structure in this system, combined with a steady 
increase in patients and treatment possibilities, led to rising waiting lists– a phenomenon 
also observed Sweden, England and other OECD countries (Besley, et al., 1999; Hurst & 
Siciliani, 2003). This problem of waiting lists was going to grow, as we will see below. But 
before that we will a look at the first wave of private hospitals in Denmark.  
 
2.5 The private hospitals which died out 
Despite the growth of the universal public health care system, there were still 
entrepreneurs willing to attempt private hospitals in the mid 1980s. When Henrik Erichsen, 
a Copenhagen-based orthopaedic surgeon opened the first private hospital in Denmark in 
1985, he immediately became front-page news. He was criticised heavily on the front page 
of one of the largest dailies in the country and being accused for undermining the public 
health care system. And it was not just any daily, it was the Berlingske Tidende, one of the 
country’s right wing newspapers, which sent its worst wishes to Erichsen’s project. He 
experienced several problems in starting up his business and several attempts were made to 
block the project.35 The environment for private hospitals was close to non-existent. The 
set-up of one single private hospital was unacceptable politically, even in the traditionally 
                                                 
35
 The story was told to the author by Henrik Erichsen in an interview, January 2009. 
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conservative municipality of Frederiksberg.36 At the national level, the Social Democrats 
put forward legislation in 1987 (while in opposition) to forbid private hospitals from 
operating in Denmark altogether, but they could not find a majority in parliament.37 A few 
private hospitals sprung up in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 38, but most went bankrupt 
within a few years. These new hospitals also met strong criticism and opposition from the 
public hospital owners, the Regions, and there was little will for co-operation, although the 
private hospitals lobbied for this.39 Few private patients had the money or the will to enter 
the private hospitals. Finally, the Danish Medical Association and the Association of 
Younger Medical Doctors also voiced strong criticism against the privatisation trends, 
despite the fact that such a development might have given the professionals better 
employment opportunities and better salaries (Krasnik, 2004). The stance of the 
professionals against privatisation is puzzling, considering that doctors historically had 
fought for the right to private practice (Jacobsen & Larsen, 2007). The explanation is 
probably to be found in the Danish egalitarian tradition and in the fact that the younger 
doctors had joined force with the president of the medical association, Erik Holst, who was 
a professor in social medicine and had a close relationship with the Social Democratic party 
(Krasnik, 2004). 
In the debate over private hospitals reservations were voiced that private 
hospitals would undermine the public system and lead to a two-tiered health care. The rich 
would get treated by the good doctors in private hospitals, leaving the elderly and 
chronically ill as well as the obligation to education and research to the public system. This 
would undermine the rich’s willingness to finance the public health care sector through 
taxes and thereby reduce the access to good hospital care for the poor (Hemmingsen & 
Hansen, 1983).  
In the 1980’s there was very little political support, even among right wing 
parties for increasing the number of private hospitals and when the idea was floated it was 
met with resistance, which made their survival difficult and for the most part impossible. 
Among policy makers privatisation in health care was not an option. Nevertheless, over 
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 At that time a few municipalites ran hospitals in the centre of Copenhagen. Erichsen wanted to 
collaborate with one of these hospitals and choose a hospital run by a conservative mayor. Even here he 
was rejected. 
37
 Folketinget, 1987-1988, 1. samling: B10 : Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod etablering og 
drift af private betalingshospitaler i Danmark. Accessible at www.ft.dk 
38
 Among those were The Mermaid Clinic, Mølholm Privathospital, Erichsens Klinik and Hamlet. 
39
 Ritzau Bureau: ”Privathospital på vej ind i den offentlige varme”, 09.06.1991. 
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time, citizens and their preferences change. These changes in the “national mood” in turn 
affected policy actors, who turned to test new policy solutions, which also involve private 
providers, in the 1990s.  
 
2.6 Changes in the national mood – the electorate and their attitudes 
 To understand how the Danish health care system moved from the building 
of a large public system towards a more privatised system it is worthwhile taking a look at 
changes in the electorate over time. Changes in the electorate affect political elites, as 
politicians pay attention to the ‘national mood’, here understood as the preferences and 
demands of citizens. This section will consider changes in the electorate as a whole, but will 
in particular link these changes to changes in the social democratic party and its policies in 
health care. The policies which, more directly, led to the rise of private hospitals were 
enacted in 2002, under a right-wing government, but the ground for these policies was laid 
in the 1990s – under the social democratic government from 1993-2001. 
 The 1980s were dominated by a right wing government, but by that time it 
was already clear that even though right-wing ideology suggested the need to privatise 
welfare state arrangements, this was hardly possible. 30 years of welfare state building had 
established social and economic logics which were difficult to break down. Furthermore, 
welfare state ideology was fundamentally accepted by citizens to the extent that any 
fundamental attack on the welfare state was regarded unacceptable (J. G. Andersen, 1996). 
Yet, new ideas about markets and more efficient public services reached the agenda – 
including the Social Democratic agenda. 
 The social democratic party was faced with several challenges in the 1980s. 
One of them was that the traditional electorate was changing. The working class was 
decreasingly loyal to the Social Democratic party (table 2.1), and what seemed to be 
another problem was that working class was increasingly voting for right-wing parties. 
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Table 2.1: Voting habits among different classes, 1964-1994 
 1964 1968 1975 1979 1984 1988 1994 Change, 1964-
1994 (%-
points) 
Workers         
Left-wing Party 14 18 16 14 17 21 12 -2 
Social Democratic 
Party 
64 53 46 52 47 41 45 -19 
Right-wing Party 22 29 38 34 36 38 43 +21 
Functionary*         
Left-wing Party 7 11 13 16 21 21 15 +8 
Social Democratic 
Party 
33 25 24 36 24 26 30 -3 
Right-wing Party 60 64 63 48 55 53 55 -5 
Independent**         
Left-wing Party 2 3 2 0 3 2 5 +3 
Social Democratic 
Party 
13 6 6 13 6 11 7 -6 
Right-wing Party 85 91 92 87 91 87 88 +3 
Source (J. G. Andersen, 1996, table 2) 
* Here used as an equivalent for middle-class voters 
** Independent mainly includes business owners. 
   
The explanations for the turn to the right among workers are multiple (J. G. Andersen, 
1996, pp. 181-194). But what becomes clear in the 1980s is that class-identification is 
weakened and workers make party choices more independently of class than earlier – the 
electorate became more volatile. New issues reached the agenda (e.g. immigration), issues 
on which workers did not support left-wing or social democratic views (J. G. Andersen, 
1996). In addition between 1950 and 1995, the working class shrank from around 50% of 
the population to around 23%, while the middle class grew to take up more than 60% in 
the mid 1990s. This the well-known story of how the working class increasingly got better 
education, better salaries and jobs shifted from the primary production sector to the service 
sector and this socio-economic shift does not need elaboration here, although it is worth 
noting that this shift is central to the argument presented. As we will see a similar 
development took place in England and Sweden (chapter 3 and 4).  
I suggest that this change also affected voters’ preferences between the 1970s 
and the 1990s. The available surveys cover rather broad questions, but nevertheless give an 
indication of the changing winds in the electorate’s preferences (table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2: Voters’ preferences, 1969-1994, selected issues.  
Percent-differences (agree minus disagree) 
 1969/71 1973/74 1979 1984 1990 1994 
1) Same economic 
terms for everyone 
19 15 10 -21 -23 - 
2) Maintain social 
reforms 
44 -8 25 39 39 35 
3) Increase 
redistribution 
39 32 19 1 26 9 
4) Maintain state-
control over 
businesses 
-9 -12 -10 -23 -26 -25 
5) Nationalisation -64 -42 -52 -57 -61 -79 
Source: J.G. Andersen (1996, tabel 12). 
 
 
Since the early 1970s there has been declining support for economic equality (questions 
1+3) and state regulation and nationalisation (questions 4+5), while the broad support for 
social reforms (question 2) was maintained. In particular the equality aspect is weakened 
and other surveys show a rising individualisation and “everyone has to make it on their 
own”-mentality in the 1980s (Gundelach & Riis, 1992). Despite these changes in values and 
preferences, broad support for the welfare state and public services remained relatively high 
in the 1980s and 1990s and there was a wish for higher spending on central issues such as 
health care and the elderly (table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3: Voters views on public spending, 1979-1994. The public spends too much 
/too little on…. 
(percent-differences, “Too little” minus “too much” ) 
 1979 1985 1990 1994 2008 
Health Care 28 61 61 73 78 
Elderly Care - 68 - 79 - 
Education 22 44 45 42 59 
Childcare 20 24 29 32 - 
Pensions 56 64 57 51 49 
Source: (J. G. Andersen, 1996, table 14), 2008-data from ISSP (2006)-data-set, kindly provided by Prof. 
Jørgen Goul Andersen. 
Note: In 1994 there were majorities against more public spending on Culture, Aid to 3rd world countries, help 
to refugees, social assistance and leaves (sabbaticals).  
 
 
These changes in the electorate’s preferences and the fact that the social 
democratic party was out of the government offices through four consecutive elections in 
the 1980s (1982-1993), put the Social Democratic party under pressure. The party had to 
undergo changes in order to either entice new or regain their old worker voters who had 
moved to the right end of the political spectrum. This change of the party took place in the 
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1980s and early 1990s. In 1992 the Social Democratic party released a new party 
programme, “The New Century” replacing the 1977 manifesto “Solidarity, Equality and 
Well-being.” As the two titles also suggest, the 1992 manifesto aimed to renew the party. 
The 1992 manifesto still commits the party to democratic socialism, but the Marxist class-
analysis and capitalist critique is absent, while the words ‘free’ and ‘freedom’ are mentioned 
17 times in the first two pages. The manifesto states that freedom and equality are equally 
important goals, which can be combined. The programme stressed diversity, 
decentralisation and plurality and suggested that the market might have positive sides 
(Social Demokratiet, 1992a). The working programme of the social democratic party, also 
issued in 1992, was strongly committed to the universal health care system, but recognised 
waiting list in hospitals as one of the major problems in health care (Social Demokratiet, 
1992b). 
Problems regarding rigidity in the health care system, problems of quality and 
waiting lists are put on the political agenda already in the 1980s (Blom-Hansen, 1998b; 
Vrangbæk, 2004). In 1991, the term “the lethal waiting list” was coined in the media 
illustrating that waiting lists were becoming a salient political problem as it was being 
conceived as a health care problem.40 At the same time, the idea of having private hospitals 
help reduce waiting lists was also introduced into the political debate, but no institutional 
framework was built to sustain it. Doctors warned that underinvestment in public hospitals 
would lead to declining health levels and that privatisation would be a more expensive road 
to travel (Jes Olesen, 1992).   
When the social-democrats came to power after the national election in 1993 
there were large debates concerning the outsourcing of public services. Although the 
social-democrats were willing to accept that services such as cleaning could be out-sourced, 
the Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen made it clear in 1994 that services such as 
hospitals, care for elderly, nursery-homes, childcare etc. had to remain in the public sector 
(Valgreen-Voigt, 1994). The main opposition party, Denmark’s Liberal Party, was more 
unclear about which stand to take. In 1996, the party-leader, Uffe Elleman Jensen made it 
clear that the party did not intend to privatise secondary health care and that “it is our clear 
opinion that we need to continue to have a public health care system” and the party was 
willing to invest more in public health care (Rønnov, 1996).  However, only shortly 
thereafter the same Liberal Party released a new policy programme declaring that they were 
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 Politiken: ”Det private sygdomsmarked vokser”, 14.04.1991 
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aiming to privatise some parts of the hospital system and suggested that 10% of hospital 
beds should be private (T. K. Andersen & Krohn, 1996). At that time, however, they were 
in opposition in parliament.  
In the first half of the 1990s it was becoming clear that the public health 
system displayed several important problems. The most important of them was the rising 
concern over waiting list in the public system (Sundhedsinstitut, 1996). Voters in the early 
1990s had changed position on the question of private hospitals and had become more 
positive towards private hospitals and the out-sourcing of health care services. In 1984 a 
survey showed a majority against the notion of private hospitals. In 1994 a similar survey 
showed a majority of citizens in favour of private hospitals, with only 23% against them. 
73% of the population agreed that the public sector should pay private hospitals in order to 
bring down waiting lists (Kristiansen, 1994). This may reflect the ongoing debates about 
waiting lists in the early 1990’s, but more likely it was the beginning of a more profound 
change in attitude towards the public sector and an increased acceptance of the role of the 
private sector. Moreover, the existence of a private alternative would increase the 
possibilities of choice. Voters appreciated the possibility to choose private schools and in 
the same manner the harsh scepticism towards private hospitals had also weakened (J. G. 
Andersen, 1995; Hoff, 1993). Therefore, the social democratic party did not contribute to 
its renewed image by insisting in 1993/1994 that private hospitals should not play a role in 
solving the waiting list problem,41 when voters in those years found waiting list to be a very 
pressing problem – in 1995 even a more important problem than unemployment.42 In 1996 
a group of younger progressive social democrats suggested that the public sector could out-
source hip-operations to the private sector, to get rid of waiting lists for this particular 
need. This proposal was clearly rejected by the leaders of the social democratic party. 
Nevertheless, these new solutions of private providers were aired in the mid-1990s even 
from within the social democratic parties.  
 
To sum up, the Danish electorate has changed over the past 4 decades. No 
single class can be expected to vote for a particular party (except maybe the independent 
businesses) as voter volatility is rising. This change has two important consequences for 
this analysis. First, voters’ preferences change and so do their views on public vs. private 
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 Morgenavisen Jyllandsposten, September 21st, 1993.  
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 According to a survey by IFKA/århus Stifttidende, October 15th, 1995. Here cited from (J. G. 
Andersen, 1996, p. 201) 
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health care. Second, for political parties this meant that new solutions and new policies had 
to be found – in particular for the social democratic party this was the case, although some 
parts of the party disagreed on the new course of the party. As the waiting list problem 
grew salient, new solutions were suggested in the health care debate, the notion of choice 
and private providers among them. In other words, political actors consider new policy 
solutions as the context changes. In the following three sections I will examine in more 
detail how these solutions were puzzled over and tested. 
 
2.7 Policy problems and policy solutions: Competition and choice in Denmark  
Competition and choice are powerful ideas, which swept across public 
sectors in western countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). They have 
been presented as solutions to the critique of the inefficiency and poor standards in public 
sector services. In health care policy the reforms have been seen as possible solutions to 
problems such as long waiting lists, inefficiency of public production, and low 
responsiveness to patient needs and wishes. Outsourcing of services to private providers 
was considered one solution, which, through competitive means, would result in lower cost 
and higher efficiency. “Choice” is another mechanism which is believed to increase 
competition and create incentives for hospitals to reduce waiting lists by increasing 
efficiency. Furthermore, choice is presented as having a value in itself for patients, now 
being able to exercise a choice, rather than have to cope with “whatever the doctor 
prescribes,” and thereby increasing the total utility of the health care system without using 
extra resources. Finally, it is expected that patients will seek out the hospitals with shortest 
waiting lists and best quality.    
Despite the existence of these new ideas on the agenda, privatisation is an 
unlikely policy change in the Danish (and Scandinavian) setting of public, integrated health 
systems with a strong degree of decentralization, since it challenges a number of existing 
structures and institutions. Christiansen concluded in 1998 that market solutions was “a 
prescription rejected” in the Danish case (P. M. Christiansen, 1998). As recently as 2002 an 
academic evaluation of the Danish health care system concluded that there is a: 
 
current international move to greater market orientation of health services. It 
has largely been resisted in Denmark. More accurately, it has been deemed 
irrelevant to the Danish health care objectives. The market thrust in other 
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countries appears rather alien to the whole Danish health service and indeed 
to Danish culture more generally (Mooney, 2002, p. 170). 
 
From an administrative perspective, with the monopoly of provision broken, the planning 
capacity and the strong links between a given regional population and the chosen level of 
public service are weakened. For hospital managers the privatisation process represents a 
risk of losing “customers” in a more competitive environment. But at the same it can 
represent an opportunity. With privatisation and choice policies the playing field is opened 
up: hospitals or departments can choose to expand to attract patients, or hospital or 
departments could be forced to close down due to a lack of “customers.” Such 
developments conflict with typical social policy objectives of (geographical) equity, access 
and robustness in service delivery. From a patient perspective, the relationship between the 
individual citizen and the health care system changes in the sense that patients become 
more empowered when they can choose their hospital to get faster treatment. Thus there 
are a number of political issues at stake which make marketisation or privatisation 
problematic or at least contestable. Despite these barriers, the decades from 1990-2010 
have witnessed several policies which have lead to increased privatisation. The following 
sections will show how these policy solutions were chosen and how they developed over 
time.  
 
2.8 1992: Choice in health care – a large solution for the very few 
Free choice of hospitals was introduced on the public agenda in the early 
1990’s. It was mainly discussed as a solution for patients who were complaining about the 
rigid administrational boundaries between the regions, which administered the health care 
system. Being resident in one region meant that a person could not use the hospital 
services in neighbouring regions, although that same person might live closer to a hospital 
in a neighbouring region. Choice as a policy proposal was picked up by the right-wing 
coalition government, who saw a larger potential for free choice-policies. The Prime 
Minister stressed in the opening speech to the parliament in 1991 that free choice among 
hospitals would be an instrument that would give citizens freedom of choice in hospitals, 
improve service and reduce waiting lists (Vrangbæk, 1999, p. 67). The choice policy was put 
on the agenda by the right-wing coalition government, but the initiative gained support 
from all major parties in 1992. The introduction of choice onto the political agenda was a 
result of patients demanding flexibility and better services and national politicians seeking 
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to improve the legitimacy of the health care system (Vrangbæk & Østergren, 2006). 
National politicians argued that the administrative borders between counties created too 
much trouble and transport for citizens and that introducing choice would solve the 
problem. The Regions, which were responsible for running the hospitals, initially opposed 
the idea, arguing that it would imply too much administrative trouble, costly transactions 
between regions, and that it could reduce the potential for efficient planning in health care. 
The Association of County Councils (Amtsrådsforeningen, representing the regions) tried 
to prevent the choice-policy, but when realising that they would fail in this attempt, the 
regions entered a voluntary agreement on free choice before a parliamentary decision was 
made to force the law through. One the one hand this was a defensive move on the part of 
the regions to maintain control over the design of the system and the changes that were to 
be made (Vrangbæk & Bech, 2004), rather than an embracement of the policy. 
Interestingly, the choice policy was first put in place between three counties dominated by 
social-democratic mayors43 on the 1st of January 1991. Due to a change of government in 
1993, free choice in secondary health care was implemented by the social democratic 
coalition government of 1993–2001. The parliamentary decision on the 1992 choice reform 
ended in a cautious approach when spelling out the details of the policy. A number of 
restrictions were built into the policy after pressure from the Regions. Due to weak 
incentives and institutional barriers very few citizens exercised their right to choose 
between hospitals (Vrangbæk & Bech, 2004). 
Consequently, the 1992 choice-reform did not create a free market in 
secondary health care. It ended up as a large solution for the very few that had experienced 
problems with the administrative borders of Regions. While there is a principle of 
decentralisation in health care, this policy indicates, however, that national policy makers 
started to interfere with health care policy – in this case, because national politicians 
believed themselves to have strong support from patients and citizens. Nevertheless the 
Regions did indeed maintain large amounts of influence over the policy, which is indicated 
by the fact that the policy was eventually watered down, with the result that regions to a 
large extent maintained administrative control over health care, and that in practice there 
was very limited cross-region mobility of patients (Vrangbæk & Østergren, 2006). The 1992 
reform was an attempt to adapt the health care system and make it more flexible to 
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 The county mayors were Social democrat Bent Hansen (The County of Viborg), Social democrat Søren 
Madsen (The County of Nordjylland) and Social democrat Ib Frederiksen (The County of Århus) 
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patients. In reality, however, there was no market installed in the 1992 choice reform and it 
did not create the expected results. There was a lack of a real price mechanisms and limited 
information available for patients who wished to choose. Albeit choice was not a major 
success in terms of high patient mobility, the new idea had gained ground and some 
regions saw possibilities in the new regime. 
In 1992 the County of Sønderjylland established a hospital in Åbenrå. This 
was set up as an independent organisation with more autonomy, which was to sell its 
services to the region but was also allowed to sell its service to other purchasers in the new 
choice regime. This hospital out-sourced a range of services to private providers.44 In 
1998/1999 Hørsholm Hospital was transformed into an independent organisation 
(frisygehus), working primarily for the Region, but it was allowed to make patients jump 
the queue if they would pay out of their own pocket. Further, Hørsholm hospital was to 
give priority to attracting patients from other regions in order to make an income from 
other Regions.  
Surprisingly, the initial reaction to these experiments from the social-
democratic Minister of Health was very limited, maybe even slightly positive – signalling 
that also the social democrats needed to try out new ways to meet the citizens demand for 
lower waiting lists (Nielsen, 1998). After the negotiations of the state-budget by the end of 
1998, the social-democrats officially accepted that private hospitals could play a role in 
insuring that patients received faster treatment, if the public hospitals could not provide 
treatment fast enough. This was, however, limited to a small number of illnesses and in 
practice, the private sector had little capacity in these areas. The social-democrats tried to 
downplay the importance of the private hospital sector, by stating that this was by no 
means the beginning of a privatisation of health care (Jessen & Petersen, 1998). Despite 
these signals, the experiments with more autonomy to hospitals were eventually cancelled 
by the Ministry of Health. The ministry ruled that hospitals were not allowed to charge 
patients who were entitled to free health care and that, even though autonomous, the 
regional political council were always responsible for hospitals and this responsibility could 
not be put in the hands of a board of directors (Krasnik, 2004). 
In parallel with the choice policies ran another debate, including a set of 
policies closely connected to the choice-agenda. In the 1990s several initiatives were being 
put in place to solve the rising problem of waiting lists.  
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 The hospital of Åbenrå in the county of Sønderjylland.  
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2.9 Waiting list initiatives in the 1990s in Denmark. 
The problem of waiting lists already existed in the early 1980s but was rising 
on the political agenda in the 1990s. This section illustrates how policy actors continuously 
redefined this problem and sought long and hard for solutions to it. The section also 
illustrates that waiting lists are complex phenomena, making it difficult to find solutions 
which are technically optimal. In this debate, private hospitals came to play a role because 
several policy actors suggested that involving private providers could solve the waiting list 
problem.  
In 1981 the Organisation of Counties (Amtsrådsforeningen) set up a working 
group to define waiting lists and in 1982 the Ministry of Internal affairs set down a working 
group which was to describe the waiting list problems and suggest solutions. Several 
attempts to define and register waiting lists were made in the 1980s. The task was not easy. 
In fact, there were various problems in registering waiting lists, concerning both how to 
define them and how to get data of acceptable quality (Vrangbæk, 2004).  
Despite data problems, there were some indications of how big the problem 
was in the mid 1990s: 68% of all hospital patients were treated with no waiting time – they 
were acute patients. 8% of all hospital patients waited more than three months. In 1992, 
28% of the non-acute hospital patients waited more than three months for an operation 
and this figure had risen to 35% in 1995 even though activity had been rising in the same 
period (Vrangbæk, 2004, pp. 28-29). Three initiatives were taken in the 1990s to fight the 
problem. The following list of initiatives on waiting lists builds mainly on Vrangbæk (2004) 
and Blom-Hansen (1998b). Understanding these initiatives gives important insight into the 
choice of the policies, which, later on in time, led to privatisation of the hospital sector in 
Denmark.  
By the end of the 1980s the first ideas about ‘waiting time guarantees’ were 
born. One region (Vejle Amt) introduced waiting lists guarantees for their own patients. 
The guarantee was a goal/aim, but did not grant citizens any rights – there were no 
consequences or sanctions if the aim was not reached. In 1989-1991 the weekly newsletter 
for doctors (Ugeskrift for Læger) published short articles on waiting times. Hospital activity 
was clearly rising, but the percentage of patients waiting more than three months had 
remained constant. In 1992 the organisation of regions suggested setting a six month 
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waiting time guarantee for selected treatments (Amtsrådsforeningen, 1992). In short, the 
problem was rising on the political agenda. 
The social democratic party, which was in opposition in the 1980s, primarily 
suggested reducing waiting lists by giving more resources to the hospital sector. In the early 
1990s the party formulated a strategy on three months waiting time guarantee. In 1992 the 
parliament debated a suggestion by the social democrats to introduce a waiting time 
guarantee combined with activity-based financing of hospitals. The proposal was 
apparently inspired by the British “Citizens Charter” (see also chapter 3), which offered a 
set of rights to citizens in relation to public services.45 In Britain the charter was 
implemented by the Conservative Government of John Major, indicating that such patient-
rights might be part of a broader set of ideas. The right-wing coalition government rejected 
the social-democratic proposal with reference to public finances and to the fact that the 
proposal would interfere with the principle of decentralisation, where regions were to be 
given autonomy to solve the problems regionally. 
The way of dealing with waiting list during the right-wing coalition 
government from 1982-1992 was in the yearly negotiations on the economy between the 
central government and the regions, respecting the decentralised health care system. After 
the government changed in 1993 to a social democratic government, the first national 
waiting list initiative was installed in 1993. The waiting time agreement (Ventetidsaftalen) 
was an agreement between regions and the central government which aimed to bring down 
waiting time to three months for hospital treatment. To work out the details of how this 
aim could be met, a working group was initiated. This working group considered the 
waiting list problem to be a problem of a backlog, which had accumulated over time. This 
way of conceiving the problem also determined the policy solution; the working group 
focussed on how to get rid of this backlog – in other words: how many extra operations 
were necessary in order to make waiting lists disappear in 1995? There were disagreements 
over the results of the analysis. The regions argued that the need was double of what was 
being estimated by the Ministry of Health. The regions had obvious economic interests in 
maximising the need. Eventually, the numbers ended close to what the Ministry of Health 
suggested. Nevertheless, in 1994 it was realised that the guarantee could not be met by 
                                                 
45
 The Social Democratic party were further inspired by Norway, in which a system of priorities in 1991 
gave patients a six months waiting time guarantee (for the most common non-acute illnesses), and 
Sweden, which had chosen a three months waiting time for selected treatments (Blom-Hansen, 1998b; 
Vrangbæk, 2004). 
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1995. The Ministry therefore agreed with the Regions to increase activity (at the end the 
Regions got it their way). In total, 1 billion DKK was invested in the waiting list initiative 
between 1993-1995. Despite this investment and the focus on reducing waiting the aims 
were not met. Despite rising activity between 1992-1994, waiting times had also gone up 
(Ministry of Health, 1997). The government and the regions agreed to give up the general 
waiting time guarantee.  
As it became clear that the guarantee had failed, the government started 
considering other policy instruments. There were debates about whether to try activity-
based financing. However, in 1994 a government working group46 issued a report (SØK-
rapporten), stating that “the group cannot generally recommend activity-based financing as 
a steering mechanism, but recommends that counties [regions] test activity-based financing 
in units with well-defined tasks.” The report further recommended that a new report 
should examine whether the three month waiting guarantee could be realised at all. In other 
words, there was still uncertainty over this question in 1994. Furthermore, the report noted 
that for the waiting guarantee to be realised, it was important to avoid “indication”-creep, 
which would lead to more patients in the queue – and thereby worsening the problem of 
waiting lists. Further, there was a need to improve the information available for patients. 
The report illustrated that waiting lists was now considered a real policy problem. There 
was, however, still uncertainty over how to define the problem and which policy-solutions 
to recommend. While it was recognised that activity-based financing could contribute to 
increased production, the report was cautious towards such a mechanism for that same 
reason. It was feared that activity-based financing would breach cost-control.  
In 1994, Denmark’s Liberal Party, now in opposition, suggested that new 
measures had to be tried out. The party suggested that the experiments with Åbenrå-
hospital (giving patients the possibility of paying their own treatment) and “free-hospitals” 
(with activity-based financing) should be established in all regions, municipalities should be 
allowed to use private hospitals, there should be more outsourcing of operations and that 
money would ‘follow the patients’ in need of heart surgery – also to the private hospitals. 
In other words, there should be more competition and economic incentives in specific 
specialities. The Social Democratic government was reluctant to approve private 
treatments, but nevertheless decided to issue a law in 1994 which granted patients the right 
to a maximum waiting time of three months for knee-operations and slipped-disc-
                                                 
46
 Regeringens Udvalg vedrørende Sygehusenes Økonomi. 
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operation. This was new for two reasons. First, it was a national law granting patients a 
right, whereas the former initiative had been an agreement with the regions. Second, the 
law stated that if the region could not fulfill the guarantee, it had to offer patients treatment 
either in another region or in a private hospital. This solution was put forward due to the 
pressure for a solution on the waiting time problems and the pressure to test out new 
policy solutions. After one and a half years, the law was abandoned (Regeringen og 
Amtsrådsforeningen, 1996). The evaluation of the project showed mixed results. With 
regards to knee-operations, activity had gone up, but there were still more than 40% of 
patients waiting more than three months. The evaluation, once again, showed that the 
policy solution chosen did not solve the problem (DIKE & DSI, 1996). The regions had 
not favoured a national law to guarantee patients waiting times – instead the regions argued 
for decentralised solutions and more funds. As the chair of the Organisation of Counties 
(right-wing politician Kresten Phillipsen) said: “a guarantee does not create more money. 
When we give priority to knees, we are simply pushing the problem to hips […] the scheme 
is bad and so the results show” (cf. Vrangbæk, 2004, p. 47).  
While the debate on waiting lists rumbled on, the government did not issue 
any new laws on waiting time until 1999. In 1996 there were several suggestions on letting 
private hospitals take part in the free-choice-of hospital scheme from 1992. There were 
suggestions concerning letting “money follow the patient” but the regions resisted, even 
the ones dominated by right-wing politicians were sceptical towards private hospitals 
(Vrangbæk, 1999, p. 150). But in 1996 all parties agreed to await the report of the hospital-
commission (sygehus-kommissionen) which was to come out in 1997. Contrary to the 
expectations, the commission did not recommend large changes – but recommended 
continuing with a system of capped budgets and negotiated contracts between the state and 
the regions, while there could be made experiments in specific areas, for example elective 
surgery. The main reason for holding on to a non-activity-related financing model for 
health care was, again, cost-control. Activity-based financing could create incentives for 
hospitals to increase production, at the expense of budget-control, argued the report. On 
waiting times, the report concluded that there would always be waiting times, although too 
long a waiting time was unacceptable for some illnesses (Sundhedsministeriet, 1997). While 
the government issued a law to strengthen the ‘free choice policy’ in 1997 and a law on 
patient-rights in 1998, none of these included new initiatives on the waiting problem 
(Vrangbæk, 2004, pp. 49-50). In 1998 an ‘activity-based financing light’ was agreed as a part 
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of the negotiations on the state budget, requiring that from 2000 10% of hospital income 
should come on the basis of activity, despite the fact that experts and regions resisted this – 
here the aim was exactly to create incentives for hospitals to increase production. 
In 1999 the Social Democratic government once again developed a new 
attempt to reduce waiting lists. The government consequently issued a guarantee that 
offered patients waiting time guarantees to twelve life-threatening illnesses, in particular 
cancer and heart problems. The regions had already launched a plan for this guarantee, but 
the government felt a responsibility to legislate nationally. If regions could not deliver in 
time, they were obliged to offer the patient treatment in another region, abroad or at a 
private hospital. The access to private providers had been pushed for several times in 
1997/8 by the right-wing opposition (Vrangbæk, 2004, p. 50). The regions were satisfied 
with the guarantee; it was a guarantee which they were almost delivering already. Observers 
also commented that the guarantee was unlikely to change much; the central problem was 
that all regions were lacking capacity, there were no private hospitals to send patients to 
and few patients were expected to accept an offer of treatment abroad. There was no 
official evaluation of the guarantee, but waiting lists did not disappear and critique of the 
policy went on in 2000/1. In 2000 the regions become more sceptical of the guarantees, 
arguing that it eschewed priorities in medical care and was expensive to administer.  
To make a long story somewhat shorter: waiting time in the hospital sector 
was certainly high on the political agenda in the 1990s. There was a great deal of debate 
over how to understand and frame the problem. While initially considered as a problem of 
backlog, it was later on reconceived as more of a structural problem. Over the course of 
the decade it became clear that it was difficult to determine the connection between 
instruments or policies to reduce waiting lists and the actual effect (Blom-Hansen, 1998b; 
Ministry of Health, 1997; Vrangbæk, 2004). With the concepts of Kingdon: there was still 
some distance between the ‘problem stream’ and the ‘policy solution stream’. But the 
waiting initiatives are clear examples of how policy makers try to adapt the health care 
system and make accommodate the demands of citizens. Most of these attempts fail, 
because modern health care systems are complex and so is the waiting list problem. An 
effective solution is difficult to find. 
According to Vrangbæk (2004) some of the factors that affected waiting lists 
are the following: 1) Changing demographics of the population; citizens are getting older 
and consume more health care services. 2) New technology makes new diagnostics and 
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treatments available, which will increase the number of patients who can be treated. In 
some cases, these new treatments can be handled by GPs in which case the hospital waiting 
list may be reduced. 3) New methods in surgery and medicine become more sensible, 
which makes operation on weaker and older patients possible. 4) Patients are becoming 
more demanding, sometimes caught by the phrase “never have so many suffered so much 
from so little” and further knowledge about treatments (and thereby patients possibility of 
demanding) is widely spread through new media. 5) If waiting times are reduced due to 
increased capacity, the number of referrals often rises. This happens either because the 
criterion for treatment “drifts” or because referral practice is changed. 6) New illnesses are 
accepted, for example environment- or life-style related problems. 7) Free choice of 
hospitals may increase waiting lists for hospitals which are well-reputatet or 8) patients are 
being transferred to a particular hospital. These last two factors may increase waiting lists 
locally but not on a national level. In short, waiting lists in hospitals are affected by a 
complex set of factors both on demand- and supply side. Puzzling out an effective solution 
was difficult.  
National policy makers implemented three policy solutions to the waiting 
problem in the 1990s. All of them were, broadly speaking, policy failures, at least to the 
extent that they did not solve the problem (i.e. waiting lists persisted). There were large 
disagreements between national politicians and the regions, who wanted to keep their 
autonomy. Over the course of the decade the political actors (both national and regional) 
changed their preferences to solutions. There was an increasing acceptance of experiments 
with activity-based financing, there was an increasing acceptance of involving private 
hospitals (despite the fact, that practically none existed) and there was an increasing will, at 
the national political level to issue laws on waiting time guarantees rather than relying alone 
on the system of “agreements” between the state and the regions – at least when it came to 
waiting in hospitals. Experts in the hospital commission did not recommend marketisation 
of the hospital sector, but did suggest that experiments could be made. The waiting 
problem had grown so important on the political agenda that national politicians felt 
compelled to act. The guarantee issued in 1999 was the effect of such pressure. While the 
social democratic government was under pressure in parliament to deliver a solution, they 
had also almost lost the 1998 election because they had not delivered a solution to the 
problems in the health care sector. While the Danes profoundly supported the universal 
health care system, they found it at the same time inadequate.          
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2.10 Trust in public health care, late 1990s. 
In most European countries people basically agree that “taking care of the 
ill” should be a primary public responsibility (Taylor-Gooby, 1999). The same goes for the 
Danish case, where 94% of the population in 1994 believed that health care was definitely a 
public sector responsibility (J. G. Andersen, 2000). Throughout the 1990’s there was huge 
public debate about the waiting lists in - and the quality of - the Danish public health care 
system. These debates affected the population’s trust in public health care. Combined with 
a more general discussion about the long-term problems of public sector finance, this 
contributed to a popular sense that there might not exist a satisfying public health care 
system in the future. In 1999, 30% of Danes were of the impression that the public 
hospitals did not offer adequate service; however, only 20% though that the quality offered 
in other countries was better. However, the large majority (69%) of the population more or 
less agreed that they would be able to get a fully satisfactory treatment in the public health 
care system (J. G. Andersen, 2000, p. 11). But when it came to people’s perception of 
private vs. public hospitals, the picture is somewhat different, as shown in table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Perceived quality in public and private health care (% of 
population, 1999) 
 Where is treatment 
preferred? 
Where is quality highest? 
Private hospital 44 42 
No difference 18 22 
Public hospital 25 2 
Do not know 13 33 
Source: (J. G. Andersen, 2000) 
       
A majority of 44 % replied that they would prefer a private hospital if they had the choice 
without costs and only 25 % had a public hospital as their first priority. The public 
hospitals came out even worse with regards to quality assessment. Almost none believed 
that the quality was best at the public hospitals. 42 % answer that private hospitals are 
better quality. These figures indicate that trust in the public hospitals and the treatments 
they offer was rather low. Even though the public health care system enjoyed public 
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support at the principle level, the perception that the private alternative was superior to the 
public was widespread among the public in 1999.  
Andersen (2000) goes further and shows that in 1999 there was also little 
trust that there would be sufficient economic resources in the public health care system in 
the future. In 1999, 72% of the Danes expected that there would be more user-payment in 
the future; 74% believed that they would have to pay themselves if they wanted to avoid 
long waiting lists; 53% thought that people would have to purchase private health 
insurance (PHI), if one wanted to be sure to get the best possible treatment. There was also 
a clear tendency that people wanted more individual treatment and to be involved in 
decision-making with regards to their own treatment.  
Another measure of trust in the public health care system can be found in 
surveys of whether people would be interested in PHI as a labour market fringe. In 1999, 
PHI was not on the political agenda or a part of the usual fringe-packages and therefore 
this gives us an indication of whether people would hypothetically be interested in PHI’s. 
Since it is always easy (and free) to answer “yes” to such a question, the first surprise is that 
only 34% were more or less interested, while 52% were not interested in PHI’s at all. On 
the other hand 70% agreed that expenditure for the public health care system should be 
increased, which could indicate a more general support for the public system, rather than 
the private (J. G. Andersen, 2000).  
As mentioned in the former section, policy makers were aware of the 
mounting criticisms of the public health care system and aware that declining trust affected 
the legitimacy of the system. At the national election in 1998 health care was a highly 
salient political issue. The social democrats, which had been in government since 1993, 
almost lost the election because they had proved unable to deal with the waiting lists in the 
health care system. The discontent with public hospitals is also reflected in survey data. 
 
Table 2.5: Survey: How well do the public hospitals work?   
 Fine Quite 
well 
 
Not 
quiet 
well 
Bad Don’t know Opinion balance 
(Good minus bad) 
Election 1998 8 26 45 19 2 -30 
Election 2001 10 33 44 11 2 -12 
Election 2005 15 39 36 7 3 +11 
Election 2007 16 27 39 16 2 -12 
Source: (J. G. Andersen, 2009) 
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By the end of the 1990s policy makers had learned two important lessons: waiting lists and 
unresponsiveness in the health care system was becoming a major political problem and 
second, that waiting lists in the public systems are a complicated matter, difficult to fight. 
Against this background, with continued pressure for improving the health care system and 
several discussions and trial-and-error processes of different solutions a new government 
entered office in 2001. 
 
2.11 Enter the private sector: The ‘extended choice’ – policy. 
When the right wing government won the election in 2001 one of the 
election pledges was – once again – to lower waiting lists for hospitals. New solutions had 
to be developed. The main proposal of the new government was to invest 1,5 billion DKK 
in hospital care but to link this to activity. The prerequisite for an activity-based financing 
system was the DRG-system, which had been developed in the late 1990s under the social 
democratic government. All parties agreed that investing in health care was a good idea. 
But the proposal created a heated debate, mainly because opponents argued that it would 
reward laggards and keep the effective and productive hospitals away from these new 
funds.   
In 2002 the “extended choice reform” was adopted by parliament (L64, 
2002b). Closely linked to earlier debates, the reform gave all patients rights to treatment 
within two months – a new “waiting-list guarantee”. If the public sector could not provide 
treatment within 2 months, patients could choose a private alternative, either in Denmark 
or abroad, without costs to the patients, but paid for by the public hospital, which could 
not provide the service within the two-months limit. However, in order to have some 
control of which health care providers are allowed to spend public money, the private 
hospitals, who wanted to provide services for patients under the waiting-list guarantee, had 
to sign an agreement with the Danish Regions, a collective body, which organises the five 
regions (formerly the 14 counties) in the country. In the agreement, terms of cooperation 
are laid down, with regards to which type of operations, type of patients and prices. The 
aim of this policy was not to save money, but, again, to reduce waiting time. In the first 
debate in parliament the private sector was mentioned but most debate centred around the 
1,5 billion kr. to the health care sector. In the second parliamentary debate, only the small 
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extreme-left party mentioned private hospitals. Indeed no-one in 2002 expected private 
hospitals to play any significant role in Danish health care.  
In the final debate of the law, the minister of health care (Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen) stated: “The private hospitals are thought of as another incentive for the 
public health system, as a valve, as the possibility the patient gets, if the public health care 
system cannot deliver treatment in time. It is not the rule, it is the exception” 
(Parliamentary debate, L64, 2002; Authors translation). It was estimated that an extension 
of free choice to include private hospitals would be cost-neutral, that is, it would incur no 
cost to the state (L64, App. 1). The social democrats supported the law. As one policy 
analyst told this author:  
…there was no debate about the private hospital proposal in 2002, because 
no-one believed that the [private] sector was going to play any role. In fact 
the proposal resembled earlier attempts to reduce waiting lists and patients 
had already the right to choose private hospitals in the 1990s – but almost no 
patients did (interview with author, 21.01.09). 
 
In other words, policy elites did not expect the private sector to grow. The 
1,5 billion DKK. to reduce waiting lists disappeared from the public agenda after a few 
years as these extra funds were made permanent.47 Instead, to the surprise of most analysts 
and commentators, the private sector profited enormously from the new opportunities in 
the waiting time guarantee. Despite much resistance from Regions ‘the waiting time 
guarantee’ had a significant effect on Danish health care. This happened because the idea 
of how to use the private sector had changed slightly since the attempts in the 1990s. First, 
Regions were obliged to make agreements with private providers. Second, a large 
information-campaign was put in place to inform patients about their right to choose 
between different providers. And third, the private sector was offered generous payments 
for services, encouraging private entrepreneurs to set up businesses. And fourth, citizens 
had over time become less sceptical about private providers. In sum, the context around 
the private sector had changed. The waiting-list guarantee has introduced a mechanism 
between the public and the private sector hospitals which has set off new dynamics. The 
introduction of market mechanisms are new to the Danish health care sector and has 
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 (Regeringen & Amtsrådsforeningen, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) 
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created a new institutional context for the agents in health care, both regional politicians, 
public hospital managers and private hospital managers.  
During the debates over the law the Social Democrats stated concerns about 
its implementation, such as that it might favour a certain segment of patients, that it might 
allow private hospitals to cream patients, that it might drive up health costs and, finally, 
social democrats are concerned, that, since doctors are a scarce resource public and private 
hospitals will compete for doctors and private hospitals might end up poaching doctors, all 
of whom got their specialist training and education in the public sector (L64, 2002a). 
However, there was no strong opposition to the notion that the law would privatise a part 
of the secondary health care system. Most of the debate circulated around how to distribute 
the 1,5 bill kr., which patient groups to favour, and how these funds could be distributed 
through a mechanism that would reward the more productive hospitals. Since there was a 
broad consensus around investing more in health care, a broad coalition of parties 
(including the Social Democrats) voted in favour of the law in 2002. 
The law was uniformly designed by the government. This may seem 
uncontroversial, but in the Danish negotiated economy, most reform proposals are 
negotiated, formally or informally by involved actors, in particular in health care, where the 
responsibility lies with the Regions. However, neither the Danish Regions nor the Danish 
Medical Association was involved in the initial discussion or the design of the law. There 
could be two reasons; first, because none of these bodies were able to foresee how the 
health care sector would evolve in these new circumstances and how public hospitals, 
private agents and patients would adapt to these new institutional circumstances; but 
second and perhaps more likely, because the government expected the regions to be 
sceptical, as the law interfered with the principle of decentralisation. Regions would be 
sceptical towards the law for the mere reason that the central government was interfering 
with responsibilities granted to regions (Blom-Hansen, 1998a). Over time the regions 
would get closely involved in the debate over private hospitals. This struggle started as the 
regions realised that private hospitals were growing and attracting a substantial number of 
patients. Regions complained about unfair competition, overcompensation of the private 
actors and the fear that doctors might flee to the private sector, where salaries are better. 
This struggle reveals that the regions’ critique was not aimed at the private sector per se, 
but rather towards the central government: “One should not blame the private hospitals, or 
the doctors and nurses in the private sector, for picking up the gold lying on the street. 
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One should attack those who lay the gold on the street. And that is the government”, Bent 
Hansen, Social Democratic chair of the Danish Regions, noted (authors translation (cf. I. 
H. Andersen, 2008). The regions argued that the economic circumstances surrounding the 
private sector were inappropriate and unfair. These new circumstances are the focus of the 
next sections.   
 
2.12 Financing the private hospital sector  
In the comments accompanying the law on extended choice it was stated that 
“the starting point will be the same (DRG-) prices, which are also used for transactions 
between the public hospitals” (L64, 2002b). It is recognised that private hospitals have 
fewer obligations, no emergency care or acute care facilities and does not provide education 
and research, but the government argued that private hospitals have other expenses, such 
as paying rent, investing in equipment and paying VAT-tax. In 2002, the Danish Regions 
agreed with private hospitals to pay the DRG-prices (for some operations about 95% of 
the DRG-rates).  
In 2002 there were two organisations representing the private hospital sector 
in Denmark.48 However, as negotiations went on every year with Danish regions (the 
purchaser of private health care services) to establish the terms and prices for services, the 
two organisations realised that the Regions were able to play these two organisation off 
against each other and press prices downwards (which would usually be called ‘competitive 
pressure’). However, the private hospitals had no interest in such pressures, rather the 
contrary. And so in 2005 the two organisations merged into the SPPD (the organisation of 
private hospitals and private clinics in Denmark). Since the Regions are the only public 
purchasers and are obliged to make agreements with the private sector and there is only 
one private sector provider, there is no market – only a monopoly purchaser and a 
monopoly provider. The agreement on terms and prices for private sector services 
consequently broke down in 2006. No agreement could be reached between the Danish 
Regions (amtsrådsforeningen) and the SPPD on the prices the public hospitals should pay 
for the patients coming from the public sector under the waiting-list guarantee. The 
Regions wanted to pay less than the DRG-prices and the private sector wanted what they 
                                                 
48
 Sammenslutningen af Privathospitaler i Danmark (SPD) og Brancheforeningen for Privathospitaler og 
Privatklinikker i Danmark (BPPD). 
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had gotten before – approximately 95% of DRG-levels. To understand why this issue can 
make these parties fight so hard, we need to take a step further into the DRG-system. 
In 2000 a payment system based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) was 
introduced in Danish health care. A DRG is a weight that indicates the amount of 
resources necessary to treat a patient with a given diagnosis. When finance is linked to 
activity (each activity has a DRG rate) it is itself a mechanism for increasing production in 
the health care sector. The funding mechanism for public and private hospitals was set up 
to maximise incentives for public hospitals to provide more operations and treatments 
within the waiting-list guarantee. If a public hospital does not provide treatment within two 
months and the patient decides for a private alternative, the hospital loses 100% of the 
DRG-rate to the private hospitals, which then provides the services. As the private 
hospitals grew in number and the proportion of patients treated in the private sector 
hospital with public money increased, the public hospitals increasingly began to oppose the 
terms. They did so because the marginal cost of operations is considerably below the 
DRG-level. (As an example, the Region of Midtjylland pays its clinics/hospitals around 
50% of the DRG-price for each operation, while the rest of the DRG-price goes to other 
purposes, such as education, research, upholding 24-hour acute facilities, central 
administration etc.). If a public hospital did provide treatment within 2 months they would 
receive 50% of DRG-price, but if they “lost” patients to the private sector, they had to pay 
100% DRG-prices to the private hospital. This created a strong incentive for the public 
hospitals to deliver in time. Yet it also revealed, as the Regions argued, that the private 
sector was heavily overcompensated. Most health economists confirm this notion (DSI, 
2009), although no comparison has been done between the real cost of public and private 
hospitals (such a study thus so far unavailable, largely because there is no knowledge about 
the real-cost of private hospital treatments since private hospital accounts are kept secret).  
Private hospitals do not have educational and research obligations, they do 
not have acute 24-hour facilities and cannot specialise in a particular type of operations and 
select patients, it is very plausible that the cost of operations in the private sector are lower 
than in public hospitals, something which is also confirmed by the organisation of private 
hospitals, SPPD (Kjær, 2007) . The chairman of the Organisation of Private Hospitals and 
Clinics in Denmark agreed that “Private hospitals have become a better business than it 
used to be” (Nyholm, 2007), while Henrik Erichsen, the founder of one of the largest 
private hospitals was more clear when he stated in 2007 that: “…now you really have to be 
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a bad business-man if you are not able to run a private hospital and make a profit” 
(Thiemann, 2007).  
When negotiations on prices for private sector hospital-services broke down 
in 2006 the disagreement was settled by the Minister of Health Care as stated in the law 
from 2002. The Minister of Health Care decided to maintain the price level that was already 
agreed on earlier, despite the protests of the Danish Regions. The Minister of Health Care 
had no interest in lowering the interest of the private sector providers. Politically the 
private sector had become important; the private sector provided both extra capacity and 
the options for choice needed for the waiting time guarantee to be a real option for 
patients.  
While private hospitals were a declining business in the 1980’s and 1990’s49 it 
turned into a very profitable business during the 2000’s. In 2003 the five largest private 
hospitals50 had surpluses, while in 2002 they were losing money (Tuchsen & Jørgensen, 
2004). In 2002 the 12 largest private hospitals altogether had a loss of 7 mill. kr., which in 
2006 was turned into a surplus of 75 mill. kr. (Pihl-Andersen, et al., 2007). The Waiting-list 
guarantee and price-agreement on private sector operations constituted a new institutional 
setting for private hospitals. As long as the public sector could not live up to the waiting-
time guarantee, there would be ‘customers’ and income in the private sector. As patients 
awareness (87% of elective patients were aware of the possibility to choose a private 
alternative in 2004 (Vrangbæk, et al., 2007) of the new possibilities grew, so did economic 
transfers from the public sector to the private as shown in figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
  The Mermaid Clinic opened in 1989 and closed in 1994 with a total loss of between 150-200 mill. Kr; 
The private hospital Borup opened in 1990 but closed the same year with a total loss of around 25 mill. 
Kr; Copenhagen Heart Center opened in 1992 and closed again in 1997; Skørping Private hospital opened 
in 1990 and closed and re-opened several times since then. 
50
 Privathospitalet Hamlet, Privathospitalet Mølholm, Erichsens Privathospital, Privathospitalet Skørping 
og Hjertecenter Varde. 
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Figure 2.2: Public expenditure on private hospitals, 2002-2007 
 
 
In 2007 the waiting-list guarantee was reduced from 2 months to 1 month, 
which further increased the demand for private hospital services, reflecting a steep increase 
from 2006-2007. The reduction of the waiting-list guarantee provoked strong reactions 
from the professionals, the doctors, which was supported by the Social Democrats. They 
argued that this would violate the principle of treating the most ill first. A one month 
waiting list would entail that hospitals would have strong economic incentives to treat 
simple problems (grown down nails, was the example used) rather then life-threatening 
deceases. The government, however, could easily ignore the professional community 
because the choice policy and the private sector option were very popular among citizens 
and patients. In 2008, 63,5% of citizens believed that the health care system should be a 
combination of public and private, although primarily public.51 And 68% believed that 
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 The Survey on Private Health Care Insurance was carried out by Analyse Denmark in February/March 
2008. The survey data was kindly provided by Ugebrevet A4. 
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choice between private and public hospitals should be possible, if waiting times are long in 
the public sector.52  
Private hospitals do not reveal where the customers come from. Some 
estimates state that around 30-50% of patients come from public sector hospitals (Sand, 
2006), however, some private sector respondents in this study declare that up to 80% of 
their patients are under the waiting-list guarantee and are therefore paid for by public 
funds.53. Overall, 72% of the patients who were operated on in the private sector in 2006 
were financed from public funds (Ministry of Health and Internal Affairs, 2007b, p. 37).  
 
Figure 2.3: The rise in private hospitals and clinics, Denmark, 2002-2008. 
 
 
 
The waiting list guarantee has put out an economic safety-net under the 
private hospital sector. Private sector entrepreneurs, which are doctors and business-men, 
were quick to adapt to these new institutional opportunities by responding to the new 
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 Another 29% believe that choice between private and public providers should be available to patients 
regardsless of waiting time in the public sector. Survey conducted in 2008 by Zapera for Mandag 
Morgen. Survery Data kindly provided by Mandag Morgen. 
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economic incentive-structures. While there were five private hospitals/clinics in 2002 the 
number had risen to 178 in 2008 (figure 2.3). Over time patients also learned about the new 
possibilities. While the owners of the public hospitals, the Regions, initially tried to block 
the choice policies in 1992, but failed, they now accept choice in health care, although 
arguing that regulation (in particular prices) should be adjusted (Ministry of Health and 
Internal Affairs, 2007a, p. 15). 
The private hospital sector grew due to a range of factors: the novel 
possibility for patients to access the private sector with public funding, the increasing 
awareness of the possibility of choice, and the generous funding for private hospitals. 
Essentially, the context with respect to private hospitals had changed remarkably between 
the 1980s and the 2000s. Realising that the private sector was a popular solutions among 
citizens, policy makers (both as the national and county level) accepted the private sector, 
although they disagreed on some of the terms on which they operate. Essentially, however, 
the introduction of the private health care sector was another attempt to adapt the health 
care system to citizens’ demands of more responsive services and faster treatment. This 
solution, which had been debate earlier, found itself in a new context in the 2000s, where 
private providers were accepted rather than rejected.  
 
2.13 Regulations for private and public hospitals 
The Danish health care sector is highly regulated. The national board of 
health is the central regulating actor, which set standards and requirements for hospitals. 
The board is responsible for controls and investigation of failures. Furthermore, the 
National Board of health is the central planning unit for national health care. In the 
planning of health care services the past 40 years of Danish hospital history has been 
marked a single movement: the closing down of small hospitals and the merging towards 
larger hospitals units. In 1973 the country had 126 general public hospitals and by 2006 
that number had been reduced to 49 (Ministry of Health and Internal Affairs, 2007b; 
Sundhedsudvalget, 2007). This reduction in hospitals has been the recommendation from 
the National Health Board for two reasons, essentially grounded in the medical 
professional evidence. First, medical specialisation requires a larger group of patients (high 
volume) and thus the concentration of particular kinds of operations in particular hospitals. 
Second, smaller hospitals were too expensive, because they did not achieve the economies 
of scale which could be achieved in larger hospital units. This has led to regulation 
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concerning which hospitals are allowed to conduct which type of operations. While most 
hospitals offer the widest range of medical care, there are a few hospitals singled out for 
highly specialised operations which include patients with rare, complicated and resource-
demanding needs (e.g. heart surgery, complicated cancer treatments and fat-reduction 
operations, etc.).  
When the law of ‘extended-choice’ and waiting-list guarantee was approved 
no distinction was made between medical care at different levels of specialisation, and thus 
the private hospitals were – in principle - allowed to provide highly specialised operations, 
in addition to more basic operations. The National Health Board argued that highly 
specialised operations had to be done under the national planning-system in order to 
provide sufficient quality (in terms of professional specialists with adequate training54), an 
adequate back-up system (which mainly consists of the costly intensive care facilities) and 
efficiency (economies of scale), which had been the driving forces behind the past 40 years 
of hospital mergers. This planning system was set in place to secure central elements in 
highly specialised areas, including conducting research and to secure the education of 
future specialist doctors in the respective fields. If these regulations and demands were to 
apply to private hospitals it would in effect mean, that private hospitals were kept out this 
part of the “health care market”. The Minister of Internal Affairs and Health Care, Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen decided that the regulations and demands for highly specialised 
operations were only to apply for public hospitals and not for private ones;55 In other words 
private hospitals had the right to conduct highly specialised operations but were subject to 
a different set of regulations (Ministry of Health and Internal Affairs, 2007a, pp. 78-80). 
One of the reasons that private hospitals are eager to enter the highly specialised field is 
because DRG-prices are considerably higher for these operations than for basis-
operations.56 In certain medical specialities the private sector has taken considerable market 
                                                 
54
 Medical research shows that for highly specialised operations, surgeons need a certain patient-volume 
to achieve a high success-rate and reduce complications in operations. The more operations a surgeon 
conducts the higher the quality of the operations. Research shows that in larger hospital units with larger 
patient-volume success-rates are higher, complications fewer and death-rates lower, due to the built up 
expertise in specialised surgery (Felsby & Bro, 2008)  
55
 Evidence for this claim can be found in §20-questions (S 1486, 15.05.2008 and S 234 10.0.2005), 
where the Minister of Health confirms that private hospitals are not subdue to the same quality 
regulations as the public hospitals in the area of highly specialised operations.  
56
 DRG-prices for all groups can be found at 
http://www.sst.dk/upload/planlaegning_og_behandling/drgtakster2008.xls. DRG-prices for highly 
specialised services are up to ten-times than basic operations. As an example most heart operation are in 
2008 paid between 145.000 kr. (app. 20.000 Euro) and 575.000 kr. (76.000 Euro), while drg-prices for 
basic operation rarely get above 75.000 kr. (10.000 Euro). 
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shares (See table 2.6 and figure 2.4). These favourable conditions for the new areas of 
health care provision were met with private sector supply. From 2006-2008 a private 
hospital specialised in heart surgery operated on close to 10% of all the patients with heart 
problems.57  
In 2005 the National Board of Health decided that fat-reducing operations 
had to be concentrated on five hospitals in order to increase quality of the operations and 
outcomes. However, in 2008, most of these operations took place in three private 
hospitals.58  In 2006 private hospitals were allowed (by the Minister of Health) to enter the 
market for fat-reducing operations, which is also a highly specialised medical area. Only 
one and a half years after, in 2008, private hospitals conducted virtually all fat-reducing 
operations. It is a very profitable business in two ways: first, demand is rising dramatically 
as obesity becomes a more widespread phenomenon. In 1999, 90 fat-reducing operations 
were conducted in Denmark, while 1200 operations were done in 2007 and the National 
Board of Health estimates that 3000-5000 Danes are in need of a fat-reducing operation 
(Felsby, 2008).  
 
 
Second, the price per operation (in fat-reduction) is much higher in the private sector than 
in the public sector. Due to an agreement on prices for private sector treatment laid down 
by the Minister of Health in 2006, the private hospitals receive almost double that of a 
public sector hospital for a fat-reducing operation, although both are paid by the state.59 
According to a specialist in fat-reducing surgery the DRG-price does not cover the cost of 
the operations, which make it irrational for public sector hospitals to offer these 
treatments. Although some public hospitals are willing to conduct fat-reducing operations 
                                                 
57
 Authors calculations on the basis of  Danish Heart Registry accessible at www.dhreg.dk  
58
 The private hospitals are Privathospitalet Mølholm, Privathospitalet Hamlet and Eira-Privathospitalet 
Skejby. 
59
 Private hospitals recieve around 80.000 kr., while the public sector hospitals receive the DRG-price set 
at 46.000 kr. in 2008 (Felsby, 2008). 
Table 2.6: Share of treatments in private hospitals (selected treatments) 
 Stationary surgery Day surgery 
Treatment 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Chest-surgery 14,5% 23,8% 6,8% 7,1% 
Fat-reduction surgery 61,5% 84,6% 100% 100% 
Back-surgery 22,9% 40,0% 50% 85,7% 
Other orthopaedic surgery 6,8% 11,8% 8,5% 18,0% 
Source: (DSI, 2009) based on data from LPR (Danish Patient Register). Shares are calculated as the share of 
the productions-value of the sum of private and public production, 2007-2008, selected treatments. 
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it is difficult to get approved by the national board of health. On the other hand the market 
is open to private hospitals. Since the marginal-cost of these operations are much lower in 
the public sector, the overall ‘extra’ expense to the private sector amounted to 
approximately 60 mill. kr. in 2008 (Felsby, 2008). 
 
Figure 2.4: Share of operations done in private hospitals, 2002-2007, selected operations. 
 
 
As of 2008 advanced cancer-treatment is also taking place at private hospitals (paid for by 
public funds). This development has led to harsh critique from cancer-surgeons because 
the number of cancer operations in the private hospitals is very low and does not meet the 
demands for volume in the public sector hospital, potentially putting medical quality at 
stake (Felsby & Bro, 2008). In 2010 a new plan for highly specialised operations, made by 
the National Health Board, revealed that private hospitals will increasingly be allowed to 
enter the market for highly specialised operations. Once again reactions from the doctors 
were critical. Doctors fear that spreading expertise, rather than centralising it, will result in 
lower medical quality (Chéret, 2010; Chéret & Rasmussen, 2010). The new plan is likely to 
increase private sector shares of the health care market. 
Political reactions to this development reveal the political ambiguity 
concerning the private sector growth. One the hand the government decided that 
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complicated cancer-treatment had to be concentrated on approximately ten hospitals to 
improve the quality. In 2003, 40 hospitals conducted the treatment, while this had been 
brought down to 20 in 2008 after new demands on minimum patient-volume were put in 
place (Felsby & Bro, 2008). On the other hand the government allowed private hospitals to 
enter advanced cancer treatment and thereby spreading the medical expertise further to 
private hospitals.60 This illustrated the distance between expert professional 
recommendation and the politics of health care. For real choice to exist there has to be an 
alternative provider – even though this provider does not fulfil the experts’ requirements 
for minimum levels of patients.   
That regulation of highly specialised operations is different for private 
hospitals than for public ones show demonstrates how the rising private sector is in 
conflict with the traditional planned health care model. It also spelled out a dilemma for 
policy-makers who were to choose between offering choice to patients (by expanding the 
private market) and ensuring quality in health care provision. However, including the 
private sector was more important and the sector expanded its role in health care provision 
due to the outcome of the decision.  
While the Social Democrats wanted to shut out private hospitals in Denmark 
in 1987, Social Democrats in the 2000s accept private hospitals and believe they form a 
legitimate part of the health care sector. Social Democrats argue, however, that competition 
should be fair and private hospitals should not be overcompensated. In the general public 
debate at the end of the 2000s, one may get the impression that the social democratic party 
is the protector of the public health care sector, while they are accusing the right wing 
coalition government of privatising the health care system through the ‘choice policy’ and 
the waiting time guarantees. This impression is misleading, considering that the Social 
Democrats (along with a wide majority in parliament) approved the ‘waiting time guarantee 
for diagnostics’ in December 2009 (L54, 2009). The law will extend the guarantee from 
2002 to diagnostics and psychiatric treatment also offered at private hospitals. With a very 
similar mechanism as the former guarantee this law will increase private health sector 
service provision – with the consent of the social democratic party. At the national level, 
there is broad consensus that choice should be offered to all patients, regardless of whether 
                                                 
60
 In may 2008 cancer treatment was taking place at the following private hospitals: Privathospitalet 
Hamlet, Privathospitalet Mølholm, Århus Speciallægecenter 
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it will enhance the private sector. The negotiations over the diagnosis guarantee hardly 
include any critique of or scepticism about the private sector.61   
At the end of the 2000s there are still disagreements between the national 
level and the regional level. In particular the Chair of the Danish Regions, the Social 
Democrat Bent Hansen, in late 2000 criticised the private hospital sector and the terms 
they were operating on.62 The critique mainly focussed on the fact that private hospitals 
were poaching staff from public hospitals, which were at the same time lacking qualified 
personnel, and that competition between private and public hospitals is unfair. Further, the 
chair of the Danish medical association also criticised the new regulation and the rise of 
tax-subsidised private health insurance, arguing that the development violates a basic 
principle in health care, that the most ill would be treated first.63 The CEO of the country’s 
largest health care interest organisation, the Danish cancer society, also publicly criticised 
the private hospital sector arguing that it may lead to a two-tiered health care system64 and 
finally the former CEO of the National Health Board also argued that the introduced 
competition was unfair.65  
In short, the waiting time guarantee has broad political support at the 
national level, even though it is the central policy promoting the expansion of the private 
hospital sector. In essence the extended-choice and waiting time guarantee put out a safety-
net under the private sector providers. The ‘choice policy’ and the stepwise expansion of 
the ‘waiting time guarantee’ is the latest iteration of the ongoing puzzling over solutions to 
adapt the health care system. These adaptations take place in the light of several important 
policy problems of responsiveness in the 1980s and 1990s. Adaptations need not be 
thought of as successful per se. On the one hand, the access to private hospitals and the 
shortening of waiting times in popular among citizens. From that perspective these policies 
may contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of the universal health care system. On the 
other hand, the policies of choice and the introduction of private hospitals have been 
expensive and, one could argue, have not solved the problem of waiting lists, which still 
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 See negotiations over the Law on changes in the Health Care Law (Forslag til lov om ændring af 
sundhedsloven. (Frit valg til diagnostiske undersøgelser, voldgiftsnævn, udvidet aktindsigt m.m.) (L54, 
2009). 
62
 The critique was raised on several occations in the media, e.g. the radionprogramme. P1, Business, nov 
2007. 
63
 Radioprogram, P1, 19. Nov. 2007. 
64
 Arne Rolighed, 2007: Sundhedsvæsenet under pres, Kronik, Politiken 10.04.07  
65
 Jens Kristian Gøtrik, 2007: Konkurrenceklausuler: Hvad laver overlægerne efter kl 15?, Debatindlæg, 
Politiken, 14.06.07. 
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exist. Further, as I will discuss below, the privatisation may also affect priorities in health 
care and affect equality of access. 
 
2.14 A rise in private health insurance 
Simultaneous with the development of the private hospital sector, private 
health insurance (PHI) increased dramatically in Denmark, which has also contributed to 
the rise in the private hospital sector. In 2000 virtually no Danes held private health 
insurance. In 2008 approximately 850.000 or 25% of the labour force was covered by 
private health insurance which supplemented the national health insurance system and gave 
access to private hospitals in case of medical needs. The dramatic rise in private health 
insurance is not a simple function of the perception of public health care or insurance 
premium price, as often argued in economic analysis (Besley, et al., 1999; Costa & Garcia, 
2003). Rather, the rise is explained by a complex set of institutional and political dynamics; 
First, a tax-policy development initiated by a Social Democratic government (L149, 1999) 
and furthered by a right-wing government (L97, 2002) has created incentives towards PHI. 
Second, what has in particular driven the rise in Denmark is the “equality-premise” for tax-
exemption: that all employees must be covered for anyone in the company to hold PHI 
untaxed. Furthermore, the tax-exemption was enacted in a period of fierce labour market 
competition, where PHI became a low cost gift to the employees. At the same time two 
decades of cost-containment in the public health care system did affect the public 
perception of health care: criticism of the public system is rising and people have rising 
faith in the private alternative (Jeppe Olesen, 2009). 
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Figure 2.5: Private health insurance on the rise in Denmark.  
 
 
As Immergut (1992) argued, the question of national vs. private health insurance is a matter 
which marks ideological divisions and has done so historically. From that perspective, there 
were surprisingly limited political contestation on the issue of private health insurance and 
the tax-exemption law in 2002 (L97, 2002). The Social Democratic party is opposed to 
PHI, but as private health insurance rose and as the private sector development gained 
popular support, even this party argued in the national election campaign in 2007 that they 
would not remove tax-exemption on PHI. After 2007 the Social Democrats changed their 
minds on this question and now stand in opposition, along with the largest Unions, to the 
tax-exemption of PHI. Nevertheless, there is pressure from below on this issue. A range of 
private and semi-public organisations have purchased PHI for their employees.66 Even a 
few Social Democratic municipalities have purchased PHI for their employees.67 The tax-
exemption law from 2002 has encouraged companies to offer PHI as fringe benefits to 
employees, which will offer quicker treatment in private hospitals. The rise of Private 
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 Large semi-public companies such as the DSB (the Danish railroad company with 9000 employees) 
and PostDenmark (the Danish postal services with approximately 30.000 employees) offer PHI to 
employees (Hebsgaard, 2007). 
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 In a decentralised public system as the Danish one, the municipality is often the single largest employer 
in a given geographical area. In 2008 a Social Democratic municipality mayor decided to offer all of the 
municipalities employees PHI (Madsen, 2008). 
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health insurance is the effect of an emergent process of several different factors – both a 
change in the incentive structure, but also a changed context, where citizens are more 
critical of the public systems, its image and waiting times.  
At the same time, however, the rapid rise of private health insurance and the 
tax-exemption of them meant a loss of tax-revenue (see table 2.7), which made the ministry 
of taxation state that PHI could constitute a threat to public finance (Ministry of Taxation, 
2007).  
 
Table 2.7: The loss of state revenue due to the tax-exemption of PHI (mill. kr.) 
Mill.kr.  
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total tax-
revenue loss 
2002-2007 
Value of tax-exemption on 
employer-paid PHI 
90 200 240 325 405 645* 1,905 
Increase in pct. Pr. year - 222,2 120,0 135,4 124,6 159,3 - 
Source: 3. udvalgsekretariat, økonomigruppen: Offentlige udgifter til udvalgte dele af det private 
sundhedsvæsen, notat til sundhedsudvalget, 23. oktober 2007. 
* Estimated by the Ministry of Taxation (Ministry of Taxation, 2007).  
 
The rise in private health insurance has also contributed to the rise in private 
hospitals, but certainly only a small part of it. Private hospitals receive approximately 20-
30% of their patients from private insurance companies, while 70-80% come from the 
public hospitals under a waiting list guarantee. Second, the argument that PHI will have a 
positive effect on the broader economics of health care because the state saves money is 
also dubious, since the full tax-exemption of PHI creates a system in which the inflow of 
capital to the private health care sector comes indirectly (by large) from general tax funds. 
In addition, the “equality-premise” did not result in an equal distribution of PHI across the 
population. It is predominantly held by the well-offs (Figure 2.8, below). Stated polemically, 
PHI is an add-on to the health care system for the rich, solidaristically financed through 
general taxes. The ‘equality-premise’ has on the other hand boosted the scale of PHI to an 
unexpectedly large extent (Jeppe Olesen, 2009). As an experienced policy actor in social 
and health care affairs told this author in 2009: “literally no-one had imagined in 2002 that 
private health insurance could become as big a purchasing success as we see today. It was a 
surprise to the insurance industry and even to the government which put the law forward” 
(interview with author, January 21st, 2009).   
In a survey conducted in 2007, 81% of white-collar workers expected that 
employers would offer PHI as a part of payment. 30% believed that this was a negative 
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development while 61% thought that it was a positive development (Rechnagel, 2007). At 
the end of the 2000s, therefore, PHI is increasingly accepted as an idea, while it was largely 
rejected a decade earlier. Despite the rise of private health care insurance, there is no sign 
of reduced support for the public health care system: as of 2008, 99.1% of the population 
believes that it is the government’s responsibility to provide health care for the sick and 
80.9% of Danes thinks that the government should spend more money on health care.68 As 
such the rise in PHI has not corroded the support for the traditional public service model. 
 
2.15 Unions in a dilemma 
Unions are traditionally strong actors in a highly institutionalised corporatist 
political system such as the Danish. The Danish unions have been silent with regard to the 
introduction of private hospitals through the waiting list guarantee. The guarantee is a 
solution to a problem, which unions also have complained about – waiting in the public 
sector. On the other hand, Unions have been much more active when it comes to private 
health insurances since it relies on private funding. However, Unions have been in a 
dilemma in the debate. The expectation would be that unions would object to the rise of 
PHI and seek to protect the universal health care system they themselves had initially 
helped create on the premise of large risk-pooling and free and equal access for all citizens. 
Although objecting to the tax-exemption of PHI, unions have been somewhat paralysed on 
the issue. The Economic Counsel of the Labour Movement (a left-wing think tank) did 
initially object to the law on tax-exemption of PHI, but were rejected by the government 
(L97, 2002). 
Labour unions find themselves caught in a dilemma with regard to Private 
health insurance. On the one hand they are defending free and equal access to the universal 
public health system which they took part in creating throughout the 20th century. On the 
other hand, unions face rising demands from their members to include PHI in collective 
bargaining (I. H. Andersen & Madsen, 2008). The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(the umbrella organisation for organised labour) stated in 2003 that they were “strongly 
dissatisfied” with the tax-exemption of private health care insurance and that “tax-
exemption of private health care insurance is a step towards American conditions in health 
                                                 
68
 Survey on Danes’ attitudes on health care 2008 (selected questions from a special question battery on 
the ISSP 2006). Accessed with the kind permission of Professor Jørgen Goul Andersen, Ålborg 
University. 
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care” (LO, 2003). The unions argue that private health care is unsolidaristic and will create 
a health-divide, both between those who are offered PHI and those who are not (mainly 
the low-paid), but more importantly between those who are in the labour market and those 
who are outside of it.  
The chairman of The General Workers Union in Denmark (SID)69, which 
mainly organised un-skilled, low-skilled and skilled workers, proposed in 2001 that 
members should be offered a PHI. The suggestion by the chairman was met with harsh 
critique from most other unions (P.N., 2001) and  - after a meeting with the Social 
Democratic minister of health - finally taken off the table. One year later, in 2002, a Gallup 
survey showed that 63% of unskilled workers (primarily organised in The General Workers 
Union in Denmark) were “very interested in a private health insurance, which would give 
them the possibility of health care treatment outside of the public health care system” 
(UgebrevetA4, 2002). By the end of 2007 a survey showed that 20% of the members of the 
union Working in Denmark held some form of PHI (3F, 2007). 
The third largest union, “Trade and Labour,” renounced PHI in general, 
arguing that was a breach in the universal health care system. However, the chairman of 
Trade and Labour announced in 2006 that “Salaries in the public labour market usually 
follow the development of the private labour market. But here salaries have come to a halt, 
while employees are given fringe benefits in large amounts. Therefore we have to consider 
whether fringe benefits should be an integrated part of the pay negotiation on the public 
labour market” (3F, 2006). Thereby the chairman spelled out the dilemma for organised 
labour and declared that unions would raise this issue in collective bargaining in 2008.  
While private health care is on the rise and some unions are including private 
health care insurance in collective bargaining, the 2007 edition of the Confederations’ 
health strategy is characterised by the absence of the words “private health care insurance” 
(LO, 2007), precisely because unions are split on the question: should they support as many 
as possible getting it, or oppose private health care insurance so as to defend the public 
system? While the general position of the umbrella organisation of unions (LO) is that PHI 
is something to be avoided, they do not interfere when sub-divisions or single company-
                                                 
69
 SID merged in 2005 with The Women’s Workers Union in Denmark into a larger union called 
“Working in Denmark”.  
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agreements include PHI as a part of the collective agreement on salaries and benefits.70 In 
2008 a survey showed that 38% of the population agreed that “Unions should generally 
aim to provide Private Health Insurance to their members” (32% disagreed).71 
The dilemma facing Danish unions has similarities (but also major 
differences) to the questions faced by American unions in the 1940’s and 1950’s. The 
American unions had argued for a universal health care insurance scheme, but realising that 
it would not succeed in that objective and seeing that employee health insurance had 
spread through the workforce, they changed positions. These developments reduced the 
interest of unions and covered workers in a government program of protection, and 
increased their interest in collectively bargained private health benefits (Hacker, 2002, pp. 
221-242). As PHI has risen in popularity among Danish workers, a similar dynamic has 
come into play. As of 2009 many unions are seeking to incorporate private health insurance 
into the collective agreements for their members. Even Municipalities (also social-
democratic ones) are buying private health care insurance for their employees. If this 
development continues, the rise in private health insurance will continue.   
The medical professions are often powerful interest groups in health care 
questions (Immergut, 1992). They enjoy a recognised monopoly on medical practice. As 
exclusive providers of medical care, doctors should have been able to affect or even block 
the rise in PHI, as it is the general position of the Danish Medical Association (DMA) that 
the rise in PHI would potentially threaten the free and equal access to the public health 
care system, in the belief that it skews the health care system towards the richest part of 
society when it is well-known that it is the poorest part of a population which is in most 
need of treatment. Needs (by professional judgement) ought to determine who gets 
medical care first, not the size of the wallet, argues the DMA. The DMA has generally 
opposed the tax-exemption of PHI. The association was not involved when the tax-law 
was changed in 2002 and by 2007 a large group of employees held – and are happy with – 
PHI. Therefore, it seems that the government can comfortably ignore the Associations’ 
arguments and protests. Furthermore, the DMA also organises doctors in the private sector 
(a small minority), who partly live off PHI. Therefore the DMA must to keep a balance, 
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 Already in 2002, the Police Union offered members low cost PHI and another union, the Christian 
Union has agreed with the Christian employers association to include PHI in the collective agreement 
(TCU, 2004) as a few examples.   
 
71
 The Survey on Private Health Care Insurance was carried out by Analyse Denmark in February/March 
2008. The survey data was kindly provided by Ugebrevet A4. 
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stating that both private and public hospitals are considered legitimate and that so is PHI, 
but it is the tax-exemption of PHI which increases inequality in health care (Jensen, 2007). 
 
2.16 Public hospital sector adaptation 
As shown above several different elements led to a rise in the private hospital 
sector. Private agents responded to changes in the context in terms of political signals and 
economic incentives. But how did public sector hospitals respond? We may expect two 
types of outcomes: first, either public hospitals will continue with business as usual; the 
private sector plays a small role in the overall health care system and there will always be a 
large part of the population which cannot afford private hospital care, so there will always 
be patients in the public hospitals – in other words, the overall institutional setting in 
unaltered and therefore the public sector agents will continue as before. The other road for 
public hospitals is to respond actively to the new institutional setting and the changed 
context.  
The evidence is that public sector hospitals have changed substantially along 
with the rise of the private sector. Hospital managers indicate that the waiting-list guarantee 
has had an important impact on the organisation and priorities in the public hospitals. First, 
because of the economic incentives: public hospitals are punished hard economically every 
time a patient chooses a private sector hospital, rather than the public. These new 
institutional settings have affected public sector hospitals in several ways. Hospitals 
managers report that the new competitive environment have changed priorities in public 
sector hospitals significantly, mainly in the area of planned surgery, where the private sector 
competes with the public sector. New procedures are set up to try to deliver treatment to 
patients within the waiting time limit of the guaranteed waiting period and to avoid the 
economic punishment of “losing customers” to the private sector.  
One way the public sector can stay competitive with the private sector is by 
imitating it. One of the first hospitals to do this was Silkeborg Hospital, which set up the 
largest clinic in elective surgery in the country in the early 2000’s. Several public hospitals 
have set up “free clinics” or “guarantee-clinics”, which are small entities that specialise in a 
small number of surgery procedures, similar to most of the private hospitals. By doing so, 
the public sector created a very efficient external, but publicly owned, operational arm, 
which is only focussed on planned surgery and does not have to deal with education, 
research and acute medicine. In these clinics public sector doctors are offered work both a 
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part of their normal job, but also in their spare-time. These public “free clinics” offer 
relatively short waiting lists. As of 2008 the “free clinics” exist in all 5 regions. The clinics 
are very efficient: an operation for cataract at the public free clinic in Brædstrup cost 4.000 
kr, while the equivalent operation costs the triple (app. 12.000 kr.) in the private hospitals. 
A knee-operation in the public free clinic costs half of the price at the large hospital in 
Vejle (one of the most efficient public hospitals) (Pihl-Andersen, et al., 2007). In other 
words the free clinics are very cost efficient, while at the same time they are able to offer 
good salaries to doctors. In short they have copied the private sector organisation, but at a 
lower cost. 
The public hospitals have also increased production (see figure 2.6, below). 
This, however, is not only a result of private sector competition. Between 2002-2007 an 
increasing share of hospital finance was change from budget-based to activity-based 
financing, where hospitals receive funding on the basis of production of DRG-values.72 
This financial system encourages increased productivity. There is a large discussion 
concerning how to measure productivity in health care and much dispute on the issue 
(e.g.Drummond, et al., 2005). When productivity is calculated as the relationship between 
increases in production-value73 and increases in expenditure, the Ministry of Health Care 
estimates that productivity is increased with around 2%/year between 2003-2006 (Ministry 
of Health and Internal Affairs, et al., 2007). A more detailed calculation of changes in 
productivity shows that in fact productivity increases in Danish hospitals were stable 
around 1% in the period from 1996-2004 (Bech, et al., 2006). Yet what drives productivity 
increases in health care is more likely to be new technology, in particular the change from 
inpatient to outpatient care. This change is driven by technological developments in 
operation-methods and anaesthetics, but allows at the same time for increased production 
of hospital services, since outpatient care is much less resource demanding.      
Despite these changes and adaptations to the new context, hospitals and 
regions struggled with the new regime. On the one hand, there were still capped budgets 
and on the other hand hospitals had to be financed on the basis of activity, a system which 
drove up production but also cost. In reality, the problem was solved in a pragmatic way. 
                                                 
72
 In 2004 the minimum share of activity-based financing was 20% (Regeringen & Amtsrådsforeningen, 
2004) and in 2007 the share of activity-based financing of hospitals had to be minimum 50% (Regeringen 
& Amtsrådsforeningen, 2007).  
73
 The value of hospital-activity is measured by DRG production value, covering prices for both in-bed 
and ambulant treatment. The prices express the average value of activity, weighted to how resource-
demanding different patients are. 
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Every year between 2002-2009, in the yearly negotiations between the state and the regions, 
the state granted extra funds to cover the cost of increased productions of hospital 
services.74 While production was increasing and waiting lists getting shorter, one central 
problem for health care systems remains cost-control. With activity-based financing a new 
cost-driver was set in motion. The regions were aware of this problem and in 2008/2009 
initiated a new strategy for planned surgery: block contracts with the private sector. 
Regions are testing out a policy solutions, which may at the same time offer increased 
production and cost-control. In 2008 The Region of Midtjylland signed contracts with 
Swedish health care provider Capio to provide 25.000 mamography-screeenings, which 
amounts to one third of all screenings (Dagens Medicin 25.4.2008). And other regions are 
pursuing the same strategy. When regions outsource large amounts of operations to private 
providers, unit-costs go down. Yet, due to the sometimes unpredictable nature of health 
care this policy may also involve problems, which we will look closer at in the English Case 
(Chapter 3).  
 
 
Figure 2.6: Rising activity, operations in hospitals, 2001-2006 
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 The exact figures vary from year to year, but every agreement includes extra finances to fund increased 
activity (Regeringen & Amtsrådsforeningen, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
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That these new arrangements have led to increased production is due to several 
developments, where one of the most important is the change from stationary to ambulant 
treatment, which is less resource demanding. At the same time, new economic incentives 
also increase production. As one hospitals manager says: 
 
In certain [medical] areas we raise production with around 6% pr. year, to 
keep waiting lists below the guaranteed level, which we cannot always do. 
However, the amount of money we “loose” to the private sector is 
significant and we try very hard to treat patients here within the waiting time 
guarantee, rather than in the private sector – it is too expensive not to […] 
And further activity based financing also gives incentives to produce as much 
as we can in our own hospital. (Interview with Danish Hospital Manager, 
Nov. 24th, 2007.)   
 
A rise in production is likely to lead to declining waiting times, if all other 
things are equal. However, with waiting list other things are not equal. Several elements 
affect waiting lists, such as technology, demographic changes, indication-sliding,75 
productivity, etc (Kjellberg, et al., 2004; Klein, 2001). Iversen (1997) found that the 
introduction of a private sector in a country with a national health service can in fact make 
waiting lists longer in the public sector, if waiting list admissions are not rationed. This 
happens in particular when doctors are allowed to work in the private sector in their spare 
time, which is the case in Denmark. Iversen’s argument is that long queues will “push” 
patients towards the private sector. However, as indicated in figure 2.7, waiting times have 
been declining since 2002, which coincides with the introduction of the waiting list 
guarantee and the start of rise of private hospital sector. However, from 2003-2007 waiting 
times76 have been almost constant, despite the fact that in this period the private sector 
grew, as shown above, and also despite the fact that the public sector increased its activity 
substantially in this period. In spring 2008 a large strike broke out among health care 
employees, which made waiting times return to the level before choice and the private 
sector were introduced (figure 2.7). As a consequence of the strike, the regions negotiated a 
                                                 
75
 ‘Indication-creep’ happens when the criteria for treatment changes. 
76
 There are several ways to measure waiting time. In the last decade the definition of actual waiting time 
has change significantly, which makes data over time unavailable. Therefore I use expected waiting time, 
which is somewhat more unprecise, but available over time. 
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pause in the waiting time guarantee and the possibility to choose a private hospital. The 
regions argued that, because of the strike, they could not meet the waiting time guarantee 
and the expenses to the private sector would be overwhelming. There is nothing to indicate 
that private health care insurance has affected the level of waiting time in the public sector 
(Andreasen, et al., 2009).   
 
Figure 2.7: Waiting time (weeks) for selected hospital treatments, Denmark, 1998-2009. 
 
 
In sum, the policy of waiting time guarantee seems to have made the 
hospitals more responsive towards patients and it has been somewhat successful. However, 
as a result of another factor, a strike, waiting times in 2009 are as high as they were before 
the choice-policy was introduced. The economic incentives to increase to production have 
indeed resulted in higher activity. Yet, as a policy to reduce waiting it has displayed some of 
the effects also found in the waiting list initiatives from the 1990s: waiting in the Danish 
health care system is hard to battle. While there has been a range of policy solutions tested 
to fight waiting lists, the policy problem remains. 
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That public hospitals are changing as a result of the reorganisation of the 
health care sector may also have affected citizens’ views of public sector health care. 
Surveys show an improvement in the public sector image between 1999 and 2008 (See 
table 2.8), indicating that the public sector may be increasing its legitimacy among the 
electorate. 
 
2.17 Privatisation and equality in health care 
There are several ways of addressing the question of equality in health care 
(Petersen, 2005). We can distinguish between equality of access and equality of usage 
(Christensen, 2003, chp. 5). In this section we will focus on two of the central questions in 
the Danish debate. The first is whether the access to the private health insurance is 
distributed equally. The second is whether the right to “choice” under waiting-list 
guarantee and to be treated at private hospitals is equally exercised. 
With regards to private health insurance the expectation from other countries 
is that it is unequally distributed (Hacker, 2002; OECD, 2004). However, in the Danish 
case the law on tax-exemption included an “equality-premise”: a central premise for tax-
exemption of private health insurance was that companies offer treatment or insurance to 
all employees. The argument was that this would enhance equality among receivers, so that 
it would not only be given to the group of CEOs that were particularly valuable to the 
company. When the government in 2002 put forward the law on tax-exemption of PHI, 
the “equality-premise” was not in the initial proposal. In the first draft of the law 
companies could choose who, among their employees, to offer tax-exempted PHI to. The 
Confederation of Danish Industries (one of the largest employer organisations) was pleased 
with these less strict rules and wrote in its comments on the law: “we have noted with 
specific satisfaction, that tax-exemption is not contingent upon whether all employees are 
offered the same health insurance” (L97, 2002, app. 1, authors translation). However, the 
Table 2.8: Where is hospital treatment preferred?  
Perceived quality in public and private health care (% of population, 1999 & 2008) 
 1999 2008 
Private hospital 44 23 
No difference 18 51 
Public hospital 25 24 
Do not know 13 2 
Source: For the survey in 1999: (J. G. Andersen, 2000). For the survey in 2008: Survey conducted 
by Zapera.com for Mandag Morgen, spring 2008. 
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Social Democrats worked hard to convince the government to include the “equality-
premise” in the law. Further, the government supporting party (the Danish People’s Party) 
decided not to support the law unless it made tax-exemption contingent upon companies 
covering all their employees. Paradoxically, this claim by the Social Democrats and the 
Danish People’s Party, which was not the intention of the right wing government, has also 
driven up the number of people holding PHI’s. Had the law not included this premise, 
companies may only have chosen to cover exactly the employees who they considered 
most valuable.    
Despite this equality-enhancing premise, evidence shows that PHI is not 
equally distributed among the population. Evidently, the unemployed, the elderly (not on 
the labour market) and the most low-paid workers with precarious labour market relations 
do not hold PHI’s. Moreover, surveys also indicate that among the working population 
there are also large differences in who are covered by PHI.  Whether a person has a PHI is 
closely related to income-level, as shown in figure 2.8. People earning more than the 
average wage are much more likely to hold PHI than people below or at average salaries. 
Job-positions also matter: 65% percent of the privately employed elite hold insurance, 
while only 17% of non-elite public employees hold insurance (Olsen, 2007). Furthermore, 
PHI is more widespread among white-collar workers than among blue-collar workers (C. 
Iversen, 2007). In an peculiar way the “equality-clause” of the tax-exemption law in 2002 
has not resulted in equality among PHI holders, which was the aim, rather it may – 
independently – have had the unintended consequence of boosting the success of PHI’s. 
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Figure 2.8: Equality and holders of private health insurance, 2008. 
 
 
Surveys77 further confirm the findings from other countries: PHI is held by well-off, well-
educated, middle-aged persons. Since most Danes hold PHI through their workplace, most 
are also active on the labour market and most often in white-collar jobs. It is the low-risk 
groups that hold PHI, like in the UK and Spain (Besley, et al., 1999; Costa & Garcia, 2003). 
The other question is in relation to equality in choice. With regards to the 
formal equality in access, the choice-reforms has not altered equality in access – all citizens 
have the right to choose an alternative, public or private, hospital if the one they had 
entered does not provide treatment within the set waiting time limit. Regarding those who 
exercise their right to choose, there are Danish studies indicating that speciality, age and 
social background influence patient choice. GP’s report that patients with a medium or 
high levels of education and patients from the middle or higher social classes are those 
most likely to utilize the possibility of choice (Vrangbæk, et al., 2007). However, this 
question still lacks firm statistical data.  
Another way that privatisation may affect equality in health care is through 
the mechanism of cherry-picking or “creaming” on the part of the private providers – a 
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common phenomena in systems of mixed provision (Bartlett, et al., 1998). This already 
happens for privately insured persons, because they all belong to low-risk groups, who on 
average require fewer resources. It can also happen within the choice programme. Since 
private hospitals are paid with the average DRG-price, uncomplicated patients are more 
profitable. This has been an issue raised by many opponents in the debate, in particular the 
public hospital owners and administrators and the Danish Regions. The argument is that it 
leaves the complicated and expensive patients in the public sector. Often the argument in 
the privatisation debate goes that privatisation will drain resources from the public sector, 
while at the same time leaving the most complicated and expensive patients to the public 
sector – essentially wearing down public sector finance and quality. There has been a few 
attempts to analyse this problem, but the evidence is inconclusive (DSI, 2009).  
 
2.18 The development of health care costs 
Proponents of privatisation reforms in health care in general expect 
privatisation to reduce costs. In international comparison this claim can seem paradoxical. 
When comparing the cost of health care across countries there is a tendency that the larger 
the private component of the health care system, the more expensive it becomes (OECD, 
2007a). These two features need not be directly connected, health care systems are complex 
and many different elements may determine the cost. However, there does seem to be 
evidence that containment of cost is easier in all public health care systems (Elias Mossialos 
& Grand, 1999). However, reducing health care costs was not the motivation for the 
Danish reforms and it was not the result either. As shown in figure 2.9, health care 
expenditure has been steadily rising over the past decade. How much of this rise is due to 
private sector expansion is hard to determine. Private hospitals produce more or less 3% of 
hospital treatments and account for around 3% of health care costs (2008-figures), but this 
does not account for the cost increase in health care over the past decade. It is more likely 
that cost are driven upwards by the mechanisms described above where the waiting time 
guarantee, increased activity based finance and improved technology makes demand for 
services higher and few limits on supply (both by public and private providers). 
 
Figure 2.9: Public health care expenditure, Denmark, 1996-2006 
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In other words, the privatisation process has not made the overall cost of 
secondary care lower. Rather, it has been a process of gradual increase in spending levels 
both before and after the private sector started to grow. If anything, public hospital 
expenses rose at a higher rate after 2002, when the private hospitals entered the scene. 
 
2.19 New political problems arising 
As argued, the drive towards privatisation in Danish health care was 
motivated by the aim of bringing down waiting lists – a problem which was conceived 
among Danish citizens as one of the biggest failures in the health care system. This was not 
a new problem in the Danish health care debate, but the solution was a new attempt to 
battle an old problem. The policies have to some extent brought legitimacy back to the 
public sector as responsiveness seems to be rising and along with public trust in public 
hospitals. Whether waiting times are in fact falling to a permanently lower level is more 
uncertain. However, the policies enacted have come at a cost. The most obvious one is the 
rising cost of the health care system as activity-based finances and economic incentives to 
increase production have driven up production and costs. Due to the poor financial 
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situation in 2009/2010 the increase in cost was slowed down and a small number of 
hospitals had to reduce its levels of personnel, resulting in a political battle over who held 
responsibility for this mis-management of the hospital system. This resulted in an 
ideological debate over private and public hospitals in which opponents argued that private 
hospitals had drained the public hospitals.  
Although the solution of involving the private sector has been popular 
among Danes, it has also resulted in new political problems, as the cumulative effects of 
the policies became evident in 2008/2009. First, it turned out that some private doctors 
were getting very wealthy from their private clinics. This did not match the general idea of 
the Danish public sector model, because it meant that some private doctors had become 
very rich with tax-money. Some private doctors were earning 10-15 times the salaries of 
public hospitals doctors. These doctors names were displayed in the daily Ekstra Bladet, 
accused of getting extremely rich on the back of tax-payers (Ishøy, 2009; Larsen, 2009). 
This made Social Democrats object to profit margins of these sizes, and experts warned 
that highly specialised doctors would move to the private sector and leave public sector 
hospitals unable to conduct specific types of surgery due to a lack of qualified personel. 
Private hospitals do make large profits. In 2006 the 22 largest private hospitals were making 
profits of 360 mill. Kr – in 2008, these hospitals had increased their profits by 87%, 
totalling 673 mill. Kr., which made the regions, the owners of the public hospitals claim 
that private hospitals were being overcompensated also for the simpler operations (A. L. 
Schmidt & Rønberg, 2009). This was a claim that had already been made by the 
independent research unit the Danish Institute for Health Service Research (DSI, 2009). In 
spring 2009, the Rigsrevision, an independent body who controls the government, had 
aired severe criticism of the Minister of Health Lars Løkke Rasmussen, claiming that he 
had deliberately agreed to overcompensate private hospitals and that he had not made sure 
that tax-payers’ money was spent in the most economically appropriate way 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2009). Under pressure, in summer 2009, the right wing government 
decided to lower payments to the private sector hospitals. A new agreement between the 
regions and the private sector, in which private hospitals were to be paid approximately 
20% lower rates, was made in summer 2009.    
Finally, and what may turn out to be the largest political problem, waiting 
lists have not disappeared. While waiting times were lowered by approximately 4 weeks 
between 2002 and 2005, since 2005 nothing has happened, in spite of the fact that the 
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private hospital sector is growing and the public hospitals are also treating more patients. 
In 2008 waiting times rose again and the latest figures show no changes in waiting times (A. 
L. Schmidt & Rønberg, 2009). It seems that the well-known health market effect has set in: 
by increasing supply, demand is also increased. A new set of adaptations to fix this spiral is 
likely to be puzzled out. Finally, problems of equality in access as the result of PHI and the 
rising cost of the health care system, due to a more demand-driven model may mount to 
large political problems. 
  
2.20 Conclusion 
This chapter started out by arguing that privatisation in Danish health care 
was unlikely to happen due to the existing structures of an all-public health care system. 
The period from the early 1980’s until today has not experienced large critical junctures or 
institutional collapse, however, by 2008 private hospitals form an integrated part of the 
health care system. The chapter shows how private hospitals were set up in the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s but did not survive because there was little support in the surrounding 
environment; both the political elites, the existing public hospitals, and citizens rejected 
private hospitals. Yet, through the 1980s and 1990s several changes took place. Citizens got 
richer, became less loyal to political parties and increasingly critical of the public sector 
services, although strong support for the universal welfare state remains. Policy makers 
responded to this problem of legitimacy towards the universal health care system with a 
range of different policy-solutions. Waiting lists became a proxy for this legitimacy problem 
in health care. Different solutions were developed; both initiatives to bring down waiting 
lists and patient choice to accommodate voters’ desire to choose between alternative 
providers rather than taking the uniform product. A vague version of competition was tried 
out in the early 1990’s and extended in the 2000’s. These policies were attempts to address 
important policy problems and thereby adapt the health care system to a changing context. 
Through the 1990’s and 2000’s ideas on how to adapt the system changed among policy 
elites. While the left wing parties had been strong opponents of both competition and 
private actors in health care, they increasingly accepted that the private sector could play a 
role in service provision. There was large debate over details of implementation and 
payment-levels to the private sector, but as of 2010 even the regions, who used to enjoy 
monopoly in health care planning and provision, now accept the private actors. The unions 
find themselves in a dilemma with regard to this development – in particular their dilemma 
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concerns the rise of private health insurances. Ideologically, the unions defy it and consider 
it to be the beginning of the end of a universal health care system, which the unions had 
contributed to the establishment of more than 100 years ago. On the other hand, union 
members want to hold Private health insurance, even the public employees of 
municipalities and regions (Ritzau, 2009). In turn, citizens also became less hostile to the 
private sector.  
From 2002 onwards the context surrounding private hospitals shifted. First, 
private health insurance saw a dramatic rise, which created a private customer pool for 
private hospitals. Second, a waiting-list guarantee was given to citizens, which meant that 
they could choose private hospitals if the public hospitals could not offer treatment within 
a set limit of time. As such this created a large customer pool coming from the public 
sector. This new regulation was not debated very intensely at the time it was implemented, 
because no-one believed private hospitals would proliferate at the spectacular rate they 
have done since. Slowly, as private hospitals actors realised they were legitimate, and taking 
advantage of very favourable economic terms, the number of private hospitals began to 
rise. Further, in certain areas of care quality-regulations were relaxed to open up for further 
expansion of the private sector. 
Yet, the introduction of private hospitals can hardly be regarded as an 
isolated instance of ideological pursuit of privatisation. While there was a clear 
disagreement over ideas about public or private actors in health care in the 1980s and 
1990s, this disagreement appears less clear in the 2000s. In particular, the social democratic 
party is less hostile to private actors in the 2000s. While the social democratic party still 
criticises the private sector terms by the end of the 2000s, the party voted in favour of the 
waiting time guarantee in 2002 and another “diagnosis guarantee” was supported by all 
parties in parliament in 2009. This policy is most likely to boost private sector activity 
again. In short, there has been a change of ideas regarding the organisation of the health 
care system and the inclusion of the private sector. This change has not come out of a 
vacuum. In the years preceding the introduction of private hospitals, policy makers had 
worked out and tested solutions to problems of responsiveness in the public health care 
system. A range of policy experiments aimed at bringing down waiting times were tried out 
in the 1990s (by a Social Democratic government) and largely failed. The introduction of 
private hospitals in 2002 was another iteration of this process of learning about policy 
solutions to the problem of waiting lists and low responsiveness. Simultaneously, a system 
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of activity-based financing of public hospitals has been rolled out. These two elements have 
been important drivers of health care costs. The private sector hospitals and the new 
economic incentives have brought about change in the health care system, for a while 
waiting times did fall and there are signs of increasing trust public health care on the part of 
citizens. Nevertheless, the introduction of private hospitals into the equation did not solve 
the policy-problem of waiting lists – the problem persists. Furthermore, there have been 
several problems in the model concerning how to finance the private sector operations.  
Among political elites there is still a struggle over the organisation of the 
health care system. But in 2010 this struggle is not as much between political parties as 
between the national government and the regional level governments. On the one hand, 
national policy makers want the health care system to deliver on certain issues, on the other 
hand, the regions argue for their right to autonomy in a decentral system. The regions won 
a political victory in 2009 when it was settled that the regions themselves will negotiate the 
terms with the private sector and that the Minister of Health can no longer interfere and set 
specific terms. With this new power in hand, the regions demanded that the private 
hospitals accept much lower prices than had previously been agreed. Negotiations broke 
down. If the private sector were not to accept the tariffs offered, then the public sector 
hospitals would stop referring patients to private hospitals, thus taking away the ‘safety-
net’, which had prior secured business in the private hospital sector. This, however, is not a 
likely development. Free choice is popular among citizens and there needs to be something 
to choose between. Even though the regions have gained power in the game with the 
private sector, it is unlikely that they will be allowed to use it to abolish the choice policy. 
Because the choice policy is not only about giving patients a choice over where to get 
treatment, it has a broader goal. Choice policies, whether in health care, elderly care or 
education is an instrument to reinstall legitimacy into the universal welfare state and the 
public sector. During the 1980’s and 1990’s the public sector was increasingly distrusted be 
citizens (as shown in the case of health care in this chapter). Choice policies may affect 
both the public sector institutions but certainly also citizens’ possibility of utilising 
alternatives to the services offered by the public provider. Politically, privatisation has not 
only been a succesful strategy, it has also produced problems. Despite such problems of 
implementation, as shown in the case of private providers in health care, choice and private 
alternative providers offered an alternative to users who have increasingly demanded 
individualised services, instead of the one-size-fits-all model. In this process policy makers 
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have come up with a range of policy solutions in health care over the past decades. Policy 
makers are puzzling over a complex problem; One the one hand, a supply-led health care 
system, where priorities are needed due to capped budgets and where planning is necessary 
for optimal use of resources. These elements suggest an acceptance of waiting lists. On the 
other hand policy makers need to respond to increased legitimacy pressures on the welfare 
state in general and the health care system specifically – if policy makers do not deal with 
these salient problems the worst case scenario is that citizens seek out private alternatives. 
In the Danish context it is still politically problematic to dismantle the welfare state. It is an 
institutional weapon (Klitgaard, 2007), not only for Social Democratic parties but also for 
centre-right governments. 
In analytical terms, private provision in health care is driven by a search for a 
policy solution to a policy problem of low responsiveness and decreasing legitimacy of the 
health care system. Over time this problem has risen on the public and political agenda and 
ideas (policy solutions) have changed. Both left and right wing parties have come to accept 
private providers as citizens have also come less hostile to private health care provision. 
The policy process has been an iterative process, where changes in context, problems and 
solutions are intertwined and develop over time.   
In this adaptive process, privatisation in the provision of services is a policy 
solution which may have contributed to solving parts of the problem of responsiveness, yet 
it also includes new problems which are likely to be challenging in the future. With regards 
to issues of equality in access it is in particular the private health care insurance that over 
time may lead to a new type of system, one in which certain groups of citizens get access to 
more or different health care than others. In the Danish context, where equality in access 
used to be a central concern this may become a policy problem itself demanding political 
action. However, access to the public sector services remains equal to all. With regard to 
the rise in health care cost, policy makers face a new situation in 2010. Like most other 
western countries Denmark faces a spending deficit, which is likely to affect also the public 
health care sector. If the existing mechanisms and guarantees are kept in place, it may 
contribute to boosting private sector development. As the surveys indicate most Danes 
were confident with the health care system in 2008, including public hospitals, but there 
was at the same time acceptance of the idea the private sector actors should compete with 
public providers, although there was no particular wish for more private actors per se. 
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Table 2.9: Danes’ view on the health care sector, 2008 (% of population) 
 
Very /quite 
successful Neither 
Very/quite 
unsuccessful PDI in % * 
Is the government successful in providing 
health care for the sick? 47,7 26,5 25,8 21,9 
How well do you think public service is with 
regards to hospitals? 66,9 - 33,1 33,8 
 
Agree/partly 
agree Neither 
Disagree/partly 
disagree  
A larger part of welfare services should be 
carried out by private actors? 36,8 19,6 43,6 -6,8 
There should be competition between public 
and private providers of welfare state 
services? 56,4 13,5 30 26,4 
One can be more sure to receive competent 
treatment at a private hospital rather than in 
a public hospital 36,3 29 34,7 1,6 
*Percent difference index calculated as: Agree – disagree / successful – unsuccessful 
 
Source: Survey ISSP 2006 Role of Government IV, ISSP data-set kindly made available by Prof. Jørgen Goul 
Andersen. The survey is conducted in 2008 (despite the data-set title). 
 
Exactly how policy makers will try to a strike a balance between cost-control 
and improving the system (and sustaining legitimacy of the universal health care system) in 
the future we do not know. But it is likely that new solutions will be developed. Danes still 
expect improvements to be made and technological advancements will add to the pressure. 
At the same, economic constraints dominate Danish public economy in 2010. The process 
of adapting the Danish health care system will continue in this new economic context. 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
 
 
England: The Planned Private Market 
 
 
In 1997 Tony Blair won a major political victory. He brought the Labour 
Party back into power after 17 cold and desperate years in opposition. One of the reasons 
Labour won that election was that they had promised to save and modernise the National 
Health Service (NHS). This promise was close to the heart of many Britons who were 
highly supportive of the NHS, but increasingly dissatisfied with the services delivered. For 
many the NHS is a precious national symbol of a modern society – almost as valued as the 
British monarchy (Timmins, 1995). The NHS needed to be saved and many felt that 
Labour was the party that could do the job. To the surprise of many, the medicine that 
New Labour chose to prescribe the NHS was to invite privatisation: “For decades there 
has been a stand-off between the NHS and the private sector providers of healthcare. This 
has to end”, stated New Labour in the NHS Plan from 2000. This was a surprise, first 
because Labour had spent 17 years in opposition accusing the conservatives of wanting to 
privatise the NHS, and second because the very foundation of the NHS was a reaction to 
all the inadequacies of a private/voluntary based health care provision system. This chapter 
aims to explain why New Labour has chosen privatisation policies to save the NHS.          
 The NHS was built up as a comprehensive national health care service in the 
postwar period. Many policy actors, including Labour Party members, accused the 
Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
of wanting to privatise the NHS. However, introducing private elements into the NHS or 
out-sourcing core health care service did not take place. There was great resistance to 
privatisation among citizens and unions. But there were several problems (concerning for 
example cost and responsiveness) and policy-solutions were developed, which involved 
market mechanisms (Enthoven, 1985). These ideas were tested in the 1990s without the 
involvement of private actors and with poor results.  
To the surprise of many, the Labour Government under Tony Blair in the 
2000s went much further in privatising NHS hospital services than the conservatives had 
 130 
ever thought possible. In 2000 the NHS paid private sector providers around £2bn, which 
rose to more than £4,5bn in 2006. In the same time span the production value of the 
private acute health care market also doubled. Between 2000 and 2008 the number of 
private hospitals grew from 225 to 335. Between 1997 and 2009 more than 100 hospital 
building projects were carried out with private financing. 
The chapter analyses a particular set of policies laid out in the NHS Plan 
2000, which explain these rises in privatisation and which to a large extent is a continuation 
of policy solutions developed in the 1980s. However, in order to understand why these 
particular policies were chosen it is necessary to analyse the development of the NHS in a 
longer historical perspective, including the ideas developed during the Conservative 
governments in the 1980s/1990s. Further, to understand why labour embraced these 
policies we need to look more broadly at the context surrounding the Labour Party in the 
1990s and their experiences in government from 1997 onwards. Although the 2000s have 
seen a range of interrelated polices, the analysis will focus on 3 programmes: 1) the 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTC); 2) the introduction and evolution of choice 
policies in the NHS; and 3) the Private Finance Initiative in health care. The chapter will 
analyse the origin and nature of these policies, but in particular will explain their existence 
in the light of the context in which they were originally conceived. 
The analysis suggests that NHS-policies under New Labour are to a large 
extent a continuation and furthering of the Conservative’s policies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Surprisingly, New Labour promised to save the NHS and did so by increasing the strategies 
of the Conservative party – which Labour had spent 15 years criticising when in 
opposition. The analysis suggests that privatisation was pursued by the New Labour 
government for reasons not too different from those found in the Danish case. Several 
problems of responsiveness were becoming apparent in the NHS, and these were 
becoming increasingly salient as citizens demanded better services. Several “waiting time 
initiatives” in NHS history had been policy failures. Voters expected Labour to deliver 
results on the NHS. Inviting private health care was a policy solution which promised to 
satisfy the demands of the middle class, which New Labour conceived as it main 
constituency, despite the fact that privatisation did not go well with the existing NHS 
values. Therefore the policy solutions had to tread a fine line, where the basic principles of 
free and equal access were combined with incentives for the NHS to become more 
responsive.   
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The solution was to install a type of market mechanism and create a plurality 
among providers of health care. However, in contrast to the Danish market mechanism, in 
which the market is open to any provider, the English solution was a planned market, where 
the government decided which providers could operate and where they could be located. 
Narrowly considered, the Independent Sector Treatment Centre policy was a failure, 
resulting in an under-utilisation of private providers and low value for money. But more 
broadly considered these new private providers have legitimised the use of private health 
care providers and have contributed to a break up of the doctors’ monopoly over health 
care services and have brought in a plurality of providers. This has contributed to existing 
NHS hospitals becoming more responsive. At the same time, it has increased the influence 
of a new policy actor in the NHS – the private sector.  
In the analysis I will argue that Labour strived to make public services more 
responsive to citizens’ needs, in particular the middle class, to avoid that these would 
choose ‘real’ private alternatives (i.e. private insurance). The support of the middle class 
remains the foundation for the NHS and the privatisation polices have aimed to meet the 
expectations of these groups of citizens. These changes towards private involvement seem 
to address a set of important problems in the NHS but at the same time have created new 
ones. Similar to the Danish case, the experiments with privatisation in England seem to 
have been somewhat more effective with regard to addressing problems of responsiveness, 
but they have also been costly.     
 These changes are hard to explain from more traditional approaches in 
political science. First, party politics does not explain the development for the basic reason 
that it is the Labour Party which has decided and implemented the introduction of private 
providers in the NHS. Second, privatisation is not the result of austerity measures – from 
2001-2008 the NHS saw an unprecedented increase in funding.  
As in the former chapter, this chapter will demonstrate how policy makers 
continuously puzzle over solutions to policy problems in the English health care system 
and these changes can be viewed as attempts to adapt the NHS to a changing context. 
Changes in the political stream over time make new policy ideas acceptable. As these policy 
solutions are tested, they reveal new problems, and new solutions are implemented to solve 
these problems. As such, this narrative, as the former, shows how policy makers try to 
connect solutions to problems, rather than debate whether the problem deserves a 
response. The narrative will analyse changes in the way the policy problems are conceived 
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and how ideas (solutions) develop over time. The chapter will also demonstrate how these 
solutions are developed under the influence of changing context.  
As in the previous chapter, this one also starts with a short description of the 
political playing field for health care politics in England and its implications for policy 
making. Hereafter, the early story of the NHS is presented, with a particular focus on the 
question of private vs. public health care debates in the NHS. Then the Conservative Era 
of the 1980’s and 1990’s are analysed, while the central part of the chapter focuses on a set 
of policies and developments towards private health care provision in the 2000s. 
  
3.1 Health care politics in England 
The British political system differs fundamentally from the Danish system 
described in the previous chapter. While the Danish system is characterised by minority 
governments and a large degree of corporatism, the British has the opposite characteristics. 
Although the United Kingdom is a multi-party system, the first-past-the-post electoral 
system used for general elections tends to produce majority governments, which consist of 
either the Conservative Party or the Labour Party, though each has in the past century 
relied upon a third party to deliver a working majority in Parliament.78 There is to no extent 
the type of corporatist interaction between employers, unions and the state, which 
characterised the Danish political system. This does not imply, however, that unions play 
no role in Britain or in British politics.  
The British political system is one which produces strong majority 
governments and has a strong state in the sense that there are only a few veto-points in the 
policy making process. These institutional features have important implications for the 
analysis of health care system reform. With strong majority governments we would expect 
governments to have few difficulties in passing and implementing their political 
programmes and manifesto-pledges. As we shall see with the privatisation reforms of the 
NHS, this has largely been the case. Furthermore, the particular policies that have driven 
privatisation have not required new laws to be approved in parliament, they have all been 
policies done “with the strike of a pen in Whitehall,” since they could be implemented 
within the existing NHS laws. Unlike the Danish case, the English case does not involve 
                                                 
78
 There is also the possibility of forming a government with a parliamentary minority which in the event 
of no party having a majority requires the formation of a coalition government. This option is only ever 
taken at a time of national emergency, such as war-time. It was given in 1916 to Andrew Bonar Law, and 
when he declined, to David Lloyd George and in 1940 to Winston Churchill. 
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parliamentary debates or political compromises, but focuses instead on government 
decisions. 
A defining feature of the British health care system is its degree of 
centralisation. While the Danish health care systems is decentralised to regional political 
and administrative bodies, the British NHS remains highly centralised, despite devolution 
policies in the 2000’s. For historical reasons, which we will get into shortly, the NHS is 
controlled directly from Whitehall with the Minister of Health holding political 
responsibility for the entire NHS. In the centralised British NHS, policies of privatisation 
are decided centrally in London and apply to the NHS throughout the country. This 
implies that government polices have a direct effect on the NHS, unlike in the Danish or 
Swedish case where the regional political actor plays an important role. Unions – in 
particular the BMA (Immergut, 1992), but also Unison (the largest public employee union) 
– have historically had a large influence over health care policies. However, over time this 
position has declined, while as the private sector rises the private health care sector 
becomes more influential as a new policy actor. Unions were increasingly marginalised 
during the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, but this trend has continued 
during the Labour governments from 1997 onwards. 
To put it simple, the central actor in English health care policy making is the 
central government. Both Unions and the private sector play a role in reforms, but not the 
central role found in Denmark and Sweden. In comparison to the other cases, parliament 
also plays a relatively unimportant role in health care (Christopher Ham, 2004). 
In order to understand the evolution of the NHS and the role of the private 
health care sector, we now turn to the history of the NHS and privatisation policies over 
time. The narrative starts with the “Big Bang” of the Modern Welfare State – the Beveridge 
Report and the establishment of the NHS. 
 
3.2 Building up the NHS 
 
The UK was the first country in the world to development a National Health 
Service. In 1948 the NHS came into existence as the first national health care system, 
offering free treatment and equal access to health care for all citizens. It was furthermore 
the first system not to be based on the insurance principle, where entitlement follows 
contributions, but national provision of services available to everyone. Hospitals (private or 
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run by local authorities) were taken over by the state (nationalised) and funded by general 
taxation. In the time of its creation it was a unique example of collectivist provision of 
health care in a market society (Klein, 2001). Although at face value it seemed a 
revolutionary change, Klein shows how the legislative transformation was a much longer 
evolutionary process which took place in the 1930’s and 1940’s (see also Christopher Ham, 
2004, chp. 1; Klein, 2001), where several reports79 had suggested that the answer to the 
shortcomings to the existing health care provision was a more comprehensive model. 1942 
saw the publication of the influential Beveridge “Report on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services”. The report suggested a large number of reforms aimed at expanding the social 
security system and establishing a National Health Service, which was to be free for every 
citizen at the point of use (Beveridge, 1942). The idea of a comprehensive health service 
was developed under a Labour government, which recognised the increasing need for 
access to health care for the working class. In the late 1940s, 2/3s of the British population 
was working class, and therefore faced increased (work-related) risks associated with 
industrialisation. Further, the unintegrated hospital system in existence before the NHS was 
also conceived to be inefficient. Beveridge and Bevan expected NHS costs to fall over 
time. They thought that, in a national service, people would become healthier and not need 
so much treatment.  
Before the realisation of the NHS there had been a lengthy political battle 
between the Labour Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, and the British Medical 
Association, who on their part fought for their own goals and were successful in many 
respects, which are important to the question of private vs. public health care still discussed 
today: first, the retension of the independent contractor system for General Practioners; 
and second, the option of private practice and access to private pay beds in NHS hospitals 
for hospital consultants. In addition, the doctors secured a rewards system that would offer 
generous salaries to those awarded and a major role in the administration of the NHS. The 
BMA had threatened to derail the National Health Service scheme before it had even 
begun, as medical practitioners continued to withhold their support just months before the 
                                                 
79
 The report of the Dawson Committee, set up in 1919, made proposals for improving health services, 
recommending the provision of a comprehensive scheme of hospital and primary health care. Reports 
from the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance in 1926, the Sankey Commission on Voluntary 
hospitals in 1937 and the British Medical Association n 1930 and 1938 all pointed to problems in the 
existing health care services and made different suggestions for change, mainly pointing to the need for 
greater coordination among hospitals and the extension of health insurance to larger groups of the 
population. The report from Royal Commission suggested that health services funding could come from 
general taxation, instead of the insurance model (Christopher Ham, 2004).   
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launch of the national service in 1948. The concessions made to the doctors made Aneurin 
Bevan state, that in order to broker the deal, he had “stuffed their mouths with gold” (cf. 
Christopher Ham, 2004, p. 14). As a result, the NHS was launched and all local and 
voluntary hospitals were placed under one single administrative structure with the minister 
of health in the top.      
 The structure of the NHS in 1948 was a result of the possible rather than of 
the desirable for Bevan and the Labour government at the time (Klein, 2001). But the 
structure was also shaped by the preceding system of health care. The closest link with 
what had been before was the General Practioners, who remained private, now 
administered by Executive Councils. Second, the responsibility for a range of personal 
services (maternity, child welfare, midwives, vaccination and ambulances, among others) 
remained with the local authorities. And, third, the largest change was that hospitals were 
now administered by the state in a centralised structure.    
Over a relatively short period of time the health service had been changed 
from a muddled patchwork of private, voluntary and public provision, financed by private 
and public sources, into a neat administrative structure, run and owned by the state and 
paid for through general taxes. The final responsibility of the NHS now resided with the 
Minister of Health. The NHS became the flagship of the British welfare state and was for 
the following 50 years very popular among the British people, who always maintained high 
levels of support for the NHS.  
The policy was the result of a clear set of problems, and a highly innovative 
solution, modified through a political compromise. However, one of the concessions the 
BMA made at the birth of the NHS was to maintain the right to conduct private operations 
in the NHS – this element of privatisation (type 3 in the typology presented in chapter 1) 
has haunted NHS politics since its early days.  
 
3.3 The battle over private beds in the NHS 
In 1958 the House of Commons held a celebration of the ten year 
anniversary of the NHS, where Aneurin Bevan, the founder of the NHS, stated that the 
NHS was “regarded all over the world as the most civilised achievements of modern 
Government” (cf. Klein, 2001, p. 24) and the anniversary witnessed self-congratulation on 
the results of the NHS. However, Bevan touched on a subject which was to remain 
politically sensitive through the NHS’ history: private pay beds in NHS hospitals, where 
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consultants could treat their own private patients for private money. There were fears 
already in 1958 that the system was being abused by some consultants, who allowed their 
own patients to skip the waiting list in the NHS, if they were able to pay for the private 
service. Between 1974 and 1976 the labour government and the BMA fought a bitter 
ideological struggle over the private pay beds in the NHS. In 1974 there were 4.500 pay 
beds handling around 120.000 patients a year – they represented just about one percent of 
all NHS beds and the patients in them represented two percent of all non-phsyciatric cases 
in the NHS (Klein, 2001, p. 90). As such they were marginal to the production of the NHS. 
However, they were important symbolically and politically. For the doctors it was a sign of 
their independence from the state.80 For the Labour government pay beds were a “crack in 
the diamond” of a pure NHS, built exclusively on the principle that treatment of patients 
should be determined on the basis of need and not on the ability to pay. In 1974, however, 
the context had changed; the BMA had lost power and pay beds had become a political 
issue with strikes and demonstrations in front of hospitals. The pay beds had become a 
visible symbol of privilege. The political cost of doing nothing was rising for Labour, who 
decided to try to phase out the private pay beds. But the BMA fought bitterly for their right 
to private business. Realising that the power resting on their professional status was 
declining, they threatened with strikes – once again a compromise was the result. The 
compromise shut down a number of pay beds. By 1979, there were 3000 pay beds in the 
NHS (Johnson, 1995) (which in practice meant very little, because the pay beds were 
under-utilised) but doctors maintained the right to private operations in the NHS. 
However, in 1980, after Thatcher had won the election in 1979, doctors who had full-time 
jobs in the NHS were allowed to engage in private practice, using NHS beds,81 thus 
increasing the supply of doctors available for private practice: between 1979 and 1986 the 
number of private consultations in the NHS grew from 132.400 to 261.600 (Johnson, 
1995). 
As of 2008, the private pay beds still provoke debate and political reactions, 
despite the fact that the number of pay beds in the NHS make up a declining portion of 
                                                 
80
 In fact the large majority of doctors were absolutely dependent on the state for their salaries, but in 
certain specialities, primarily surgery, consultants could make an extra income from their private patients. 
81
 As a restriction, doctors who were full-time consultants, could earn a maximum of 10% of their gross 
income from private pratice. However, part-time consultants could engage in unrestricted in private 
practice if they forfeited one-eleventh of their NHS-salary (Johnson, 1995, pp. 22-23). 
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private sector operations.82 This indicates that doctors who wish to engage in private 
practice increasingly go elsewhere – namely to the regular private sector, to which we shall 
return to later.  
   The NHS has undergone several changes and has been evolving gradually 
through successive adjustments to the original design. One of these very visible changes 
was the reorganisation of the NHS in 1974 (Klein, 2001; Ham, 2004). Substantial and 
radical critique of the NHS was built up in the 1970’s focussing on problems in the services 
combined with a loss of confidence within the public agencies, who were adversely affected 
under the regime of retrenchment (Webster, 2002b). However, until the late 1990s, there 
was political consensus around the NHS, at least as far as it should remain a public service 
with free and equal access for all. Further, the service was to large extent run by doctors, 
which, despite being salaried employees, fought to maintain autonomy. As the Department 
of Health and Social Security acknowledged in 1971: “the existence of clinical freedom 
undoubtedly reduces the ability of the central authorities to determine objectives and 
priorities and to control individual facets of expenditure” (Expenditure Committee, 1971, 
Cf. Ham, 2004, p.29). In other words, doctors were the central actors setting priorities and 
objectives in health care. Debates over this role and the consensus on the NHS as a public 
service started with the Thatcher government. 
  
3.4 Margaret Thatcher, John Major and the Internal Market 
In 1979 the national election was won by the Conservative leader Margaret 
Thatcher, while the Labour party began a journey into the political wilderness. It took the 
political pendulum 17 years to swing away from the Conservatives. During this time 
Labour had been rehabilitated and transformed into New Labour. In the view of essential 
continuity between the Conservative and New Labour in the field of health care policy, 
New Labours policy-initiatives are appropriately considered in the light of the Conservative 
era health care policy.   
The pace of reform speeded up after Thatcher took office in 1979. The oil-
crisis in the 1970’s had brought a halt to the rapid expansion of public services and public 
expenditure that characterised the 50’s and 60’s. The Labour government in power in the 
1970’s had been forced to tighten economic policies bringing it in conflict with its 
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 In 1972 the private beds in the NHS had a market share of private operations of 48,3 %. In 2007 the 
NHS market share was down 9,4% (Laing and Buisson, 2008, pp., see table 2.11).  
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traditional base of political support, the trade unions. When the Conservatives took over 
the government in 1979 they continued tight economic policies and introduced several 
privatisation programmes. The conservative government introduced a programme 
involving the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, such as airports, telephone 
companies (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998), reductions in taxation and much stricter control on 
public expenditure. For the health system economic restrictions meant that budget grew at 
a slower pace than previously. The budgetary constraints shifted attention towards using 
the existing budget more efficiently and the idea of market principles were aired by the 
Thatcher government. Government plans to introduce market principles into the NHS 
resulted in conflict between the government and strong pressure groups. The consensus on 
health policy that had prevailed in the earlier years of the NHS broke down (Webster, 
2002a). The beginning of the 1980’s was characterised by attempts to make the NHS more 
efficient and businesslike (Christopher Ham, 2004), elements and ideas which were later to 
be known as New Public Management (Hood, 1991). The Conservative government did 
not come to power with a fixed plan of what to do with the NHS. It introduced a range of 
initiatives to make the NHS more efficient, not always coherent with one another 
(Christopher Ham, 2004). The reforms evolved incrementally, each step making further 
steps and further change possible. As Webster has commented, the Thatcher reforms were: 
“a process of continuous revolution, in which the end result was nor predictable at the 
beginning, and indeed the whole process of policy making was akin to a journey through a 
mine-field” (Webster, 1998, pp. 143-144). 
The first reform was the management reform, sketched out in the Griffiths 
report of 1983. Roy Griffith, a director of the grocery store J. Sainsbury, suggested 
implanting business doctrine and service management into the public health service. The 
report struck a hard blow at consensus management (in which the doctors had a central role) 
and suggested disentangling NHS management from Whitehall and implementing a system 
of general management at all levels of the NHS (Griffiths, 1983; Webster, 2002b, pp. 162-
174). For the first time in NHS history, the BMA was not involved in health care system 
policy making. The BMA protested against the reforms and so did other interest-groups, 
however, without any luck. The NHS received managers, and quite a few of them: in 1986 
there were one thousand persons general or senior managers in the NHS; in 1995 there 
were 26.000 (Webster, 2002b, p. 203). The reform had an impact, but did not turn out to 
be the strong force of change that the government had hoped for, and due to pressure 
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from all sides the management reform was unstable. However, the reform started a 
movement which had importance with regard to privatisation: by giving general managers 
authority also over the medical profession, it laid one of several stones on the path towards 
competition in the public health care market. It gave general managers the possibility to set 
up strategic goals for hospitals, rather than simply administering them. The only measure 
taken involving privatisation was a policy of ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ (CCT) or 
contracting out in 1983, which required all health authorities to put ‘hotel services’ 
(catering, cleaning and laundry) out to tender (Powell, 2008). 
 The critique of the Griffith’s reform did not only come from doctors. 
Professor Alain Enthoven, who was to become an unofficial adviser to the Thatcher 
government in the 1980’s claimed that the reform lacked market mechanisms. Enthoven 
saw the NHS as inefficient, riddled with perverse incentives and resistant to change. 
Enthoven argued that in the absence of market incentives, general managers would be 
insensitive to efficiency questions, just as the old consensus management had been 
(Enthoven, 1985).  
The privatisation debate came alive under the Thatcher government. The 
word privatisation was more than it had been previously one that provoked strong 
ideological reaction. The 1983 Labour manifesto promised to “remove private practice 
from the NHS and take into the NHS those parts of the profit-making private sector which 
can be put in good use” (cf. Klein, 2001, p. 131). The conservatives for their part 
welcomed closer relationships between the state and the private sector. The Thatcher 
government, which took office in 1979, initially aimed to privatise the NHS by relying 
more on private provision and private health insurance. The main political problem with 
these aims was that financing the NHS from general tax revenues was very popular with 
the electorate and powerful interest on this point had developed over the NHS’ 30 years of 
existence. Overall public support for state financing of health care was high and increasing 
in the 1970’s and the 1980’s (J. I. Walsh, 2000). With the NHS being one the most popular 
institutions (second to the royal family) in the UK, the Thatcher government did not go far 
down the line of privatising the NHS – they were blocked by the very NHS-institution 
itself and its popularity. Therefore there was no policy window for privatisation.  Thatcher 
left the rhetoric of privatising the NHS altogether and in 1982, at the Conservative annual 
party conference, Thatcher wanted to put the discussion to bed, stating:  “Let me make one 
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thing absolutely clear. The National Health Service is safe with us” (cited from J. I. Walsh, 
2000). 
As the 1980’s wore on, a widening gap between the funding of the NHS and 
needed funding to meet demands became apparent. By 1988/89 shortfall in the hospitals 
and community health care had amounted to £1,8 billion – according to the governments 
own calculations (Christopher Ham, 2004, pp. 34-36). The impact of the accumulated 
underfunding threatened to become a major political issue and the BMA warned in 1987 of 
underfunding and the president of the Royal College of Surgeons warned that the NHS 
was close to breaking point. The Thatcher government quickly found a bit of money, but at 
the same time announced a far-reaching review of the NHS. The review resulted in the 
White paper, Working for Patients, published in 1989.  
 
Table 3.1: Average yearly spending increases, public health care expenditure, 
United Kingdom, 1971-1997  
 1971-1979 1980-1989 1990-1997 
Average yearly spending increase in public health care 
expenditure 
 
4,6% 2,8% 3,2 
Source: OECD health care database, 2009. Average calculated by author using fixed prices 
(index year 2000) 
 
The white paper laid the groundwork for was later labelled the “internal 
market” reflecting the ideas of economist Alain Enthoven (1985). The internal market was 
installed under John Major in 1991 and the central idea was to split purchasers and 
providers in the health care system so that Health Authorities could exercise more effective 
control over costs and production. The NHS administration was broken up into quasi-
autonomous trusts from which authorities bought services. The role of Regional Health 
Authorities was taken over by 8 regional offices of the NHS management executive. For 
the first time, Klein comments, the NHS became truly a nationally administered, 
centralised service. (Klein, 2001). According to Enthoven the market would allocate 
resources more efficiently and increase productivity, which would result in shorter waiting 
times for patients and increased responsiveness. As such, it promised to be a solution to 
problems of efficiency and low responsiveness in the NHS. This policy solution was 
certainly new to British health care and had been in the “soup” of ideas since 1985. The 
internal market was a redesign of the financial flows on the NHS-map. Primary care Trusts 
(typically GPs) were to purchase services from NHS Trusts (hospitals). Both GPs and 
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hospitals were given further freedoms in order to survive in the internal market for 
patients.  
The 1991 reforms did not represent a systematic attempt to translate an 
“internal market model,” as suggested by Enthoven, into practice. The phrase itself did not 
appear in Working for Patients, the government paper that introduced the 1991 reforms. The 
whole enterprise was much more pragmatic and less ideological than the outraged reactions 
to the reforms suggested. Some of the key innovations, e.g. the purchaser-provider split 
and the introduction of general practitioner fundholding, did not feature in Enthoven’s 
model. Instead Enthoven’s ideas were influential because they crystallised a new way of 
thinking about healthcare policy rather than because they provided a blueprint: the central 
theme in 1985 was the need to devise powerful incentives for NHS personnel to serve 
patients as efficiently as possible. The system had to be organised in order to serve the 
patients. In Enthoven’s analysis, one of the problems with the old NHS was that the 
interest of the patients was often lost: the traditional NHS model contained “no serious 
incentives to guide the NHS in the direction of better quality care […] In fact, the structure 
of the NHS contains perverse incentives. For example, a district that develops an excellent 
service in some speciality that attracts more referrals is likely to get more work without 
getting more resources to do it. A district that does a poor job will ‘export’ patients and 
have less work, but not correspondingly less resources, for its reward […] There are other 
perverse incentives. A consultant’s NHS waiting list creates a demand for his services by 
private pay patients. Thus clearing a waiting list is directly opposed to the economic interest 
of the consultant” (Enthoven, 1985, pp. 13-14). In short Enthoven suggested that a new 
set of incentives were needed in the NHS model for the service to improve. These new 
ideas were translated into what became known as the “internal market” of the NHS. 
Despite the hopes of the internal market, the existing evaluations of the 
internal market showed that it did not have the expected results in terms of efficiency and 
productivity. A few studies indicate a small positive impact, while most studies suggest that 
the internal market had no significant effects on the outcomes produced: waiting list 
dropped only marginally after 1991 and started rising again after 1993. On the other hand 
there is evidence that the internal market was expensive to administer – administrative cost 
in the NHS rose from 6% in the early 1990s to 12% in 1997 due to the market experiment 
(Christopher Ham, 2004, pp. 44-47; J. Le Grand, 1998; Webster, 2002b). Despite much 
rhetoric, heated political debate and contestation, the internal market did not result in 
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privatisation either in production or in finance. The NHS remained publicly provided and 
financed. 
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched in 1992 under the John 
Major Government with the aim of increasing the involvement of the private sector in the 
provision of public services. The PFI marries a public procurement programme, where the 
public sector purchases capital items from the private sector, with an extension of 
contracting-out, where public services are performed by the private sector. Put simply, a 
private investor designs, builds and operates and school or hospital, while the state rents it 
back for a monthly fee. PFI differs from privatisation in that the public sector retains a 
substantial role in the service provision, often as the main purchaser of services. It differs 
from contracting out in that the private sector provides the capital asset as well as the 
services. As the term PFI implies, it is private finance that is the crucial addition. Thus under 
the PFI, the private sector not only designs, builds and operates, but also finances the 
facilities – and all of this under long-term contracts, generally of 30 years or more. The 
political logic behind PFI is straightforward; it enables a government to initiate an increase 
in capital expenditure, for example to build new hospitals, without having to increase taxes 
in the short term. The idea of PFI was opposed vigorously by the Labour Party. Most 
critics pointed out that PFI was very low value for money, since private investors would 
claim much higher rates of return than a normal state investment would involve, thus 
making the overall capital costs higher. The PFI scheme was not used in health care under 
the Conservative government. 
 
3.5 Private health insurance on the rise 
Throughout the 1980’s the provision of private acute medical care and 
private health insurance grew substantially (Klein, 2001, pp. 131-133). In 1980 there were 
154 private hospitals with 7000 beds and by the end of the decade these numbers had risen 
to 216 hospitals with almost 11.000 beds. The trend was also towards a new type of 
ownership. In 1980 the independent sector was mainly owned by charitable or religious 
organisations. By the end of the decade most independent hospitals were owned by for-
profit groups. It was debated whether there would be an American take-over of the private 
health care sector, but it did not happen: the US companies that had been present in the 
market sold out (Klein, 2001). The increase in the private sector reflected the rise in the 
private insurance market, depicted in figure 3.1.  
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In 1980 tax concessions were made for employer paid-medical-insurance 
premiums for those earning less than £8500 a year (Webster, 2002b, p. 155). This may have 
affected the private health insurance market to some extent, but cannot account for the rise 
in the private insurance alone. Klein (2001) argues that, in fact, the rise in private health 
insurance had little connection to government policies. Despite much friendly rhetoric 
towards the private sector, the Thatcher government did very little to encourage private 
sector growth directly. It was often argued that the Thatcher government “starved” the 
NHS financially to such an extent that the Brits opted out and chose private solutions and 
that that explains the private sector growth in the 1980’s. However, if we dig a little deeper, 
there is little evidence to support this claim. First, the private sector demand was mainly for 
elective surgery, which the NHS had long waiting lists for. In other words, the private 
sector, as it had done before in the private NHS beds, offered faster treatment of simpler 
types for people of working age. 
  
Figure 3.1: Private health insurance, UK, 1975-2007 
 
 
 
Second, the evidence suggests that private sector growth reflected not just 
frustration over waiting times, but also a wish for more consumer control over non-
 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
Subscribers of private medical insurance 
(1000's) left axis 
Persons covered in % of the UK population (% 
of pop.) right axis 
Source: Laing, 2008, table 3.1. 
 144 
medical aspect of treatment, such as privacy, timing of operations, food etc. (Calnan, et al., 
1993). The private sector had the resources to meet this demand for those who could pay. 
Third, and related to this, an increase in private insurance is closely related to social and 
economic changes which were taking place; more people were moving into the middle class 
and held jobs which provided health care insurance as a part of the pay package or paid 
salaries which made insurance affordable. The rise in private insurance may simply reflect a 
spreading of what the wealthy had always done – to exit into the private sector when it 
suited them. The private health sector had simply become available to more people in a 
similar dynamic as seen in the Danish care. Furthermore, people who had private insurance 
continued to rely on the NHS for a large part of their health care needs (Klein, 2001, 
p.133). The notion that the exit to the private sector would erode support for a large, 
public, tax-financed health care system was contradicted in the 1980’s. At the end of the 
decade, support for the NHS was still high, and public support for spending more money 
in it was stronger than at the beginning.83 In short, the rise in health insurance in the 1980’s 
is therefore not simply a reaction to a rising dissatisfaction with the NHS.  
When looking at the picture from the side of private business, the private 
hospital sector was not the economic adventure that shareholders had been hoping for. 
Many hospitals suffered from under-occupation, with occupancy running at 60% or lower. 
Insurers experienced problems in holding down premiums as the market became 
competitive and as claims rose. The big winners were doctors or the medical profession. In 
1980 insurers paid out £57 million in fees to doctors, by 1988 the figure was almost £245 
million (Klein, 2001, p. 133). 
 
To sum up, the NHS remained publicly provided and financed during the 
Thatcher and Major governments from 1979-1997 (with the exception of the private 
finance initiative). There were several problems, both with regards to finance and 
responsiveness. The BMA was losing influence and increasingly being marginalised in 
health care politics, giving the government even better options as regards implementing the 
policies they wanted, but in the conservatives did not want to risk an electoral beating that 
seemed to be associated with privatisation in the NHS. But several new policy ideas were 
born and tested during the Conservative government. The internal market was in reality a 
                                                 
83
 According to British social attitudes survey, 86% of Britons in 1985 thought more spending was needed 
on the NHS, this figure had gone up to 89% in 1990. 
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politically managed market in which competitive incentives were severely attenuated by the 
control exercised by central government (Chris Ham, 1997), and in which PFI was still 
being heavily criticised for being a waste of tax-payers money.   
But these new ideas were to become important. Although the internal market 
reforms did not involve the privatisation of services, it changed the NHS in important 
ways. It was the first step in an evolution towards more private elements in the service. The 
internal market logic and the focus on management in the Thatcher years prepared the 
NHS for the introduction of private providers and more direct competition in hospital 
services. The internal market created a new set of key players and a new incentive structure 
for the health care sector. In the internal market, the most powerful position was not being 
in charge of a regional health authority, but it was being a chief executive (or director of 
finance) of a hospital. Hospital managers were to be entrepreneurial and were able to 
position (with regards to specialisation in particular fields) their hospitals to gain a 
competitive edge. In the traditional NHS, the focus had been merely on medical issues – 
now hospitals were considering the financial and economic sides of hospitals. Hospitals 
could poach specialist staff in neighbouring hospitals in order to build up and dominate 
certain niches and compete for patient income (Pollock, 2004, pp. 110-114). From the 
internal market arose a notion that hospitals were to compete with other hospitals. These 
ideas were to serve as great inspiration to further privatisation under the Labour 
Government from 1997 onwards, as we shall see below.  
 
3.6 Waiting in the NHS 
If there is one thing the NHS is notorious for, it is waiting. At its inception in 
1948, the NHS inherited a waiting list of around half-a-million patients and, as hard as 
successive governments may have tried, the number only spiralled upwards until the end of 
1990s. The first initiatives to bring down waiting list were taken already during the 1950s 
(R. Hamblin, et al., 1998). Due to a long tradition of registering waiting lists, the 
phenomenon can be viewed over a long period of time, as seen in figure 3.2 
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Figure 3.2: Number of persons on waiting lists for NHS treatment, 1949-2008. 
  
 
 
Waiting lists rose steadily from 1949 to 1999.84 The UK has some of the 
longest waiting lists in the western world – and therefore the issue has long been high on 
the political agenda. There have been a long list of attempts to bring down NHS waiting 
times, but as indicated in figure 3.2, none up to 1999 were very successful.  
The main political lesson from the waiting lists initiatives were that waiting 
lists are not reduced by increasing supply of services alone. In fact, the evaluations showed 
that increased service supply might lead to increased demand, making waiting lists grow 
even more (A. Harrison & B. New, 2000), because when waiting lists shortened GPs would 
change referral practices (Earwicker & Whynes, 1998). In the mid-1990s waiting lists were 
becoming a political problem. The British Social Attitudes Survey shows that while more 
than 66% (more or less constant from 1987-1999) of Britons are satisfied with hospital 
services, only around 20% are satisfied with the waiting times in the NHS. In 1996 24 % 
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 One the reasons for the sharp rise from 1988 onwards is the inclusion out-patient waiting times in the 
statistics. 
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were satisfied with waiting times in emergency departments, 21% were satisfied with 
waiting times for non-emergency operations and 19 % were satisfied with waiting times to 
get an appointment with hospital consultants.85 Waiting lists were becoming synonymous 
with the short-comings of the NHS and a sign of its lack of responsiveness towards 
patients. 
 
Figure 3.3: Waiting times, NHS, 1987-2008 
 
 
The Labour government, which entered government in 1997, inherited this 
policy problem and aimed to find a solution. The solution they developed involved 
privatisation, which Labour had fought against so bitterly for decades. Before turning to 
the details of the solution, we will take a look at the context surrounding the emergence of 
New Labour, because that context helps explain why labour chose these solutions.   
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 A collection of these statistics are available at www.ons.gov.uk 
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3.7 New Labour enters the scene 
The statistics of the 1997 general election, which brought the labour 
government to power, suggest that it was as much a landslide victory86 as was the 1945 
election, which brought Attlee’s Labour party to office and hence the NHS itself into 
being. With a majority of 197 seats, Tony Blair’s government was in a more commanding 
position than any other post-war government (Klein, 2001, p. 189). This position made the 
government able to carry out its political programme without political restrictions. With 
regards to the NHS, many hoped – and believed – that the labour party would restore the 
NHS and abolish the marketisation reforms put in place by the former conservative 
governments. Unions were also hoping to be heard more and be reintegrated in policy 
making. Any such hopes were not fulfilled. 
The New Labour party was intentionally different from the old Labour party 
and distanced itself from its ideological inheritance. The belief in nationalisation, central 
planning and technocratic paternalism, which had been the thinking of old labour, and 
which lay behind the creation of the NHS, had to be altered, although the party had to 
remain committed to the NHS – “we want to save and modernise the NHS”, stated the 
1997 Labour manifesto. However, “saving” the NHS did not mean turning it back into its 
1960s version. Instead New Labour would puzzle out a range of solutions for the problems 
in the NHS, including when such solutions involved privatising provision of services. 
To understand why New Labour chose a particular set of solutions for the 
NHS we will take a brief look at the reorientation of Labour (also called The Third Way). 
Like Thatcherism, the Third Way was a response to a changing environment. The social 
and economic changes that had brought Thatcher to power in the late 1970s, and allowed 
the Conservatives to hold office for 18 years, meant that Labour had to revise its image and 
policies if it was to return to power. The decline of the traditional industries in Britain was 
reflected in a decreasing membership in unions. The new emerging social and economic 
structure was based on services and gender roles were changing. The transformation of the 
Labour party during the 1990s into New Labour was the product of the fact that “Britain 
was a changed country in which the old signposts had either undergone heavy modification 
                                                 
86
 ‘Landslide’ is the term most often used about the general election in Britain in 1997, because it 
produced the largest labour majority (179) and the largest number of labour MPs (419) in history, with 
the largest swing (10.3%) since 1945. However, this is a good example of how the electoral system in 
Britain works. If we look at votes instead of seats, the picture is different; labour’s share of the vote was 
44,4 %, better than any election since 1970, but worse than any election from 1946-66. Taking turnout 
into account, only 30,9 % of the registered electorate came and voted labour (Crewe, et al., 1998). In that 
view it was less of a dramatic call for change. 
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or disappeared altogether” (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 152). The Labour party had been created 
to represent the large and poor working class. By the 1990s the working class had shrunk 
significantly and was no longer, broadly speaking, poor. In 1945 two-thirds of the labour 
force belonged to the working class. In 1979 this percentage had fallen to around half, to 
37 percent in 1992 and to 34% in 1997. Simultaneously, the percentage of employees in the 
service industries rose from less than 45% in 1959 to 60% in 1981. Between 1979 and 1997 
employees in manufacturing declined from 32 % to 18 %, while the proportion of workers 
in service industries rose from 58% to 75%. Trade union membership fell from 53% of the 
civilian workforce in 1980 to 32% in 1994. Furthermore, the middle class had become 
wealthier, most often owning both a house and a car by the early 1990s (Rubinstein, 2006, 
pp. 172-173). Over the decades the working-class had become middle class. A nation of 
producers had turned into a nation of consumers.  
Political adviser Philip Gould became known for conducting focus group 
interviews to learn about peoples’ views on the Labour party and its policies. In 1992 
Gould’s focus groups showed that “Labour is no longer the party of ‘ordinary people’. 
People are saying, ‘I’ve left the Labour Party and the Labour Party has left me’ (Gould, 
1998b, p. 5). As observed throughout this analysis, political parties aim to win elections. By 
the mid-1990s it was cleat that Labour could no longer base its policies and strategy on 
working class solidarity and loyalty. Any hope of winning the election would have to be 
based on the support of the middle class. Tony Blair noted this in a speech in 1993, when 
he argued that labour had lost previous elections because the party had not changed in 
accordance with the British society: “The changes in class composition, the breakup of the 
old class-structure, mean that to form a new electoral majority the left has to reach out 
beyond its traditional base” (Blair, 1996, p. 221). Philip Gould, the central adviser to New 
Labour, wrote after the 1997 election: “The middle class can no longer be viewed as a 
small, privileged sub-sector of society. Mass politics is becoming middle-class politics. 
Winning the century means winning the middle-class support” (Gould, 1998a, p. 396).
  
The new Political Strategy of Labour was to a large extent a response to these 
socio-economic changes within Britain. The Third Way was to some extent an analysis of 
how to win an election, rather than a consistent political philosophy. The key word was 
“new” – new Labour calls for new solutions.  The inherited NHS, therefore, had to be 
modernised. The Third Way promised a new agenda, where themes that used to be 
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antagonistic (e.g. Private vs. public / State vs. market), could be united. Further there was a 
change in perspective on the role of the state: it is to create opportunities for people to 
participate in the labour market, for it is “the private sector, not government, is at the 
forefront of wealth creation and employment generation” (Cf Klein, 2001, p. 191). 
 Under Third Way thinking an important conclusion was drawn with 
importance for public programmes, such as the NHS: Taxation and public spending had to 
be under tight control. The 1997 Labour manifesto committed itself to maintaining the 
public spending programme inherited from the Conservatives, but it also promised not to 
raise income taxes, and indeed to reduce them if possible. The political strategy behind 
these pledges was clear: New Labour had to get rid of the old “tax-and-spend” image. 
However, when it comes to policies, the Third Way would be pragmatic – “What counts is 
what works” (Labour, 1997).  
Despite the word “new” reappearing all over the Third Way campaign, many 
policies built on and developed the policies of its predecessors. When it came to the NHS, 
the tactic of distancing itself from Old Labour was tricky – the NHS was a political 
cornerstone for Labour, one which the party was expected to protect. The 1997 manifesto 
denounced the internal market and GP-fundholding, which were characterised as 
conservative policy-failures. Specifically, the manifesto promised to take 100.000 persons 
off the waiting lists and to end waiting for cancer surgery. Improvements were to be 
funded by cutting management cost by £1 billion, echoing Thatchers’ 1979 election pledge 
(a promise made by almost all incoming governments in the history of the NHS (Klein, 
2001, p.203).) 
 
3.8 The national mood on health care 
When the Blair Government gained office in 1997, around 35% of Britons 
were satisfied with the NHS (see also figure 3.9). The Blair government took over a health 
care system which had been very effective at cost containment – or alternatively which had 
been hugely under-funded. The UK spent 6,8% of GPD on health care in 1997, which was 
far below most other European countries (Germany 10,2%, France 9,7 %, Sweden 8,1% to 
give a few examples).  The per capita spending on health care was also quite a long way 
below other modern health care systems in 1997: the UK spent $1559/cap, while Germany 
spent $2682/cap, France $2369/cap and Sweden $2299/cap (OECD, 2006). At the same 
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time, voters believed that the NHS needed improvement and that New Labour would be 
most suited for that task (see table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2: Issues and parties’ policies preferred in 1997 and 2001 
 1997 – party preferred 2001 - party preferred 
National Health Service Lab. + 54 Lab. + 28 
Education Lab. + 44 Lab. + 30 
Europe Lab. + 17 Lab. + 5 
Law and order Lab. + 27 Lab. + 5 
Unemployment Lab. +41 Lab. + 48 
Note:  these issues were thought to be the five most important problems facing the country across the two 
elections. In each case the score shown is the percentage of respondents preferring Labour on the issue 
concerned minus the percentage preferring the Conservatives  
 
Source: Denver (2003, table 5.1) 
 
 
In the 1997 manifesto New Labour pledged that its “fundamental purpose is 
simple, but hugely important: to restore the NHS as a public service working cooperatively 
for patients not a commercial business driven by competition”. There were two essential 
aims with regards to the NHS. The first was to shorten waiting lists, which had become a 
salient issue, and quoted among the English as one of the most unsatisfying elements of 
the NHS.87 Second, the manifesto further stated that New Labour would “end the Tory 
internal market” and increase spending in the NHS. One of the concrete statements in the 
manifesto is that new labour is opposed to the privatisation of clinical services (Labour, 
1997).  
As in Denmark (and Sweden) Britain shows strong support for government 
health care and have done so consistently over many years. The NHS is an institutionalised 
part of the British welfare state and despite the fact that many new right wing ideas had 
been aired in the 1980s this had not affected Britons view of the role of the state in health 
care (see table 3.3)  
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 British Social Attitudes Survey show that while more than 66% (constant from 1987-1999) of Britons 
are satisfied with hospital services, only around 20% are satisfied with the waiting times in the NHS. In 
1996 24 % were satisfied with wainting times in emergency departments, 21% were satisfied with waiting 
times for non—emergency operations and 19 % were satisfied with waiting times to get an appointment 
with hospital consultants. A collection of these statistics are available at www.ons.gov.uk  
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Throughout NHS history there have been discussions of whether the health 
care should be the same for everyone or whether the wealthier should be able to pay for 
better treatment. In the 1980s this debate was heated in the light of the rise of private 
health insurance, and consequently in 1986 the British Social Attitudes Survey started 
tracking the issue (See table 3.4). When New Labour came into government in 1997 the 
“national mood” on this question was shifting towards a more uniform health care model. 
Despite the fact that the Britons were getting richer, and being able to pay for better health 
care, they increasingly thought that the same health care services should be available for 
everyone. 
   
Table 3.4: Rising support to universal health care 1986-1996 
Question: Do you think that health care should be the same for everyone, or should people who can afford it be able to pay for 
better health care? 
 1986 1989 1991 1993 1996 Change 
(1986-1996) 
Same for everyone 45,6 49,8 54,3 54,6 59,9 +14,3 
Able pay better 53,1 49,0 43,7 43,4 38,9 - 14,2 
DK/NA 1,3 1,2 2,0 2,0 1,2  
Total 100 100 100 100 100  
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey. Available at www.britsocat.com. Change calculated by author as the 
difference between 1986 and 1996. 
 
Regarding public expenditure, there was also consistent public acceptance of increasing 
public spending on health care. In 1996 almost 90% of Britons thought that there was a 
need for more spending on health care and 42% believed that there was a need to spend 
much more, even though it might increase taxes.88 
 
                                                 
88
 British social attitudes, 1996 (GVSPEND2). Available at www.britsocat.com. 
Table 3.3: Consistent support for public health care 1985-2002, Britain. 
Question: On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide health care for the 
sick? 
 1985 1986 1990 1996 2000 2002 Change 1985-
2002 
Definitely should be 84,7 84,2 83,6 80,5 87,2 84,1 - 0,6 
Probably should be 13,0 13,8 13,9 16,2 10,8 11,6 - 1,4 
Probably not 0,6 0,7 0,6 1,2 0,1 0,6 0 
Definitely should not 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 - 0,1 
Can not choose / 
NA 
1,4 1,0 1,6 1,8 1,7 3,5 + 2,1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100   
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey. Available at www.britsocat.com 
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Figure 3.4: Popularity of government spending on health care. People’s priorities for public 
spending*, Surveys, 1983-2007, UK.  
 
 
It was against this background that New Labour entered the Scene in 1997: 
health care spending had been low in Britain for many years, falling behind other European 
countries, there was rising dissatisfaction with the NHS, and waiting lists were a major 
political issue, but the support for the NHS-model and for more spending on it was high. 
The solution was not to boost the private insurance sector, as Britons increasingly found it 
unfair that the rich had access to better health care. People were not expecting a revolution, 
simply a better NHS. The central concern for Labour when looking for policy solutions 
was that they had to improve performance of the NHS in order to make middle class 
voters support it, as one the government advisors on health care put it: “Otherwise, the gap 
between system performance and public expectation would widen, the middle classes 
would progressively buy their way out, and the NHS would spiral down to become a 
residualist safety net.” (Stevens, 2004, p. 37).  
The NHS had always been a major political asset for Labour (see table 3.3). 
If the middle class started renouncing it, it would not only be a disaster for the NHS (and 
its funding base), but it would imply a massive political loss for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, there was a need to show important improvements to the NHS, to make sure 
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that the middle classes would continue to support it. There was only one problem: taxes 
had to be kept down. 
 
3.9 Re-testing old solutions 
In 1997, Frank Dobson, an Old Labour veteran, was chosen as Secretary of 
State of Health. The choice of an old labour stalwart would help create confidence among 
the public and the health service that traditional, Bevanite, NHS values would be guiding 
any changes. As some sort of counterbalance, Tessa Jowell and Alan Milburn, both sworn 
advocates of modernisation, were chosen as junior ministers. Frank Dobson was highly 
critical of the private sector in health care. In the electoral campaign Labour had criticised 
the Conservative government for the long waits on inpatient care. Once in office Labour set 
targets for hospitals to bring down these waiting times. Dobson relied on the traditional 
NHS hierarchy and set targets that health authorities were to meet. Dobson did not 
abandon the internal market, as Labour had promised. The split between purchasers and 
providers remained, but instead of competition between providers, they now had to 
cooperate. But in effect, nothing much happened in the NHS in the first three years of the 
Labour government, and certainly no privatisation took place. The targets to bring down 
waiting lists on in-patient care did bring down this waiting list, while at the same time out-
patient waiting lists grew (A. Harrison & B.  New, 2000). One year after Dobson had taken 
office and promised to cut waiting lists, the waiting lists had risen to 137.000 persons (BBC 
NEWS, 1998). The BMA and the NHS Confederation criticised the focus on waiting lists, 
because the intense focus on waiting lists risks skewing clinical priorities and draining 
resources from other areas of the NHS, like high quality cancer and mental health services. 
Nevertheless, Dobson stood firm on targets and in 1998 Labour poured £320 million into 
reducing waiting lists. The money did get people of the waiting list, but as seen on figure 
3.3, waiting times remained stable in 1998-2001. 
There was nothing new in trying to reduce waiting lists by command and 
control in the NHS (Klein, 2001). 1962 saw the first initiative on waiting lists in the NHS, 
when the department of health requested hospitals to go through their waiting lists, 
followed in 1963 by a strong recommendation to bring down waiting lists. In 1964 the 
Department of Health concluded that the largest increases in waiting lists had taken place 
in the specialities where production had increased the most. Against that background more 
Doctors authorisations were issued for these specialities (R.  Hamblin, et al., 1998).  In 
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1986 the Conservative government issued the “waiting list-initiative” for which a separate 
fund was created to increase hospital efficiency. The initiative ended in 1995, after the fund 
had channelled £252m into hospitals (A. Harrison & B.  New, 2000). In 1991 “The 
Patients’ Charter” gave patients a set of rights in the NHS. One of those was that no 
patient should wait more than 18 months for an operation (which may in fact seem a long 
time). In 1995 this right was extended to cover all hospital treatments (Department of 
Health, 1996). Furthermore, the internal market, already mentioned, was also expected to 
reduce waiting lists as a result of competition (A. Harrison & B.  New, 2000). 
The first initiatives from 1962/63 had no effect on waiting lists and the 
issuing of more doctor authorisations only increased the waiting lists. Enoch Powell, 
Minister of Health from 1960-1963 said of his attempts to reduce waiting lists that they 
were as “hopeful as filling a sieve” (cf. Klein, 2001, p. 221). The Waiting list-initiative from 
1986-1995 did not succeed either in tackling the problem. An evaluation of the fund 
concluded that the ear-marked funding had contributed to eschewing clinical priorities 
towards patients who had waited a long time, rather than those patients most in need of 
treatment. The nature of the ear-marked and short-term funding also reduced efficiency 
and made long-term planning difficult. The fund did result in increased activity, but this 
only led to more patients being referred to treatment, which made waiting lists grow even 
more (Clinical Standards Advisory Group, 1996; Newton, et al., 1995). Looking at figure 
3.3 also suggests the internal market did not bring down waiting time. Harrison and 
Appleby sum up the attempts from 1948-1998 to bring down waiting times as “Fifty years 
of Policy Failure” (A. Harrison & Appleby, 2005, p. 3) 
These experiences led to an understanding that more supply/production of 
service would not lead to reduced waiting lists, on the contrary waiting lists rise along with 
production (National Audit Office, 2001), because when lists go down, GPs are 
encouraged to refer more patients to hospitals, i.e. the threshold for referral goes down.89 A 
complete evaluation of the waiting list initiatives until 1997 reveals that the existence of 
long waiting lists was not the result of backlog on operations – it seemed to be a structural 
problem (A. Harrison & B.  New, 2000). 
In short, when Labour came to power they were re-testing old policy 
solutions to the problem of waiting lists. Hospitals had always been positive towards 
                                                 
89
 There are debates about the exact mechanisms at work, but studies find that the referral rate goes up 
when waiting times go down (Earwicker & Whynes, 1998; Goddard, et al., 1995). 
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waiting list initiatives because they brought more money to the hospitals (and therefore 
hospitals also have some incentive to have waiting lists) (Klein, 2001). And as with the old 
solutions, they achieved limited results. Labour fell in line with Conservative spending 
plans on health care and Labours policies towards the internal market did not involve the 
radical rejection that was suggested by Labour’s political rhetoric. In short, it is fair to say 
that Dobson followed the line laid out by the former Conservative government.  
As the Blair government reached the year 2000 it had fulfilled none of the 
electoral promises in health care: waiting lists were still very long and the internal market 
had not been abolished (although it had been altered slightly). At the same time satisfaction 
with the NHS was falling and 44% of the Britons blamed the Labour Government for the 
situation (Annabell Ferriman, 2000). Something had to be done – after all, if anything, the 
NHS ought to be safe with a Labour government and the 1997 election had shown that 
health care was the most urgent problem among the electorate (King, 1998, table 7.4). 
Labour had to produce visible results on the NHS. The numbers (in 
particular in waiting time) were not showing progress as fast as labour had hoped for. In a 
leaked personal memorandum, Philip Gould, adviser to the Prime Minister, warned that 
“we have got our political strategy wrong. We were much too late with the NHS. We raised 
expectations that could not be met in our first two years.”90 The Blair government was 
aware that results had to be achieved as regards the NHS, but at the beginning of 2000 
people’s day-day experience with the NHS fell short. People still had to a wait long time for 
appointments, the quality of treatment varied, appointments were inconvenient to obtain, 
hospitals were dirty and the level of services did not match the expectations of patients or 
staff (Webster, 2002b, pp. 215-217). New solutions had to be put forward. 
 
3.10 The NHS Plan 
Although New Labour had started their period in government with promises 
to follow the Conservatives’ spending levels, it soon became obvious that these spending 
levels did not match their aim of resurrecting the NHS. Labour was warned on this in 
particular by the BMA and other Unions, but made no concessions to its critics because the 
goal of showing economic responsibility, as a part of the “New Labour image” ranked 
higher. However, by autumn 1999 Tony Blair and Gordon Brown agreed that more action 
                                                 
90
 The memo was published in The Sun, july 15th 2000, and can be read on BBC at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/840548.stm  
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was needed to counteract the growing complaints and the notion that, to quote Webster, 
“the UK was drifting into the Third World league of health care” (Webster, 2002b, p. 231). 
On may 16th 2000 the prior commitment to keeping public expenditure down 
fell when Blair announced that he would raise the rate of increase of spending on the NHS 
from 6,7% of GDP to 8%, bringing the NHS to the average EU-level. This was partly 
possible because of a favourable global economic environment, creating the potential for 
extra spending, but more so it was a reaction to a crisis of professional and public 
confidence in the service. Prior to the launch of the NHS Plan an analysis of the 
perceptions of NHS staff and the public had been conducted. Both the public and staff 
gave high priority to more and better paid staff. The public also wanted reduced waiting 
time and staff wanted more training and better integration of services. The failures of the 
NHS were attributed to an under-invested system and a major theme in the NHS Plan was 
to increase spending to provide extra beds, more intermediate care, new hospitals and more 
doctors (Department of Health, 2000b). 
The aim of the investment was to bring public expenditure on health care in 
the U.K. up to the average EU-level, which lies just above 8% of GDP. Between 2000 and 
2006 the investment level was raised from 6,8% of GDP to 8,3% of GDP. Accordingly, 
between 2000 and 2006 the real growth rate of public expenditure was 45% in real terms, a 
significantly higher level than the preceding 25 years.91   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
 OECD figures are used for the whole UK (not only England) in order to get a longer time range. 
Figures for England alone can only be calculated from 1998 onwards. This has been done for example by 
Civitas, showing a similar development. Statistics for England are available at www.civitas.org 
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Figure 3.5: Public health care expenditure, UK, 1975-2006. 
 
 
At the same time policymakers were developing solutions aimed at reforming 
the supply-side to expand output and improve quality (Department of Health, 2000b). Part 
of the plan was to create a wider range of providers of healthcare, so as to increase 
capacity, encourage innovation and improvement in services, and to give patients more 
choice. Therefore, the NHS Plan involved a new type of public-private partnership 
(Department of Health, 2000b, section 11), which would involve private providers of 
health care in order to expand the operating capacity of the NHS.  
 
3.11 The concordat with the private sector 
Local agreements for the NHS to use spare capacity in private hospitals 
already existed before 2000, but this mechanism was used only in extraordinary 
circumstances. According to the Department of Health, the NHS had spent £1,25 billion 
in 1998/1999 on contracts with the private sector, amounting to approximately 4,6% of the 
NHS budget and paying for about 350.000 operations in the private sector (Carvel, 2000). 
It was already known that this type of spot-purchasing in the private sector was expensive 
and bad value for money for the NHS. 
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The NHS plan renounced the divide between the public and the private 
sector, because “ideological boundaries or institutional barriers should not stand in the way 
for better health care for patients…” (Department of Health, 2000b, p. 96). The NHS was 
therefore to make a concordat with the private sector concerning providing critical and 
elective surgery and intermediate care for NHS patients, paid for by the NHS. In addition, 
the government would “explore with the private sector the potential for investment in 
services - such as pathology and imaging and dialysis” (Department of Health, 2000b, p. 
98).  
According to Pollock (2004), the kick-start towards the use of private sector 
hospitals on a long term basis was a mix between a need for problem solution, interest 
group pressure, and a historical accident. In February 2000 a senior public relations officer 
of the Independent Healthcare Association, Tim Evans, had managed to join a TV-
audience for a question and answer session with Prime Minister Tony Blair. Evans asked 
Blair if he had any “ideological objections to cooperation between the NHS and the private 
health care sector. Mr. Blair answered “no,” Evans told the PM that the former Health 
Minister Frank Dobson in 1997 had instructed all NHS Trusts only to use private hospitals 
in exceptional circumstances. After having made further inquiries Blair ordered Dobson’s 
instructions to be cancelled (Pollock, 2004, pp. 70-71). Alan Milburn (who had replaced 
Dobson as Secretary of State in 1999) started negotiations with the Independent 
Healthcare Association about a concord and made a formal nationwide agreement (the 
concordat) with the Independent Healthcare Association to use more private sector capacity 
for NHS patients in order to shorten waiting lists, in particular within elective surgery 
(Carvel, 2000).  
But there were also more material reasons behind the cooperation with the 
private sector. First, a national inquiry had revealed that beds in the NHS were often 
occupied by people over age 65 and that a large part of these (in total 13% of all beds) 
should not be in hospital because they did not require the resources of an acute hospital. 
But they could not be discharged to their homes, but needed intermediary care. Since no 
public facilities existed, these patients were “blocking” beds needed by other patients 
(Pollock, 2004). Second, the private sector could contribute to reduce waiting time for 
elective care. The growth in the private sector had been low in the 1990’s, which had left 
many private hospitals with excess capacity. While the NHS had an average bed occupancy 
rate of 83% the private hospitals often had rates under 50%. The private sector was 
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therefore most interested in treating NHS patients. The concordat allowed for this if it 
offered “good value for money for the tax payer and assure high standards of care for the 
patient” (Department of Health, 2000a). 
 
Although launched as a pragmatic attempt at a provisional solution to the 
waiting list problem, the concordat provoked hostility among Labour backbenchers and the 
Unions (Carvel, 2000). However, the policy programme did not have to pass parliament, 
since it did not alter any legal principles. The long-term treaty with the private sector was a 
first step in what Labour had claimed would be a new view on public-private partnerships 
in the NHS, where old ideological boundaries should be set aside (Department of Health, 
2000b). Despite the original 1997 manifesto pledge not to commercialise or contract out 
core health care (cited above) the NHS plan 2000 allowed for a break-up and 
commercialisation of NHS hospital services. New Labour was re-vitalising the ideas of a 
more plural provider market already invented with the internal market in the 1990s. 
 
3.12 New policy solutions 
The introduction of the private sector hospitals was not only about solving a 
short term problem of bed-shortage. After only two year in office, Tony Blair complained 
of having ‘scars on my back’ from his attempts to get ministry departments and civil 
servants to improve on policy delivery. His critique centred on the notion that the 
government’s attempts at improving delivery in the public services were being hampered by 
public servants who were concentrating on operating in policy chimneys, protecting their 
turf and their own interests rather than advancing government programmes.92 At the core 
of the Blair administration there were economic advisers who agreed and argued that the 
NHS was stifled and had become a “non-moveable monster” dominated by doctors’ 
monopoly over the service. In particular, it was the view that the professionals (doctors) 
were notoriously resistant to change.93 Any attempt at policy-change, that affected doctors 
working conditions, pay, working hours etc. was rejected or opposed by the medical 
profession. The medical profession held enormous power (and had always done so) and 
                                                 
92
 The “Scars-on-my-back speech” was held on the 6th of July 1999, where Blair said: “I bear the scars on 
my back after just two years in Government ... so heaven knows what it will be like after a bit longer.” 
The aside was intended to reflect Mr Blair’s frustration with the resistance to change among civil 
servants, but was widely interpreted as an attack on vested interest among public workers in general. 
93
 Interview with British health Policy advisor. 
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could always play a tough card against the government: namely the argument that “the 
proposal (any proposal) will threaten the quality of care and put patients’ life at risk.” 
Governments before had all tried dealing with deaths or accidents related to the NHS in 
parliament, which resulted in political problems. The core of the administrations’ analysis 
was that the NHS and the medical profession were unresponsive – both to policy-
initiatives and to patients – because they have monopoly status and care mostly about their 
own interests.94 The Blair administration was looking for a way to break this resistance 
among doctors or a way to overcome the monopoly and force doctors to work differently 
and more responsively with regard to patient needs. The core advisers were economists 
Steven Simons and Julian Le Grand, who both argued for the virtues of inducing 
competition between health care providers and giving patients Choice.95 As a policy 
solution, these ideas were not new – they resembled very much the basic ideas of 
Enthoven and the internal market. Regarding the supply side, advisors they came up with 
the idea of “Contestability”, which had also been debated in the years of the internal 
market under the John Major Government.  
Contestability theory was developed in the early 1980s by the American 
economist Will Baumol (1982), who recognised that monopoly providers do not need to be 
exposed to actual competition in order act competitively, the mere threat of competition is 
enough to make monopolies responsive to user needs. Contestability is not a synonym for 
competition but rather refers to a situation in which a provider faces a credible threat of 
competition. The concept is fundamentally different to “market-testing”, because it does 
not require every individual service to be competed over. The basic features of contestable 
markets are low entry barriers (easy access and low sunk cost) and exit possibilities from 
the market. The British health care market is by and large characterised by none of these 
features. But the idea was that if the government could threaten NHS hospitals (and their 
chief executives) with placing a competing (private) hospital in their area, hospitals might 
become more responsive just in the face of that threat. As a British health care policy 
analyst put it: “In the NHS there was a sense, that government will set targets, but if they 
are not reached, nothing will happen […] they are no sanctions towards the NHS, when it 
fails”96 
                                                 
94
 According to Le Grand, Doctors act as ‘knaves’ rather than ‘knights,’ see Le Grand (2007). 
95
 Interviews have been done with both advisors, who also latter published they ideas on health care 
reform, see Stevens (2004) and Le Grand (2007). 
96
 Interview with author, June 24th, 2008. 
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Labour embraced some of the basic ideas of the internal market and 
competition on the supply side and Simon Stevens, the health care adviser to Tony Blair, 
later stated that health care now was characterised by: “a new bipartisan consensus on the 
value of a more mixed supply side; and increased challenge to the medical profession’s 
power. In part this is because of an increasing appreciation of the fact that health care 
improvement requires a source of tension to overcome the inertia inherent in all human 
systems. The past five years have seen England searching for the optimal policy mix to 
generate that constructive discomfort.” (Stevens, 2004, p. 42) 
This “constructive discomfort” was to shake up the NHS. The first step was 
to be to break up surgeons’ monopoly by inviting international private health care 
providers to deliver surgery services in competition with the NHS. Related to this 
argument, the government argued that the introduction of private providers would create 
innovations, because private providers would be interested in working more efficiently and 
responsively to patients. Therefore, the NHS as a whole would gain from such innovations. 
Simultaneously, the NHS it self was changing. The service had begun to 
create Treatment Centres within the NHS (public centres), capable of providing a limited 
range of planned – that is, non-emergency – surgery and diagnostic services. One of the 
technical reasons for setting up “treatment centres”, which focus on elective surgery, is that 
in general hospitals emergency cases are always given priority to non-emergency cases, such 
as hip-replacement or cataract surgery. This had long been claimed to be one of the reasons 
for the long waiting lists for planned surgery. To bring down these lists there was a need to 
separate non-emergency care from emergency care and create fast-track surgery. This 
development was  welcomed by doctors who argued that it would not only create shorter 
waiting time, but possibly also better quality surgery, since surgeons would become more 
specialised (House of Commons, 2006, p. 7).  The first NHS treatment centres opened in 
1999, and would increase in number in the following years. 
 
3.13 Enter the private sector 
Waiting lists were the hottest issue in the debate over the NHS in the first 
years of the Labour Government. In 2001 Alan Milburn, the Secretary of Health, stated 
that “Waiting is the public’s number one concern about the NHS” and promised to buy 
25.000 operations in the private sector in 2001 and 2002 (Carvel, 2001).  In the 2001 
Labour manifesto, the idea of using private sector hospitals to bring down waiting lists was 
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stressed: “we will… work with the private sector to use spare capacity, where it makes 
sense, for NHS patients create a new type of hospital - specially built surgical units, 
managed by the NHS or the private sector - to guarantee shorter waiting times” (Labour, 
2001). Working with the private sector in delivering health care had become a strategy for 
Labour. As remarked by the Editor of the Society Guardian, this marked a shift in NHS-
policies. Just four years earlier it would have been politically impossible to state such a 
policy, even for the Tories (Butler, 2001). This new strategy was not without risks. In a poll 
made in March 2001 for the coming elections (in May 2001) 48% of the Britons said that 
“public services should always be run government or local authorities” and only 25% 
agreed that “public services should be run in partnership with private companies.” The 
same survey showed that the majority of Britons thought several of the public services 
which had prior privatised should be brought back to the state (ICM, 2001). In other 
words, the voters were not in favour of public-private partnerships, much less of 
privatisation. However, the same polls promised Labour a head win in the coming elections 
and most people still believed that Labour would be the best safeguards of the NHS (see 
table 3.1).   
These new policies towards the NHS were, however, a U-turn. Labour, who 
fought four elections claiming that the Conservatives would privatise the NHS, now 
seemed bent on doing the job themselves. These new policies and their implementation set 
off a process which would extend the use of private contractors deeper into the NHS than 
even Margaret Thatcher would have dared dream of.   
After the election victory in 2001 New Labour carried on with the NHS plan 
sketched out in 2000. In January 2002, Alan Milburn, outlined proposals of how to redefine 
the NHS. Milburn stated that the NHS was “run like an old style nationalised industry 
controlled from Whitehall”  and that the NHS needs to be changed “from a monolithic, 
centrally-run, monopoly provider of services to a values-based system where different 
health care providers – in the public, private and voluntary sectors - provide 
comprehensive services” (Milburn, 2002).  
One of the priorities was setting up more Treatment Centres, to take care of 
routine operations, where waiting lists were long. As mentioned, the reality in hospitals was 
already ahead of the NHS plan. As early as 1999 NHS Treatment Centres had been set up, 
formalising a practice already adapted in some NHS hospitals. By 2002, sixteen NHS 
treatment centres were operating and by 2007 there were 43 NHS treatment Centres 
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(Player & Leys, 2008). But according to health care policy makers this was not enough, 
because it did not provide the essential mechanisms to break up the monopoly of doctors 
and creative incentives for providers to increase efficiency and deliver on the 
Government’s promises to bring down waiting times. 
 While the initial NHS treatment centres were public, the follow-up plan 
Delivering the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2002a) also included the use of private 
sector providers, also called Independent Sector Treatment Centres or ISTC’s. These 
ISTC’s were to be commercially owned and were to operate surgical treatment, most often 
offering routine fast-track elective surgery and diagnostic procedures through contracts 
with the Department of Health. This exercise was in essence the planning of a market. 
 Since the aim of the programme was to expand capacity and bring down 
waiting lists, the programme had to involve a real increase in medical professionals and not 
simply a push of NHS Doctors to the private sector. In the Department of Health there 
had long been dissatisfaction with the fact that NHS-doctors could work in private 
hospitals at very high salaries.97 There was also fear in the NHS that the ISTC would poach 
NHS staff, in particular good and experienced doctors and nurses. Therefore in the design 
of ISTC contracts poaching was made complicated and tenders were mainly given to non-
UK providers, who were to bring in their medical staff from abroad.  
There were to be three waves of contracting with private providers. Wave 1 
of the ISTC programme, which saw the first centre open in October 2003, focused on 
routine orthopaedic, ophthalmic and general surgery. In the autumn of 2003, then Secretary 
of State for Health, John Reid, selected several overseas companies, including Capio from 
Sweden and Netcare from South Africa, to set up treatment centres in the UK. Some £1.7 
billion was set aside for financing five years’ worth of health care from these providers, 
totalling more than 1,3 mill. procedures (Player & Leys, 2008). There were certain terms of 
contracts in wave 1: contracts ran for five years, they have a specified number of 
procedures and a guaranteed volume of work,98, clinical standards must be upheld, the 
provider must bear the clinic performance risk99 and the principle of ‘additionally’100 had to 
be upheld. The companies contracted with in wave 1 were based overseas and brought 
                                                 
97
 Interview with Civil Servant, Department of Health. 
98
 The provider is guaranteed a minimum volume of work and is paid for that amount, whether carried out 
or not. 
99
 The provider is responsible for dealing with any cost arising from them or arrange transfer to a facility 
that can solve the problem. 
100
 ISTC must supply additional human resource capacity and cannot poach from NHS hospitals. 
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many of their staff from overseas, emphasising the Department of Health’s determination 
to ensure that these independent units added to the existing capacity (Player & Leys, 2008, 
chp. 1).  
 
Figure 3.6: The independent Sector Treatment Centres, 2002-2006 
 
 
The centres, which could be based within existing hospital facilities, in a 
separate fixed geographical location, or as mobile clinics travelling between hospitals, are 
characterised by exclusive focus upon day case or short stay scheduled care and relatively 
low risk cases. They specialise in types of surgery that have historically experienced the 
highest waiting times, notably cataract removal and hip and knee replacements. In the 
overall health care system they would be small players, but in the field of elective surgery 
ISTCs they were to conduct around 10% of all procedures (House of Commons, 2006). 
The decision of where to locate treatment centres was highly centralised. Since it was the 
Department of Health which made the contracts, negotiations were also centralised. The 
private providers were not limited to work for NHS patients, they can offer they services 
on the regular health care market as well. 
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Wave 2, which began in March 2005, broadened the scope of procedures and 
expanded the diagnostic element significantly. Phase 2 was expected to deliver “up to” 
250,000 elective procedures per year with a further 150,000 procedures offered through a 
choice-scheme (Extended choice Network) at a cost of around £3 billion and two million 
diagnostic procedures annually at a cost of around £1 billion (House of Commons, 2006). 
Wave 2, however, was never completed.  
After Tony Blair left office in July 2007, the new Health Secretary Alan 
Johnson slowed down the process of ISTC procurement. In November 2007, Johnson had 
decided that 10 schemes would be carried through, while 6 schemes planned for wave 2 
would be cancelled, “as they were unlikely to provide acceptable value for money as the 
local NHS has successfully improved capacity to meet patients needs” (cited from Player & 
Leys, 2008, p. 108). Wave 3 of independent sector contracts was cancelled even earlier, 
right after Johnson took office in July 2007; Johnson told the Health Select Committee that 
he did not believe that there was a need for another Independent sector procurement and 
there would not be a third wave (Player & Leys, 2008, p. 109). This U-turn may have two 
explanations. The first is that Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister taking over from Blair 
was ideologically less committed to the idea of privatisation than Blair had been. Brown 
and Johnson were both more closely related to the Unions (in particular Unison and the 
BMA), who had been opposing the policies from the beginning. The other explanation is 
that the ISTC programme was turning into a political problem because evidence was 
showing that the programme had had several unintended consequences. The ISTC 
programme was costly, because the private sector was overcompensated (in comparison 
with the NHS), it was also a waste of money because all operations were paid for but the 
private services were underutilised – private hospitals under the ISTC programme had 
many empty beds (Pollock & Godden, 2008; Ruane, 2008). And third, doctors were very 
unhappy with the cooperation between private and public hospitals: surveys showed that 
doctors often could not get a hold of medical records when carried out in the private 
sector, and that many patients came to the NHS for re-operation after having visited the 
private hospitals. There is also a lack of data about the work carried out at ISTCs (House 
of Commons, 2006). The BMA concluded that the private services must be “integrated 
with existing structures to avoid the fragmentation of services and the loss of continuity of 
care for patients” (The Health Commitee, 2006, ev 55). At the same time the NHS had 
already increased production significantly in the areas with waiting lists and brought waiting 
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lists down. The reason for the slowing down of the programme was most likely not 
ideological (later on the idea was transferred to primary care, as we shall see), but rather 
that problems were arising and the ISTC was low value for money.   
 
3.14 Choice in the NHS 
 In 2001, the Labour manifesto promised to give patients more choice 
(Labour, 2001). The extension of choice into health care was seen as a way of meeting 
patient expectations, improving efficiency, reducing waiting lists and strengthening local 
accountability. Choice, however, is not a new phenomenon in the NHS. Patients could 
choose which hospital they wanted to go to until the 1990s, and the right to choose 
between GPs has always existed in the NHS – albeit limited by under-provision in many 
areas. During the 2000s patient choice was increased; by the end of 2005, all patients 
needing an outpatient appointment were to be offered a choice of referral to one of four 
hospitals. By 2008, every patient who needed to be referred by their GP for a specialist 
outpatient consultation were to have a choice of any provider that could offer care at NHS 
tariff rates, including NHS, private and public–private providers (Department of Health, 
2004b). 
A number of new policies were necessary for the development of choice. 
Payment mechanisms have restricted patient movement and limited clinical capacity to 
support choice and, in the prevailing culture, patient preferences have often been 
neglected. The choice policy was a solution to these problems and designed to tackle these 
failures. Financial mechanisms had to be adapted to support choice. Of particular 
importance are the financial mechanisms encompassed in Payment by Results (Department 
of Health, 2002c); capacity increases associated with the programme of independent 
treatment centre procurement (Department of Health, 2002b); the introduction of the 
Choose and Book IT system (Department of Health, 2004a) and associated initiatives to 
support choice at the point of referral. In 2006 patients were given a choice between four 
or five providers to choose from, they were given choice through the electronic booking 
system and it was made easier to register with GPs. In 2007 the “choice-web-site”101 was 
launched and a review of Patient Choice in The NHS is initiated (The Darzi Review). In 
2008 Patient Choice was opened completely: patients referred by their GP for hospital 
                                                 
101
 Se for example: http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Yourchoices/Pages/Yourchoices.aspx or 
http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Treatments/Pages/Treatments.aspx 
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treatment can now choose to be treated in any hospital anywhere in the country, including 
private hospitals (who accept the NHS tariff). 
As seen in the Danish case, there are more barriers to choice than meets the 
eye. First, there are information problems. A lot of patients are not aware of the possibility 
to choose. If they are, what information is needed for a patient to make a good choice? 
Second, quality or waiting time does not seem to be the most important thing when 
patients choose, just as important factors is distance from home. Choice may only be 
exercised by the well-informed and therefore de facto contribute to unequal access to 
health; choice itself does not therefore contribute to better health care quality for all. These 
problems had already been raised by independent research projects and evaluations 
(Appleby, 2004; Rosen, et al., 2005) 
The Labour government stressed three issues, which have political 
importance. Citizens had asked for the possibility to choose in health care. Further, two 
pilot projects – The London Patient Choice Programme and the National Coronary Heart 
Disease Choice scheme, had demonstrated patients’ willingness to exercise their right to 
choose (Burge, et al., 2005). And further, as a review of choice in the NHS concluded: 
“Patients value the offer of choice even if they opted for treatment in their local hospital so 
satisfaction with the NHS may improve as patients feel they are being involved in 
decisions” (Lang, et al., 2004, p. iv). In other words, choice had value whether exercised or 
not. 
In addition, the choice scheme fit well with the economic ideas behind the 
reforms of the NHS. In order to create more competition between NHS providers, it was 
important to reform the demand side as well as the supply side. GPs would still act as 
gatekeepers and decide who could get access to hospital treatment, but patients could now 
freely choose provider and that provider would get directly paid, through the ‘Payment by 
Results’ system (which essentially is equivalent to DRG-systems in Denmark and Sweden). 
This policy idea was not all new, but it was being adjusted to meet the demands of citizens. 
The choice policy did not have to go through parliament, but received 
support from the Conservative opposition. On the other hand, the British Medical 
Association was very sceptical, arguing that choice programmes harmed the NHS by 
leading to hospital closures and the sending of more patients and tax-payer money into the 
private sector treatment centres, which would lead to a disjointed health care system, rather 
than an integrated one. Furthermore, the choice given to patients was incomplete, because 
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only waiting list length was really measurable, while quality of operations was much more 
difficult to assess. Unison, the largest public sector Union in England, also opposed choice 
and the ISTC programmes because a market-system will be “inefficient and costly and […] 
it risks undermining the quality of care” (Unison, 2007, p. 3). I will return to the question 
of unions later on, but with regards to the choice policies the unions’ critique was ignored; 
the government had strong support for the policy in parliament. 
   
3.15 Revitalising the Private Finance Initiative 
 The Private Finance Initiative was launched under the Conservative 
government in the 1990s. In opposition Labour was opposed to the PFI, as it was seen as 
privatisation and short-sighted. However, after having re-named the programme to Public-
Private Partnership the idea was revitalised in 1997. Whereas before 1997, investment in 
the NHS under the PFI was non-existent, between 1997 and 2008 private capital 
investment totalled £10 billion, which has increased capital spending almost 30% pr. 
year.102    
 
Table 3.5: Value of PFI private capital spending, Department of health, 1997-2008 
(£millions) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Capital 
Value 
1997-
2008 
(£millio
ns 
205,8 585,3 617,3 623,1 324,6 593,4 683,0 1648,3 1066,2 2100,3 2055,2 396,0 10898,4 
Source: Calculated on the basis of statistics on Public-Private Partnerships, available at: http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/ppp_pfi_stats.htm 
 
 
The PFI policy was a solution to a problem of old and outdated buildings in the NHS. In 
1997 50% of NHS hospitals were built before 1948 and in the late 1990s 50% of Britons 
agreed that improvements on buildings were needed.103 But taxes could not be increased 
and capital spending in the Department of health could not go up. PFI was the solution, 
which made the government able to spend money now and pay later.  The Minister of 
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 This figure differs from year to year, for an overview, see Department of Health (2009, annexes, figure 
4a). 
103
 British Social Attitudes Survey. 
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Health, Frank Dobson, had accepted the political logic: “People might argue that even if 
the private finance initiative schemes were not the best value, there was great value in 
getting hospitals built now, as opposed to getting them built sometime down the line” (cf. 
Annabel Ferriman, 1999). The NHS Plan took the PFI programme further and aimed to 
initiate the largest hospital building programme in English history (Department of Health, 
2000b, pp. 44-45). Between 1997-2009, more than 100 PFI projects have been signed by 
the Department of Health to a capital value of £10.898 million104 Very few of these 
investments appear on the departmental balance sheet. 
Supporters claim that it increases return on public money and shares risk 
with the private sector, whereas critics argue that it is overly expensive, leaves all the risk 
with the public sector and that its most valuable feature was the ability to hide major capital 
investments away from the public expenditure statistics (Christopher Ham, 2004; Pollock, 
2004). But the political logic of the PFI is straightforward: it allows the state to ‘live now 
and pay later.’ With the aim of showing results in modernising the NHS, Labour also 
converted on the issue of PFI and embraced it more intensely than the Conservatives had. 
  
3.16 A vested interest grows stronger: the private hospital sector 
In light of the ISTC programme, the private hospital sector was growing and 
increasingly satisfied with the developments in health care policy. The number of private 
hospitals grew significantly from 2003, while the number of private sector beds fell from 
the mid-1990’s forward (See figure 3.6). This is in particular due to medical advances, 
which makes more operations possible in day surgery. The large increase in the number of 
hospitals after 2003 is due to the large increase in private day surgery hospitals, in particular 
ISTCs (Laing and Buisson, 2008). 
In the period from 2000-2007 a new vested interest had grown stronger as 
the private hospitals and the ISTC’s had come together and become a member of the NHS 
confederation, an independent body for the range of organisations that make up the NHS. 
In 2003 Blair had told the representative of private health care providers that “we are 
anxious to ensure that this is the start of opening up the whole NHS supply system so that 
we end up with a situation where the state is the enabler, it is the regulator, but it is not 
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 Calculated on the basis of statistics from HM Treasury available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/ppp_pfi_stats.htm  
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always the provider” (Carvel, 2003). The private sector had become collaborators with the 
NHS after decades in which the sector had been kept as isolated as possible from the NHS.  
 
Figure 3.7: Number private hospital beds, UK, 1980-2008. 
 
 
The private sector had invested resources in building up capacity to serve 
NHS patients and had strong and growing economic interest in this business (se figure 3.8, 
below). The nature of the private health care sector had also changed. While private 
hospitals used to be owned by non-profit, voluntary or religious organisations, for profit 
groups owned 77.2% of private hospitals in 2008105 (Laing and Buisson, 2008).  Spending 
on private acute healthcare services by the NHS rose to be the second largest funding 
source for the private hospitals,106 generating an estimated 19% of revenues in 2007. This 
compares with an estimated share of 10.5% in 2004, which preceded the period of large-
scale central procurement, including the start of the Independent Sector Treatment Centre 
(ISTC) programme. In 1997 the NHS had spent app. £96 mill buying medical, acute and 
mental care in the private sector. In 2007 the number had increased to £1.353 mill. (Laing 
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 Further for-profit groups owned 76,2% of private beds and accounted for 74,5 % of private sector 
revenue (Laing and Buisson, 2008, see table 2.9). 
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 The main source of revenue of private hospitals is private health insurance (Laing and Buisson, 2008). 
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and Buisson, 2008, see table 2.1). NHS spending on independent hospital services grew 
rapidly between 2005 and 2007 as the Government continued its drive to bring waiting 
times down by buying private elective care. The central procurement initiative, ISTCs, was 
the main driver of growth in NHS spending in the private sector (Laing and Buisson, 
2008).  
Despite the fact that the ISTC programme was the main driver of private 
sector growth in the 2000’s, the private sector hospitals had hoped for more. The then 
Secretary of State for Health, John Reid stated in 2004 that up to 15% of NHS elective 
surgeries may be outsourced to the independent sector, but the actual number fell way 
short of this promise. Based on some 6.2 million elective surgery procedures107 purchased 
by the NHS in England in 2006/07, plus well over 2 million surgical procedures carried out 
in outpatients, 15% of this total would be around 1.3 million procedures, potentially 
doubling the overall activity of the private hospital sector in England from 2007 levels. In 
this scenario, the private sector NHS contracts could potentially have accounted for over 
half of the independent sector’s activity, compared with just under a fifth actually recorded 
in 2007, a significant undershooting.  
When the government began to withdraw from its commitments to the ISTC 
programme in 2007, the private sector increased political pressure. Nuffield’s (one of the 
largest private providers) chief executive, David Mobbs said that “after four years of 
endless bureaucracy and considerable investment, independent sector providers were 
starting to wonder if they were wasting their time.”108 These new interest groups held 
relatively strong cards: the main aim of the government was to cut waiting lists and the 
private sector knew that it had been a part of that solution – if it withdrew from providing 
more services, the government could get in trouble on their electoral promises and policy 
aims.    
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 An approximate based on waiting lists, booked appointments, and planned inpatient and day cases. 
108
 Keynote Speech at Laing and Buisson’s inaugural Independent healthcare Convention, October 2007. 
Cited from (Player & Leys, 2008, p. 107) 
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Figure 3.8: The value of private acute health care markets, UK, 1997-2007 (£ mill.) 
 
 
The health secretary Alan Johnson reacted to the pressure from the private 
sector by reaffirming that the government was still committed to rely on a range of 
providers and that the independent sector would, beyond the current rounds of 
procurement, would have a large role to play in procurement locally (Player & Leys, 2008, 
p. 108). Further, Alan Johnson did not reduce the budget for the private sector 
procurement, which remained at the £4bn promised. But the idea was to decentralise 
procurement to the local level, where primary care trust would be able to purchase health 
care service from private and public providers. Alan Johnson did not reverse the 
development back towards the fully integrated NHS, rather it was a shift from a national to 
a local programme of contracting for an extended range of private services, with the overall 
amount of state funding or private health care unchanged.   
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Ben Bradshaw, the Minister of Health, stressed this new direction of policy 
in November 2007, stating that there would be a large market for private health care 
services in the expansion of primary and community care facilities and that is were the 
private sector involvement will increase tin the future. The government planned in 2007 a 
“charm offensive” to encourage private sector providers to bid for the running of more 
than 250 family doctor practices and health centres in England (Timmins, 2007a, 2007b). 
This indicates a new turn in the English privatisation policy; GPs were to be more 
responsive and needed to be “contested” or, simply, respond to the pressure of 
competitive forces. Once again the problem was low responsiveness, in particular the 
government wanted GPs to have longer opening hours and to offer citizens the possibility 
to see the GP out of normal working hours. The doctors protested and did not want to 
have out-of-hours consultation. The government solution was again to introduce private 
providers to compete with the existing GPs.   
The original ISTC programme, which was justified in terms of the need to 
expand capacity to reduce waiting lists for elective care, has come to a halt at the central 
level. But the initial introduction of private sector actors has had another effect, which has 
been to normalise the use of private sector providers to deliver NHS services and has made 
the primary health care sector open to competition between providers by enabling patient 
choice. It has also created vested interest on the side of private providers, who are 
increasingly being paid by the state (although they also have incomes from the treatments 
of private individuals). The private providers have expressed uncertainty over the changes 
in policy and have feared that the funding for private sector provision would be reduced. 
The statements above from the health care officials and ministers are reassuring news for 
the vested interests in private sector health care provision.  
The private sectors interest in the NHS market is consistent and may easily 
be growing as does their share of NHS funds. The past decade has seen a sharp increase in 
funds that the NHS pays into the private sector. These new policies of using private 
providers implied a large amount of NHS-expenditure to purchases outside the NHS, as 
shown in figure 3.8. In September 2009, Health Secretary Andy Burnham suggested that 
NHS hospitals were “preferred providers” to the NHS. This statement once again made 
the private sector show its new muscles; in December 2009, the NHS Partners Network – 
which represents private providers of NHS care – put in a complaint to the NHS’s Co-
operation and Competition Panel, claiming that the policy is anti-competitive. The 
 175 
independent panel was setup to insure fair competition among health care providers and 
has accepted to investigate whether the policy of preferring public providers is anti-
competitive (Stratton, 2010). Such tendencies stress the increased political power of private 
providers in English health care.  
 
Figure 3.9: Public health care expenditure on private services 
 
In the overall NHS budget, private providers are still marginal. There is, however, a clear 
trend towards increasing the role of the private sector and their share of the NHS budget 
(figure 3.9, table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6: Contracting out to private hospitals rises, England, 1996-2006 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
annual 
change 
1995–
2006 
Change 
1996-
2006 
Expenditure 
on health 
care 
purchased 
from 
outside the 
NHS (£bn) 
(contracting)* 
 
0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.9 3.4 3.9 4.7 19.6% 571% 
Contractings’ 
contribution 
to total NHS 
growth  
- 0.0 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.9 5.2 6.1 7.0 8.4 37,2% 740% 
              
Source (National Statistics, 2008, figure 4.8 & figure 4.12). 
* These figures cover health care bought in private hospitals, but also community care for elderly and mental care is included. 
 
The private providers also take account of the environment they operate in 
after 2003. That environment is one of strong NHS support and reluctance to privatisation. 
To stay legitimate, private providers repeatedly state that they, and their entrance to the 
health care market, does not represent privatisation, rather they conceive themselves as a 
central part of the NHS (House of Commons, 2006). As an example, Mercury, a private 
hospital service provider states: “Mercury Health, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tribal 
Group plc, is a UK business that supports the NHS by creating additional capacity, thus 
enabling patients to be treated earlier and to have greater choice, including access closer to 
home…An Independent sector treatment centre is an NHS service” (House of Commons, 
2006).  
 
3.16 The Unions in opposition 
One question remains unanswered. Where are all the powerful organised 
health care interests in these debates? The Unions in the UK were traditionally been among 
the strongest labour supporters. When the labour government returned to power in 1997 
the unions had high hopes of gaining more influence on policies than they had enjoyed 
during the conservative era from 1979-1997. As already noted, the British political system 
is a party-system and not corporatist as the Danish (or the Swedish) and therefore 
organised interests have not played the essential political role they have in the other 
countries. Nevertheless, the unions have historically played a major role in the health care 
sector (recall the history of the construction of the NHS, see also Immergut (1992). After 
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1997, the Unions hoped that their interests and preferences would be heard in debates 
about the health care sector. Unions got one thing they had hoped for: higher expenditure 
on health – but with regards to privatisation, union protests were overheard. 
Tony Blair had already in the mid-1990s distanced New Labour from union 
influence by insisting that there was no special relationship between the party and unions. 
Unions would be treated in the same way as other groups by a future labour government 
and would receive “fairness not favours.”109 This strategy was part of the Party’s attempt to 
demonstrate to middle-class (swing-) voters that the party was changing towards the middle 
and away from old Labour and the reliance on union votes. This change was accompanied 
by several internal party reforms to limit the influence of trade unions (Seyd, 1998, pp. 62-
63). The time was over when the Unions dictated Labour party policies. 
The largest public sector union, Unison, is starkly opposed to the 
privatisation policies in the NHS, including both ISTC’s and PFI projects (Unison, 2003, 
2007). Since 2001, when the first announcements of public-private partnerships in health 
care came out, it has fought hard against the policies, even threatening strike action (Parker, 
2001). At the Annual Labour Party Congress in 2003, the congress – and mainly union 
representatives – voted against the Government’s plans for Foundations Hospitals, which 
was seen as a policy which would lead the NHS straight to privatisation. The response 
from Labour had already been given in advance of the congress, by Tony Blair: “the days 
are long gone, were the congress voted, and the labour government followed through” (cf. 
Skau, 2003). Unison has consistently fought the ISTC sector programme. Both because 
they fear for the working conditions of health care personnel in a privatised hospital 
system, but also because ideologically the union is in favour of a public hospital system, 
based on cooperation rather than competition. However, the Labour Government has 
ignored their protests.  
The British Medical Association (BMA) has also fought the involvement with 
the private sector, which it opposed from the beginning. While the BMA used to be a 
central actor in health policy, they are losing that position. The Blair government’s view on 
the BMA seemed to be that they would be a counter-productive partner in the project of 
bringing down NHS waiting list, since doctors would have an interest in keeping waiting 
list long, so that doctors could work in the private sector at very high wages (Timmins, 
2005). As such, the approach by New Labour towards the BMA resembled the Thatcher 
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 Tony Blair: Speech to Trade Union Congress, September 1995. 
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approach in the 1980’s. At the Labour party conference in September 2005, the 
government met heavy critique on the private sector’s growing role. Paul Miller, chairman 
of the British Medical Association’s consultants committee, has called the planned transfer 
of some NHS units to independent sector management, “The start of a massive 
privatisation of the provision of health care in the NHS.” Over the past decade the BMA 
has argued that the private provision is not good value for money: that failure-rates are 
much higher in the private sector hospitals; that surgeons working in the international 
health care providers are poorly educated; and that the private sector is free-riding on 
English education of doctors and medical research. At the heart of the criticism from the 
BMA is also a fear of pluralism, because it will weaken the BMA bargaining power. In 2006 
all of the British healthcare trade unions and many representative bodies in the NHS 
established a new organisation, NHS Together, aimed at forcing the government to change 
direction on its health reforms away from market reforms and private provision. The 
organisation brings together unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress (TUC) such as 
Unison and the GMB with organisations such as the BMA, the Royal College of Nursing, 
and the Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association, with the sole purpose of lobbying 
against NHS privatisation reforms, which are believed to result in a fragmented health 
service.110 Furthermore, the BMA launched a manifesto titled “Standing up for doctors – 
Standing up for health” in December 2009, which argues strongly against all the 
marketisation and privatisation reforms including PFI, ISTC and Payment by Results 
(British Medical Association, 2009).111 
All of these protests from unions have been ignored by the Labour 
government. The Government can ignore unions for three reasons. First, English unions 
do not enjoy the institutionalised role that Danish or Swedish Unions do and therefore do 
not automatically play a role in policy-making. Although, the BMA historically had large 
influence over health care issues, this position has been in decline since the 1980s. Second, 
the Labour government has invested massively in the NHS, something which the BMA 
had demanded for a long time and a large part of the investment went (not all intentionally) 
into raising doctor’s salaries. The third reason is that the whole ISTC programme had a 
secondary implicit goal: to challenge the monopoly of the BMA by importing medical staff 
from overseas of doctors. The idea behind the ISTC policy was that the doctors’ monopoly 
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 See the campaign material at http://www.tuc.org.uk/theme/index.cfm?theme=nhstogether 
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 The manifesto can be found at http://www.bma.org.uk/lobbying_campaigning/manifesto.jsp?page=1 
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over health services was one of the central problems and barriers to delivering policy 
outcomes, such as shorter waiting lists. Finally, government has rejected the Unions’ 
concern about quality in a privatised system arguing that regulation is put in place to secure 
quality. 
  
3.17 Privatisation and regulation in the English NHS 
As shown above, the policies which have lead to an increase in privatisation 
has done so, through contracting out services, reflecting a move from square 1 to 2 in 
figure 1.1 (chapter 1). This short section will consider how regulatory policies in health care 
have developed accordingly. Along with the increasing involvement of the private sector, 
further devolution of NHS hospitals also took place. The programme called Foundation 
Trust Hospitals (Department of Health, 2002a) changed the legal statue of hospitals from 
“Public” into “Public interest Companies.” The programme devolves power and 
freedoms112 to hospitals making them able to compete with other NHS hospitals or private 
hospitals.  
These new foundation hospitals are regulated by an independent regulator, 
called Monitor, which also regulates the hospitals once they have achieved Foundation 
Trust status. The Health Care Commission supervises and inspects all providers of 
secondary care on clinical issues and standards of care. In addition, the National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence, NICE, was established in 1999 to provide evidence-based guidance 
for the NHS about the cost effectiveness of treatments.  The Commission for Health 
Improvement, CHI (subsequently renamed Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection, and now the Healthcare Commission), was established by the Health Act of 
1999 to monitor and help improve the quality of patient care in the NHS. The National 
Service Frameworks (NSF) was developed from 1999 onward to provide national service 
standards for a particular medical condition or population group, based on scientific 
evidence and on the perspectives of a range of stakeholders. Health authorities and trusts 
are expected to acknowledge NSFs when drawing up service agreements and seeking to 
improve the quality of the service. The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health (CPPIH) was established following the 2002 NHS Reform and Healthcare 
Professions Act to secure the NHS would become more responsive to patients. Overview 
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 Foundation trusts are allowed, for example, to make joint ventures with private companies, to borrow 
money on the financial markets, sell assets and outsource clinical activities. 
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and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) are set up to scrutinize local health services. Local 
Authorities were mandated to set up OSCs in the Health and Social Care Act of 2001. 
Since 2003, NHS organizations have been required to provide OSCs with information 
about services and decisions that affect them. The list is not even complete, but the point is 
clear: along with devolution and the involvement of private sector providers a range of 
commissions and regulatory bodies have been set up to control these more independent 
health care institutions, contributing even more to what had already been labelled “a 
regulatory state inside the state” (Hood, et al., 1999). That privatisation is accompanied by 
increased regulations also reflected in several policy areas (Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002; V. 
A. Schmidt & Scharpf, 2000). 
 
3.18 Public sector hospitals’ adaptation 
The ISTC programme was launched alongside a new funding mechanism for 
NHS-hospitals called Payment By Results (Department of Health, 2002c). This laid out far-
reaching changes to how money moved around the NHS, and set up incentives for NHS 
hospitals to behave more like businesses. Payment by results aimed to increase the amount 
of work done by hospitals, especially in areas with long waiting times, since it gave NHS 
hospitals economic incentives to increase production.  It also opened up the way for 
money to begin to follow patient choice. Under Payment by Results, hospitals are now 
moving away from locally negotiated block contracts towards payment per 
operation/process. This mechanism is in the Danish and Swedish case known as DRG. 
Under payment by results, hospitals are paid only if an operation or treatment is carried 
out.113 If a treatment costs more than the tariff at a particular hospital – and around half of 
England’s hospitals are expected to fall into this high-cost category – the hospital will have 
to find ways of bringing those costs down. It can either cut costs, or try to do more 
operations to generate extra money. There is still relatively little evidence on the direct 
impact of these new financial mechanisms (Maybin, 2007).  
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 There are more than 1,000 HRG codes, designed to capture all the treatments and procedures that a 
patient might have while in hospital for a particular condition or operation. Similar coding systems exist 
in many other countries. Most importantly, the price of each HRG procedure or treatment is fixed in 
relation to a national tariff, based on its average cost across the NHS. For example, under the national 
tariff the cost of a hip replacement is £4,830, and treatment for a heart attack is £1,775, no matter where 
the operation is done. Hospitals that operate in parts of the country where staff costs are unavoidably 
high, such as London, are reimbursed directly by the Department of Health. Payment by results means a 
hospital will be paid the fixed price for every treatment it undertakes. 
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However, it seems clear that hospitals are adapting to the changing 
environment. First, many hospitals have started to provide fast-track surgery themselves in 
order to keep patients (and income). In fact, a Commission report found that these new 
innovations in NHS hospitals were the main reason for the drop in waiting list times 
(House of Commons, 2006).  Second, hospitals have aimed to widen their catchment area 
in order to attract more patients. More broadly, the hospitals were adapting to a more 
competitive environment under the presence of ISTCs. Some hospitals were failing this 
transition, while others were successful. In 2009 there was a wide debate over whether 
these failing hospitals were to be closed or have a private sector management team 
installed. Further, several mergers between failing public hospitals and more successful 
ones have taken place. This reconfiguration of the public hospital structure is likely to be 
intentional on the part of government (Player & Leys, 2008).  
 
3.19 Conclusion: Why privatisation in England? 
Privatisation policies in the past decade in the NHS have been a solution to 
the problem of the system’s low responsiveness. Long waiting lists have been a symbol of 
this problem. The Labour government, which came in power in 1997, entered in a 
particular context, where the party had reformed itself and shown results to voters who 
were decreasingly loyal to the Labour party and increasingly demanded more individualised 
services and results on policy outcomes. The “national mood” was one which expected 
Labour to improve the NHS and that implied the need to make improvements that were 
visible to citizens. Several already tested attempts were made to bring down waiting lists 
without results – mainly because doctors’ monopoly in the NHS was a barrier to change. 
Therefore, using a pragmatic approach, the government developed a policy-solution which 
could challenge the professional monopoly and force hospitals to focus on the 
Government’s aims of increasing responsiveness in health care services. They planned a 
market. This solution was much inspired by market ideas already in the “soup” of ideas 
under the conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s, but now taken one step 
further to involve private sector providers. While the Unions had protested massively, 
these actors are increasingly being overheard, while at the same time a new political actor, 
the private sector, is gaining influence. 
New Labour chose these solutions, not because of radical ideological shift, 
but for much more pragmatic reasons. The government needed to show policy results and 
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show that the NHS can deliver what voters expect from it. That goal was more important 
than holding on to traditional Labour policies and union support – in fact, Labour 
intentionally changed strategy and moved away from the traditional labour strategy in order 
to satisfy the middle class voters and offer them choice, a more responsive service and 
shorter waiting times. These were demands raised by the middle class and Labour was 
determined to deliver because the middle class is the class that determines elections.  
One of the main political targets of private provision was to bring down 
waiting lists. Looking at waiting list data, it seems clear that waiting times have been falling 
since the NHS started purchasing care from private providers. In 1997 more than one 
million Britons were on the waiting list, while by mid-2008 that figure is down to 
approximately 550.000.114 However, it is not at all evident that this change is due to the 
private sector involvement. Several factors play a role. First, the massive investments in the 
NHS from 2003 onwards have contributed to increasing activity in the NHS. Second, and 
more importantly, the NHS treatment centres were put in place before the Government’s 
decision to invite private contractors from overseas to compete with the NHS. Certainly, 
the ISTCs did provide some more capacity, but considering the actual numbers of 
operations in the private sector, these providers have not been of substantial volume to 
bring down waiting lists significantly. Most evidence suggests that the main reason for why 
waiting lists have been dropping is due to changes in the NHS and the NHS treatment 
centre, rather then because of the private sector. The Audit Commission issued a report in 
2008 asking “Is the treatment working?”, which evaluates the broad range of initiatives in 
the NHS Plan, concluded that the massive investment in the NHS made from 2002-2008 
had mainly gone into raising staff salaries, resulting in higher expenditure but lacking a 
proportionate increase in productivity. Finally, the report echoed the Health Committee by 
stating that some of the improvements for example in waiting times were not the effect of 
private providers but of the NHS trying to meet waiting targets set out in the old fashion 
command and control NHS style(Audit Commission, 2008). Such a claim is difficult to 
assess. Had the private sector not been present would the impetus for change have been 
missing?  
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 Waiting list data are not simple to interprete as noted earlier. The figures mentioned are for inpatient 
waiting list, however, also outpatient waiting list are dropping from 1997-2007 and the number of persons 
receiving treatment within set targets is increasing. Extensive data is available at 
http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/ 
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The massive investments in health did result in increased output. But in the 
same period, unprecedented amounts of resources were poured into the NHS, leading to a 
fall in the overall productivity. The figures do not allow for a closer look at elective surgery, 
were this picture might be different (this is so far the only area where there is in fact a 
plurality of providers). 
 
Table 3.7: Health care output, health care input and health care productivity*, 
England, 1995-2006 
 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 2005 2006 Average 
annual 
change 
1995–
2006 
Average 
annual 
change 
2001–
2005 
Output 100.0 109.7 113.4 118.4 125.9 142.3 146.7 150.3 3.8% 3.9% 
 
Input 100.0 111.7 115.2 121.6 126.7 154.5 163.1 167.4 4.8% 6.5% 
 
Productiv
ity 
100.0 98.2 98.5 97.4 99.4 92.1 89.9 89.8 –1.0% –2.5% 
 
Source: (National Statistics, 2008, figure 1) 
* These figures do not include quality adjustment. When quality adjustment is included, there is also a 
decrease in productivity from 2001-2006, see National Statistics (2008, figure 2). 
 
            
These figures stress that marketisation and privatisation policies did not 
result in saving money or cutting costs. On the contrary, costs have been increasing. The 
main aim of the policies was to deliver results and to improve citizens’ experiences with the 
NHS. This was a key aim for Labour, both because they feared middle-class voters would 
choose private solutions if the NHS did not live up top their expectations, but most 
importantly, because Labour had to win the support from middle-class voters in order to 
stay in power.  
If we consider privatisation as a solution, it also involves several problems. 
The private providers were paid in block contracts (as in the old NHS system) and they 
were secured payment even when not delivering the operations, they were paid to do. This 
combined the worst of two worlds. On the one hand an economic model with incentives 
to sub-optimise (as in the old NHS) combined with a for-profit provider. Narrowly 
considered, the Independent Sector Treatment Centre policy was a failure, resulting in 
underutilisation of the private providers and low value for money. Furthermore, the 
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economic incentives involved in Payment by results may result in eschewing medical 
priorities towards those who have waited longest, rather then those most in need. And 
third, the breaking up of the service may also result in a less integrated service. These are 
problems that are likely to need attention in the future reforms. 
 
An evaluation from 2008 found that patients are benefiting from a wider 
range of providers and that choice has resulted in positive change in the attitude among 
providers. Furthermore, citizens are increasingly satisfied with waiting times (Audit 
Commission, 2008) and net satisfaction with the NHS is the highest it has been in 20 years 
(figure 3.10) 
 
Figure 3.10: Satisfactions with the NHS in Great Britain, 1983-2006. 
 
 
Taking a longer historical view, privatisation in the English NHS has gone 
through different stages. In the aftermath of the NHS construction battles over private 
health care kept wavering back and forth, with the doctors fighting for their right to private 
business. While Thatcher may have wanted to privatise the NHS the political context did 
not allow for such policies, but several new ideas were developed. At the same time there 
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had always been a problem of low responsiveness and waiting times in the NHS and 
several attempts to solve them had been made. However, as the middle class changed 
through the 1970s and 1980s, this problem became more salient and rose higher up the 
political agenda. When Labour came to power, it inherited this problem and aimed to 
puzzle out a solution for it. Since several old solutions had failed, the solution became one 
which involved private sector provision in order to break up doctors’ monopoly. 
Paradoxically, the doctors, who had been in favour of private practice for most NHS 
history, now fight the privatisation policies. Over time the BMA has become the protector 
of the public NHS, both because the BMA ideologically supports the public health care 
model, but also because they believe that a real market will not be in their favour.  
Labour argues that the fear is that citizens opt for private solutions. 
Considering the large and sustained support for the NHS, this fear seemed exaggerated. 
But there is no doubt, that citizens increasingly expect to be more involved in their health 
care, have more choice, and that they expect shorter waiting times (at the moment the 
British are promised a maximum waiting time of 18 weeks) (Coulter, 2002; The Kennedy 
Report, 2001). The policies of ISTC, choice and PFI are aimed at offering better services to 
these changing citizens.  
It is important, however, to remember that the policies debated in this 
chapter have not undermined or destroyed the English NHS. The service is still equal to all 
and free at the point of access, which were the founding principles. In this author’s view, 
the policies analysed can rather be considered adaptations of the NHS to a changing 
context of a middle class with a different set of expectations towards health care. There is 
no political force today in Britain wishing to destroy the National Health Service. Both 
Conservatives and Labour fight over the NHS and who will be its best protector. The 
competition to be the “party of the NHS” is hotter than ever. In 2008, the NHS’s 60th 
birthday year, it is clear that both the Conservatives and New Labour are determined to 
claim the mantle of the “NHS’s saviour.” As one of the party leaders said: “[the NHS is] an 
institution which embodies, in its very bricks and mortar, in its people, in its services, 
something which is great about Britain. That something is equity, the founding value of the 
NHS.” The fact that you cannot be certain which of the party leaders said this, makes the 
point.115” While the NHS will survive, it is also most likely that it will see further 
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 The quote is from Conservative Leader David Cameron’s speech on the NHS, delivered in Manchester 
on 2 January 2008. 
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adjustments in the future and it is also very likely that the private sector will continue to be 
a part of those adjustments. 
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Chapter 4  
 
 
Sweden: Privatisation From Below 
 
In 2003 Mr. Persson was diagnosed as needing a new hip after having 
experienced pain for some time. The waiting time in Swedish health care system for a hip 
operation in 2003 was eight months. When in pain because of hip-problems, eight months 
can be a long time. However, the fundamental ethic in Sweden’s universal health care 
system is that people who are in most need must be treated first. Thus, a problematic hip 
may hurt, but it can wait. What made Persson unique was not his wait for hip surgery. 
Rather, Göran Persson stood out because he was Prime Minister of Sweden at the time. 
Persson could surely have used his position in the government or private money to gain 
access to private care and skip the waiting list. But Persson stated that he planned on 
waiting for his surgery like everyone else – in Sweden the Prime Minister gets his place in 
the queue like everybody else. Had he gone private he would have undermined his own 
credibility, since the Social Democrats, which he was leading, had long been strong 
advocates of the public universal health care system (including the waits in the system). 
However, the waiting lists are also one of the most politically salient problems in that same 
system. Despite political promises that no one should have to wait more than three months 
for surgery, 60 percent of hip replacement patients waited longer than three months in 
2003 (Socialstyrelsen, 2004). Just as in the Danish and English cases, waiting lists and other 
problems of responsiveness in the traditional public health care model have played an 
important role in the debate on health care in Sweden in the past 20 years. Similar to the 
Danish and English case, privatisation policies were chosen in the hope of making health 
care services more responsive to the needs and preferences of patients. These policies were 
adaptations of the Swedish health care systems to a changing context. 
The Swedish health care system is a central part of an extensive welfare state, 
constructed in the post war decades. These decades were politically dominated by the social 
democratic party, whose vision of a welfare society shaped a health care system where 
equality was an absolute central aim. Building up such a system included national health 
care insurance, founded in 1955, and a nationalisation of health care services. In contrast to 
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both the UK and Denmark this involved all parts of the health care system, including 
General Practioners in primary care. By the mid-1980’s Sweden had almost no private 
doctors and through a process of decentralisation, health care became the responsibility of 
regional level government. This decentralisation process was in part a response to some of 
the problems of an all national health care system, which had begun to appear. These 
problems included rising waiting lists and in many respects health care services were 
increasingly seen as unresponsive. Despite massive and broad support for the welfare state 
and the state production of service – the Swedes were not happy with these problematic 
elements of the health care services.  
The 1980’s was a decade were new winds swept across the western world. 
They came from the UK and the USA and were critical towards the state. The ideas of 
Thatcher and Reagan also made it to Sweden, and pushed debates on the organisation of 
the welfare states. One of these ideas was that the state should, instead of producing its 
own services, outsource production to the private sector. This was met with some 
suspicion in social democratic Sweden. There was a heated debate on outsourcing of public 
services in Sweden, and outsourcing was, in the debate, made equal to the demolition of 
the welfare state. In Sweden, most services are decentralised to municipalities or counties, 
which have a wide range of freedoms to set up their own systems of delivery. Eager to 
experiment and find more efficient models, municipalities had started to outsource garbage 
collection, which involved the transfer of public employees to private firms and new 
working conditions – which was one of the central opposing arguments to outsourcing for 
the Unions. There were fears that the privatisation of garbage-collection would be a 
harbinger of large-scale breakdown of the public sector and eventually the welfare state. It 
was a heated ideological debate, with the conservative party and other centre-right parties 
arguing for more private involvement and the social democrats with a hesitant position. 
However, the social democrats were not all against outsourcing. In this debate, the Social 
Democratic prime-minister of the time, Olof Palme, stated: “we distinguish between 
children and trash,” meaning that while trash was a technical matter, which could be 
handled be private companies, core welfare-state services as childcare, (and elderly care and 
health care) we not to be handed over to private sector providers, as it was incompatible 
with the aims of the welfare state project, in particular regarding equality. Although 
cautious towards the new ideas of private delivery, the Social Democrats at the national 
level did not block it nor encourage it. There was a will to test out whether these new ideas 
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would bring positive effects. Close to 30 years later, in the late 2000’s, the situation in 
welfare delivery is very different. Almost 500 primary schools are privately run, a large part 
of elderly care and primary care is also run by private individuals or private companies 
(Paula Blomqvist, 2004), and one of the most efficient full-scale public hospitals in the 
centre of Stockholm has been sold to a private company and is now owned by a 
multinational investment company. By 2008 more than 380.000 Swedes hold private health 
insurance. The Social Democrats have been in power for the bulk of those 30 years, but 
they have changed and so have their ideas. During the 1980s and 1990s it became more 
and more evident that the national health care system itself produced a range of problems 
(e.g. the lack of choice and waiting times). Service responsibility was decentralised and 
there were several attempts to bring down waiting list in the public sector. These 
adaptations of the health care system were only partly successful and the inadequacies of 
the public health care system remain a great concern for the population and for policy-
makers.  Although several of the policies that have contributed to privatisation have been 
initiated under centre-right governments, the Social Democrats have only rarely drawn 
back reforms when they have had the chance, they have either modified or strengthened 
them towards choice and private delivery of services. However, as this chapter will show, 
the privatisation process in Sweden is not driven by national policy-makers, rather by 
decentral political bodies – therefore privatisation has come from below in Sweden. 
Importantly though, when counties (both right and left leaning ones) started to experiment 
with new – private – ways of delivering services, the Social Democrats did not block these 
privatisation experiments, although forces within the party argued that private elements in 
the public health care system would breach equality.  
Unions have a particular role in Swedish policy-making and have traditionally 
stood very close to the Social Democrats – however, in the case of health care the Unions 
support privatisation much more wholeheartedly, which enhances the social democratic 
dilemma: how to organise a health care system which maintains its basic principles of 
universalism and free access, does not cost too much, but at the same time delivers services 
of such quality that the Swedes will maintain support for it.  
In this chapter I will argue, in a similar line as the previous chapters, that 
privatisation in health care has taken place because policy makers, whether from the centre-
right parties of from the Social Democrats, want to address and solve some problems in 
the universal public health care system. To be sure, privatisation is not the only only 
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solution to these problems; as in the other cases, several other policies were tried and tested 
in order to increase responsiveness of the system. The goal of these reforms has not been 
to destroy the universal welfare model, but instead to adapt to a changing context. The 
basic premise for the universal tax-financed welfare state is that it enjoys broad public 
support. For that support to be maintained, citizens must be satisfied with the services the 
state delivers. If not, Swedes are likely to opt for private solutions as affluence and desire 
for individualism grows. This is already taking place in Sweden, which has witnessed a 
sharp rise in private health insurance. 
Privatisation, I will argue, is one of several means to address some of the 
central criticisms towards the public health care system in Sweden while keeping the 
universal principles intact. This adaptive process has taken place in response to a changing 
context, as perceived by policy-makers. At the same time, and just as importantly, 
privatisation creates a new set of problems and dilemmas for Swedish policy-makers. 
This chapter will present a historically informed analysis of the changes in the 
Swedish health care sector. The chapters set out with a short analysis of the Swedish 
political system and the dominance of the social democratic party in post war Sweden – 
features which are crucial to understanding Swedish politics and the developments in 
Swedish health care. From that follows a descriptive part on the construction of the 
Swedish health care system, while the main part of the chapter is based on the political 
dynamics in health care policy in the 1990’s and the 2000’s, where the Swedish health care 
system experienced considerable privatisation.  
 
4.1 The Swedish political system 
Similar to Denmark, but in contrast to England, Sweden has an electoral 
system based on proportional representation. Voters in Sweden elect members to represent 
them in a unicameral parliament known as the Riksdag for a maximum term of four years. 
Candidates are chosen on the basis of proportionality to represent 29 constituencies. The 
parliament has 349 members, of which 310 represent constituencies and the remaining 39 
hold the adjustment seats provided to increase the overall proportionality of representation 
(Ferrara, 2003). 
The proportional electoral system awards seats to parties whose votes exceed 
the minimum thresholds and thereby avoids the magnification of awards to the winning 
party, as does the English system, and includes parties with less support. As a consequence 
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Sweden, as we saw in Denmark, has a parliamentary system with multiple parties.116 The 
parties that have continuously been represented are the Moderates, the Liberals, the Center 
Party, and the Social Democrats.117 The Social Democrats have been the dominant political 
force of the twentieth century. This party has won more seats than any other party in every 
election since 1921, although it was unable to be a governing party for a total of ten years 
since that time (Ferrara, 2003). The Social Democrats have usually held a minority of seats 
and often cannot expect to have a parliamentary majority approve a cabinet made of only 
their own members, so a frequent strategy is to form a majority coalition with one or more 
other parties118  
An understanding of Swedish politics is difficult without an understanding of 
the Social Democratic party and its influence and dominance in Swedish politics. The 
postwar period was absolutely dominated by the Social Democratic party, which held 
power in Sweden from 1946-1976 and from 1982-1991 and from 1994-2006. In the 60 
years from 1946-2006, the social democrats held power in the national parliament for 51 
years. The post-war political history has several similarities with the Danish case presented 
in chapter 2, but the dominance of the Social Democrats is much stronger in the Swedish 
case.  
Similar to as in Denmark, Sweden is a strongly corporatist system, in which 
unions play a central role in politics and policy-making.119 However, in the field of health 
care, the Swedish Doctors Union from the very beginning opposed nationalisation 
(Immergut, 1992) – and they still do today. The doctors’ unions in Denmark and Britain 
partly won the battle of private medical practice, while the Swedish Doctors lost it 
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 Due to the minimum thresholds, the parties that win seats are more likely to be viable parties without 
extreme political views, so it has been possible for multiple parties to work together in a stable arena. 
Between 1921 and 1998, only five different parties won representation (Ferrara, 2003). 
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 The electoral system allowed other parties to begin winning seats, beginning with the Green Party in 
1988 and then the Christian Democrats plus the New Democracy Party in 1991. 
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 In fact, the fragmented party system has organized itself into socialist and non-socialist blocs. The 
socialist bloc, of course, is led by the Social Democrats who have cooperated in the last decade with the 
Left Party and the Green Party. The non-socialist bloc is often led by the Moderate Party that may ally 
with the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the Center Party. 
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 The Swedish law making process has a stage called “Remiss”, where certain political actors are invited 
to comment and suggest changes to the proposed law. The ‘core’ of state Remiss bodies consist of the 
responsible central boards and agencies, county administrative boards (länsstyrelser), the courts of law. 
Further, but important, the relevant professional organisations, both on employer and employee side, are 
involved and a group of interest organisations represent a sort of generalist knowledge of public affairs. 
These are commonly the Swedish Trade Unions Confederation (LO), the Swedish central organisation of 
salaried employees (TCO), the Swedish conferederation of professional associations (SACO/SR), the 
Swedish employers’ confederation (SAF), the Federation of Swedish Industries (SI) and the association 
of regions and municipalities (SKL) (Bjurulf & Swahn, 1980). 
 192 
completely in the postwar decades, as the following pages will demonstrate. This does not 
mean that Swedish doctors oppose a national health care system, on the contrary the 
Swedish Medical Association is a strong supporter of it – but they take a particular stand on 
the balance between private and public delivery. 
The Swedish welfare state, as developed by the Social Democrats (with the 
close support of the unions) after the Second World War, was designed not only to protect 
its citizens from income loss due to ill health, old age or other misfortunes, but to create a 
new society, based on the values of social equality and universal rights, central to the social 
democratic vision of “the good society.” The welfare state consists of a comprehensive and 
universal social security system of flat-rate and income-related benefits, generous 
provisions for social assistance, and a range of tax-funded, publicly provided, social 
services. The social service sector includes health care, primary and secondary education, 
care services for children, services for the elderly and the handicapped, and programmes 
for the treatment of substance abuse.  In the mid-1990s Sweden spent nearly 32,1 % of its 
GDP on social expenditures, the highest level among OECD countries.120 
Equal to Denmark, the Swedish welfare system offers generous social 
benefits and spends more public resources on welfare services than most other western 
democracies. But it is not the expenditure levels which make it distinct121 but rather the way 
in which it has institutionalized the principle of universalism and the values of social 
egalitarianism (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 1990). Arguably, these characteristics are most 
prominent in the social services sector, which provides services at subsidized cost to all 
members of society, even the very the richest citizens. In contrast to other welfare states, 
e.g. Germany, France or Spain, this sector was, until the early 1990’s, organized as public 
monopolies of somewhat standardized services. All citizens, regardless of income or social 
status were referred to public service providers (whether a school, health centre or hospital) 
in their area of residence, there were no choices to be made. In fact, Sweden has been an 
example of a country where discouragement of, and even hostility to, private alternatives 
within the school and health-care sectors was most pronounced  (Wolfe, 1989). Swedish 
voters have consistently shown their support for this system of social democracy that 
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 Figures are available from the OECD SOCX database at 
ww.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG 
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 In fact, as argued in chapter 1, comparing only expenditure levels alone may even be misleading, since 
the particular set up of redistribution differs between countries. For example, Hacker (2002) shows very 
convincingly how the US has a rather large welfare state, but its redistributive mechanism is the tax 
system, rather than direct public transfers.  
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ensures the welfare of its citizens (Stefan Svallfors, 2003). This system, known as the 
Scandinavian welfare model, grants the state a monopoly on most essential services.  
An important feature of Sweden, which may not be immediately apparent to 
the reader, is the particular geography of Sweden, which is essential to understanding 
Swedish public policy. The country is large and is very unevenly populated. According to 
the official statistics 84% of Swedes live in urban areas (SCB, 2007). However, the 
population is spread over a vast territory. In 2005, about 25% of the Swedish population 
lived in the country’s three major cities (1,25 mill in Stockholm, Gothenburg: 510.000, 
Malmö: 258.000). Another nine cities had a population of over 75.000. The remaining more 
than 6 mill Swedes live in smaller cities or in the country side spread over the country’s 
450.000 square kilometres (an area greater than Italy, Switzerland and Austria combined). 
Population density is around 21 persons/square km, although considerably higher around 
the bigger cities. The south of Sweden is more populated than northern and western parts 
of the country which are hardly populated at all (SCB, 2006). These aspects have clear 
implications for public policy and for health policy, in particular in the strong egalitarian 
context of Sweden. Since the needs for public services differ substantially between different 
parts of Sweden, it has been very important to respect regional and local political 
autonomy. As we shall see this affects the nature of policy making in health care, which 
often has to balance between central political promises and pledges and the respect for 
regional autonomy in health care planning. In this respect the Swedish health care model 
differs from the English centralised NHS, the Swedish health care system is decentralised 
to the regional level, the counties. Funding of health care in Sweden is a shared 
responsibility between the national government and the county councils, with the latter 
carrying most of the cost through the tax revenue they raise themselves. With respect to 
the management of the system of health services production, the role of the county 
councils is even more dominant. Formally, all but a small number of hospitals are owned 
by the county councils; the county councils also own the primary-care centres where most 
Swedes receive their primary care. Most doctors, both those practicing in hospitals and 
those working in primary-care centres, are salaried employees of the county councils. Most 
other personnel in the system are county council employees as well. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the county council is the largest single employer in many Swedish communities, 
and many councils’ chief executive officers manage more resources than CEOs in all but 
the largest private firms.  
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The national government contributes to health care funding in two ways: 
through direct grants to the county councils and through the money that flows through the 
social insurance system to fund certain specific providers. The most important ones in the 
latter category are privately practicing doctors, and pharmacies.122  In the past, the county 
councils were not directly involved in managing those services that were funded through 
social insurance. However, through reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, their role in these 
areas has been strengthened as well, and a large share of the social insurance funds now 
flow to the county councils rather than directly to providers. This process of 
decentralisation to the counties was the first wave of adapting the Swedish health care 
system, by shifting responsibility to counties to accommodate for different needs and 
demands by Swedish citizens. 
Prior to the 1990’s the distribution of resources followed a certain pattern: 
the health care budget of a region, a healthcare centre or a hospital was most likely to 
mirror the last year’s budget, adjusted for inflation. Hospitals would yearly revise the 
budgets of their clinics and on this basis suggest a budget for the next year. Despite that 
there were budget restrictions, it was relatively soft – if a hospital asked the region for more 
resources it would usually get them. In other words, there were no incentives to keep 
spending down, rather the opposite; producers had incentives to point to new medical and 
technical needs, which would drive costs up (P. Blomqvist & Rothstein, 2005, chp. 6). 
Counties, however, had global budgets and cost-control was – and remains – a central 
concern. This has implications for privatisation polices, because while privatisation is often 
assumed to lower health care costs it can also involve mechanisms which drive up 
aggregate health care costs.     
While day-to-day health care production, management and planning is highly 
decentralized, national legislation nevertheless continues to impose certain restrictions on 
what the county councils can do. Beyond the general language dealing with equal access 
without regard to ability to pay or residence, the national government retains a degree of 
control/influence over some of the health care system’s most important features, through 
legislature. 
This playing field, where the political and administrative responsibility of 
both secondary and primary health care is decentralised to regions, has important 
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 Another major component is dental care. However, neither dental care nor pharmacies will be 
discussed further here. 
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implications for privatisation reforms. It implies that each region can – and they do – enact 
different reforms, which is also reflected in the fact, that different regions have different 
levels of privatisation, depending partly on the region’s geography/demography. However, 
before turning to the privatisation reforms, the following section will show how the 
Swedish national health care system was established in the post war decades. 
  
4.2 The construction of the Swedish health care system 
In 1948 the General Director of the National Board of Medicine in Sweden, 
J. Axel Höjer, suggested that Swedish health care should consist of a network of council 
owned health-centres, which were to offer comprehensive preventive as well as curative 
medical services to all Swedes, while only the hardest cases should be sent to hospitals 
(named the Höjer Report). The suggestion met with hard resistance among doctors. Höjer 
was accused of wanting to socialise the private medical world and reduce the role of 
hospitals. The debate had clear political implications: it was a traditional right-wing view on 
health care that collided with a social democratic vision (Qvarsell, 2007, p. 63). But the 
suggestions also made doctors object, because it would change their position from being 
private businesses to becoming salaried employees of the counties – they were to be 
nationalised. Furthermore, specialists and hospitals doctors also objected because the 
suggestion seemed to involve a displacement of power away from specialists towards GP’s. 
Despite the resistance, the Social Democrats, as with most other things in the postwar 
period, got their way – but it was to take two decades before a system like the one 
envisioned by Höjer came into existence.     
The public health care system, based on universal insurance paid by general 
taxation, was founded in 1955, when the local health insurance funds (sjukkassorna) where 
all incorporated into a national scheme. A few years later, a new hospital law required 
public hospitals to provide outpatient care for heavily subsidized fees—a reform that in 
effect drove existing private hospitals out of the market (Qvarsell, 2007).  
The 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s were the decades of the modern breakthrough 
in health care with rapid development in medical science, huge expansion of health 
institutions, and a confirmation of medical professionals position and health care’s role in 
the quest for a welfare-society. Politically there was broad agreement that a modern health 
care system needed to be developed and the way it was developed – as a public national 
health care system – was not a politically salient issue. Behind this lay the general growth in 
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wealth in Sweden, which after the war had gone into a 25-year period of high economic 
expansion, symbolically represented by the Minister of Finance (always a Social Democrat), 
who would once a year go on live national television to explain the coming expansion and 
improvements of welfare provision and programmes (Qvarsell, 2007).  This expansionary 
economic policy was based on the ideas brought forward by the economist – and social 
democrat – Gunnar Myrdal, who argued that the way to create wealth in a country was 
through the adjustment of national budgets. Very much in lines with the thesis of John 
Maynard Keynes, a country should invest public funds in order to build up wealth and 
create jobs and growth. Against the common economic orthodoxy at the time, Gunnar 
Myrdal argued that such a financial policy would be sustainable even if the state had to 
borrow the money. In the post war decades Sweden built a welfare state based on 
expansive financial policy. The modern health care system, with large public hospitals 
driven by experts fitted the prevailing ideas of the time. The welfare state and its expansion 
should be designed and steered by expert knowledge and equality secured through public 
financing and ownership – the health care system was a case in point.  
The main opponents to the universal tax-financed health care system were 
the Swedish doctors, who found themselves more and more surrounded by state 
regulations. In contrast to other in countries, the doctors were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to block the transition from an insurance-based system to a universal system 
(Immergut, 1992). The main disagreement in postwar health care reforms was exactly the 
question of doctors’ employment and their ability to work privately. The doctors lost: in 
1959 pay-beds in country hospitals were terminated and in 1963 the state-run system of 
district medical officers was transferred to the counties and finally the Seven Crowns 
Reform (Sjukronor-reformen) consolidated the public power over the health care system in 
1970 (Saltman & Otter, 1992). This reform entailed that the bulk of doctors became public 
employees and thereby received their income through fixed salaries, instead of, as earlier, as 
a mix between salary and performance payment. That the reform strongly discouraged 
private practitioners (without formally prohibiting them) is testament to the fact that the 
number of privately employed doctors went down from 25 per cent in 1970 to a mere 5 
per cent in the mid-1980s (Borgenhammar, 1984, p. 472). The Seven Crowns reform was 
the last step in the process of transforming the Swedish healthcare system into a National 
Health Service (NHS) with almost exclusively public service provision. The same reform 
realigned patient-fees on a national level – the fee was set at Seven Crowns. In the tail 
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water of nationalisation of all medical services, the Care-centres, envisioned by Höjer in 
1948, were built up. They often employ several doctors and nurses and different kinds of 
therapists. The Swedish’s care-centres offer much more extensive care than GP’s in 
Denmark and England (who, in a bit of a caricature, mainly write medical-prescriptions or 
send people to the hospital, if they are ill). 
The Dagmar Reform of 1984 further restricted doctor’s possibilities to 
engage in private business and the possibility of doctor’s working privately in their spare-
time. The reform meant that doctors who wanted to work privately, but within the public 
insurance-system, needed to make an agreement with the county in which they operated. In 
essence the right to free establishment of health care service was abolished and the power 
was transferred to the counties, who could now control the numbers in private practices. 
With the Dagmar-reform, the Swedish health care system resembled quite closely what the 
Höjer Report had suggested 46 years earlier. By the late 1980’s health care was fully in the 
hands of the counties and was a totally public health care system (both regarding funding 
and provision). 
Apart from protest from doctors who were being nationalised during the 
construction of the Swedish health care systems, there were also other concerns over the 
massive health care machine being built. While on the one hand, the health care system was 
a sign of modern times and progress, the embracement of new technology, prosperity and 
organisation based on ideals of economies of scale and rational design, the coin also has a 
flip-side. In a famous novel by P.C. Jersild, “Babels House,” from 1978, the author draws 
an image of a large, industrial-like, anonymous and alienating hospital, where patients die in 
the corridors and doctors and nurses are motivated and driven by their own personal 
ambitions alone (cf. Qvarsell, 2007). There is rising public dissatisfaction with waiting lists 
and discontent with some of the systems’ elements, leading to an increasing feeling of 
‘alienation’ in the health care system (Twaddle, 1999). This is despite the fact that the 
system had already shown important health care results: expected average age was rising, 
general state of health among Swedes improving, improved physical working conditions, 
better food standards, child deaths declining etc. (Qvarsell, 2007).  
The first response to these problems was decentralisation of service 
responsibility and more flexible regulation of health care. In 1975, the government had set 
down a commission of inquiry (hälso- och sjukvårdsutredningen) to revise the national law 
governing the health care sector. In 1980 a proposition was made to the Riksdag 
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(Regeringens propositionen 1981/1982:97) to replace the, by that time 18 year old, health 
care law. The earlier regulations had been quite detailed and increasingly irrelevant in the 
face of radical change in medical technology. The new law would allow for more local 
decisions and more flexibility to remain relevant in periods of great changes. The 
Commissions proposal would have decentralised all operational responsibility to the 
counties, while retaining the responsibility in the national government for technology and 
personel. The final law as enacted significantly weakened the national role in this regard 
(Hälso- och sjukvårdslagen, 1982:763). The national health law of 1982 decentralised 
responsibility for the health care sector in order to allow counties to adapt their health care 
services to their particular needs and the local demands. A few years later (1984), the 
Dagmar Reform, mentioned above, would try to balance this freedom, changing the 
financial flow so that the state paid a lump-sum (per capita) to counties, thereby enabling 
the state to maintain resource control.    
 
4.3 Medical Technology and aging  
 As seen in the Danish and English cases, both technological change and 
aging plays a central role in understanding shifts in health care. As mentioned above, the 
health care law of 1982 was also a response to rapid changes in technology. An increasing 
need for medical care is a function of both population growth and of aging. An older 
population has more chronic disease and a younger one more acute disease. The latter 
requires more medical care per capita. With industrialisation, which came relatively late in 
Sweden compared to other European countries, there came an increase in the proportion 
of old-aged citizens. Already by the late 1970s Sweden’s population was one of the oldest 
in the world. In the 1990s, 17,7 % of all Swedes were over the age of 65. In 2003 this 
figured had dropped to 17,2%, but Sweden is still one of Europe’s oldest populations.123  
 Medical technology and knowledge developed just as fast in Sweden as in 
other western countries. Throughout the post war period technology has been one of the 
cost-drivers in modern medicine. New interventions were developed at both ends of the 
life cycle. In 1967 the first heart and liver transplantations were conducted, transplantation 
technology was massive developed and today is considered commonplace. CAT and MR 
scanners are found in all hospitals making it possible to diagnose and cure diseases which 
                                                 
123
 In Europe, Sweden had the fourth largest proportion of +65 citizens in 2003, only exceeded by Greece 
(17,3%), Germany (17,5%) and Italy (18,2%). Statistics available at www.scb.se. 
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used to be considered incurable. Genetic diagnosis and neonatal intensive care was 
developed and so were new medicines and drug treatments. Today, there are medications 
so gentle that operation and cures can be offered to even very old persons. 
 These technologies add to medical cost. At the basic level, they cost millions 
of Swedish crowns to manufacture and buy, resulting in the rising capital cost of creating 
and maintaining medical facilities. At the same time new technology has reinforced 
pressures towards higher specialisation and therefore increases the labour intensiveness of 
medical care. As with Denmark and England, Doctors also had an interest in new 
technology and often had a say in selecting and using technology (often through powerful 
interest groups, in the Swedish case the Medical Association). Since new technology 
provides new capabilities, there was a “technological imperative” biased towards using 
more complex and expensive tools in diagnosing and treatment. This problem of cost-
pressure was relatively easy to handle in a system like the Swedish (and Danish and 
English) in which there is strong political control over health care. Both Denmark and 
Sweden managed to reduce health care spending in the 1980s (figure 4.1). The following 
section will discuss how Sweden handled the cost crisis as it became apparent in the late 
1970’s.   
 
Figure 4.1: Growth in Cost of Health Care, % of GDP, Sweden, Denmark and the UK, 
1971-2007. 
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4.4 How Sweden dealt with the health care crisis 
Sweden was hit by the recession in the 1970’s and the economy seemed, like 
that of many other Western countries, to enter a negative spiral. The loss of export 
markets, particularly within big Swedish trades like mining and shipbuilding, led to 
declining growth levels (Brenner and Bundgaard Vad, 2000). This development, together 
with the explosive rise of health care costs in the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s and still-expansive 
fiscal policies, resulted in rapidly growing budget deficits in the late 1970s. As the economic 
situation deteriorated, the previously consensual political climate in health care changed as 
well. By the early 1980’s the Conservative Party and the main employers’ organization, the 
SAF (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen), had become openly critical of the existing welfare 
system and demanded thorough reforms. The target of the political attacks was the 
provision of public welfare services such and health and social services. The critique also 
found support in ideas popular in the USA (Reagan) and the UK (Thatcher) at the time. 
The public sector was described as wasteful, overly bureaucratic, and, above all, it was 
argued that it deprived the Swedish people of their right to choose freely what services they 
preferred. By the mid-1980s, the two centrist parties, the People’s Party and the Centre 
Party had joined the Conservatives in their campaign for privatization and consumer 
choice, creating, for the first time in Swedish postwar history, a united opposition against 
Social Democratic welfare policies (Paula Blomqvist, 2004). As the expansive financial 
policy continued, in 1982 Sweden devoted a large proportion of GDP (9.2%) to health 
care, much higher than the OECD average (figure 4.1, above). At about that time it was 
also becoming clear that Sweden was facing a public-finance crisis of major proportions, a 
crisis that would last for many years. Serious concern with cost containment in health care 
can be dated back to the early 1980’s. Since the major responsibility for managing the 
system had already been transferred to the county councils by that time, the burden of 
implementing cost reductions fell largely on the decentral actors, while the state also gained 
cost-control through the Dagmar Reform in 1984. The cost-containment measures of the 
80’s were relatively successful in the sense that by the end of the 1990’s Sweden spent 
about 8.4% of its GDP on health, a full percentage point less than twenty years earlier 
(figure 4.1, above). 
During the 1980s, the principal tool for cost containment was simply 
budgetary planning under which the county councils imposed global budgets on particular 
districts within the county. In turn, the districts tried to stay within their aggregate 
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constraint by establishing global budgets for units such as primary care centres and hospital 
departments within the district. While the global budget system had considerable success in 
reducing the rate of expenditure growth, it did not lead to a major change in resource 
allocation in the system. Often, budgets were established based on historical cost. In some 
counties, the flexibility of local decision-makers was also limited by other constraints, such 
as rules against personnel layoffs during times of high unemployment. Thus, while 
expenditure growth slowed, there was little evidence that the system was becoming more 
efficient. Instead, it appeared to many that the success of cost containment had to a large 
extent come simply through a reduction in the level and quality of services received by the 
population, and especially during the latter half of the 1980s, increasingly long waiting lists 
for certain types of care became a concern among Swedes (Rosenthal, 1986, 1992). 
Establishing global budgets at the county level made it possible to compare 
the per capita cost of care in different regions, and contributed to the subsequent trend 
toward the principle of population-based health care funding. Also to the extent that costs 
in some districts were higher than elsewhere because care was delivered to residents of 
other districts, the global budget system contributed to discussions that made such 
transactions explicit and thus contributed to laying the groundwork for explicit inter-
district negotiations over contracted care.  
The economic constraints on health care amplified some of the existing 
problems in the public health care system. The critical public debate about the organization 
of the welfare services sector during the 1980s also reflected the growing problems of 
County Councils in delivering services as their own financial situations deteriorated. As a 
result of attempts to ration services and reduce costs, waiting lists for health care (and other 
services) grew, resulting in public discontent. A media debate about the deficiencies of the 
system followed, giving right-wing critics of the system further opportunity to develop their 
arguments about the negative effects of the public monopoly. While discontent with the 
lack of services was growing, opinion polls consistently showed a high level of support for 
the welfare system in general, including the service sector (S. Svallfors, 1999). As the 
possibilities within health care treatments expanded, the health care system produced more 
and more services, and ordinary Swedes’ expectations and demands of the system rose 
accordingly. In other words the system exhibited what is also know as supplier-induced 
demand, which furthered the pressure for the health care sector to deliver more. The 
debate during the early 1980s did seem to reflect a general public frustration, not just with 
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the waiting lists but also with the inflexibility of this extensively regulated system, where 
regard for the working conditions of the staff sometimes seemed to be given higher 
priority than the needs of users (Saltman & Otter, 1992). In other words, the health care 
system was producing at set of problems which were the result of dynamics within the 
system itself. These problems were impossible for policy makers to ignore. 
 
4.5 Changes in the Swedish electorate  
 Through the 1970’s popular support for the Social Democratic party started 
to decline. The 1976 election became a historic event; after 44 years in power, the Social 
Democratic government was defeated. While some of the discontent within the party in 
1970 and 1973 was explained by a worsening economic situation, the 1976 election was lost 
for other reasons, namely a discontent with bureaucracy and a debate over socialisation or 
the future of private enterprise (Petersson, 1978). The period from the 1950 to the 1970s 
had shown a rising volatility among voters, reflecting the fact that a rising part of the 
electorate changed party preference and that class voting was declining (Petersson, 1978, 
see table 5 and 6.). Further, voters increasingly thought that politicians were losing touch 
with their roots and not paying attention to ordinary people’s lives. Despite this, the Social 
Democratic Party would regain strength over time (table 4.1), but the two lost elections in 
the 1970s were nonetheless a wake up call for the party. It was realised that the rise in voter 
volatility also meant that parties increasingly will have to appeal to citizens and new voter 
segments to gain election. 
 
Table 4.1: Voter Volatility and Electoral turnouts (% of votes), Sweden 1973-2006.  
Social Democratic Party and Red/Blue Block.  
 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Social Democratic Party 43,6 42,7 43,2 45,6 44,7 43,2 37,7 45,3 36,4 39,9 35 
Red Block 48,9 47,5 48,8 51,2 50,1 54,5 45,6 56,5 52,9 52,9 46 
Blue Block 48,8 50,8 51,2 45 47,9 44,7 53,3 41,4 44,5 44 51,1 
            
Voter Volatility* 27 28 29 33 39 40 51 49 57 57 58 
            
Source: www.scb.se, calculations made by author. Red Block (Social democratic party, Left Party, Green Party). 
Blue Block (Center Party, Moderate Party, Liberal Party, New Democracy, Christian Democratic Party, Sweden 
Democrats). Red and Blue Block do not also add up to 100%, because parties who receive below 2% are included. 
 
* Voter Volatility measured as the percentage of voters who make their party-choice during the election campaign. 
In 1964 it was as low as 18%. Source: (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2008, figure 2.1) 
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The problem of a general lack of congruence between welfare services and 
people’s preferences was not ignored by politicians, who realised that “the national mood” 
was changing. The loss of power in 1976 for the first time in 44 years was a shock to the 
party – a loss partly caused by the electorate’s more critical attitude towards the public 
sector. Opinion polls showed that the electorate had developed a very negative attitude 
towards the public sector under Social Democratic rule between 1973 and 1976 (Petterson 
1977: 199–205). The internal Social Democratic explanation for the loss of power in 1976 
was that voters perceived the public sector and the welfare state as a rigid bureaucracy, and 
associated bureaucratic red tape with the Social Democratic party in particular (Mellbourn, 
1986; Premfors, 1991). In 1982, when the Social Democrats returned to office after six 
years in opposition, they entered office with an ambitious plan to undertake public sector 
reforms. After 44 years in government it was difficult to identify the borders between the 
party and the state, and the gap between state activities and citizens had grown, as the 
activities within the public sector did not properly reflect citizen preferences (Gustafsson, 
1987). Gunnar Myrdahl, a labour economist and sometimes participant in Social 
democratic governments, presented a hard critique of trends in Swedish society in 1982. It 
was indeed a critique of the results of the social democratic project. Myrdahl’s point was 
that while the large societal programs had been ideologically committed to equality, such 
programs were increasingly governed by a large, centralised bureaucracy far away from the 
everyday experiences of those the system was intended to serve. What is lost in this process 
is not only the close connection between programs and the lives of ordinary people, but 
the process of collective decision making, democracy itself (Myrdahl, 1982). Essentially it 
was a critique of centralisation. In the medical arena Myrdahl also suggested that the trend 
towards centralisation in health care was problematic and argued for more decentralisation 
and for the advantages of smaller hospitals (Myrdahl, 1982, p. 35). These ideas were 
considered to be pragmatic and were to be picked up by Social Democratic policy makers 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
The new Social Democratic reform programme was developed by a group 
consisting of central party members and headed by the deputy Prime Minister, Ingvar 
Carlsson. At the party congress in 1984, the group presented a programme that among 
other things proposed that welfare policies should build on citizenship and freedom of 
choice in the future (SAP, 1984, p. 10) although universalism is the central pillar of the 
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Swedish welfare state, meaning that large segments of the population have a substantial 
interest in preserving the welfare state institutions. Means-testing and targeting are 
explicitly warned against because broad-based political support for the welfare state is 
difficult obtain with the use of selective social policies (SAP, 1984). The deputy Prime 
Minister also argued that the renewal of the public sector implied a public sector governed 
by the consumers (L. Anell & Carlsson, 1985). For example, citizens should be allowed to 
choose an alternative to the local public school, yet welfare state institutions should 
stimulate collective behaviour among the citizens. Carlsson argued that Swedes should be 
served by a public sector organised in such a way that collective action is rational for the 
individual. Honest taxpayers should trust that everybody else also participates in  financing 
the public services from which everybody benefits (L. Anell & Carlsson, 1985). 
 The discussion about political versus market-based decisions was, according 
to the Social Democrats, a question about power and political control. The development of 
the universal welfare state was connected to the endeavour to preserve a democratically 
controlled public sector. However, the social democrats also emphasised the importance of 
the welfare state’s institutional efficiency in order to preserve welfare state legitimacy and 
institutional trust. To maintain solidarity between different societal groups, welfare policies 
must be of a high quality. Advantaged and well-off groups may otherwise look for 
solutions outside the system, which is likely to result in demands for lower taxes and thus 
undermine the mechanisms of solidarity (SAP, 1988). 
 At the same time attitudes among Swedes have been changing over time. 
More citizens demand investments in public services, which they find inadequate. Certainly, 
Swedes display massive support for public funding of these services, while there seems to a 
change in the view over who could deliver these services. Notably, the universal services 
receive more support than specific programmes of social contributions. 
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Table 4.2: Attitudes towards welfare services, Sweden, 1981-2006. 
Percentage who wants to increase (+) 
and decrease (-) 
1981 1986 1992 1997 2002 2006 
Expenditure in health care +45 
-3 
+47 
-4 
+53 
-4 
+77 
-2 
+79 
-2 
- 
Expenditure for elderly (pensions and care) +30 
-1 
+37 
-3 
+60 
-2 
+70 
-2 
+70 
-2 
- 
Primary and Secondary Education +26 
-7 
+32 
-2 
+50 
-1 
+70 
-1 
+71 
-1 
- 
Social contributions +16 
-22 
+17 
-22 
+13 
-26 
+21 
-21 
+15 
-21 
- 
       
How Should services be financed? (% 
who answers through public funding*) 
      
Education - 79 75 75 76 86 
Health care - 90 90 92 93 91 
Child care - 63 63 66 69 74 
       
Who is best at delivering services (% 
who answers (‘private providers’) 
      
Education - 8 11 12 10 13 
Health Care - 9 14 9 12 19 
Child Care - 10 20 18 15 16 
       
Source: (Stefan Svallfors, 2003), 2006-data kindly provided by Stefan Svallfors. 
 
*The question is phrased: “should mainly be paid through taxes and employer contributions”.  
 
Surveys on the question of whether Swedes believe they need private insurance to 
complement the public system in case of illness reveal declining trust in the public system. 
In 1997 and 2002 around 18% of Swedes said “yes, absolutely” (Stefan Svallfors, 2003, 
table 8) to the question of whether healthcare should mainly be paid for through taxes and 
employer contributions. The notion among the Social Democrats that citizens might turn 
to private alternatives if unsatisfied with the public health service seemed real. In the 2000s 
Swedes increasingly do, as we shall see below. In sum, the Social Democrats had to find a 
balance between meeting citizens increasing demands, while maintaining the universal 
model and not increasing taxes. The real private alternative, e.g. private insurance, was the 
worst scenario, as it would not only breach equity, but could also break up solidarity 
between societal groups and threaten the legitimacy of the welfare state. 
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4.6 The changing of the political tide 
The 1985 elections became a public referendum on the future of the welfare 
system, vigorously defended by Social Democratic leader Olof Palme (Paula Blomqvist, 
2004). When that referendum is about the welfare state and its survival, the Social 
Democrats usually win, and 1985 was no exception. However, soon after the election, the 
first changes in attitudes towards the public sector became visible also within the Social 
Democratic Party itself. A prominent advocate of public sector reform in the mid-1980s 
was Kjell-Olof Feldt, Minister of Finance between 1983 and 1990. Feldt’s prime concern 
was not the lack of consumer orientation within the public sector, but this sector’s size and 
productivity. In the late 1980s, a range of publications flowed from the Ministry of Finance 
advocating the introduction of various types of “quasi-markets” in the public services. In a 
quasi-market, the provision of services is separated from direct political control, and the 
role of government is reduced to that of “purchasing” services on behalf of the public 
from a variety of competing “providers” on a contract basis (Julian Le Grand & Bartlett, 
1993). These new ideas were the very same that were being aired in Britain in the same 
period and where also being developed in the academic debate. In the late 1980s, Richard 
Saltman and Casten von Otter (1987) published a proposal for “public competition” in 
Sweden, and the Swedish Institute of Health Economics published a working paper on the 
Swedish system by Alain Enthoven, (the economist whose work had inspired the 
conservatives in Britain to implement quasi-markets in several welfare services including 
health care.124) Work commissioned by the Federation of County Councils in 1991 
provided sympathetic discussion of different models of public competition, and the U.K. 
model of health care reform through a purchaser-provider split was well known in Sweden 
(Federation of County Councils, 1991). Furthermore, at the administrative level inspiration 
came from New Public Management, which argued that public administration had much to 
learn from private sector organisation and that competition within service provision would 
enhance quality and cut costs (Hood, 1991; Klausen & Ståhlberg, 1998). The right wing in 
Sweden kept fighting a battle against the welfare state, arguing that this system had grown 
to be an overly paternalistic one. It had taken away Swedes’ control of their own lives: they 
could not choose their own school for their children, they could not choose their own 
                                                 
124
 Alain Enthoven also provided the theoretical logic behind the Dekker-Simmons plan for health care 
reform in the Netherlands. 
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doctor etc. What was needed, according to the right wing, was to put citizens back in 
control of the welfare system instead of the being controlled by the system. 
 
Despite the fact that the conservative political parties became more 
aggressive in the 1980’s in challenging socialist ideology, the Social Democratic party 
remained in power. Nonetheless, the Social Democrats had to recognize that a significant 
proportion of young voters were attracted to conservative philosophy and that the issue of 
individual choice was an important one for this generation. The social democratic party did 
in fact pick up the issue of “individual freedom” in the early 1980’s and tried to reshape it 
and make it fit the social democratic ideology and search for ways to promote individual 
choice and freedom while still maintaining a commitment to solidarity and equity. The 
Social democrat Ingvar Carlsson (who became Prime Minister in 1986) expressed in a 
speech in 1983 the notion that socialism is a “freedom movement” which stresses 
individual freedom and freedom from starvation, ignorance, injustice, and exploitation. 
“Let me stress that by freedom we mean individual freedom to try new things, to get a 
good education, to search for happiness.” Carlsson further said that individual freedom 
includes freedom from “powerlessness’ and the freedom to take more individual 
responsibility (cf. Rosenthal, 1986, p. 594). In the same period the Social Democratic 
Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt, spoke positively of privatisation of parts of the 
public sector activities (Ahlqvist & Engqvist, 1984 ), for which he got in heated discussions 
with other social democrats who disagreed fundamentally. In this atmosphere of more 
individual assertiveness, consumers were also being increasingly critical of the public health 
care system. A study of public complaints reflect public concerns about poor service, 
waiting times, long waiting lists, and impersonal care and lack of continuity of care 
(Rosenthal, 1986). 
The political debate in health care in the 1980’s was not only about efficient 
organisation. It was also about the role of the patient and more generally the relationship 
between the citizen and the public sector. The public sector had gained itself an image of a 
bureaucratic and anonymous machine, where patients had little say or influence – an image 
which was sustained in the media (P. Blomqvist & Rothstein, 2005, p. 193). Times were 
changing and people wanted more influence, a say over how they were treated and choice 
of where to be treated. There was a push to strengthen the patients’ role. Since the public 
health care system was not able to meet these demands, legitimacy of the system seemed to 
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be weakening. This was clearly addressed by the social democratic minister of health, 
speaking in a parliamentary debate in 1988: “People should be able to visit the doctor, the 
health care centre, or the hospital they wish, also across county boarders. Attempts with 
such choice have been shown to reduce the demand for private alternatives” (cf. Saltman & 
Otter, 1992, pp. 49-50). In the Social Democratic party program from 1990, the Social 
Democrats state that patients should be able to exercise choice between health care 
providers (SAP, 1990). 
     
4.7 Experiments with private providers in the 1980’s 
Analysis of privatisation trends in Swedish health care often take as their 
starting point in 1991, and the arrival of a centre-right national government. (P. Blomqvist 
& Rothstein, 2005; Saltman & Bergman, 2005) This view is not quite accurate. As 
explained above, Swedish health care is decentralised to the county level. Several 
experiments with private provision took place in 1980’s at the county level, under the 
Social Democratic national government, and at a time when most counties had centre-left 
majorities (Saltman & Otter, 1992).  
Already by the mid 1980s a rise in private medical practice was noticed, both 
among private doctors working for the public sector and private doctors working for 
patients with private insurance (Rosenthal, 1986). More importantly, however, were the 
experiments with private providers carried out by counties themselves. In the 1980s several 
counties began experimenting with privately operated companies seeking to explore 
potential financial efficiencies, which were heavily needed, because of the economic 
constraints resulting from the crisis in the 70s. One of the most well known experiments 
was the establishment of City-Akuten (city-acute), an ambulatory clinic in Stockholm. The 
City-Akuten is an interesting example of how corporate style privatisation has developed 
within the public health care system. The demand for City-Akuten’s services was very high, 
reflecting the wish for quick individual treatment, without appointment, located in the city 
centre near to working places. The cost of the clinic was to be paid for by Stockholm 
County. It was a private clinic staffed by physicians, who most often have a full time job in 
the public sector, but who spend free-time or vacation periods working in City-Akuten. 
Another type of private provision happened through competitive bidding. While auxiliary 
services had already been outsourced to some extent, in the late 1980’s also clinical services 
(primary care and elective surgery) were also tendered for private companies. With regards 
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to primary care, as of 1990, 50% of counties were experimenting with some kind of private 
provider model (Saltman & Otter, 1992, p. 45) and in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s private 
provider models were pursued in counties of both right and left-wing dominance. With 
regard to secondary care, counties were also keen on collaborating with the private sector; 
in 1990 60% of counties were using external providers (often corporate for-profit 
businesses) for elective surgery – a figure double that for 1989 (Saltman & Otter, 1992), 
which indicates the rapid pace of change in policy direction. Several other examples of 
experiments at the county level are given by Twaddle (1999, pp. 14-20). This also shows 
that the counties responsible for health care delivery were somewhat ahead of the national 
political debate, where the Social Democrats were still sceptical towards private provision 
of core welfare services.    
In the Swedish system as it existed during the 1980s there was little freedom 
of choice. Access to private doctors was largely limited to those living in large cities, so that 
for most people, the only source of primary care was a publicly operated centre. Even if 
you lived in a place where there was more than one primary-care centre, you were only 
allowed to go to the one serving the population of the area in which you were a resident. In 
the centre, you were treated by a nurse or the doctor on duty, who might or might not be 
your “regular doctor.” Similarly, people needing hospital care could only receive it in the 
hospital serving their area of residence. As a result of these problems, political decision-
makers began paying increasing attention to proposals of economists to introduce elements 
of reform into the Swedish health care system. In fact, choice was initially not laid down in 
national legislation, rather the counties decided that patients should have choice over which 
provider to choose in 1990 (Twaddle, 1999). This decentralised decision was made 
predominantly by Social Democrat-led counties. The decision by counties to introduce 
choice was intended not only to make the system more efficient (raising the quality of care 
while continuing to contain costs), but also to respond to the public’s desire for more 
freedom to choose their health care providers. Although in some ways these objectives are 
complementary, in others they are in conflict, as will be further discussed below.  
For choice to exist in health care there must be some alternatives to choose 
between. Since money had to follow the patient in the choice system, there had to a split 
between purchasers (the counties) and providers (doctors). Swedish policy makers were 
inspired by the English reforms (HSU 2000, 1994; Whitehead M, et al., 1997) and 
introduced a "split" between the funding and management functions. Under managed 
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competition, the purchasers should also be free to choose among competing providers in 
contracting for their population's care. Unlike the case for the U.K., there is no national 
legislation in Sweden that mandates a purchaser-provider split. However, most county 
councils introduced, over the first half of the 1990s, a version of provider “split”. The 
exact model varied. In Dalarna County, the split was accomplished by essentially giving 
purchasing authority to primary-care centres which received population-based funding to 
cover the cost for all types of care for the population in their catchment area. (This was 
reminiscent of the U.K. system of fundholding, with the centres acting as fundholders: 
Like U.K. fundholders, the centres had to negotiate with hospitals for secondary care for 
its patients.) In other counties, a single purchasing agency was given responsibility to 
negotiate with all providers in the county. As in the U.K., the experience with the 
purchaser-provider split in Sweden has been mixed. In some counties, there was little de 
facto change even though the split was formally introduced. There has often been little 
competition, as purchasing agencies simply sign contracts with the same hospitals that have 
always provided given types of care. When there is a single purchasing agency, each 
hospital may be given a “block contract” which simply specifies that it will provide the 
same types of services as it always has, in return for a lump-sum grant that may be set on 
the basis of its historical cost. In practice, purchasing agencies may also, indirectly, allow 
providers to incur deficits by simply increasing next year’s block grant by enough to cover 
them. Thus, in those counties where there was an absence of political will to make the 
system effective, ways can be found to design a system that formally qualifies as a 
purchaser-provider split, but makes little or no difference in practice. In some counties 
where the purchasing function was decentralized (as in Dalarna county, and the city of 
Stockholm) the split was potentially more effective, but other problems arose. According 
to Harrison and Calltorp (2000, p. 228), the negotiations between local funding agencies 
and hospital caused confusion and high administrative costs, and the purchasing function 
was subsequently centralized again. In the city of Stockholm, although the evidence 
suggests that there was a substantial increase in hospital productivity, aggregate costs for 
hospital services rose because the volume of services increased and payment was on the 
basis of a fixed sum per treatment performed. Essentially, the county was testing a DRG 
system. But whenever providers started to increase production (reacting to the economic 
incentives in the model), cost rose and soon after the county council commanded providers 
to stop producing, because the early 1990s were times of decreasing tax-revenues. The 
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DRG system lost its credibility among providers (M. I. Harrison, 2004). To counteract this 
problem, the system in Stockholm was also re-centralized and modified in other ways. In 
spite of these problems, and even though some of the more radical experiments have been 
altered (in Dalarna and the city of Stockholm), the purchaser-provider split remained an 
important principle in the Swedish system, at least in the sense that funding agencies and 
producers will “increasingly conduct their transactions through contracts that specify 
mutual entitlements and obligations” (Arvidsson & Jönsson, 1997, pp. 55-56, authors 
translation). 
 To sum up, there were several experiments of adaptation in the organisation 
of health care in the 1980s and 1990s in the counties. Most of them were of a ‘trial and 
error’ character: different models were tested, most of them were rolled back or modified. 
On the one hand, the 1982 health care law had given counties more flexibility, on the other 
hand the central government was increasingly imposing constraints on health care 
spending. In 1991, as the country faced its deepest depression in 50 years, the central 
government constrained fees for ambulatory services and limited growth in counties’ total 
spending levels. County taxes levels were frozen, effectively blocking revenue flow to the 
health care system. Despite the crisis, a government has to perform to its voters and deliver 
on promises in health care. In the early 1990s this was also the case for the newly elected 
right-wing government.  
 
4.8 Patient choice, care guarantees and the family doctor reform  
Although the general story proposed here is that privatisation has been 
driven from below, there are also elements at the national level which have played a role in 
the changes of the Swedish health care system. In 1991 the government became a centre-
right one, which, during the election campaign, had promised to address the problems in 
Swedish health care. The perceived public dissatisfaction with the lack of freedom to 
choose one’s health care provider was addressed in two reforms. The first of these was 
called “patient choice and care guarantees” (PCCG) and was directed specifically at hospital 
care. The second one was the family doctor reform directed at primary care. The Swedish 
debate over waiting lists had been ongoing since the 1980s. Right-wing parties had 
suggested that market mechanisms would solve the problem, while the social democrats 
were more hesitant and argued that health care problems should be solved at the regional 
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level (Blom-Hansen, 1998b).125 The patient choice and care guarantee was initiated in 1992 
and offered a waiting time guarantee for 12 selected medical procedures in which waiting 
lists were particularly long. The state granted further funding for the counties to reach care 
guarantee goals. Its cornerstone was the provision that patients requiring surgery or other 
hospital treatment (within the 12 selected procedures) would have the right to treatment 
within three months – if their own county could not offer treatment within that time, 
patients were allowed to choose a hospital in another county (or private hospital) in which 
they would receive treatment (Recall that under the earlier system in Sweden, patients 
requiring hospital treatment could only receive it in the hospital to which they were 
assigned; that is, the hospital serving the area in which the patient resided.) In addition, the 
reform specified that “money would follow the patient;” if a patient elected to receive care 
in a hospital other than the one to which he or she was originally assigned, a specified sum 
of money would be transferred from the budget of the latter to that of the former. The 
PCCG reform was not only intended to address the general public dissatisfaction with the 
lack of patient choice of provider, but more so the problem of waiting times (it was 
assumed that patients were likely to choose treatment in a hospital with a shorter waiting 
time, if they have the option).  
In absolute terms, the PCCG reform led only to a relatively small reallocation 
of health care funds, since very few patients exercised choice. The guarantee was adjusted 
through 1993-1996, but was eventually cancelled in 1996; the government agreed with the 
counties that the (Landstingsförbundet, 1996). Therefore it is also surprising that Harrison 
and Calltorp (2000, p. 223) conclude that by 1993, waiting lists had “ceased to be a political 
issue,” although it was the case that the guarantee did reduce waiting lists in 1992/1993. 
However, already by 1994/1995 waiting lists had risen to levels witnessed before the health 
care guarantee (Socialstyrelsen, 1997). Part of the reason for the rise was increased supply 
of operations (which, as discussed in the former chapters, is a well known factor to drive 
up waiting lists) and a labour conflict in the health care sector in 1995 (which as in the 
Danish case also drives up waiting lists). The waiting list guarantee was a policy failure 
(Blom-Hansen, 1998b). The issue of waiting lists and other problems were not dealt away 
with – they were to re-emerge on the political agenda.  
                                                 
125
 Yet, the Social Democratic government had increased block-grants to the Counties in the 1980s 
through the yearly negotiations with counties (Blom-Hansen, 1998b, p. 364). 
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The beginning of the 1990’s saw the first real political battle over the 
organisation of the Swedish health care system and the issue of private health care. The 
right-wing government who had won the 1991 election, established a commission which 
was to consider three different models of health care provision: the first was the county 
council model, reformed with market-like solutions and competition, the second was a 
model of primary care management similar to the UK’s GP-fundholding and the third was 
a compulsory health insurance model, using competing insurance providers. However, the 
right-wing government stressed that private funding could not be made a major 
component of any of the proposals, reflecting the existing institutional set up and the 
major public support for a public health care system. The three models reflected, that in 
the coalition government, the different parties favoured different solutions (Garpenby, 
1995). The commission itself did not provide any answer to which model was preferable – 
that was up to politicians to decide (SOU, 1993). A group of international experts were 
called in to advise the government. The expert did not support the insurance model, which 
was the model favoured by the Moderate Party. This led the commission into a stalemate 
and finally the Social Democrats and the left wing socialists left the committee. 
This is an example of the Swedish political system of minority government 
often makes it difficult to agree on a solution – certainly impossible if the solution is too 
radical in favour of one of the parties. However, the right-wing coalition was under 
political pressure to show the will to reform and their interest in the health care sector, 
although it could not be “revolutionised.” The result was the family doctors reform in 1994 
(Garpenby, 1995). The central element of the reform was to introduce a right for patients 
to choose a specific primary-care doctor as their family doctor, and to guarantee that this 
doctor would henceforth become the patient’s regular physician. This right was intended as 
a response to public dissatisfaction with the fact that those who received treatment in 
primary care centres could not count on being seen by the same doctor on successive 
occasions. In addition, of course, establishing a regular doctor-patient relationship can be 
seen as a way of improving the quality of care, since diagnosis and treatment are likely to be 
better when the doctor knows the patient well. Another objective was to raise the 
productivity of primary-care doctors by making their income more directly dependent on 
the number of patients that had chosen them as their family doctor. Introducing an 
element of competition among doctors for patients was also seen as a way of making 
doctors pay more attention to patients’ desire to be treated more like “valued customers.” 
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It was envisaged that this would be accomplished by including elements of capitation or fee 
for service in the physician's remuneration, although county councils retained the authority 
to negotiate the system of remuneration for the primary care doctors that were employed 
in the primary care centres. 
 In addition to serving these objectives, the family doctor reform was also 
intended to strengthen the role of privately practicing physicians in primary care. It did this 
by introducing a provision under which the county councils were obliged to allow doctors 
to establish themselves as privately practicing primary care providers, and specified the way 
such doctors would be paid (through a mix of capitation and fee for service). The family 
doctor system went into effect at the beginning of 1994. Effectively this made the primary 
care sector open-ended; any doctor could open up a private medical business and attract 
customers, who were paid for by through public funds. It did not take long for problems 
with it to become apparent. Because the terms on which doctors could establish private 
practice were relatively generous, a substantial number did so, and the cost of paying 
private doctors quickly became a significant part of overall health expenditures in some 
counties. In 1996, 12% of specialised doctors were private entrepreneurs, 13% of doctors 
in general practice were private and 20% of physiotherapists were private – and in primary 
care almost 50% of physiotherapist were private businesses (SOU, 1996). Presumably, 
there was an assumption that the additional cost of privately produced care would be 
substantially offset by reductions in the cost of care provided through public primary care 
centres. But this did not happen, in part because Swedish labour legislation at the time 
made it difficult for the county councils to lay off those doctors that ended up with few 
patients (some county councils also continued to pay primary care centre physicians on the 
basis of salary). 
 In the 1994-election that followed the introduction of the reform, the Social 
Democratic party returned to power, and the government quickly moved to undo a 
number of the changes that had been introduced. In particular, the system of giving 
doctors the right to establish publicly funded private practices was repealed, after having 
been in force for less than two years. While the family doctor reform has generally been 
regarded as a failure, certain elements of it remain. The Social Democrats did not modify 
the law, because it allowed for private doctors, in fact the Social Democrats argued that 
there may be positive elements in a mix between private and public providers (Proposition 
1996/1997:123, 1996). Instead the family doctor system was modified because the model 
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was open-ended and left the counties without a central cost-control mechanism: “The main 
motive of these changes [to the family doctor system] is to give the counties a real 
possibility of conducting their planning responsibilities within the health care law” 
(Proposition 1996/1997:123, 1996). Private medical providers were allowed, but they had 
to make agreements with the county of their business and location. In other words, private 
doctors were accepted by the Social Democrats, but they did not want a free market; 
because of the third-party payment problem, the social democrats feared that costs would 
rise uncontrollably. From 1996 onwards the counties regained the right to organize the 
system of primary doctors. However, most counties decided to continue the system under 
which patients have the right to choose a family doctor, and some of the newly established 
private practices continued in existence, although under more restrictive contracts with the 
county councils. While many counties have returned to a system of purely salaried doctors 
in the primary care clinics, others have maintained an element of capitation (fixed fee per 
patient inscribed). 
In short, the family doctor reform offered another experiment with private 
providers. It was successful in the way that many Swedes did choose a private doctor, 
because they appreciated the possibility to choose. Although the rules were altered, many 
counties decided to maintain private providers. Importantly, however, the experiments 
revealed that the Social Democratic party was adapting its ideas about the organisation of 
health care. Over time, the party has accepted choice and increasingly also accepted that 
private providers could play a role in health care. 
Harrison and Calltorp (2000) argue that Sweden became “an important 
pioneer of market-oriented reform in publicly funded health care systems” (p. 219) because 
of the national reforms in the early 1990’s. What does not seem to be recognised is that 
these developments, choice and private provision, had already been set in motion 
decentrally by the counties, who tested several models in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 
(M. I. Harrison, 2004; Twaddle, 1999). The national right-wing government enacted 
national reforms aimed at putting conditions in place that were already the reality in many 
counties. And at the regional level, the decision to offer choice in health care was less 
motivated by ideology – most counties agreed on choice, despite party colour. Rather, it 
was a response to several existing problems within the public health care system. Choice in 
Swedish health was initially not encouraged by the national government – it emerged as the 
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result of counties trying to find solutions to the financial and organisational problems of 
the existing model. 
 
4.9 The redraw of reforms 
The national reforms enacted in 1992 had several unintended consequences 
and were slowly pulled back and/or adjusted (M. I. Harrison, 2004; Twaddle, 1999). The 
Family doctor reform was modified by the Social Democrats, who returned to power in 
1994, mainly because it left the primary care sector open-ended. This drove costs upward 
because more doctors established themselves as private businesses paid for by the counties. 
Further, the family doctor reform had drawn GPs to the cities, and started a drift of 
doctors away from rural areas. This shift made it difficult for counties to plan health care 
supply – which was not only a central concern but also a legal obligation (in the health care 
law of 1982) for the counties. As it became clear that market experiments were costly, 
rather than cost-containing, counties started restricting market arrangements. Importantly, 
however, it was not a full scale drawback of reforms. Most counties maintained choice and 
the purchaser-provider split and per case payment based DRG. Despite general political 
rhetoric against marketisation of health care, the Social Democrats realised that both choice 
and waiting times represented important issues on citizens’ agendas. And further, the idea 
of private providers was not abandoned.  
The waiting time initiatives were not drawn back. While the doctors had been 
positive towards The Family Doctor reform, and the possibility of private practice, 
professionals were very critical towards the idea of waiting time guarantees. The main 
reason is that by focussing on a particular set of elective medical procedures, the basic 
premise of health care priorities – that “the most needy should get treatment first” – is 
violated. The health care guarantee had twisted priorities in health care away from the large 
number of patients with severe cronical illnesses, who are most in need of care, towards a 
small group of patients, with health care problems which are less urgent form a medical 
point of view (SOU, 1995).  
 Against that background the social democratic government agreed with the 
counties in 1996 (in the Dagmar-agreement) that the care guarantee should be 
complemented with a “visting guarantee” (besöksgaranti), which meant shorter waiting 
times in primary care. In the negotiations with the counties in 1997, the three months 
waiting guarantee was cancelled. It did not have much practical impact, because counties 
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did not deliver operations within the promises waiting times (as mentioned above). The 
visiting guarantee was more general and were a to guarantee citizens on the following 
points: contact with the primary doctor on the same day the doctor was contacted, if a visit 
to the doctor is needed the patient must be seen within 7 days, and if patients need 
specialised care they have a right to see specialised doctors within 90 days (Socialstyrelsen, 
2006).    
In 1999 the government received a report from the National Board of Health 
Care on the question of waiting guarantees and waiting lists in health care. The report 
concluded that waiting lists exist because the resources available in the health care sector do 
not keep up with technological development (Socialstyrelsen, 1999). In other words, more 
resources were needed if problems related to waiting times were to be solved. This was not 
good news for the Social Democratic government after years of serious economic 
problems in the Swedish economy. The report also stressed that the problems of access to 
and waiting time in public health care is likely to affect people’s trust in the public health 
care system and that it may evolve into a serious problem of legitimacy. The report further 
argues that health care guarantees, of the kind tried before should be avoided, because they 
tend to obscure medical priorities (Socialstyrelsen, 1999). The report recommends several 
measures to increase access to health care, the central ones were: 1) Increased capacity: 
within the existing system of primary care much more health care can be produced, which 
will ease the pressure on hospital services; 2) Choice and better information: if patients are 
given free choice of health care provider and good information of waiting times this will 
allocate resources better and improve access; 3) A nation-wide project on waiting times 
should be pursued. 
In the budget for 2000 the Social Democratic government stated that no new 
waiting time guarantees would be given. However, waiting times are still are the forefront 
of health care debates, which the government is very well aware of. In 2005 a national 
waiting time guarantee was again agreed on with the counties.  But in the timespan between 
the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s the private health care sector has expanded significantly. 
This has happened because counties have slowly started to purchase health care services 
from private providers in order to deliver both choice and shorter waiting times – these are 
issues which have grown in importance locally, notwithstanding whether the county 
council in question is dominated by social democrats or right wing parties. In this 
development, Stockholm County went further than other counties. 
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4.10 St. Görans Hospital – THE private hospital in Sweden 
In the centre of Stockholm lies St. Görans Hospital. Until the mid-1990s, this 
was a regular acute/general public hospital run by Stockholm County. When, in 1999 St. 
Görans hospital was sold to a private company it acquired a central role in the debate over 
privatisation in health care in Sweden. To understand what happened, we need to go a bit 
back in time. In 1994 Stockholm County, at that time led by the moderate party (centre-
right) decided to turn St. Görans Hospital into a “Public Company”, giving it an 
independent status, although owned by the county (not too different from what Labour did 
in England in the 2000s with ‘Foundation Trusts’). From 1994-1998, the Social Democrats 
were in power in Stockholm, but St. Görans kept its status as a public company. When the 
moderates return to power in 1998, planning for selling the hospital picked up pace  and in 
May 1999 St. Görans hospital was sold to Bure Hälsa och Sjukvård AB. Bure Hälsa och 
Sjukvård AB was a subdivision of Investment AB Bure, a company which was founded on 
money from employee-funds. The employee-funds were created in 1984 to strengthen the 
employees’ influence over business through the collectively owned investment-funds, 
which, through company-taxation, raised large sums of capital between 1984 and 1990. 
When the centre-right government decided to shut down the employee-funds in 1992, the 
funds were to be channelled into the entrepreneurial sector, through risk capital funds. One 
of these was ‘Bure’, which was later to invest in the health care sector. In other words, 
through this peculiar chain of events, the capital which was originally collected to increase 
collective ownership of private businesses was now instead being used to privatise parts of 
the public health care sector.  
After St. Görans Hospitals was sold a debate on privatisation arose again. 
The Social Democrats were against the idea, the Social Minister, Lars Engqvist, who was 
also responsible for health care, stated that “The Government has reacted strongly and 
negatively to the development towards viewing ill people at the hospitals as some form of 
business […] it is a systemic change of Swedish health care, which the government will 
work against […] therefore we are now considering to change the law so that private for-
profit companies cannot run hospitals” (Riksdagsdebate, 4th November, 1999, authors 
translation). In the years to come, Bure developed rapidly into a multinational company, 
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which by 2004 changed its name to Capio AB and today is a part of a multinational 
investment fund.126  
The sale of St.Görans resulted in much critique. The hospital was sold for 
250 mill. Swedish Crowns in 1999. Since 2003 Capio has made yearly profits higher than 
the total buying sum, and the company has a turnover of around 1,5 billion Swedish 
Crowns. Furthermore, the auditor of reports has criticised how the hospital was sold 
without any other offers given – Stockholm County had not followed the law on public 
tenders. In reports in 2002 and 2005 auditors criticised the fact that Capio had terms which 
other care service providers did not have – for example a guaranteed volume of patients. 
Further, the contract with Capio is supposed to be re-negotiated in 2012, but can be 
extended to 2017. However, should the county decide not to renew, the region has to pay 
compensation of 275 mill. Swedish Crowns – a sum higher than the original sales prices 
(Rognerud, 2009a). In other words, the private partner carried very few risks in the deal. 
Despite the fact that St. Görans Hospital in Stockholm makes up a very small 
part of the total Swedish health care system, it had an important symbolic value. In the 
early 2000s the debate led to the passage of a national law temporarily prohibiting (until the 
end of 2002) the sale of public hospitals to for-profit companies (Socialdepartementet, 
2000).  A governmental commission (Profit or Not-for-Profit in the Swedish Health 
System) was established by the Social Democratic government to review the question of 
private health care in Sweden. In 2002 the commission published its report. The report was 
to inspire debate around the question of how to reform health care and – as the title signals 
– whether Swedish health care should be for profit or non-profit or how private profit-
making businesses would and would not be able to participate in publicly financed health 
care and social services. In its final report, the commission proposed that contracting out 
the management of an existing county hospital to a private firm should be permitted only if 
the contractor agrees to run the activities solely with public funding (e.g., with no private 
patients or funding). The commission also suggested that contracting out of university 
hospitals should be prohibited (SOU, 2003). In February 2004, the government proposed a 
permanent ban, called the Stop Law, preventing for-profit private companies from either 
managing county-owned hospitals or accepting publicly funded patients within their private 
hospitals. The report was important for the social democrats, because it laid the foundation 
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 From 2006 onwards Capio has been owned by several hedge funds: Apax Partners Worldwide, Nordic 
Capital Fund VI and Apax France. 
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for their position on private vs. public health care: health care, in particularly secondary 
care, should be run by the public sector and there should be a clear division between the 
private and the public sector. Private hospitals were allowed to exist, but if they received 
public money, they should not be allowed to work for private money as well. This rule was 
included so as to make sure that there was a clear distinction between the public and the 
private health care. The debate on the stop-law revealed important political dilemmas for 
the social democratic party. While the law was designed by Social Democrats at the 
national level, it was at the same time criticised intensely by leading social democrats in the 
Counties, who argued that the anti-privatisation stand had no relevance to a modern health 
care system. Further, major Unions in health care (Vårdforbundet and Kommunal) 
criticised the proposal for cementing the public monopoly, while the health care sector 
could benefit from a plurality of providers (Karvik, 2004). The Stop Law was largely a 
symbolic manifestation of the social democratic party. The law did not stop any ongoing 
process of selling public hospitals and after the ban was removed in 2006, no hospitals 
have been transferred to the private sector.  
While the national level Social Democrats are reluctant to privatisation in 
health care, they accept it. The only health care reform concerning private providers which 
the social democrats have rolled back has been the Family doctor reform in 1994. The bulk 
of changes towards private provision of health care has been accepted on the national level 
or even initiated by Social Democrats at the country level. But the party remains sceptical, 
very much so in political rhetoric – the aim of free and equal access must not be breached.  
 
4.11 Waiting: still an issue 
At the beginning of the 2000s there were several reports suggesting that 
access to health care was a major concern among Swedes when it came to the health care 
system (which meant shorter waiting lists, physical or phone access to primary doctor). In 
2002 queues were the largest single problem in the health care system, according to 35 % 
of the Swedish citizens (Socialstyrelsen, 2003, figure 11.) The “Doctors Report 2003” from 
The National Board of Health and Welfare also focuses on the problem of access to and 
satisfaction with the health care system: 
 
Seven out of ten Swedes believe they have the access to health care they need 
[…] Shorter waiting times and shorter waiting queues  is what the population 
considers to be the most important question. The group [of Swedes], which 
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believe this has increased between 2002 and 2003. The great problems of 
access in primary care is still to get through on the phone to a health care 
centre. Out of the persons who wanted to see a doctor at the health care 
centre, a little more than half could see the doctor the same day, while 8 out 
of 10 saw the doctor within a week. Waiting times in 2003 were equal to 
those in 2002. Out of the patients who were sent on to hospital treatment, 
more than 70% were treated within 3 months, but waiting times differ 
substantially depending on the medical speciality needed. Shortest waiting 
times are found heart-operations […]  while the longest waiting times are for 
operations of knees and hips and preparations for hearing-aids, where more 
than half of the patients wait more than three months (Socialstyrelsen, 2003, 
p. 8)      
 
 
In other words, despite several almost 15 years of attempts aimed at driving down waiting 
lists the problem remains. As discussed in the British chapter, waiting lists are difficult to 
fight. In the Swedish case, the decentralised nature of the system may add another 
problem, as one Swedish health care analyst points out:  
 
…it has been worthwhile for the counties and the hospitals to have waiting 
lists. Every time the national government has initiated programs to shorten 
waiting lists, the regions and the hospitals have asked for more money and 
they have got it (Interview with author, 31st march 2009). 
 
The attempts to bring down waiting lists in the 1990s and early 2000s did not have any 
durable effects. Once the extra money from the state to buy extra capacity at the regional 
level had been spent, then queues started growing again – an effect known from England 
as well. Problem pressure persists, however. In 2005 a new extended health guarantee was 
issued (vårdgarantin), offering treatment for patients within 90 days after diagnosis. The 
counties received 1,95 billion Swedish Crown in 2005 (and 1,75 billion in succeeding years) 
to fulfil the plan (Socialstyrelsen, 2006). In 2008, waiting lists for operations had only been 
shortened marginally and waiting for doctors visits had increased (Socialstyrelsen, 2008). By 
2009 yet a new ‘health care guarantee’ was issued by the Swedish government. Waiting time 
and access to health care continues to be a salient issue. Many attempts have been made to 
find solutions to these problems, but so far none of these solutions have been successful.  
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4.12 The scale and scope of private health care in Sweden 
The rapid rise in public health care expenditure in the 1970s had given 
Sweden one of the world’s highest levels of public expenditure in health care by the end of 
the decade. As the fiscal crisis put pressure on the Swedish economy, several budget 
constraints were put in place to reduce spending at the regional level. This brought down 
the public expenditure on health care quite significantly between 1977 and 1990 as 
illustrated in figure 4.1, above. There were debates over whether these reductions would 
push citizens to purchase health care privately. From 1990 onwards Sweden saw a rather 
remarkable increase in private expenditure on health care. The private share of health care 
expenditure rose from 10,1 % in 1990 to 18,3% in 2006, but importantly these figures 
cover many types of expenditure127 (OECD data does not allow for more detailed figures). 
Policy makers viewed the rise in private expenditure with some scepticism and fear. In 
particular the Social Democrats feared that if they did not deal with the problems in health 
care, the Swedes might begin to opt out of the universal model and seek private solutions. 
As one central policy maker commented:  
 
we [in the social democratic party] were very aware of the problems in the 
public health care system. In particular in some parts of the party there were 
fears that if we did not handle the issues then people might turn to other 
solutions. If central parts of the Swedish population lost confidence in the 
public system, then it could collapse as a model. That was the fear. (Policy 
adviser to the social democrats, 1998-2005, interview with author, april 2009)  
 
At the same time, the private health care business sector was growing 
because Counties where increasingly purchasing health care services in the private sector, 
despite the somewhat critical stance to privatisation on the national level, where the Social 
Democrats were in power in between 1994-2006. However, by the beginning of the 2000s 
the Social Democrats had accepted that involving private actors could serve the purpose of 
meeting the demands of the Swedes. And the party had internally become less sceptical of 
private providers, because they promised to deliver services at lower costs. There was a 
rising awareness that for a public sector system to work, satisfied patients were not enough 
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 The OECD defines private health care spending as: private sources of funds include out-of-pocket 
payments (both over-the-counter and cost-sharing), private insurance programmes, charities and 
occupational health care. (OECD, health care Database 2008). 
 223 
(in general patients-satisfaction surveys were showing good results), you also needed happy 
citizens – therefore the waiting time had to be brought down, because it represented an 
inadequacy of the public system. 
In the period from 1994-2004 the private health care sector kept growing, 
indeed rather quickly. The number of private health care firms128 has increased from 5 000 
to 12 600 between 1993 and 2004. Most enterprises are very small and employ up to ten 
people. In 2004 the private owned enterprises in the Swedish health care sector employed 
over 104.000 people, compared to 41.000 in 1993. The major increase in the number of 
employed has taken place among firms who produce services for elderly, disabled 
individuals and addicts. The overall turnover among the private enterprises amounted to 50 
billion Swedish Crowns in 2004, which is more than twice the turnover in 1997 (Nutek, 
2007). This development took place due to the decentralised nature of Swedish health care. 
Each county decides for itself how to deliver health and care services to the Swedes and an 
increasing number of counties offer choice between different providers, both public and 
private. And the counties had long been open to try out different solutions to welfare 
service delivery.  
Most of the private business are small (Nutek, 2007, table 4.4). But over the 
past decades the role of large private health care corporations has increased. In 1993 large 
businesses employed 28 percent of private employees in the private health and care-sector. 
In 2004, the share had grown to 40%. When it comes to revenues there is also a 
concentration of larger companies; in 1993 large companies accounted for 30% of the 
revenues in the private health care sector, which had risen to 36% in 2004. When we take a 
closer look at the private health care sector in Sweden two elements are significant. The 
first is that the private primary care sector is the one that has seen the most notable 
increase in the past decade, while the private secondary care sector is small, although 
growing. The second element is that there are huge regional variations in the levels of 
privatisation between the different counties in Sweden.  
The rise of the private primary care sector is mainly policy-driven at the 
regional level. It rises because counties allow for private businesses to grow in primary care 
to different degrees. Figure 4.2 below shows the aggregate purchasing of different types of 
private health care in Sweden from 2001-2007 (data before 2001 is not available). While 
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 These figures cover the health care sector broadly, which includes care for elderly, handicapped, 
primary care, rehabilitation and other areas, but does not include doctors. The figures cannot be compared 
to the figures presented in the Danish or English Chapter. 
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counties pay for an increasing amount of primary care delivered by private providers, the 
level of secondary care is somewhat stable between 2001 and 2007 (figure 4.2).  
  
Figure 4.2: Swedish Counties’ Purchasing of health care from private companies 
 
 
Despite the relatively stable level of outsourcing of specialised care, there is an increase in 
the amount of private hospital beds in Sweden, as shown in table 4.3, although the private 
sector plays a small role in the Swedish health care system. 
 
Table 4.3: Hospital beds*, public and private, development from 2001-2009 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
% change 
2001-2007 
Public 28813 27267 26516 26070 25545 25343 25280 -12 % 
Private** 309 658 816 1018 934 880 916 +198% 
Private in pct of total 1,1 2,4 3,0 3,8 3,5 3,4 3,5 
+2,4 (%-
points) 
Source: Authors' making on the basis of SKL: "Statistics on health care and regional development", annual 
reports from 2001-2007, Activity Data. Available from www.skl.se. Accessed on the 22nd of june 2009. 
* Hospital beds include beds in both specialised somatic care and psyciatric care. More than 90% of private 
beds are in specialised somatic care 
** These figures only include private hospitals which are on contract with the counties. 
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Despite the fact that no public hospitals have been sold to private enterprises since St. 
Göran in Stockholm, the private sector hospitals play an increasingly important role in 
secondary because counties contract with private hospitals to deliver either certain types of 
services or to be able to use the capacity in the private sector, when there is pressure on the 
public sector hospitals. While St. Göran was the only private hospital working with the 
counties in 2001, in 2007 there are 20 private hospitals or clinics delivering services and 
hospital beds to the counties129 
Due to the decentralised nature of Swedish health care, the aggregate figures 
cover wide regional differences in privatisation in Swedish health care. While some counties 
buy very little primary care from private provider, others purchase between 30 and 40% of 
primary care from private providers. These large differences do not only reflect ideological 
differences between counties, it also reflects geographical and demographical differences. 
Some regions are scarcely populated, and in these regions planning is needed in order to 
ensure that doctors are available even in remote places – these regions often rely more on 
public primary care. In bigger cities, like Stockholm and Malmö, the level of private 
providers is much higher.   
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 These hospitals and clinics were, number of beds in (…):  S.t Görans sjukhus AB (251), Ersta sjukhus 
(117), Sophiahemmet (40), Brommageriatriken AB (120), Nackageriatriken AB (66), Stockholms 
sjukhem (55), Elisabethsjukhuset, Carema Närvård AB (Simrishamn), Reumatikersjukhuset Spenshult, 
Lundby sjukhus AB (11), Nordhem (15), Carlanderska sjukhuset (22), Kristinehamns sjukhus (20), Säffle 
sjukhus (19), Läkargruppen AB., Strömbacka Rehab AB (12), Selfhelp Gävleborg AB (17), Forsa Rehab 
Hudiksvall (3), Rosengård i Sandviken (5), Axlagården. Source: SKL, 2008: Statistics on health care and 
regional development 2007. Activity data, table 31. Available on www.skl.se. Accessed on 22nd of june 
2009 
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Table 4.4: Counties purchasing of services from private companies 2007. In 
percentages of total net cost (excl. Medicine) 
Medical field 
Primary 
Health care 
Specialised 
somatic 
care 
Specialised 
Psychiatric 
care 
Other 
health care 
services 
Total Health 
care (excl. 
dentists) 
Stockholm 40,4 16,3 11,4 19,0 20,5 
Uppsala  10,0 5,4 1,5 0,8 5,4 
Sörmland 15,5 2,5 6,3 0,7 5,2 
Östergötland 13,5 3,3 10,4 0,1 5,6 
Jönköping 7,0 1,2 2,6 7,2 3,2 
Kronoberg 15,4 2,4 2,8 1,1 4,6 
Kalmar 9,1 1,0 4,6 1,0 2,9 
Blekinge 7,5 0,2 3,9 0,0 2,0 
Skåne 25,8 4,5 10,7 12,8 9,3 
Halland 31,7 4,2 0,8 0,7 9,3 
Västra Götaland 18,2 4,7 2,5 3,5 6,9 
Värmland 19,5 3,6 4,4 0,0 6,2 
Örebro 16,1 2,9 2,1 0,6 4,8 
Västmanland 43,5 2,9 3,8 5,6 10,3 
Dalarna 4,9 1,1 4,6 1,7 2,3 
Gävleborg 14,2 3,7 7,4 0,0 6,2 
Västernorrland 16,1 2,3 3,3 0,0 5,1 
Jämtland  10,1 1,4 0,5 0,3 3,2 
Västerbotten 17,2 0,5 2,4 0,0 3,7 
Norrbotten 9,2 1,3 1,3 0,1 3,0 
Total 22,3 6,1 6,4 7,0 9,3 
Source: Adapted from SKL, 2008: Statistics on health care and regional development 2007. Economic 
data, table E 31. Available on www.skl.se. Accessed on 22nd of june 2009 
 
 
While the larger cities can let private providers operate on market-like terms 
and still ensure that all citizens have access to a doctor, this can be much more difficult in 
rural areas, where – if the market was to decide – there would mainly be doctors in the 
cities because running primary care in thinly populated areas would be less profitable. The 
counties are obliged to secure that health care is available to all citizens, even in remote 
areas – and therefore some counties rely on public provision, where they retain full control. 
To sum up: at the beginning of the 1980s almost no Swedes consulted 
private doctors. In 2007 more than 31% did. In 2007 all 21 counties had outsourced some 
health care services to private providers (SOU, 2007) and several private hospitals were 
delivering services to counties. This rather large change is not the effect of national 
legislation, as was very much the case in England and Denmark. Rather it arose from 
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below, at the regional level, due to the decentralised nature of Swedish health care, where 
counties since the 1980s have experimented with different models of providing health care.  
 
4.10 What of unions and the privatisation in health care? 
“Let the market take over health care!" declared a 1997 headline in Dagens 
Nyheter, the largest daily newspaper in Sweden. Surprisingly, this quote did not come from 
an economist or a right-wing think tank, but from the chair-woman of Sweden’s National 
Union of Nurses, Eva Fernvall (Dagens Nyheter, Nov. 25th, 1997). The majority of her 
union’s 120,000 members backed her ideas of ‘health care pluralism’. Unions have 
traditionally played a hugely important role in Swedish politics. Throughout history they 
have been closely linked to the Social Democratic party, which has been in government for 
the bulk of the past 60 years. As already discussed earlier, doctors were the prime 
opponents to the universal tax-financed health-care system, but they were unsuccessful in 
blocking it (P. Blomqvist & Rothstein, 2005; Immergut, 1992). As in other countries, the 
main problem was the doctors’ employment-terms and their ability to work privately, 
which provoked resistance among doctors. In the 1990’s and 2000’s the medical profession 
are still arguing for more freedom and the right to work privately. In the early reforms of 
the 1990’s the Swedish Medical Association played a part in the restructuring of health care. 
In 1991, the union presented two papers. The first was entitled ‘A New Primary Health 
Care,’ and recommended the implementation of a new system of family doctors. That 
paper laid the foundation for the family doctor reform, discussed above. The second paper 
describes how a purchaser-provider split can help facilitate the entry of private players into 
the health care market. Doctors favoured the market reforms and the possibility for private 
business. The doctors repeated their support for free choice, market competition and the 
right to free establishment of medical businesses in the 2000’s (Sveriges Läkarförbund, 
2004, 2009). 
The Swedish Medical Association (Doctors), The Swedish Association of 
health professionals (Nurses) and The Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union (which organise 
other health care staff) are all in favour of the privatisation reforms. The largest union in 
Sweden, Kommunal has 600,000 members, 80 percent of whom are women; most of its 
members work in the healthcare sector. They include cleaning staff and ambulance drivers, 
with less medical education than the nurses. They work in hospitals and for municipalities, 
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taking care of the elderly. Kommunal has discovered that their members who work for 
private caregivers enjoy good working conditions and higher salaries. 
All three unions favour a health care system which is publicly financed, but in 
which private provision is a possibility. In this regard, curiously, the three unions share the 
views of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise regarding competition in the health care 
sector. Both Employers and Unions agree that the private sector offers a more stimulating 
work environment, in which their members enjoy a high degree of participation in both 
daily work and the decision-making process. The most important reason for the health care 
staff supporting privatisation, however, is to strengthen themselves on the labour market 
(and get better conditions and higher salaries), which could only be obtained with a 
plurality of employers. As stated by a senior official from the Swedish Medical Association:  
 
There are 21 regions, who are employers of doctors. But in reality it is a 
Cartel. They meet once a month to agree on salaries and working conditions, 
so in reality there is only one employer. With a plurality of employers, 
doctors would have better conditions and would also have the possibility of 
setting up their own business. (Senior official, Swedish Medical Association, 
interview with author, April 2009) 
 
The unions, however, also fear the workings of the market and fear that it might break 
down the basic idea of free and equal access to health care in Sweden. Therefore, unions 
stress that funding must be public and health care should not be delivered for profit. The 
main objective should be that stated in the Swedish Health Care Act: “good health care for 
all, and all treated equally.” A publicly financed health care system, not private insurance, is 
the best way to achieve this objective, according to the Swedish Medical Association. The 
hope for better conditions for health care staff in a more privatised health care market 
depends on supply and demand. If demand for health care labour is higher than supply, 
then the doctors will be able to play employers out against each other and gain. That is 
exactly the situation the situation in Sweden; there is a need for more doctors than the 
country has. In the 2000’s the Unions see privatisation as a way of getting the best 
conditions for their members. 
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4.11 Private health insurance in Sweden 
Long queues in the public health care sector are often good news for the 
private health care sector, because it is one of the factors that may enhance the insurance 
business. Although the question of privately financed health care is a non-topic in Swedish 
health, and there are no economic incentives (as for example tax breaks in Denmark in the 
2000s and England in the 1980’s) the last decades have seen a remarkable rise in private 
health care insurance. In 1985 the international insurance consortium and largest insurance 
company in Sweden, Skandia, began offering private executive health insurance. This has 
been purchased both by large Swedish corporations and smaller family businesses for top 
executives. Sophiahemmet (a nonprofit private hospital in Stockholm) was the cooperating 
hospital. By 1986, 4,500 individuals were covered by this insurance (Rosenthal, 1986). 
Skandia originally thought that only large corporations would be interested in purchasing 
the insurance for their key executives. However, in the 1980’s 80 percent of the purchases 
were from small and middle-sized companies. (Rosenthal, 1986) In 1990, 23,000 people 
had private health insurance. That number had increased to 115,000 by 2000 (SOU 
2001:79), to 359.000 in 2007 and by 2009 it is estimated that around 380.000 Swedes hold 
private health insurance.  
 
Figure 4.3: Private Health Insurance, Sweden, 2000-2007 (no. of persons insured) 
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Source:Sjukvårdsförsäkring statistik 2000-2007, data provided by Försäkringsförbundet. The data coveres both privately paid insurances 
(16% in 2007) and insurances paid by employers (84% in 2007). 
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It is estimated that the private insurance companies receives premiums of 
around 1,5 billion Swedish crowns. Altogether that is less than one percent of the Swedish 
health care expenditure and marginal to the system as such. Most have private insurance, 
paid for by their employers (Noren, 2009). What the private insurance offers is not better 
quality of care (most of the doctors involved in private schemes hold full-time positions in 
the public health care system) (Hort & Cohn, 1995; Rosenthal, 1986) – but rather shorter 
wait-times.  
Private companies offer insurance for key personnel, who are often well 
educated, well paid middle-aged people. Insurance holders are guaranteed quick treatment 
in private hospitals whenever they need it. If they get ill and it’s acute, they will be treated 
within the public system immediately, but if they need elective surgery, they have the 
option to get treatment from private caregivers who are unavailable to those in the public 
waiting line. The public debate has focused mostly on the possible problem of queue 
jumping. The question of private health insurance is one that provokes negative reactions, 
almost everywhere in the Swedish political making system – even the Swedish Employers 
(Svensk Näringsliv and Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen) are sceptical towards the 
development (also because incurres cost on the employers), which indicates how 
profoundly the support for the universal health care system is. The rise in private insurance 
is considered to be the most fundamental threat to the public health case system – and 
more broadly, the Universal welfare model, a stance very similar to what was seen among 
the social democrats in Denmark and Labour in England. In Sweden, the notion of equality 
is particularly strong and conflicts with the first paragraph in Swedish health care law, 
starting that “everyone must have access to health care on equal terms”. Private insurance 
gives some people more access than others. The insurance is not available to all (individuals 
over 67 years of age cannot purchase the insurance) and price depends on age and medical 
condition (most often, people are only eligible if they are healthy at the time of purchase). 
No insurance companies produce health care, instead they contract with private health 
clinics and hospitals. After a change in government in 2006 to a centre-right coalition, the 
former mentioned stop-law was substituted with the start-law, which allowed private hospitals 
to contract with the public and the private sector (Regeringens Proposition 2006/07:52, 
2006). 
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From a political point of view the rise in private health care insurance is not 
obvious. While the Social Democrats have accepted that choice is important in health care, 
they insist that financing should be public, as they state in the party program from 2001: 
“We cannot accept the development towards increasing private insurances on welfare 
areas” (SAP, 2001, p. 20). However, the right-wing parties and the Swedish Employers 
Organisations, also insist that financing of health care should be public. There are no 
political organisations supporting private financing of health care. In both England and 
Denmark there were public policies encouraging the up-take of private insurance (through 
tax-policy), but this is not the case in Sweden. Yet, Swedish citizens increasingly purchase 
private health insurance. To be sure, fewer Swedes are covered by private health insurance 
than Danes and Britons. Yet, this indicates that the rise in private health insurance in these 
countries, which all have universal public health systems, is not the result of tax-incentives, 
rather it is the result of rising wealth, declining trust in public health care and a wish among 
citizens to have faster access to health care services. 
The rise in private health insurance also results in private sector activity. In 
2008 a new private child-hospital, called Martina, opened in Stockholm. This hospital is 
fully private with access only to those who hold private insurance or pay by themselves. 
Once again the debate over private health care rose over the development towards a 
privatised insurance-financed health care system. This new private hospital is not the direct 
result of public policy – rather a group of investors saw a business opportunity. 
Nevertheless the consequences of this development is clear for the county politicians, as 
one Social Democratic member of Stockholm’s County council states: “People who buy 
private health insurance will ask themselves whether it makes sense to pay high county 
taxes. In the long run, this means a two-tier health care system. We have seen it in other 
countries and it is a dangerous development. The only thing the county council can do to 
avoid the development is to offer a sufficiently good health care system” (authors 
translation) (cf. I. Andersen, 2008). In others words, if the universal health care system is to 
survive, it must improve – it must adapt. 
The rise in private health insurance in Sweden is not policy driven. Rather it 
rises, because companies decide to offer private health insurance as a part of the pay-
package, similarly to the Danish case, but without the tax-incentives.  Employers may be 
persuaded by health insurance for their employees for economic reasons, namely that in the 
case of illness, insurance-holders will receive fast treatment and can return quickly to their 
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jobs. However, there is no evidence of this. Further, observers also argue that the debate 
around long waiting times in the public Swedish system also contribute to the popularity of 
private health insurance.  This development seems driven partly by rising affluence in 
Sweden in the 2000s, but its popularity among insurance-holders is likely to have a 
connections to the debate about waiting times and problems of access in the public 
Swedish health care system. The private insurance holders are offered free choice of when 
to be treated and more coherent treatment.130 
 
4.12 Citizens’ views on health care 
Over the past decades voters have increasingly considered health care to be 
an important topic. In the regular elections survey, Swedes increasingly think that health 
care is one of the most important issues to be dealt with (table 4.5). If we look closer at the 
problems of the health care system, citizens’ satisfaction with access to health care has note 
improved significantly over the past decade (tables 4.6). According to the respondents I 
have interviewed this is the result of the changes in the health care sector: Swedes are 
satisfied with the ability to choose between providers and find it a positive that private 
providers compete with public one to provide services. Further, the shift towards per case 
payment also gives health care producers incentives to produce more visits in the primary 
sector, and gives providers incentives to offer better service, for example shorter waiting 
times. 
Table 4.5: Voters’ agenda, Sweden, 1979-2006. 
 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 % point-
change, 
1979-2006 
Employment 18 29 25 5 23 41 34 7 35 +17 
Welfare/healthcare 4 12 19 15 22 21 28 36 32 +28 
Education 6 3 3 2 4 6 20 29 24 +18 
Taxes 17 8 20 19 18 13 15 15 14 -3 
Pensions/elderly 
care 
5 8 8 9 20 9 17 20 21 +16 
Source: Selected issues from (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2008, table 3.4). The figures show the number of 
respondents who answered that these issues were most important for them and their party choice in the 
election. 
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 In Sweden much critique of the public system connects to the fact that often people with complicated 
diagnoses need several examinations, which implies being on several waiting lists for specialists. The 
private sector offers a coordinated examination with little or no waiting time. 
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These aggregate survey figures in table 4.6 cover rather large regional differences. Again, 
however, there does not seem to be a clear connection between levels of private provision 
and levels of satisfaction. For example the County of Skåne has a relatively high level of 
private provision, but is one of the regions in which only 75% of citizens agree that they 
have access to health care they need. 
 
Table 4.6: Survey: Are waiting times acceptable? Answers in pct. Sweden, 2001-2008, 
Primary Care 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Change %-
points, 2001-2008 
Yes 72 71 73 75 77 78 79 85 +12 
No 25 27 26 24 22 21 20 15 -10 
No Answer 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 -2 
 
Survey: Do I have access to the Health Care I need? (%) Sweden 2001-2008 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Change 
%-
points 
2001-
2008 
Agree 70 69 69 69 73 74 75 77 +7 
Neither agree or disagree 17 17 17 17 14 14 14 13 -3 
Disagree 10 11 12 12 11 9 9 8 -2 
No answer 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 +1 
Source: Vårdbarometeret, 2008, Sveriges Kommuner og Landsting. Available at www.skl.se. 
 
On the other hand, Halland, which also purchases a lot of private health care, 
also has only 85% of satisfied patients. Kalmar, which relies mainly on public provision, 
however, has got some of the most satisfied citizens with regards to access. (SKL, 2008).  
However, another survey focuses more directly on comparing satisfaction between private 
and public primary care and indicates that the Swedes are consistently more satisfied with 
the private providers than with the public ones.  
 
Table 4.7: Satisfaction with primary care, Sweden, 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Private 
providers 
76 72 73 69 74 72 
Public Providers 69 64 66 63 65 62 
Source: Svensk Kvalitetsindex, 2004 (Swedish Quality Index) adapted from (Socialstyrelsen, 2003). The 
index is built on a combination of peoples’ expectations and the experienced quality. 
 
 234 
One the reasons suggested for this difference is that citizens themselves have chosen their 
private doctor, patients are sure to see the doctor they have chosen and are able to get in 
touch with that doctor. The private doctors offer more personalised environment and 
waiting time is shorter (Socialstyrelsen, 2003) 
Despite the fact that the surveys reveal increased satisfaction with access, it is 
hard to disentangle the factors behind this. It is most likely that the level of resources also 
played a role in the negative perceptions of health care during the 1990s. Where Sweden 
had cut down health care expenditures from 9,2% of GDP to 8,2% between 1982-1992, 
the number had slowly been increasing and in 2006 Sweden once again spent 9,2% of GDP 
on health care.  Just as we saw in the Danish and the England case, the governments show 
improvements on waiting times and access to health care – however, in all cases it has been 
combined with significant rises in health care expenditure.  
 The 2000s saw a change in the Social Democratic approach to private 
providers. While the Social Democrats had been fighting the idea of for-profit providers in 
health care, from the beginning of the 2000s the party was becoming more pragmatic, as 
stated by a senior political adviser to the Social Democratic government in the 2005: 
 
Around 2005 we came to a point where we thought: The state should not sell 
assets, such as hospitals. And university hospitals should remain public. But 
apart from that, all primary and secondary care could be delivered by private 
entrepreneurs in competitive tenders. We came to that conclusion for one 
main reason; we realised that if we wanted to maintain a universal, tax-
finances health care system, it was not enough to have satisfied patients, we 
also needed satisfied citizens. That is the precondition for the support of the 
public health care system. Therefore queues had to be made shorter and 
access to health care better. Private provision in primary care had already 
shown to be effective in that regard. And when we look back today [2009], 
had private provision not been introduced, the primary care sector would be 
a disaster (interview with the author, April 2009, authors translation)  
 
 
The question of private provision in health care was becoming less ideological; the Social 
Democratic approach to privatisation had become one of pragmatism – if it works, and 
serves the purposes of increasing accessibility and more satisfied citizens – then we can do 
it. In other words, if private provision is a viable solution to some identified problems, then 
we may give it a try.  What remains paramount in the late 2000s for the social democrats, 
but also for most other central Swedish policy actors, is that no VIP-access can be given to 
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the public health care system – equality in access is a fundamental principle which must be 
up-held. 
Although private solutions were developed first at the regional level, there is 
still a concern with waiting lists in national politics. The Swedes are not satisfied with their 
health care system. In 2006 a rightwing government won the national election. One of the 
election pledges was to remove the stop-law, which was duly done on 1 July 2007. Another 
one was to re-install a national choice-law. This time, however, it seemed largely 
uncontroversial, as counties already offer choice in health care and there is broad political 
support to choice in Sweden. In 2009, this right-wing government issued another waiting 
time guarantee (propositionen 2009/10:67). In other words, problems keep being on the 
political agenda and policy makers continue to puzzle out solutions for these problems. 
The health care system is continuously adapted to changing circumstances. One of the 
these circumstances is ‘the national mood’ or the satisfactions of the Swedish citizens. For 
decades it has been sceptical towards the country’s health care system, although some 
improvements in satisfactions level seem to be growing, as accessibility is growing. 
 
4.13 How the rise of the private sector affected the public sector 
As in the cases of Denmark and England in relation to the introduction of 
private sector provision, most evidence suggests that the public health care sector in 
Sweden has changed quite dramatically over the past decades. As far back as in the mid-
1980s, when the first experiments with private provision started, positive impacts on the 
public systems were already noticed, in terms of rising productivity and more focus on 
responsiveness (Saltman & Otter, 1992). Respondents in this study also indicated that the 
patient choice and DRG-payment systems do affect the public health care sector towards 
being more responsive to patients and that they organise services differently. Hospitals, 
which increasingly rely on activity based financing, must adapt to attract patients to sustain 
budget levels. Again, there are large regional differences (Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions, 2008). In particular in larger cities choice between providers have 
had an impact, where the payment systems are constructed in ways for doctors to attract 
patients and increase productivity (high fee-for-service, low capitation), also public health 
care centres must compete for “customers”. Yet, a study by Anell concludes that 
improvements in medical outcomes have certainly been made in health care outcome in 
Sweden in the past 20 years. However, these outcomes are more affected by changes in 
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welfare and general living conditions together with advances in medical technology, than by 
the marketisation reforms done at both the national and regional levels (A. Anell, 2005). 
This may very well be the case, and as I have argued here, privatisation and market reforms 
have not aimed at improving the survival rate of patients, but rather at addressing problems 
of responsiveness among patients. With regard to this aim, the economic incentives 
structure has also made public hospitals increase production. 
 
4.14 Conclusion 
While Sweden remains an overwhelmingly public system when compared 
with most other countries, it is important as an example for this very reason. Even in the 
most “socialist” of advanced capitalist welfare states, the direction of change is clearly 
towards privatisation. Both the British and Swedish cases are good examples of how the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split into national health systems has led to an 
increase in private provision. In Britain, a substantial increase in the use of the private 
sector by National Health Service purchasers is particularly benefiting foreign health care 
companies based in Europe and the United States. Private provision in Sweden had been 
effectively eliminated by the 1969 reform, which saw the number of privately employed 
doctors go down from 25 percent in 1970 to 5 percent in the mid-1980s. However, 
decentralization to the county councils in the 1990s, followed by the introduction of quasi-
markets, meant that by 2007 all counties had private providers, with these accounting for 
around 25 percent of all patient visits in 2007. The share of privately employed health care 
staff increased from 4.8 percent in 1993 to 7.2 percent in 2000. The largest proportion of 
private providers is to be found in the larger cities, where their share of total provision is 
about 15 percent. Almost all the increase in private provision during the 1990s and 2000s 
was accounted for by for-profit providers (Nutek, 2007). 
However, when considering how the private sector rose in Swedish health it 
striking that not much of it has been driven by national legislation, as we saw in Denmark 
and England. Instead, because of the decentral nature of the Swedish welfare model, the 
Regions, at the local level, have been the drivers in the privatisation of health care delivery 
– as such it has been a process of privatisation from below. Counties slowly started 
experimenting with new models of service provision in the 1980s to solve economic 
problems, but also to address some of the critique of the old “one size fits all” bureaucratic 
state-monopoly model. Thus, these policies and experiments can be viewed as adaptations 
 237 
to a changing context. Over the past decades there has been both right and left wing 
governments in Sweden, just as there have been shifts in the political compositions of the 
regional political bodies. Nevertheless, the direction towards choice and private providers 
in health care seems somewhat unaffected by these changes in political leadership in 
particular at the county level. At the county level this may be less surprising, since it is often 
noted that at the local levels of government party politics play a minor role, rather “what 
counts is what works.” I have argued in this chapter, that the introduction of private 
provision, in both primary and secondary health care in Sweden is the result of counties 
aiming to address the problems in the traditional public health care system. As such, 
Sweden’s privatisation in health care has come from below. Addressing these problems has 
been politically important in order to maintain the Swedes’ trust in public health care and 
more broadly in the universal welfare model. Health care remains a salient political issue at 
the national level and, as this chapter has shown, national politicians are sometimes 
introducing cost-containment and other times ‘waiting guarantees’ and choice, 
demonstrating the tension between local pluralism and national coordination (Garpenby, 
1995). Whether these policies will be successful the future will show. As of 2010, waiting 
time for primary care was stabile since 2006 (not reduced), while waiting in secondary care 
showed slight improvements (Socialstyrelsen, 2010). 
On the other hand, the introduction of choice and private providers also 
involves a set of dilemmas. One of them is that cost-control remains essential and the more 
freedom of choice and private provision is introduced, the more difficult it becomes to 
control costs. The other problem is that equality is fundamental aim in the universal model. 
Within the choice paradigm it is well-know that more educated persons are more likely to 
make better choices, which may in effect create inequality in health care. Such tendencies 
are known in the larger cities where some doctors are known to refuse to work in certain 
areas of the city that are more socially/medically “heavy” than others. This had led to 
differentiated payment systems within Stockholm County to secure the supply of doctors 
in areas with many immigrants. Another dilemma is that while privatisation may make the 
citizens more satisfied with health care services, it also involves doctors making a profit 
from their business based on tax-money. These profits are sometimes as high as 50% (of 
the subsidies from the counties). This raises very critical voices in Sweden. Some of the 
private companies running private health facilities (e.g. Attendo, Capio, Aleris and Carema) 
are owned by international hedge funds, which systematically direct profits (made from tax-
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money) to tax-free countries such as Jersey or Luxembourg (Rognerud, 2009b), which 
again provokes the profound notion of non-profit public services, delivering services for 
the Swedish citizens. These examples show the dilemma between the wish for market 
solutions and the reluctance towards some of its built-in consequences (that some 
entrepreneurs make large profits). Furthermore, the rise of private health insurance is also a 
dilemma for the universal Swedish model, because it – more directly – invokes unequal 
access to the health care system.  
Although many parts of the welfare state are being questioned, the principle 
of universalism in health care has not been challenged in Sweden. The support among 
Swedes for public funding of health care still seems solid, although it is not unconditional. 
Support for the public health care system, and other welfare arrangements, depends on the 
actual functioning of the institutions – whether they can provide value for money for most 
persons, especially the middle class. If most people believe the quality of care they receive 
is strikingly inadequate compared with their tax burden, then support might erode – and 
politicians are very aware of this risk. As shown above no established interest in Sweden – 
neither political parties, employer organisations or unions – believe that this is a goal 
worthy of pursuit.  
Swedish policy makers must balance the ambition to restructure the welfare 
state with the various demands from much of the population. Values have shifted 
considerably in Sweden in the past twenty years, and most persons no longer accept 
“standardized public services.” In the 1980s the health care system was adapted by 
decentralising responsibility to counties. Later, these counties puzzled out and tested 
several marketisation models in the light of both cost constraints and citizens’ demands for 
more responsive services. Some were successful, but most were not, because most of initial 
market experiments in the 1990s did not bring the expected cut reductions (M. I. Harrison, 
2004; Twaddle, 1999). Counties continue to adapt their health care models both in the light 
of economic constraints and in the light of ‘the national mood’ on health care. But what is 
common in these adaptations is that private providers increasing play an active role, as 
shown in this chapter. 
The increased reliance on private actors indicates how ideas evolve over time. 
While the policy makers in the postwar decades (i.e the social democrats) had successfully 
nationalised the whole health care system, the 1990’s and 2000’s has re-introduced private 
providers. Over time, social democrats have realised that the traditional welfare state model 
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itself produced a set of problems, both of responsiveness and of ‘alienation’ towards the 
health care system. The Social Democrats launched several programmes to reduce waiting 
time; so far none of them have been successful. Another way in which the health care 
system is being adapted today is through pluralism and private providers. This idea has 
evolved over time in Sweden. The first response to the problems was decentralisation, 
second, experiments with markets and private providers. A third response has been to give 
patients free choice between private or public primary care doctors and allowing for private 
hospitals to deliver services to Swedish patients. Sweden even sold one of Stockholm’s best 
working public hospitals to an international hedge fund in order for private entrepreneurs 
to be more responsive to the Swedes. These policy ideas have evolved over time due to the 
continuing pressure from a changing context, where the electorate and their preferences 
and demands change towards the public health care system. Indeed, the adaptation process 
in Swedish health care has been one in which policy makers have developed policy 
solutions to problems which have themselves changed over time. 
I have argued in this chapter that this adaptation process has been driven by 
several factors. First, citizens are changing over time. The Swedes have become more 
demanding towards public sector services and improving medical technology re-inforces 
this demand. Swedes have also, as in Denmark and England, become less loyal to particular 
parties, which make parties more responsive to citizens’ agendas. While privatisation itself 
has not been on the agenda, private providers deliver much of what citizens want: 
personalised treatment, shorter waits, better access. Second, Unions, Employers, Counties 
and right wing parties pushed for a plurality of health care providers. Over time the Social 
Democrats took a more pragmatic approach to the questions of private actors and 
accepted that a more flexible system was demanded. All these policy makers want to see 
the universal model survive. The model’s survival depends on citizens’ support of the 
system. Therefore the health care systems must be adapted to meet citizens’ expectations 
of the system. Ideas over how to organise and solve problems in the health care sector 
evolved as the context changed. Ideas of decentralisation, marketisation, choice and private 
providers are policy responses to the critique of the traditional health care system. The 
debate about the necessity of saving the universal welfare state by responding to the varied 
demands among the population by introducing competition within the public sector, 
choice and private provision, will probably continue, as the Swedish health care system 
continues to adapt.   
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 Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Welfare State Adaptation 
 
The universal health care systems in Denmark, England and Sweden are 
increasingly being privatised. A common expectation in political science for this 
development would be that it is the result of right-wing politics. In short, these countries 
privatise health care systems because right-wing parties in government favour privatisation 
over public provision. Another common expectation would be that privatisation takes 
place due to financial pressures, stemming from external forces, such as globalisation or 
internally from the challenge of demographic changes or budget constraints. These 
pressures certainly are important for health care systems – and social policy more generally 
– across the industrialised world. But as seen in this study, privatisation does not involve a 
retreat of the state or result in less costly health care systems (See also Rothgang, et al., 
2008). I suggest that privatisation in Denmark, England and Sweden is the result of policy 
makers puzzling over solutions for problems of responsiveness inherent in the national 
public health care system. These problems grew salient as citizens also changed and 
demanded improved public services. As demonstrated in this analysis, several policies were 
tried out to meet these changing demands. Privatising elements of the health care system is 
the latest iteration of this policy development process, which was hoped to make health 
care services more responsive to users’ needs and expectations. It was a pragmatic solution, 
more than driven by ideology or cost-pressures. Privatisation policies are not aimed at 
breaking down the public health care system, but to improve it – or at least to improve 
citizens’ experiences and satisfaction with the national health care system. Although the 
changes in these health care systems are significant, all three countries still have universal 
health care systems securing equal access to citizens. As such, the privatisation trends can 
be considered adaptations to the original model as the context changes. Adapting welfare 
state services, such as health care, is crucial for political parties who seek to maintain the 
legitimacy of the universal welfare state model. This conclusion will sum up the findings 
and discuss their theoretical implications. 
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5.1 Why did governments increasingly privatise national health care systems? 
The health care systems analysed in this thesis have gone through different 
phases over time. They were constructed and consolidated in the 1950s-1970s. These were 
years of increased public expenditure on welfare services, often thought of as the “Golden 
Era” of the welfare state. Politically there was a consensus that health care should be 
expanded and in all three countries governments largely left health care policy in the hands 
of the medical professions. The development of health care in the “golden era” was driven 
both by increasing needs for health care, but even more so by technological advancements 
which made more treatments available. It was also a time when the predominant idea of 
how to solve societal problems in these countries was through state responsibility for both 
finance and production. This also concerned health care systems, which in all three cases 
became a state responsibility between 1948 and the early 1970s. There was not a single 
policy window; the process of building a national health care system was a historical 
process, involving several incremental steps. 
 When the economic crisis hit the western world in the 1970s the great 
expenditure increase in public services slowed down. The need for cost-control was not 
only a result of the economic crisis. In the 1970s policy makers and analysts had come to 
believe that the best way to understand health care financing was Wildavsky’s Law of 
Medical Money: “medical cost will rise to equal the sum of all private insurance and 
government subsidy”. In other words, the demand for health care spending is endless and 
health systems are not self-stabilizing (Wildavsky, 1977). In comparison to other European 
countries, Denmark, England and Sweden had one clear advantage of having a universal 
and national health system: cutting cost was (technically) easy, and could be done simply by 
capping public health budgets. Whereas other European countries relying on insurance 
principles could not simply cut health care costs, the public universal systems had this 
effective measure (Elias Mossialos & Grand, 1999). The flip side of capping budgets was 
that waiting lists started to rise. When doctors were to make medical priorities under 
budget constraints, they would choose to treat people who were in most need first, while 
those who could wait were put on the waiting list. As the problem of waiting grew on the 
political agenda, policy makers tried to solve it by increasing capacity in the areas with 
waiting lists. The results of these policies varied in different countries as shown in the case-
studies, but there is a common current: increasing supply in one treatment area would 
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either decrease capacity in others, increase the demand for that particular treatment – or 
sometimes both effects would occur. In other words, waiting lists could not only be 
considered a backlog of operations, there are structural dynamics that make them hard to 
reduce within the public health care system. Yet, privatisation was not on the health care 
agenda in the 1970s and 1980s – not even in Thatcher’s Britain. It was not a solution which 
found support among citizens, not among policy makers – even the right wing parties did 
not pursue privatisation as a policy in the 1970s and 1980s. There was no policy window 
for privatisation. 
Simultaneously with the rise of health care systems, important socio-
economic changes took place between 1950 and 1990: rising affluence, a changing nature 
of the electorate, the weakening of class-to-party relationship and greater voter volatility, 
stressed by the discussion of the decline of class-voting in European countries. The decline 
can best be explained by the rise in living standards (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999), which 
shifts a large part of the working class to the middle class, affecting citizens attitudes and 
moving them towards the middle of the political spectrum. This shift has affected citizens’ 
attitudes and demands. There is no longer a strong belief in nationalisation and central 
planning, rising affluence makes consumerism flourish and more individualised services are 
expected from the public sector. This development affects the social democratic parties 
and evokes what Prezeworksi called the “electoral dilemma of social democracy” forcing 
them to appeal to the interests and demands of middle class voters in the pursuit of an 
electoral majority (Przeworksi, 1985). Social democratic parties increasingly realise that in 
order to win elections they must adjust policies to meet the needs of this growing middle 
class. This development also affects health care polices, where middle class citizens 
increasingly are demanding more responsive services. In particular citizens are unsatisfied 
with waiting lists and waiting times and demand a more individualised and flexible health 
care system with more possibilities of choice – the ‘Ugly Swede’ takes over from ‘Old Sven’ 
(Heclo & Madsen, 1987). These social changes affect citizens’ attitudes and push the 
problem of responsiveness to the political agenda in health care. 
Policy makers in Denmark, England and Sweden debated these problems in 
the 1980s and started to develop solutions to them in the early 1990s. In Denmark an 
experiment with choice in secondary care was made in 1992, but met considerable 
resistance from the regional authorities, which operate the health care sector. This led to a 
limited and watered-down policy used by a limited amount of patients. In Sweden, choice 
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was introduced in the early 1990’s in primary care, but regional authorities (counties) 
differed on their level of experimentation with private providers. While some counties 
opened choice widely and included private providers, others restricted it as much as 
possible. In Britain, the “internal market” in the 1990’s did not offer choice to patients, but 
to health authorities and did not involve private providers, but nevertheless there were 
hopes that the market would increase responsiveness and reduce waiting times.  
In Britain waiting lists had been a problem since the birth of the NHS and 
several attempts to bring down the lists had failed. In the 1990’s policy makers in Sweden 
and Denmark were also searching for solutions to the problem of waiting lists. In all three 
countries waiting list policies were enacted in the 1990s. Broadly, the policies aimed at 
reducing waiting lists all involve increasing the supply of the procedures which had waiting 
lists. Most of these policies were failures; the policies did lead to falling waiting list, but 
most often involved rising waiting times in other specialities or only shorter waiting lists for 
a limited amount of time. In all three countries these experiments led to an acceptance of 
the fact that waiting list was not simply a capacity problem, but also a structural problem.  
In the 2000’s policy makers tried new solutions to the problem of waiting lists. The 
solutions were similar in the sense that 1) they relied on economic incentives aimed at 
solving the structural problem identified with waiting lists and 2) the solutions all involved 
some version of a more demand-driven system where citizens were offered choice and 3) 
they all involved private providers. These solutions all relied on a similar set of ideas of 
economic incentives for the supply side, initially developed by Alain Enthoven in the mid-
1980s. At a more technical level, none of the countries implemented the blueprint 
suggested by Enthoven, and the solutions differed between countries. In Denmark a 
“waiting list guarantee” was established giving patients the right to choose a private 
provider if the public hospital could not deliver service within the waiting time limit. Public 
hospitals could not meet guaranteed time-limits and combined with attractive price-
agreements for private sector operators a private hospital sector was build. In England the 
solution chosen was to import private providers from abroad and place them around 
England in places where there was a certain need. Placing private providers close to 
existing hospitals created a type of competition between those two providers, nevertheless 
is was a planned market. Both the Danish and English solutions were the result of national 
legislation. On the contrary, the Swedish process of privatisation was driven by the 
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decentral actors, the counties. Some counties have embraced the private sector, while 
others are reluctant – but privatisation did indeed grow form the regional level or from below.  
The introduction of the private providers in health care can best be described 
as a pragmatic solution to a particular set of policy problems of low responsiveness in the 
national health care systems. Over the past decades, policy makers have puzzled over 
solutions to these problems and several attempts were made to solve within the public 
system, but failed. Involving private actors is the latest iteration of this policy process. 
Privatisation was chosen in the 2000s in the light of changing electorate, who increasingly 
accepted that private actors could play a positive role in the public health care system.  
That the solution was pragmatic does not imply that private sector provision 
in health care is a non-political matter. In all three countries the privatisation policies has 
evoked considerable debate and contestation. In Denmark the government was accused of 
creating an American health care system, in England unions strongly oppose the range of 
policies involving private actors and marketisation of the NHS. In Sweden, the 2000’s saw 
a harsh debate over whether public hospitals should be sold to private entrepreneurs. Yet, 
the social democratic parties in Denmark, England and Sweden all support choice in health 
care and accept the role of private providers in this choice policy. The social democratic 
parties support the policies because they accept that these policies are solutions to an 
important set of policy problems.  
When policy makers look for solutions to problems they also look to other 
countries to get inspiration and gain knowledge about how different solutions work. Since 
Denmark, Sweden and England all have universal health care systems, they learn from each 
others’ experiences. In the Swedish debate Enthoven’s ideas of how to install incentives for 
health care providers enter directly as parts of the Swedish academic society engages with 
these ideas and find them relevant for the Swedish health care debate. In England the 
programme “Delivering the NHS plan” explicitly mentioned the experiences from 
Denmark and Sweden to argue that choice is possible in a national health care system 
(Department of Health, 2002a, p. 22). In Denmark there are no direct references to the 
British internal market, but several respondents mention that the Swedish experiments with 
private providers in welfare service delivery have been considered closely by policy makers 
in Denmark (See also Udliciteringsrådet, 2004). The ideas about how to solve the problems 
of responsiveness move across systems and therefore ideas matter in explaining why 
privatisation was chosen as the preferred policy solution. While it seems clear that a 
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diffusion of these policy solutions have taken place, this project has not focused explicitly 
on how these policies diffuse, whether through networks, policy evaluations/policy studies 
etc. Nevertheless, policy makers have learned from each other, but the particular policies 
have taken different shapes in different countries. 
To sum up, the explanation for why privatisation is introduced in health care 
lies in a complex dynamic relationship between health care systems, which produce a set of 
particular problem (low responsiveness), and policy makers, who develop solutions to these 
problems; different solutions are tested at different times depending on which ideas are 
available in the “soup” of ideas and how these ideas are conceived both among policy elites 
and citizens. Over time these factors change as the socio-economic context change. The 
middle class get wealthier and more demanding and their preferences and attitudes change. 
These tendencies and demands are captured in a modern and effective democracy, where 
political parties who seek election increasingly need to win the middle-class vote. This 
makes it possible and feasible for policy makers to develop new policy solutions which 
involve private providers to compete with the public providers. Policy makers come to 
believe that a more pluralistic supply of services (which was one of Enthovens ideas) will 
meet the changing demands of citizens. Privatisation can therefore been seen as an attempt 
to adapt the health care systems to a changing context and a changing set of problems. To 
some extent, the adaptive process seems to have worked. Citizens’ satisfaction with the 
public health care systems is rising. On the other hand, waiting lists do still exist, and at the 
beginning of 2010 we are maybe seeing the rise of a new (or the return of an old) policy 
problem: costs have risen too much – again.  
Whether there was or is a real risk of citizens opting out and choosing private 
alternatives, as is feared, is unclear. It is evident that in all three countries private health 
insurance has risen substantially in the past decades, but these insurances supplement 
national health insurance, they do not replace it. Yet, policy makers do fear that if private 
insurance becomes too popular, support for the public system may plunge. Swedes, Danes 
and Britons continue to rely mainly on the national health care system in the case of illness. 
Furthermore, support for the national systems remains very high in all three countries. 
Remembering the four-fold table from chapter 1, the trend in all three countries is a move 
from square 1a to square 2a in order to avoid a move to square 4 (figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1: Directions of privatisation 
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While I have argued that policy makers continuously puzzle out solutions to 
problems, as suggested by Heclo (1972), at the same time they do also ’power’. In the case 
of health care privatisation they ‘power’ over the medical profession, and in the in Danish 
case also the Regions, reflecting some of the basic conflict lines in health care politics 
(Immergut, 1992). By introducing a plurality of both public and private providers in health 
care, governments aim to break the monopoly of doctors, and interfere with doctors’ right 
to prioritise in health care matters. Through financial incentives and competitive 
mechanisms governments aim to make doctors pay attention to the responsiveness of the 
health care system, rather than only on narrow health issues. We would expect doctors, 
nurses and related medical staff to object and oppose such ‘powering’ on the side of 
governments. Surprisingly, the Medical Associations in England, Denmark and Sweden 
have taken very different positions on the question of privatisation. The British Medical 
Association is fiercely against privatisation and marketisation reforms in the English health 
care system, which they fear will weaken their position. The Danish Medical Association is 
also firm supporters of the public health care system and the values it embodies, on the 
other hand it accepts private hospitals and choice in health care. The DMA is, however, 
opposed to the one month waiting list guarantee, which drives private hospital expansion, 
arguing that this will push the health care system to treat those who have waited the 
longest, rather than those who have the most urgent need for care. The Swedish Medical 
Association does not only accept privatisation – it warmly promotes it. The SMA expects 
that a plurality of providers will improve its position and improve the conditions for their 
members. As shown in the cases the starting point for doctors differ. In the UK, there 
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were always private hospitals as alternative workplaces and GPs were private businesses. In 
Denmark, as well, GPs were private, while in Sweden all Doctors were salaried employees 
from around 1980. This position has troubled Swedish doctors, because once nationalised, 
they lost power – they had only one employer, the state, to broker deals with. In the UK, 
on the other hand, doctors have always been able to make extra income in – or work solely 
within – the private sector. In other words, these different starting points shape the 
preferences of doctors unions in different ways. 
In the Danish case the government exercises ‘power’ over regions, which are 
responsible for health care, because the policies aimed at giving choice to patients and 
introducing private providers overrule the principles of regional autonomy – and these 
regional governments are opposed to the government’s policies, at least in rhetorical terms. 
In Sweden, there was no national legislation to enhance choice until 2009, but several 
‘agreements’ with counties to increase responsiveness, although there were no sanctions 
when targets were not met,131 and as such regional autonomy has been respected. In 
Britain, these political problems do not exist due to the centralised nature of the English 
NHS.    
Institutions matter on different levels. Political institutions, such as electoral 
systems and systems of policy making, differ substantially between the three countries. 
These differences have not led to different outcomes, as a historical institutionalist 
approach might suggest (Steinmo, 1993).  In all three cases privatisation has been a part of 
the policy solution. We may however, suggest that the institutional setting of universal 
public health care system did in all cases produce similar sets of problems and solutions. 
Yet, the way in which these different countries reach the solution differed, as argued in 
chapter 2-4. 
 
5.2 New problems in the horizon – the problematic consequences of privatisation 
Despite the fact that privatisation and choice in service delivery may 
contribute to making citizens satisfied with welfare state services, it is not an unproblematic 
policy path. The policy-solutions put in place in the three countries are not perfect. In fact, 
they each involve a set of problems. In England the ISTC programme was costly and had 
damaging effects on local health economies. In Sweden there are problems with getting 
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 This may be about to change with the introduction of “Vårdval” from 2009, a policy which gives 
citizens a granted rights to care within certain time limits. 
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health centres set up in certain areas because doctors prefer more profitable areas, leaving 
some areas, and in particular poorer areas in cities, with few doctors available. In Denmark 
the policy also involved overpaying the private sector, which resulted in political problems 
for the government and a health care sector that was arguing that people were treated not 
on the basis of need but on the basis of waiting time. In all three countries there are 
debates over whether private actors are skimming off the best patients and are being paid 
too generously and whether the plurality of providers leads to a fragmentation of the health 
care system, resulting in problems for patients. These problems are already rising on the 
health care agenda and policymakers are trying to think up solutions to these problems, as 
they become politically salient.    
 At the end of the 2000’s one problem is common to all three health care 
systems: costs are rising. Having opened the system to choice and private providers the 
central cost-containment measure (budget-capping) has been weakened. When unhappy 
with a particular provider and the level of responsiveness, patients can now choose a 
private provider. This, combined the profit-seeking of providers, is likely to drive costs 
upwards. However, the main cost-driver in any health care system is not choice-policies, 
but demographics and technology.  As in the rest of the industrialised world Denmark, 
England and Sweden face ageing societies which require increasing amounts of health care. 
Simultaneously, medical technology is developed to deliver more and better health care. 
Therefore health care costs are expected to rise dramatically in the future (OECD, 2009). 
The public NHS model had a simple, but crude, cost-containment measure: to cap budgets. 
This measure of cost-control is being weakened by the choice policies, a more demand-
driven health care model and the involvement of the private sector. Furthermore, when 
profit is being linked to treatment, there is a risk of “overtreatment”. In all three cases, 
there has been a large increase in production and indications that the economic incentives 
lead to ‘DRG-creep’. DRG-creep happens when the medical indications for treatment 
slide/move, i.e. threshold for operation are lowered, because hospitals have an economic 
interest in operating as many patients as possible. Although increased production was the 
aim of the privatisation programmes, it was never intended that hospitals should operate 
“healthy” patients. 
The rising number of citizens who are covered by private health care 
insurance may involve problematic aspects. In all three countries PHI is rising and while 
around 12-15% of Danes and Britons have private coverage only around 4% of Swedes 
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have it – relatively limited numbers. There are two perspectives to consider. First, PHI is 
supplementary and does not replace the existing national insurance. Therefore citizens in all 
three countries rely primarily on the national insurance. As such, these insurance schemes 
are a way for the wealthy to buy their way around waiting lists. In this perspective it may 
also simply be a new layer of health care coverage in the same way as pension schemes 
having been evolving (J. G. Andersen, 2008). This is supported by the fact that there is still 
substantial public support for the public health care system. The second perspective is that 
a rise in PHI could contribute to the emergence of a two-tier health care system, in which a 
part of citizens have another (and faster) type of access to health care than others. This 
violates one of the basic criteria in universal health care systems: that treatment should be 
offered on the basis of need and not on the size of the wallet. This crucially affects the 
equality notion of the system as a whole and provokes large debate, not least because the 
dividing line between those who hold PHI and those who do not equates very well with a 
classic insider-outsider debate. Since PHI is often paid for by employers, it excludes the 
most vulnerable groups (the elderly, the unemployed, children and students), who do not 
get access to fast treatment in private hospitals. From a public health perspective, it is hard to 
sustain that PHI should be tax-exempted, as in the Danish case – because it offers 
solidaristic finance for better health care access for a group of citizens which are already 
privileged.  
One of the more problematic consequences of choice policies and 
guarantees, again from a health care perspective, is that these policies may distort medical 
priorities. Doctors and hospital managers claim that the economic incentives in the choice 
policies results in that patients are being treated on the basis on time on the waiting list, 
rather than on the basis of medical need. This breaks with the fundamental principle in 
these health care systems of treating patients on the basis of medical need. On the one 
hand, the idea of setting economic incentives for hospitals to bring down waiting times was 
essentially made to interfere with doctors’ priorities. Doctors argue that the health care 
system gives priority to patients with ingrown nails over patients with lung-cancer. Since 
choice is given in elective services, it may in the long run divert attention and funding away 
from medical treatments, which, however, is the largest and most life-saving part of health 
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care systems132. These are policy problems, which policy makers will have to deal with in 
future adaptations of their health care policy endeavours. 
 
5.3 Legitimacy in Universal Welfare States 
Rothstein has argued that universal welfare institutions urge citizens to 
cooperate on common solutions for social protection (Rothstein, 1998). Universal welfare 
states are considered to hold a special legitimacy, one which is of major strategic 
importance to social democratic parties. The legitimacy of any welfare state arrangement 
depends on its ability to deliver benefits and social services in return for tax money. It is 
equally important that collective public institutions strengthen individuals’ trust in others to 
cooperate – that citizens judge the welfare institutions to be of high substantial and 
procedural legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). For selective welfare states in which social benefits 
are targeted and the social clientele are means-tested, the main social policy concern is how 
do we solve problems for them? In this type of welfare state setting social policy generates 
sharp political conflicts over the goals and generosity of welfare policy between those who 
merely contribute through our taxes, and those who benefit from the social policy 
programmes. In contrast stands the universal welfare model, where the question is how we 
solve our problems in matters of education, health and social security? As universal welfare 
programmes redistribute between most members of societies and enrol most citizens as 
recipients or potential recipients, they urge for a search for broadly accepted solutions to 
social problems with a high degree of legitimacy. A high level of procedural legitimacy 
encourages the readiness to engage in collective action as citizens trust that tax money is 
allocated for the right reasons rather than wasted on bureaucracy and ‘illegitimate’ 
recipients. In addition, a high degree of substantial and procedural legitimacy promotes a 
universal welfare state’s capacity to solve the fundamental problem of collective action: that 
of financing social policy. A high degree of legitimacy increases the acceptance of the 
relatively high taxes paid in universal welfare states. Citizens accept their tax bill because 
they trust others also to accept it, to pay a fair share and refrain from free-riding (Rothstein 
1998: 157–66). 
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 In the health care debate there is an ongoing difference over how many resources should be channelled 
to elective services (often planned surgery) and medical services (life-saving treatments, cancer 
etc.)…more. 
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By pointing out the institutional foundation of legitimacy in universal welfare 
arrangements, Rothstein also indirectly points out the threats to these structures. First, if 
the welfare state does not meet modern citizens’ demands for individualised social services, 
as well as options to choose between alternative service providers (see also Inglehart, 1990), 
it may result in problems of legitimacy. If the public health authorities produce and deliver 
standardised benefits while citizens’ preferences are diffuse and diverse, or produce 
services which are considered non-responsive to citizens’ demands, citizens might 
increasingly turn to the market and pay for individual solutions to cover their needs. If 
citizens turn to the private market and pay for individual benefits they may be less willing 
to pay their tax bills as well (J. G. Andersen, 2003, p. 69). Therefore, non-responsive public 
services can constitute a threat to the legitimacy of the universal model. Several strategies 
can be imagined. One is to offer citizens a choice between a variety of providers (public 
and private), financed publicly. Another strategy is to decentralise welfare production away 
from central authorities. If the producing institutions of the welfare state are decentralised 
to, for instance, regional or local authorities, these will to a larger extent be able to respond 
to individual preferences (Sharpe, 1970). In all three cases both strategies have been 
followed. Health care was decentralised in Denmark and Sweden in the 1970 and 1980s 
and devolution has taken place in England as well and choice policies have been 
implemented in all three countries in an attempt to accommodate a rising demand for 
choice and more individualised services. As such, the analysis presented here is in line with 
Rothstein’s logic of universal welfare state legitimacy. 
Klitgaard argues that social democratic governments choose marketisation or 
privatisation reforms to strengthen their own power, as he states “if social democratic 
strategists have reason to perceive particular policy problems as a threat to welfare state 
legitimacy, they may be prepared to implement market-type reforms if these are believed to 
prevent loss of legitimacy and declining welfare state support” (Klitgaard, 2007, pp. 173-
174). The suggestion implies that social democratic parties introduced marketisation for 
pure rational and calculated reasons – in order to gain popularity. This analysis is in line 
with Klitgaard to the extent that privatisation policies are responses to particular important 
policy problems, and, as I have also stressed several times, with the notion that parties seek 
re-election. At the same time, considering the range of policies tested to solve (for 
example) waiting lists problems, this analysis suggests that the process was more a trail and 
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error of different solutions, where privatisation is the latest idea, rather than simply a 
calculated success based on an overall rational vote-maximising plan.  
Considering the consensus of these policies, I suggest that Klitgaard’s 
argument about social democratic party’s aim of “marketising to secure welfare state 
legitimacy” can be taken one step further. The case-studies of Denmark, England and 
Sweden all show that in the 2000’s universal welfare services, such as health care, are no 
longer a unique property of the social democratic parties. Just as the social democratic 
parties have been eager to conquer the middle classes, so have the right wing parties moved 
to the middle and often embraced the third way: Sweden’s former conservative party is 
claiming to be the new labour party of Sweden; in Denmark a right-wing coalition has 
governed from 2001-2010 essentially claiming to be protectors of the welfare state; and 
finally in England there is a fight between Conservatives and Labour to be the saviour of 
the NHS.  In 2009, any party in England, Denmark and Sweden arguing for the destruction 
of the welfare state would most likely be heading for political suicide – and therefore no 
serious party does so. In fact, all large political parties in all these three countries are aiming 
at the centre of the political spectrum, claiming to be the protector of central welfare areas, 
such as health care, education and elderly care. In all of these three countries public 
services, like health care and education, are distributed to virtually everyone. The middle 
class, which is by far the largest electoral group, is the group of people that profits most 
from these services. Therefore, in a competitive democracy, parties will attempt to address 
the demands of these groups of voters.  
Klitgaard’s central puzzle – why do social democratic parties accept 
marketisation? – is motivated by a traditional assumption often made in political science, 
namely that right-wing parties represent sound macroeconomic policy and budgetary 
discipline, whereas left-wing and social democratic parties enjoy aim for generous social 
policy and an enlarged welfare state (Gingrich, 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2001; Klitgaard, 
2007; Ross, 2000). In this study I have also put on emphasis on explaining why social 
democratic parties promote privatisation/marketisation. However, laying out the dynamics 
of this shift also reveals that the assumption often made about left and right wing parties in 
political science is increasingly irrelevant or misleading at the end of the 2000’s. Parties 
today find themselves in a context in which the pivotal middle class values welfare state 
service, such as health care and education, but has a specific set of demands concerning 
them. At the end of the 2000’s, both right and left wing parties have an interest in 
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increasing the legitimacy of welfare state institutions, such as the universal health care 
systems. Therefore, governments in Denmark, England and Sweden are inclined to try and 
develop solutions to important policy problems in welfare state provision – but these 
solutions are driven by pragmatism (whatever works), rather than ideological pursuit of one 
particular solution. Rational choice scholars sometimes stress that the changes of mind 
exhibited by political actors results from a change in strategy rather than a change in their 
material preferences (e.g Weingast, 2005). But what this analysis suggests is that the 
political actors in Denmark, Sweden and England have no essential and non-contextual 
preference towards private actors in health care. Instead, their strategies, as political parties 
seeking re-election, are shaped by the context they are in. This context today is one where 
citizens support a public health care model, but want certain levels of quality from it. 
Therefore, it is not only social democratic parties who are seeking to find new solutions to 
increase the legitimacy of the universal welfare state model with privatisation and choice 
policies: the logic is similar for right-wing parties.  
One might obviously ask whether the explanation offered in this analysis and 
the argument outlined above is only relevant to health care and the specific characteristics 
of that field. My answer would be ‘no.’ Decentralisation and privatisation can be found in 
different policy fields, such as elderly care, education and childcare and has taken place 
under both right-wing and left wing governments (Paula Blomqvist, 2004; Christensen, 
2003; Gingrich, 2007; Svensson, 2001). A very recent example of this pragmatic logic, from 
another field though, is found in the present macro-economic policy of almost any 
European country. In 2009 and 2010 all European countries display massive deficit public 
spending – a policy which we, in political science, used to assume to be a feature exclusive 
of left-wing governments and highly criticised by right-wing governments. Nevertheless, 
the 2009/2010 public spending plans were largely masterminded by right wing 
governments, who by large dominate European nation states in 2010.   
 
5.4 Does politics not matter at all? 
Prominent students of the welfare state (Gösta Esping-Andersen, 1985; 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 1990; Green-Pedersen, 2000, 2002b; Korpi, 1981; Korpi & Palme, 
2003) argue that politics drive policies. This analysis has also shown that social democratic 
parties use policies to widen and consolidate their constituency base. But the power 
resource arguments imply that these goals constitute the prime dynamic of policy 
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evolutions. As I have tried to show, this claim understates the conflicting pressures inside 
the policy systems in health care: unions disagree with left-wing parties, but sometimes 
agree with business organisations; some parts of a party disagree with others; local level 
governments disagree with national level governments etc. If the empirical chapters have 
cast doubt on the image of unitary actors, they also intend to deny the ideal of planned 
progress towards a specific goal, which characterises typical power-resource based 
theorising. I have shown how developments in health care policy are taken step by step and 
in an incremental manner. One step in this process may open up new options for choice or 
show unexpected problems. The next step in the policy evolution depends on the steps 
taken before. An important example in all three countries was the development of a pricing 
mechanism for services, which was initially invented in order to handle economic 
transactions within the public sector. However, once established it became possible to use 
the DRG-rates to buy services in the private sector, which in turn led to a growing private 
sector. 
The case of private health insurance also offers a blurred picture with regards 
to actor preferences. On the national level, left wing parties agree that private health 
insurance is a problem and should be opposed, because it violates the principles of free and 
equal access to health care. Right wing parties, on the other hand, believe that private 
health insurance is a matter of personal choice and it should be left to the individual to 
decide. But beneath this surface, there is a mixed picture. In the Danish case several Social 
Democratic municipalities have offered all employees private health insurance and unions 
have included private health insurance in their collective bargaining agreements due to 
pressure from members. Further, in the Danish case, PHI is tax-exempted, costing the 
state substantial amounts of money (indirectly) to pay for private health insurance. This 
part of the PHI-schemes does not fit well with the more conservative part of the right-wing 
politicians in Denmark. In England, tax-exemption for PHI was removed by the Labour 
government in 1997 but the Conservative party’s official policy (in Dec. 2009) is that 
private health insurance should not be encouraged by the state. In Sweden, PHI is on the 
rise because PHI is increasingly included in wage-packages. There are no particular policies 
to encourage this development. The Social Democratic Party wishes to reverse the 
development and unions are opposed PHI, but, somewhat surprisingly, so is the Business 
Organisation (Svensk Næringsliv). For employers PHI implies extra costs for employers – 
for a service which is already paid for through general taxes. Therefore, employers suggest 
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improvements to the public health system rather than private insurance (despite that 
private insurance would surely boost private employers’ business in the health care sector), 
for example through a larger plurality of providers.  
 There are differences between left and right wing parties with regards to 
health policy, but the differences do not clearly follow the expected left-right divide, often 
assumed in welfare state studies. And furthermore, these policies change over time. 
Therefore, we cannot simply assume that particular parties or other political actors will 
have a fixed set of preferences – and hold them constant – in the search for a more 
simplified explanation of political outcomes. Political parties are not static agents with a 
fixed set of preferences, which can be assumed a priori. Instead, political actors form 
preferences according to the societal context they are in – and that context changes.  
 
5.5 Is social democracy eroding? 
Social democracy grew out of a revisionist critique of Marxism. As a 
movement it blossomed into a powerful and creative political movement. Orthodox 
Marxism’s historical materialism and class struggle were explicitly jettisoned in favour of a 
belief in the primacy of politics, rather than economic determinism. These principles were 
translated into a distinctive and viable policy agenda based on cross-class appeals and a 
“people’s party” approach together with a commitment to using the state to control 
markets. The result was the severance of socialism from Marxism and the emergence of 
what should correctly be understood as social democracy, which thrived in particular in the 
Scandinavian countries both before and in the decades after WWII. Reading the party 
manifestoes from the 1960s and 1970s of the social democratic parties in Denmark and 
Sweden clearly reveals this historical legacy.133 However, as already mentioned in chapters 
2-4, the social democratic policies came under pressure during the ‘70’s, where the basic 
aims of full employment and large public spending programmes were questioned. Neo-
liberal winds and ideas suggested that social democracy was an unsustainable and 
undesirable model. 
In the 1980’s several excellent social scientists foresaw the erosion of social 
democracy, both as a movement and as a political concept (Gösta Esping-Andersen, 1985; 
                                                 
133
 See for example ’Program för Sveriges Socialdemokratiske arbetareparti’, 1960 or 1975 (Sweden) and 
’Socialdemokratiets principprogram 1961: Vejen frem’ and ”Socialdemokratiets principprogram, 1977: 
Solidaritet Lighed og Trivsel’ (Denmark).  
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Heclo & Madsen, 1987). These predictions were clearly wrong. 25 years later, social 
democracy still exists in Denmark and Sweden. But it is equally clear that social democracy 
has changed – or rather, it has evolved – over time. It is fair to say that social democrats 
still aim to reform capitalism democratically through state regulation and the creation of 
programs that work to counteract or remove the social injustice and inefficiencies inherent 
in capitalism. The ideals of free and equal access to health care still prevail and so do a 
range of other social democratic ideals concerning education, wage distribution and labour 
market policy. But to hold actual social democratic polices of the late 2000’s to the aims 
and means of the party in the 1970’s is inadequate. In the past 30 years the context around 
social democracy has changed, and this has affected social democracy and the policies they 
pursue. The environment consists both of the affluence and expectations of citizens and 
more broadly developments in society, both with regards to technology and the private 
market commoditites. As the affluence of citizens has grown so have their expectations 
about what kind of services the welfare state should deliver and the manner in which it 
should be delivered. In the case of health care this translated into a demand for a service-
minded system, which offers individualised services and short waiting times (and of course 
effective, that is life-saving, services). With the development of technology more medical 
treatments have become available and what used to be considered a very complicated, 
specialised and expensive treatment (e.g. cataract surgery or knee surgery), which required 
the hospitalisation of patients for several days or even weeks, can now be completed in a 
few hours in the morning and the patient can be at home for afternoon tea. Furthermore, 
developments in the private commodity market have given consumers immense amounts 
of choice between products which match the individuals’ exact needs and wishes. Citizens 
in time have come to demand the same type of choice and individualisation from the 
welfare state and the services it delivers. Privatisation, the introduction of choice and the 
outsourcing of services to private providers can all be viewed as policy makers’ attempts to 
meet these changing demands from citizens.  
The changes towards privatisation in health care systems in Denmark, 
Sweden and England do not represent the erosion of social democracy or the welfare state. 
And it seems overly paranoid to suggest that these policies form part of a grand plan to 
destroy the universal health care system. As shown in the analysis in chapters 2-4 reform is 
incremental and consists of small changes. It is only the accumulated effect of these small 
changes that comes to represent rather large-scale change. Reforms are purposeful, but 
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nonetheless pragmatic adaptations of the universal model to the changing realities of the 
contemporary world: traditional social democracy and the massive public institutions it 
constructed, in both health care, education and pensions to give some examples, thrived 
during the prevailing environment of the post-war decades, where there was a demand for 
collectivised services, which would offer uniform services, and dramatically improve the 
general public health and the average living age. However, these institutions also had 
inherent within the model a set of problems: they were overbureaucratic and unpersonal, 
while waiting times were decided by professionals, which together made citizens critique 
the institutions in the 1980’s onwards. The recent reforms of universal public health care 
system responds to these problems. And in that response, as discussed in the former 
section, comes also a range of problems which are likely to be dealt with in the future. 
Socio-economic change has an electoral dimension. After the welfare state 
boom in the early postwar decades, and the financial crisis in the 1970s, it became 
increasingly difficult for political parties in the industrialised world to win elections on a 
distinctively left-wing platform. This was both due to the failure of left wing policies to deal 
effectively with the economic crisis in the 1970s, but more so due to changes in the 
electorate: the former left-wing supporter, mainly from the working class, was now 
increasingly middle-class, aspirational and consumeristic. In Britain, this change in the 
electorate rejected the Labour Party four times consecutively between 1979 and 1997. 
When Tony Blair and his colleagues in the New Labour movement prepared for the 
election of 1997 they had taken the strategic decision to explicitly disassociate themselves 
from the previous, strongly democratic socialist incarnations of their party. The Labour 
Government that came to power in 1997 continued the tradition that Margaret Thatcher 
started in the 1980s of selling off nationalized industries, and proceeded further with 
privatisation policies in health care than Thatcher. Similarly, in both Sweden and Denmark 
the social democrats warmly support choice in health care and accept the consequent rise 
of private health care. The electoral dimension of these changes is that social democratic 
parties change their policies accordingly. 
 If we take this argument one step further, the changing electorate centering 
on the middle can also work to enforce social democracy as a model. The social democratic 
model, and indeed its central features of free and equal access to health care and education, 
is highly valued among middle class citizens. If a party wants to be elected it needs to 
embrace these elements and improve them, rather them dismantle them. This is reflected in 
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changing profiles of the political parties to the right of the centre. In its earlier incarnations, 
the Swedish Moderates was seen by many voters as a right wing party which threatened 
public welfare. Nowadays the party has re-branded itself into “the new labour party” of 
Sweden and embraced the welfare state - the essence of the “model” - and tried to look 
more like the model’s principal defenders, the Social Democrats. In Denmark, where the 
Liberal Party took over government in 2001, the elected Prime-Minister, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, had to renounce statements in his own book “From Social-state to Minimal-
state” from 1993, where he argued for the state to play a much smaller role than it does in 
Denmark. When elected, Fogh Rasmussen renounced the claim, saying that since the 
publication he had grown older and wiser. Regarding the welfare state Fogh Rasmussen 
stated in one of his first national speeches: “We spent the 20th century building the Danish 
welfare state. Now we need to develop it to a modern welfare society”(Rasmussen, 2002). 
The centre-right government had to move towards the political centre and warmly support 
most of the basic elements of the welfare state – and as shown in the Danish case increase 
public spending on public health care. At the time of writing, New Labour is still in 
government in England, however, judging from the election pledges being made by right-
wing opposition leader David Cameron, the Tories have no plans of implementing a 
revolution in either health care or education, instead they promise to continue the policies 
of New labour in these policy fields, knowing that dismantling the NHS could lead to 
electoral disaster. In fact, the Conservative Party in Britain has come to consider the NHS, 
one of the most socialist features of British politics, very important to the country and “an 
institution that binds the nation together.” 134 As such, the changes in the electorate towards 
the centre makes parties compete more intensely for centrist voters. Whether these 
developments do work to strengthen the welfare state model depends on other factors as 
well. As mentioned above, it is crucial for the model to be sustained, that citizens believe 
that all contribute their fair share and do not free-ride. Therefore trust in welfare state 
institutions and trust in fellow citizens is important for sustaining the universal model. 
These elements can come under pressure in times of economic hardship, as those in 
existence are seeing presently.135  
                                                 
134
 The Tories stress that the NHS is an important institution to sustain, even by granting more money to 
it. The Tories policy plans can be found at: 
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Health.aspx accessed on the 26th of July 2009 
135
 The problem of free-riding is more relevant in services of cash-benefits (unemployment insurance and 
social assistance), rather than in-kind benefits, such as health care and education. 
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 Privatisation and marketisation are policies closely related to a neo-liberal 
agenda. Recently, scholars have argued that neo-liberalism and the policies it promotes will 
undermine the welfare state and social democracy. Ryner, for examples argues that the 
SAP’s embracing of neo-liberal policies in order to appeal to middle-class voters go counter 
to the logic of social democracy, because  the welfare state institutions had “succeeded in 
creating the sense of an ‘extended working class identity’ (Himmelstrand et al., 1981). 
Politically, the SAP was the main beneficiary of this state of affairs, and its status as the 
‘natural party of government’ rested on it. From this perspective, the neoliberal shift makes 
no sense, since it fundamentally challenged the institutions in question and hence 
contradicted SAP’s electoral interests.” Simply put, Ryner argues that embracing neo-liberal 
policies will indeed lead to the end of social democracy because these policies will destroy 
the electoral grounding of the Social Democratic party, which underpins the welfare state 
model. It is very true that the neo-liberal shift of social democratic parties has created 
problems for these parties, who often become schizophrenic in the attempt to meet the 
demands of the middle class, while at the same time trying to hold on to the working class. 
But I think Ryner is wrong when suggesting that this development will undermine the 
welfare state. What I instead suggest is that what ‘social democracy’ means has co-evolved 
with the changing nature and status of voters and citizens. First, the political foundation of 
the welfare model has changed over time. While right wing parties criticised the state 
heavily in the 1980s, there is a convergence of political parties in support of the welfare 
state, indicating that the welfare state may have outgrown the Social Democratic Party – at 
least some of its basic elements, health care, education and elderly care are supported by all 
larger parties in Sweden, Denmark and England, while at the same time these policy arenas 
also experience reforms. Second, in this study I suggest that adaptations of the welfare state 
model are necessary to ensure its survival – indeed as argued above, it is necessary to 
maintain the legitimacy of the model, even if some of the solutions chosen are taken from 
the neo-liberal part of the “soup of ideas.”  
Andersson argues that neo-liberalism, embedded in the third way, redefines 
the notion of a public good. The idea of a public good in the “old” social democratic thinking 
was something that the public needs, but the market will not or cannot deliver and implied 
a critique of key tendencies in capitalism. “Social democracy’s postwar notions of public 
good were informed by exactly such a critique of the tendencies of industrial capitalism” 
(Andersson, 2007, p. 11). In neo-liberal thinking, a public good is something that the 
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market needs, but cannot do. In other words, neo-liberalist policies respond to market 
needs, not what the public or society needs. As such, the neo-liberal shift will undermine 
the welfare state, because it will no longer provide solutions, which are adequate for the 
collective society, but solutions which serve the single individual operating in the atomistic 
market. Therefore, Andersson argues, neo-liberalist policies involve a capitalisation of the 
social, without any concern for equality and with an implied loss of a public “ethos of 
solidarity which stated that there are goods in society that should be beyond the control of 
the market because their public value is of a character fundamentally in conflict with the 
idea of profit or even property.” (Andersson, 2007, p. 12) 
 This argument touches a central problem in the debate of privatisation of 
public services. Opponents of privatisation fear that profit-motives in public services will 
distort priorities in service delivery away from health care quality towards ways of 
maximising profit. Policy makers are not blind to this critique. As a response, a range of 
regulatory policies and regulatory institutions have followed the privatisation of service 
delivery. Whether these rules will be successful is doubtful, considering that in all cases 
there are serious problems in connecting economic motives to health care decisions, when 
the incentives uniquely award hospitals that increase production. At the same time, it is also 
important to remember, that all three countries still have universal health care systems, 
which offer free treatment of high quality to all citizens – this principle is upheld. While 
there has been privatisation on the provision of health care services, there has been limited 
privatisation of the financial side of the secondary care system. Even though some parts of 
health care provision is outsourced to private providers and market mechanisms are 
introduced in the public system, health care is still treated as a public good. Nevertheless, 
Andersson’s critique is relevant, because it does point to the fact that the neo-liberal 
policies involve dilemmas. On the one hand it contributes to solving a problem of 
responsiveness and on the other hand it may increase inequality, which is particularly 
relevant in relation to the question of private health insurance.     
The findings in this analysis do not suggest that social democracy is fading 
away. Instead, the idea of social democracy is changing and adapting to a changing 
environment. Using a counter-factual, we might ask: what if these health care systems had 
not changed or had not been adapted to deliver on citizens’ demands? In that case, I would 
suggest, that the universal welfare model (and social democracy) would indeed face 
legitimacy problems. Coming back to the Italian example, mentioned in the preface, this 
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phenomenon seems to the case in Italy, where increasing numbers of Italians choose to go 
private, because the Italian health care system is still largely unresponsive and paternalistic 
towards citizens – while the Italians have changed in similar ways as in Denmark, England 
and Sweden.136 While neo-liberal policies do involve tradeoffs, for example between 
efficiency and equality, policy makers do try to prevent adverse consequences through 
regulatory policies to control the private sector. At the same time, however, it seems that 
the electoral power of the middle class and their continued support to central welfare state 
institutions, such as public health care and education systems, will work to increase the 
survival chances of the welfare state. As Stein Kuhnle suggested: “Processes of piecemeal, 
democratic adaptation to changing social, economic and political circumstances and 
challenges appear to have been underestimated” (Kuhnle, 2000). Predictions of the 
breakdown of the welfare state, either due to pressures of globalisation or through neo-
liberal policies, seem overblown in my view. 
While I do not think that choice policies and private provision in health care 
will dismantle the welfare state, it will certainly affect it. One aspect, which has been 
stressed in all three cases, is the rise of a new political actor in health care: the private 
sector. This political actor has explicitly been kept out of health care politics for 50 years 
and with these new policies they enter the political scene. The private providers make an 
effort to claim that they form part of the public service, but it will be very interesting to see 
how these new actors take up their new role in policy making.  
 
5.6 How to conceive of policy making – back to Heclo?  
 Until the 1990s, market solutions was a “prescription rejected” (P. M. 
Christiansen, 1998); in 2010 it is increasingly a “prescription embraced.” As mentioned in 
the empirical chapters, ideas concerning how to solve policy problems evolve over time, as 
policy makers test different solutions. I started out this analysis in comparative political 
history by suggesting that Heclo’s idea of understanding policy making as “collective 
puzzlement on society’s behalf” is a meaningful way of considering public policy and 
privatisation trends in the welfare state. The case studies have shown that this perspective 
is meaningful. Yet, what has not been discussed so far is how, then, these ideas, or 
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 As mentioned a lot of Italians choose private providers, despite the existence of a universal public 
system, because this public system does not deliver what Italians expect from it. The Italian health care 
system is very much the authoritarian, unpersonal and alienating system, which Danes, Swedes and 
Britons have complained about since the early 1980s. 
 263 
solutions, evolve over time. Heclos suggestion is that policy making is a process of social 
learning. By opening up the black box of “puzzling on what to do”, Heclo’s perspective 
sought to address to complex relationship between power, institutions and to consider 
change in ideas as a central factor in understanding policy change. Similarly Hall suggests 
that learning is “a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response 
to past experience and new information […] learning is indicated when policy changes as 
the result of such a process” (P. Hall, 1993, p. 278). Eventually, Hall suggests that Third 
Order Learning can result in a change of the policy paradigm, that is a change in the 
“framework of ideas and standards […], the goals of policy and the kind of instruments 
used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing” (P. Hall, 1993, p. 279).  
This study throws light on these changes of policy ideas and how they 
change over time and therefore also offers insights into how we should study policy 
making. The health care systems studied here all developed different levels of privatisation 
in response to a changing context. The traditional health care models all held within them 
several problems. In one perspective we can see policy making as a process of trial and 
error. Several policy solutions were tested to solve the problems of unresponsiveness and 
waiting – and a great part of them failed. The new ideas of markets, choice and private 
providers were tested over time. The experiments displayed both positive sides and 
negative sides. In terms of increasing responsiveness, they have been somewhat successful 
in terms of cost, introducing choice and private providers have been expensive. In another 
perspective we can regards these new policy solutions as a result of a changed context. In 
this case the idea of privatisation evolves because several contextual factors change. 
Principally, there is higher demand for health care services (due to technological changes 
and ageing), there is a demand for more responsive services (due to the changes in the 
electorate), in the 2000s there was better economic scope for expanding health care 
services and increasing production (letting go of cost-control could be afforded) and more 
broadly citizens where increasingly critical towards the large public bureaucracies. In short, 
the context around the public welfare state services had changed. Therefore new policy 
ideas evolved as a response to this new context. These new policy ideas were contingent on 
the preceding policies; there was no revolutionary break-down of the public health care 
systems, the evolution of privatisation was incremental. These new policies was not only 
contingent on former policies, but most likely also inspired by developments in other 
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sectors (in many other areas (postal services, telephones, rail-ways, electricity etc.) the 
former public service had been  privatised through the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the fact 
that evaluations and the academic literature overflows with evidence of how great failures 
many of these projects were, the drive away from “the traditional public model” (and all its 
inherent failures) was so strong that introducing private providers also reached the health 
care sector. In short, my proposition is that ideas evolve because policy makers adapt their 
policy solutions to a changing context. In the 2000s it was no longer a policy option for 
policy makers to suggest that the traditional model worked and was the solution to stick 
with. For policy makers, a range of central social facts (relating to the health care arena) had 
changed, which allowed – and pushed - for new policy solutions or new ideas. This implies, 
that the context largely shaped policy preferences of actors. In this new context introducing 
private health care providers was one of the policy solutions, which promised to address 
important policy problems. 
This process has several similarities to what Culpepper suggests about why 
political actors embrace new ideas: When social facts change, so can actors’ strategies and 
opinions about the appeal of alternative solutions. When actors realised that their prior 
solutions are flawed, they may engage in institutional experimentation and the uncertainty 
present in this process make new solutions possible (Culpepper, 2008). Clearly this process 
is not random. As policy makers learned from from failed experiments (e.g. waiting time 
initiatives), new solutions had to be puzzled out. In this process of searching for solutions 
policy makers sought inspiration from other countries,137 but did also develop their own 
version of it. Recently, National politicians in England have considered offering Britons the 
right to choose private hospitals in a way very similar to the Danish choice model 
(Bowcott, 2009). One of the reasons that these health care systems all develop similar 
solutions is that in all countries a similar set of contextual changes have taken place. As 
stressed the electorate changes over time, but also technological advances put health care 
systems under greater pressure to deliver more. Further, the economic context changes 
over time. While the 1980s was a decade of declining economic strain, the 2000s has been a 
decade of prosperity, allowing for expansion of the health care budget. Certainly, there 
have been institutional constraints and profound ideas about public finance of the health 
care systems persist. But as also argued, the introduction of private provision was 
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 This process of cross-system learning is admittedly one perspective which is underdeveloped in this 
thesis. 
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unthinkable 30 years ago. And in this regard, there has been a paradigm shift in the ideas of 
organisation of health care in the past decades. This process takes place in an ongoing 
iterative relationship between structure and agency. Policy makers pay attention to citizens’ 
demands and the changing nature of the electorate. Policy makers also pay attention to the 
changing nature of health care itself, which over time develops to offer more and better 
health care technology. These changes result in new issues on the political agenda. In 
response policy makers adjust policies to new goals. Therefore, policy making should not 
merely be considered as matching solutions to problems. To understand why problems and 
solutions change over time, we should consider these broad contextual changes – the changes of the 
social facts. Such a perspective does not undermine the notion of rational actors. It merely 
suggests that actors’ rationality and their preferences for policies are shaped by the political 
context these actors act in. However, this requires studying public policy over long 
stretches of time. Rather than focusing on explaining one single grand policy reform, policy 
studies of the piecemeal, democratic adaptations to changing social and economic contexts 
offer central insights into why and how institutional changes come about. By considering 
longer time perspectives the analysis is able to grasp these more profound changes and 
makes it possible to understand why ideas evolve over time. A new perspective, (rising) in 
political science and public policy, may offer a framework that catches these evolutionary 
dynamics. That is the focus of the last section.   
 
5.7 On adaptive processes… 
In this study I have suggested that privatisation in health care in Denmark, 
England and Sweden can be explained in a public policy perspective; there are a set of 
problems, which may be considered more or less important, and there are several different 
solutions available (Kingdon, 1995). Policy makers in turn develop solutions to these 
problems (Heclo, 1972). Problems rise and fall on the political agenda over time, some 
solutions are considered more viable at some times than others and policy makers are 
heavily influence by their environment in their selection of problems and solutions. In this 
final section, I will explore how a public policy perspective contributes to our 
understanding of political systems and the changes taking place in them.  
I have presented three stories which all show the relevance of ideas, 
institutions, socio-economic changes and political actors in explaining policy changes. 
These perspectives reflect the most common approaches in political science to explain 
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policy changes (see for example John, 1998). I have not pointed to the primacy of any of 
these factors; rather I have shown how these factors intertwine dynamically in the case of 
health care policy in Denmark, England and Sweden to produce a specific outcome. If we 
take away ideas from the explanation we would not be able to explain why privatisation was 
one of the favoured policy solutions. If we take out socio-economic changes from the story 
we would not be able to explain why privatisation could be an accepted or legitimate policy 
solution for social democratic parties – or for centre-right parties. If we leave out electoral 
interest we would be able to explain why policy makers are so eager to solve particular 
problems, etc. This stresses a basic point, namely that taking one of these elements from 
the explanation, or giving primacy to say ideas, makes the explanation less complete. It is 
exactly the intertwined dynamics between these elements that explain the outcome in 
focus. Such an approach is not uncommon for a public policy study, which “tends to 
include in its baseline all political activity and institutions—from voting, political cultures, 
parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, international agencies, local governments, and back 
again, to the citizens who implement and evaluate public policies” (John, 2003, p. 483). In 
others words, the public policy perspective aims to capture the complexity and dynamics of 
policy making in explaining specific outcomes. This also implies that the “stages-models” 
of policy making, often found in standard text books, has been criticised and largely 
abandoned (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
   In the conclusion of the seminal book “Agendas, Alternative and Public 
Polices” Kingdon writes: “events do not proceed neatly in stages, steps, or phrases” (1995, 
p. 205) and further “ we still encounter considerable doses of messiness, accident, 
fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck. Subjects sometimes are on agendas without our 
understanding completely why […] There remains some degree of unpredictability” (1995, 
p. 206). In other words, while political processes are constrained in a number of ways, they 
are at the same time highly fluid. Kingdom compares his own model of policy changes to 
“some fascinating developments in contemporary theory-building about patterns in 
complexity [which] have parallels to the garbage-can style of theorising […] it turns out that 
these diverse processes have a lot in common, and that various models developed to 
understand them also look similar in many respects. In these “complex adaptive systems,” 
[…] agents interact with oneanother as they continuously adapt the changing environments 
and anticipate change as well” (1995, pp. 223-224). 
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Complex systems are characterised by several features, but some of the 
central ones is exactly that outcomes is the result of the intertwined dynamics of actors, 
ideas and context (including both institutions and socio-economic changes). Outcomes 
emerge out of these interrelated dynamics of complex systems (Miller & Page, 2007). 
Another defining feature of complex adaptive systems is that they evolve constantly. The 
suggestion involves thinking about social and political institutions as part of a complex 
system, which adapt within a constantly changing context. We would not expect simply to 
see a policy equilibrium, which occasionally punctuates or collapses, as suggested in 
institutional theory or some versions of public policy literature (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1992). In this perspective systems change is a result of dynamics beyond the single actors 
and agents. In these complex systems change can be understood as evolutionary and have 
emergent properties - and there are no single designers.  
Evolutionary theory lies largely outside the mainstream of political science 
today. However, several scholars have begun to think about how evolutionary theory may 
offer a dynamic approach to the study of politics. In the field of public policy Peter John 
has argued that evolutionary thinking offers a more coherent framework for understanding 
public policy (John, 1998, 2003). Wolfgang Streeck suggests that Evolutionary Theory offer 
helpful concepts for understanding long term changes in the Germany Political Economy 
(Streeck, 2009) and Steinmo suggest that evolutionary thought offers convincing 
explanations for why welfare states choose different policy paths in response to 
globalisation (Steinmo, 2010). Evolutionary theory is particularly attractive because it 
addresses one of the weaknesses identified in institutional theory: while institutional theory 
is excellent at explaining stability, it lacks tools to explain endogenous change.  
 The analysis of changes in health care system points in the same direction as 
these scholars suggest. Political outcomes are the result of intertwined dynamics between 
ideas, interests, socio-economic changes and public policies. I suggest that an evolutionary 
perspective may be very fruitful for understanding policy change over time. In the cases 
studied here, it is not the policy choice itself which explains the outcome of growing 
privatisation. The outcomes are most often the cumulative result of several different, 
sometimes unrelated, choices and developments. The outcomes are not decided or neatly 
planned or calculated from the outset – they emerge. Had the involved actors had the 
ability to plan or calculate outcomes precisely, they are probably some they would have 
avoided; When the Major government in Britain decided to introduce the internal market, it 
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most likely did so because it believed it would be a good solution to a problem of 
incentives in the NHS. However, had the government had immense calculative capabilities, 
it would have foreseen that it would turn into a failure; the policies had little effect on the 
NHS – the largest and most significant being that administrative cost doubled over a 
decade. They did not, because such an outcome was impossible to foresee. Had Blair been 
able to calculate that the introduction of private hospitals into the NHS would end up with 
the Department of health paying private providers for empty beds, he might not have done 
it differently. Had the Danish government known that by allowing patients to choose 
private hospitals it would be eliminating some types of operations from the public sector, 
essentially creating a private monopoly in specific types of health care services, it might 
have tried to avoid this outcome. Had the Danish Health Minister known that by deciding 
on a particular level of prices for private hospitals he would be criticised by the ‘state 
accountants’ for not taking properly care of tax-payers money (which right wing policians 
would like such an accusation?) The number of private doctors in Sweden is not the result 
of right wing government opting for private doctors: it is the cumulative result of many 
decisions at the regional level, both by right and left politicians, to allow for private doctors 
and, in turn, a large number of citizens who have chosen to attend these private doctors 
instead of the public health centre. No single designer planned these outcomes. While 
actors and their decisions are important in politics and policy making, they cannot alone 
account for outcomes. Political outcomes emerge out of the intertwined relationship 
between several factors. 
 
The privatisation of health care systems in Denmark, Sweden and England 
are good examples of evolutionary processes. Governments in these three countries 
continuously develop policy solutions to policy problems in changing contexts. The 
importance of policy problems vary over time and so do the policy solutions available. We 
cannot predict whether the welfare state will survive – so far it has been deemed to be in 
crisis several times, but is still alive. Adaptations will also be needed in the future. In 
Denmark there is a rising debate the inequality aspect of private health insurance, which 
reveals a Danish dilemma: one the one hand people who hold private insurance are happy 
with it because it offers them fast access to health care – on the other hand, most Danes 
are opposed to the idea of unequal access to health care. In Sweden the present debate also 
revolves around equality. The right to free establishment for doctors for a fixed public fee 
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has resulted in a situation where only very few doctors want to operate in the poorer areas 
of Stockholm, mostly populated by immigrants, thereby offering limited access. This has 
already led Stockholm County to suggest a different level of payment for doctors in these 
areas, in order to make them establish clinics. In England and Sweden, there is a growing 
debate over the ‘fragmentation of care’ as more private providers come in to offer different 
medical services, but there is a lack of integration between these new providers and the 
public health care systems. Adaptations will continue. 
 Political institutions cannot survive by standing still. If the welfare state is to 
survive it will constantly have to adapt to an ever changing context. I, for one, hope that 
policy makers will continue to address important policy problems, including those inherent 
in the privatisation policies in health care. Constant policy adaptation is essential for 
upholding the legitimacy of the universal welfare state for the benefit of future generations.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Example of interview guide 
 
The interview is semi-structured. The interview-guide is adjusted to each respondent, their 
position and experience. 
  
The aim of the interview is to elucidate: 
 
• The background for privatisation reforms (the choice-reforms, the waiting-list 
initiatives, waiting list guranrantees and the rise of private health insurance) in the 
health sector 
• How different actors, in particular (your organisation), acted to and tried to gain 
influence on the reforms 
• The outcomes of the reforms, expected and unexpected. 
 
General information for the respondent: Anonymity. If quotation is relevant I will send 
them for confirmation.  
 
 
 
Theme Questions  
Introduction In your opinion, what were the central drivers for xxx-
reform? 
 
How has the xxx-reform affected the health-care 
system? 
 
Have the reforms had a negative or positive influence? 
How?  
 
What are the relations between (your organisation) 
and the reforms? 
 
Characteristics of the reforms What started these reforms? 
 
Where they characterised by: 
 
Transparency? 
Conflict or cooperation? 
Time-pressure? 
 
Was there great public interest in the reforms? What 
did that matter? 
 
Actors interests In your opinion, what was at stake in these reforms? 
 
 
If (your organisation) could have decided the design 
of the reform, how would it have looked, if different? 
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What is the background for those desires? 
  
Strategies and coalitions Which means did you use to influence the reforms? 
 
Which means did other actors use 
 
Who where the opponents? 
 
What did your effort result in?   
 
Paradigms in the health sector  When did the ideas of marketisation/privatisation get 
widespread in the health sector? 
 
Where do these ideas come from? (USA, EU, 
England, OECD, think tanks, etc.?) 
 
How did your organisation react to these ideas?  
 
What did the health sector look like before these ideas 
got widespread and reforms implemented? 
 
How do you view the health sector today? 
 
Consequences of reforms Who wins and who looses on these reforms? 
 
Has the reforms increased pressure on the public 
hospitals?  
 
Has the reforms raised productivity in the hospitals? 
Why? How can it be measured? 
 
Has the xx-reform produced problems? 
 
How are they being handled (technically / politically?) 
 
 
(More technical – for certain informants only:) 
 
How has the reforms affected: 
 
Productivity (input-output) 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
Are hospitals more efficient? Why? How can it be 
measured? 
 
Quality  
 
Has reforms raised quality in the hospitals? Why? 
How can it be measured? 
 
 
Equality 
It is being discussed whether the reforms will raise 
inequality? Do you agree? Why? 
Is there data to support your view? 
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Creaming? 
It is often claimed that private hospitals will only treat 
profitable patients and leave the hard and expensive 
cases to the public sector hospitals. Is that likely to 
happen? Is there any documentation to support your 
view?  
 
Plight of personnel? 
There is a fear that doctors will leave the public sector 
and favour the private due to high salaries. Is that 
likely to happen? Why? Is that a problem? 
 
 
Finalising Considering the reforms in their final form, are there 
particular problems that need to be dealt with? 
 
Could the reforms have been of a different design, 
given the political circumstances? 
 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
Who would you recommend that I talk to, if I want to 
know more about this subject? 
 
Could you put me in touch with him/her? 
 
---------- 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix 2: List of informants 
 
 
 Organisation Title138 Interview 
date 
DENMARK 
1 The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Health Care 
 
Head of office 26.10.07 
2 The National Health Board 
 
- 27.10.07 
3 The National Health Board 
 
Head of office 28.10.07 
4 The National Health Board 
 
- 28.10.07 
5 The National Health Board 
 
Vice head of office 20.01.09 
6 Danish Regions Director 27.10.07 
7 Danish Regions 
 
Head of section 27.10.07 
8 The Region of Midtjylland 
 
Vice-director 29.10.07 
9 The Region of Midtjylland 
 
Vice-director 30.10.07 
10 The Region of Midtjylland 
 
 
Chief  of secretariat 29.10.07 
11 The Region of Midtjylland 
 
Chief of economics 29.10.07 
12 The Region of Midtjylland Hospital Manager 24.10.07 
13 The Region of Midtjylland Hospital Manager  
14 Private Hospital CEO 28.10.07 
15 Private Hospital  CEO 30.10.07 
16 Danish Cancer Society - 26.10.07 
17 Danish Medical Association Chair 08.06.08 
18 University of Southern Denmark Professor in Health Economics 26.10.07 
19 Danish Institute for Health 
Services Research 
Health Economist 26.10.07 
20 Danish Institute for Health 
Services Research 
Health Economist 26.10.07 
21 Public Hospital Professor and lead surgeon 04.12.07 
22 Private Hospital CEO 21.01.09 
23 LO (Union) Political strategist 11.03.08 
24 3F (Union) 
 
Political strategist 11.03.08 
25 DI (employer organisation) Political strategist 12.03.08 
26 SPPD (Organisation of private 
hospitals and clinics) 
- 21.01.09 
27 Danmark (private insurance) - 21.01.09 
28 Danica (private insurance) - 03.06.08 
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 In a few cases the title of the informant is omitted, when the title would directly identify the 
respondent. 
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29 Danish Nurses Organisation Political adviser 25.02.08 
30 Sundhedskartellet (unions of 
health care workers) 
Political adviser 03.03.08 
31 FOA (union) Political adviser 11.03.08 
32 Social Democratic Party  Member of Parliament 17.11.08 
33 LO (union) Union politician 23.03.09 
    
ENGLAND 
34 NO.10 Former Government adviser on health care 26.06.08 
35 NO.10 Former government adviser on health care / 
Professor 
16.06.08 
36 Unison (Union) Political Strategist / Campaign leader 23.06.08 
37 Unison (Union) Political Strategist 02.02.09 
38 Public hospital (Queen Elisabeth 
Hospital) 
Chief Executive 24.06.08 
39 Civitas (Think tank)  
 
Health care analyst 24.06.08 
40 Foundation Trust Network 
 
Leader 25.06.08 
41 ISTC network (now HS partners 
network) 
 
Director 18.09.08 
42 London School of Economics Health politics researcher 26.06.08 
43 Public Hospital (Guy’s and St. 
Tomas’ Hospital) 
Director 26.06.08 
44 Think tank, Kings Fund Chief Analyst 26.06.08 
45 Think tank, Kings Fund Health Care Analyst 26.06.08 
46 Independent regulator, Monitor Chief Analyst 27.06.08 
47 Independent regulator, Monitor Economic analyst 27.06.08 
48 Institute of Public Policy 
Research (Think tank)  
Health Care Analyst 27.06.08 
49 Institute of Directors (Think 
tank/interest group) 
Head of Section 27.06.08 
50 
 
Labour Party Political adviser  
51 Democratic Health Network Political Analyst 25.06.08 
52 British Medical Association Senior Official 25.06.08 
53 The Department of Health Head of Division 25.06.08 
54 Mutuo (consultancy) Consultant (health care specialist)  23.06.08 
55 Public Hospital (St. Georges 
Hospital) 
Director  
56 British Medical Association 
(Doctors’ Union)  
Senior Official 07.09.08 
57 Private Hospital CEO 25.03.09 
58 Private health care operator CEO 26.03.09 
59 Royal College of Nursing Senior Official 06.09.08 
 
SWEDEN 
60 SocialStyrelsen (National Board 
of Health and welfare) 
Former Director 01.04.09 
61 Stockholms Läns Landsting 
(Stockholm Country) 
Civil Servant 01.04.09 
62 Stockholms Läns Landsting 
(Stockholm Country) 
Civil Servant 01.04.09 
63 Uppsala University Political Scientist 03.04.09 
64 Corporation of Swedish 
Enterprise (Svenskt -Näringsliv) 
Vice-director 02.04.09 
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65 The Nordic School of Public 
Health. Former Director of 
Health Services, The Western 
Health Services Region. 
Professor 01.04.09 
66 The Ministry of Health Care Former Secretary of State to the Minister of 
Health Care 
30.03.09 
67 Association of Swedish local and 
regional authorities 
Political Analyst 31.03.09 
68 Vårdforetagarna (Private Health 
business organisation) 
Director 31.03.09 
69 Swedish Medical Association Senior Official 21.04.09 
70 Swedish Association of Health 
care Professionals  
Political advisor 21.04.09 
71 Kommunal (Public Employee 
Union) 
Political advisor 22.04.09 
72 University of Gothenburg, 
School of Business, Economics 
and Law. 
Professor 08.08.09 
73 Social Democratic Party  Former member of parliament 30.03.09 
74 Public hospital, Stockholm CEO 02.04.09 
75 Private hospital, Stockholm CEO 28.04.09 
 
 
